


Individualism and the Western Liberal Tradition

Evolutionary Origins, History, and
Prospects for the Future

KEVIN MACDONALD



**INDIVIDUALISM AND THE
WESTERN LIBERAL TRADITION:
EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS,
HISTORY, AND PROSPECTS
FOR THE FUTURE**

KEVIN MACDONALD

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PREFACE

The origins of this book go back to the early 1980s when I spent a year as an unemployed Ph.D. Armed with the evolutionary theory of sex, I started reading in anthropology and basically found that as societies created higher levels of economic production, wealthy, powerful men were able to control ever larger numbers of women. The interesting thing was that this was not generally the case in Western Europe. This issue led to a number of papers on the establishment and maintenance of monogamy in Western societies (cited in Chapter 5) and ultimately to this book.

Of course, the fundamental issues have changed over the years. The critical questions now are why the West became so successful (monogamy is part of the story) and, in recent decades, why is it so bent on self-destruction. The short answer to this is individualism, but my attempt to answer those questions requires some long journeys through population genetics, European history and pre-history, and the changing elites in the West, especially after World War II, as well as psychological research. The overall theoretical lens used is evolutionary psychology—I accept the general principle that humans have a set of psychological mechanisms that influence their behavior and that genetic variation is an important contributor to these influences.

But this is not to imply what is usually disparagingly referred to as “genetic determinism.” Human history is far too complex for explanations solely in terms of genetics. In several chapters I develop the psychological basis for cultural and ideological influences based on research on the higher brain centers—prototypically located in the prefrontal cortex. These mechanisms are incredibly elaborated in humans and, in a very real sense, they are what makes us human. Thus ideologies and social controls influencing human behavior play a central role here, but there is no claim that such influences are a deterministic outcome of human psychology interacting with the social and material world.

Moreover, human history is littered with contingencies and cannot be predicted or even postdicted in any detail by any theory I am aware of—certainly not by an evolutionary psychology positing only a set of universally available evolved modules as explanatory devices.^[1] History is filled with twists and turns, often depending on the outcome of particular battles or political conflicts, themselves influenced by a host of psychological and

contextual factors. For example, Chapter 5 discusses the cultural influence of the Catholic Church and the psychological mechanisms underlying this influence, but also the ideologies and social controls so essential to its success during the High Middle Ages. There is a lot of material here on the consequences of the rise of Protestantism in England, but no attempt to provide an explanation of exactly why it occurred when it did. Historical accounts have the benefit of hindsight but we are still left with accounts that fall well short of a complete explanation. So be it.

So how does evolutionary psychology enter in? Essentially the thesis is that ethnic influences are important for understanding the West—that the pre-historic invasion of the Indo-Europeans had a transformative effect on Europe, inaugurating a prolonged period of what will be labeled “aristocratic individualism” resulting from variants in Indo-European genetic and cultural influence (Chapter 2). However, beginning in the seventeenth century and gradually becoming dominant was a new culture labeled “egalitarian individualism,” itself influenced by the ethnic tendencies of northern hunter-gatherers that had remained relatively submerged during the period of aristocratic domination. Egalitarian individualism ushered in the modern world and we are living with its consequences today. As in the outcome of particular battles or political conflicts, the rise of this new people and new culture is not predictable in detail, but we can certainly trace out its consequences in hindsight.

This book has benefited from interaction with many others over the years. In recent times, I would single out F. Roger Devlin who proofread the manuscript and corrected many stylistic deficiencies. I also want to thank Simon Ström, whose expertise in the area of population genetics was very useful, and Luke Torrisi, whose expertise on Protestant millenarianism contributed greatly to the material on nineteenth-century America.

RECENT POPULATION GENETIC RESEARCH

This book seeks to present a biologically informed view of Western culture and civilization with a special focus on individualism, a trait that, like all others of interest to psychologists, has a genetic basis.^[2] It is therefore appropriate to begin by tracing the genetic history of the West.

A genetic basis for a trait can evolve via advantageous mutations or via phenotypic plasticity (i.e., change as a result of experience). In an organism with some degree of plasticity, environmental events can result in changes in the phenotype. If this phenotype is advantageous, the organism would tend to accumulate mutations that make the development of the phenotype more reliable and result in genetic influence/control over the trait.^[3] This is sometimes labeled “phenotype first” evolution because the genetic changes occur after the trait first appears in the population as a result of plasticity.^[4]

Developmental plasticity allows for a relatively fast route to producing adaptive phenotypes compared to the gradual accumulation of advantageous mutations. Nevertheless, it is now well accepted that evolution via either route can occur well within historical time spans.^[5]

Because of their intelligence, humans have been able to create novel environments, such as by domesticating animals and thereby permitting the use of dairy products as a mode of subsistence. These novel environments in turn may select for different mutations and ultimately for different traits, such as lactose tolerance in a dairying culture or traits such as shorter stature that results from accommodation to a low-quality agricultural diet (see below). As a result, the argument for a psychological basis for Western individualism does not require that one document the existence of individualism in a direct line of descent from the primeval people who first populated Europe ~45,000 years ago, or even from far more recently.

A theme of this volume is that there is a northwest-southeast genetic and psychological gradient in Europe, with individualism being more common in the historical populations of northwest Europe. However, genetic influences

on traits related to individualism may have developed and continue to be under positive or negative selection pressure into contemporary times.

As a result, it becomes important to document the first traces of individualism by doing research on the earliest peoples whose behavioral profiles are fairly well known. Later chapters document individualist tendencies in the earliest important influences on European individualism—Indo-European cultures (Ch. 2) and the hunter-gatherer cultures of northwest Europe (Ch. 3). It is apparent in the following that at least some genetic influences from these peoples persist into the contemporary era.

THREE DISTINCT POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN PRE-HISTORIC EUROPE

There is an emerging consensus for three distinct population movements into Europe during prehistoric times: 1) Western hunter-gatherers (WHGs), 2) farmers from Anatolia, known as Early Farmers (EFs), and 3) the Indo-Europeans (I-Es) originating in the Yamnaya culture of the Pontic Steppe region in present-day Ukraine and Southern Russia.^[6]

1) WHGs are the primordial European population, entering Europe ~45,000 years before present (ybp). Jones et al. suggest the following scenario for an early separation of the WHG from other groups of migrants in the original exodus from Africa:

Given their geographic origin, it seems likely that CHG [Caucasus hunter-gatherers] and EF are the descendants of early colonists from Africa who stopped south of the Caucasus, in an area stretching south to the Levant and possibly east towards Central and South Asia. WHG, on the other hand, are likely the descendants of a wave that expanded further into Europe.^[7]

Upon entering Europe, the WHG displaced the Neanderthals, but picked up a small amount of Neanderthal genetic material through interbreeding.^[8] Based on examination of skeletons found from Spain to Hungary dating from the Mesolithic period (~11,500ybp to ~6000ybp), these people constituted a “relatively homogeneous group”.^[9]

In Scandinavia, a distinct subgroup known as Scandinavian Hunter Gatherers (SHGs) evolved from WHGs, but it remains uncertain whether SHGs have contributed to the genetic makeup of modern Scandinavians.

2) The EFs arrived from Anatolia around 8000ybp, introducing agriculture and defining the transition to the Neolithic era. Genetically, they do not resemble present-day Anatolians.^[10]

3) Finally, the I-Es arrived from the Pontic Steppe region in the Early Bronze Age (~4500ybp). The proto-I-Es, also known as Yamnayans, are an amalgam of “Armenian-like” Near Eastern peoples (48–58 percent)^[11] with three hunter-gatherer (h-g) groups: Caucasus h-gs (CHGs), Ancient North Eurasians (ANEs) including Siberia (Ancient North Eurasians [ANEs]) and Eastern h-gs (EHGs). The ANEs are related to North American Indians,^[12] while the EHG are at the eastern end of an East-West genetic cline of hunter-gatherers.^[13]

The general picture is that Western European populations were relatively genetically distinct from each other in the Early Bronze Age, but became increasingly intermixed following the I-E influx, resulting in relatively less (though still significant) differentiation in contemporary Europe.

ANEs	Ancient North Eurasians
CHGs	Caucasus Hunter-Gatherers
EFs	Early Farmers from Anatolia
EHGs	Eastern Hunter-Gatherers
I-Es	Indo-Europeans
H-Gs	Hunter-Gatherers
SHGs	Scandinavian Hunter-Gatherers
WHGs	Western Hunter-Gatherers

Abbreviations used in this chapter

PERCENTAGES OF ADMIXTURE OF WHGs, EFs, AND I-ES

The EF migration from Anatolia which defines the beginning of the Neolithic at first resulted in an “almost complete replacement” of previous WHG populations in the south of Europe, reducing them to a 7–11 percent share of the resulting genome. However, there was a later resurgence of WHG ancestry to 23–28 percent of the genome in the early Bronze Age;^[14] Haak et al. also note a “resurgence” of WHG genetic representation around this time.^[15]

Importantly for the discussion in Chapter 4, the genetic legacy of the EF’s continues to be more prevalent in the south of Europe today, being highest in Sardinia (~90 percent), while the contribution of the CHGs and EHGs (by way of the I-Es) is more prevalent in northern and central Europe. Jones et al.:

CHG, or a population close to them, contributed to the genetic makeup of individuals from the Yamnaya culture, which have been implicated as vectors for the profound influx of Pontic steppe ancestry that spread westwards into Europe and east into central Asia with metallurgy, horse riding and probably Indo-European languages in the third millennium BC.^[16]

Allentoft et al. also studied the introduction of the Yamnaya-derived I-Es into Europe during the Bronze Age, beginning around 4500ybp with the Corded Ware Culture (found between the Rhine and the Volga rivers and in southern Scandinavia), as well as evidence from later dates of I-E presence in Italy.^[17] Corded Ware DNA and Yamnaya DNA form a clade (a group with a common ancestor) to the exclusion of Bronze Age Armenians, indicating that the “Armenian-like” admixture of the Yamnaya noted above “has a steppe origin rather than a southern Caucasus origin,” i.e., it does not actually come from Armenia.^[18]

The I-E expansion carried Yamnaya genes over vast distances, from Scandinavia to South Asia. But it is important to note that Yamnaya incursions into Iran and India did not result in individualist societies, likely because the peoples they conquered there remained strongly collectivist. Moreover, as emphasized in Chapter 2, the I-Es exhibited important tendencies toward individualism, but their general method was not to eradicate the people they conquered: they dominated them, making use of

their labor, etc., and eventually interbred with them.

Haak et al. corroborate the I-E component of European ancestry, finding evidence for a “massive migration” of the Yamnaya into Europe, beginning around 4500ybp and associated with the Corded Ware culture.^[19] Around 75 percent of the ancestry of the Corded Ware samples in Germany came from the Yamnaya, as did 60 percent of the Y-chromosomes, the Y-chromosome percentage indicating that the conquering males had relatively high reproductive success compared to previously resident males. This was a sudden influx, suggesting an invasion rather than cultural diffusion—a proposal that fits with the highly militarized culture of the proto-I-Es discussed in Chapter 2.

In addition to the ~75 percent Yamnaya ancestry of the Corded Ware culture, Haak et al. estimate around 4 percent WHG and 17 percent EF. In modern Europeans, the highest Yamnaya ancestry is among Norwegians, around 55 percent, with decreasing percentages in southern and eastern Europe (the lowest being 10 percent in Sardinia). Their results also indicate a north-south cline in WHG ancestry. The highest percentage of WHG ancestry is in the Baltic states (Lithuania and Estonia, with ~40 percent WHG ancestry), with zero representation in Spain and Italy. Contemporary Norway and Iceland have ~17–20 percent WHG ancestry. This indicates that after the Corded Ware period in Central Europe (4900–4400ybp), there was a resurgence of h-g genetic input throughout Europe.

Haak et al. conclude:

Our results support a view of European pre-history punctuated by two major migrations: first, the arrival of the first farmers [EFs] during the Early Neolithic from the Near East, and second, the arrival of Yamnaya pastoralists during the Late Neolithic from the steppe. Our data further show that both migrations were followed by resurgences of the previous inhabitants: first, during the Middle Neolithic, when h-g ancestry rose again after its Early Neolithic decline, and then between the Late Neolithic and the present, when farmer and h-g ancestry rose after its Late Neolithic decline. This second resurgence must have started during the Late Neolithic/Bronze Age period itself, as the Bell Beaker [~4800-3800ybp] and Unetice [~4300-3600ybp] groups had reduced Yamnaya ancestry compared to the earlier Corded Ware, and comparable levels to that in some present-day Europeans Today, Yamnaya-related

ancestry is lower in southern Europe and higher in northern Europe.

In addition to the findings from Haak et al. noted above, Lazaridis et al. find that the ANE (which arrived in western Europe via I-E genetic influence) are represented in modern Europeans at a maximum of 20 percent.^[20] They infer from their data that contemporary southern Europeans inherited their European hunter-gatherer ancestry mostly from the EFs as a result of their mixing with WHG in the south of Europe. On the other hand, northern Europeans acquired up to 50 percent of their WHG ancestry from WHGs in the north of Europe—i.e., their h-g contribution was over and above the contribution of their EF ancestors. This indicates that the WHG in northern Europe were not simply replaced, either by the EF's or the I-Es, but eventually mixed with the latter groups. They also note that in general Europeans have a larger proportion of WHG than ANE ancestry. ANE ancestry was absent prior to the Neolithic transition to agriculture in both WHG and EFs, a finding consistent with the ANE ancestry contributing to the Yamnaya culture implicated in the I-E invasion beginning in the early Bronze Age.

THE PITTED WARE CULTURE OF COASTAL SCANDINAVIA

The finding of WHG ancestry above and beyond that contributed by the EFs who had mixed with WHG in their northward migration fits with findings of Malmström et al. on the Neolithic Pitted Ware culture of southern Scandinavia (~5200ybp–4300ybp).^[21] This culture co-existed with both the Funnel Beaker culture (derived from EFs) and the Corded Ware culture (dominated by I-Es). The Pitted Ware culture, including the Late Mesolithic Ertebølle culture, was a h-g culture that lived close to the sea and whose diet was mainly based on shellfish and other seafood, as well as hunting and gathering. As discussed in Chapter 3, these communities were sedentary for at least much of the year and developed large communities with complex social structure.

The Pitted Ware findings include a number of unique mitochondrial haplotypes (particularly haplotypes U and K) not found in either the Funnel Beaker (EF-derived) samples or the Corded Ware (I-E-derived) samples, and they clustered with Mesolithic h-g samples from central Europe and Iberia. Based on the very large differences in the prevalence of mitochondrial haplotypes between the Pitted Ware h-gs and the other groups, Malmström et

al conclude that the Pitted Ware h-gs could have contributed anywhere between zero and 60 percent of the mitochondrial haplotypes of the contemporary Swedish population while they could not reject any level of contribution from Funnel Beaker samples up to complete replacement of the Pitted Ware h-gs. In conjunction with the data from Lazaridis et al. on the unique contribution of northern WHGs to the gene pool beyond that resulting from EF-WHG mixing in the south of Europe, a direct contribution to current Swedish populations from the Pitted Ware h-gs or at least some other northern h-g group seems likely. Malmström et al. note that the possible continuity between the Late Mesolithic Ertebølle culture and contemporary Scandinavians remains an open question. Given the discussion in Chapter 3 on the Ertebølle culture, this remains an important issue for future research.

Further, there is genetic continuity between the SHGs and the Pitted Ware culture. Mitnik et al. find that the SHG did not contribute to the genetics of southern Sweden in the early Neolithic. However, their results for the middle-Neolithic showed genetic continuity of the SHG with the Pitted Ware culture of the same area, proposing a two-way model between SHG-derived (74 ± 6 percent) and EF-derived (26 ± 6) genetic contributions. In the late Neolithic-early Bronze Age, their results are consistent with some local admixture between the EFs and the SHGs—“the Neolithic PWC [Pitted Ware Culture] foragers are largely genetically continuous to SHG.”^[22]

Thus, a direct contribution of SHGs to contemporary Swedes remains a possibility, although the data thus far are also consistent with the h-g contribution to contemporary Swedes of around 20 percent (see above) deriving completely from WHGs, whether by way of mixing with EFs or independent of it.

FURTHER EVIDENCE FOR NORTH-SOUTH WHG AND EF GENETIC CLINES

The north-south gradient in WHG genes is the theme of a study by Pontus Skoglund et al. of three 5000-year old h-gs and one 5000-year old farmer, all from what is now Sweden.^[23] When compared to contemporary European and Levantine samples respectively, the three Neolithic h-gs appeared largely outside the distribution of the modern sample, but in the direction of contemporary Finnish and northern European individuals. On the other hand, the Swedish farmer clustered with contemporary southern Europeans. Skoglund et al. estimated that contemporary Swedes have the following percentages of EF-related ancestry in a north-south gradient: 31 ± 6 percent

(northern), 36 ± 7 percent (central), and 41 ± 8 percent (south). The fraction of farmer-related ancestry decreases from 95 ± 13 percent in Sardinians to 52 ± 8 percent in individuals of northwestern European descent overall). Skoglund et al. suggest that there were barriers to gene flow which gradually relaxed, and that present-day Europeans are intermediate to the primordial WHG population and the farmers who entered Europe from the southeast in the transition to the Neolithic—again highlighting the contribution of h-gs to the contemporary European gene pool, particularly in northern Europe.^[24]

Another study by Skoglund et al., based on one Mesolithic h-g, six Neolithic h-gs, and four Neolithic farmers, found genetic continuity between the Mesolithic and Neolithic h-gs, as well as genetic differences from the Neolithic farmers.^[25] Corroborating previous findings, the Neolithic farmers (EFs) clustered with contemporary southern and central European populations, while the h-gs, although outside the variation of contemporary European populations, were closer to northern European populations, particularly Lithuanians, with contemporary Swedish groups intermediate between the farmers and the Neolithic h-gs but closer to the h-gs. The Mesolithic h-g used for comparison purposes had no trace of farmer ancestry despite having lived well after the beginnings of agriculture in the area, while the Neolithic farmers had significant h-g ancestry presumably as a result of mixing during their expansion north into areas previously occupied by h-gs. The genetic distances between the farmers and the h-gs in this study were greater than the distances between any contemporary European population (Finnish vs. southern Italian is greatest^[26]).

Another study of Mesolithic h-gs in Sweden used saliva from masticated food of three individuals,^[27] finding that they clustered between EHG and WHG, but in the direction of WHG, and closer to contemporary northern European populations as compared to central and western European populations; they were most distant from southern and eastern European populations. Mesolithic individuals found in Norway were closer to the EHG group, whereas those found in Sweden (including the three individuals in this study) were closer to the WHG group. This latter finding confirms previous findings that the Scandinavian peninsula was populated beginning at the end of the last Ice Age in two separate migrations, one from the south (~ 11500 ybp) by WHG and one from the northeast (~ 10300 ybp) by EHG. enc

I conclude that there is a north-south genetic gradient in Europe, with the

EF genes much more common in south and WHG (including SHG) and I-E genes more prevalent in the north. This implies that any genetically based psychological contributions of h-g's and I-Es would be more common in contemporary northern Europeans than in southern Europeans, while genetically based psychological contributions of the EFs would be more common in the south of Europe.

However, as noted at the outset of this chapter, these genetic continuities and clines are probably also influenced by selection *in situ*—that is, genetic differences that are continuous with these pre-historic clines were likely to continue to evolve as the mixed populations in the cline from southern to northern Europe remained separated for several thousand years. For example, genetically based psychological predispositions or physical features originally more pronounced in one of the three groups could be selected for without major effects on the entire autosome. Thus, if traits predisposing to individualism were more pronounced in h-gs and I-Es compared to the EFs (as appears to be the case), these genes could spread in the population without a major effect on the general autosomal contribution of the EFs. The same could also occur with physical features, such as light skin, blond hair and blue eyes, given that these traits may well have been more advantageous in northern latitudes as well as sexually selected aspects of physical attractiveness in individualist marriage (see following section and Ch. 3). In any case, a theme of later chapters is that there are psychological differences related to individualism that reflect this north-south genetic cline.

SELECTION FOR GENERAL COGNITIVE ABILITY AND PHYSICAL TRAITS

Michael Woodley et al. performed a genome-wide-association study comparing the frequency of genes that have been linked to general cognitive ability (GCA) in contemporary populations with the same genes from Europeans who lived from ~4500–~1200 years ago.^[28] The results showed selection for genes linked to GCA over this period.

Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 8, despite their roots in Proto-Indo-European, the words 'fair' and 'fairness' appear only in the languages of northwest Europe where they originally referred only to behavior within the tribe. This is clearly a marker for the importance of moral reputation within the group, and it suggests selection for these traits in the northwest of Europe but not elsewhere throughout the extensive areas conquered by the Indo-

Europeans. This cultural addition and its genetic basis could therefore result from the assimilation of the conquering Indo-Europeans with the more egalitarian h-gs of northwestern Europe. Despite the individualistic tendencies of both the I-Es and the h-g groups of northwestern Europe, the I-Es are not well characterized as egalitarian. They were strongly hierarchical, with egalitarianism only apparent within the aristocratic military elite (Ch. 2).

Regarding physical traits, the gene for light eye color was at 100 percent fixation in h-gs throughout Western Europe.^[29] Although the more northerly SHG from what is now Sweden had the gene for white skin, other WHG found in what is today Spain and Luxemburg did not have the skin-lightening allele which is nearly fixed in present-day European populations, while EF samples were homozygous for this allele. These results indicate selection against dark-skin in the south of Europe after the influx of the EFs.^[30] The finding of light skin in these skeletal remains suggests that this mutation may have been present in some WHG populations, particularly in northern Europe—i.e., the populations most likely to have genetic continuity with contemporary northern Europeans. Indeed, another study of the SHG noted that they had the genes for both light eye color and light hair color.^[31]

Regarding the proto-I-Es, genes for light skin pigmentation were relatively infrequent in an ancient DNA sample from the Pontic Steppe region compared to contemporary Ukrainians, indicating selection as the I-Es spread north. They attribute these results to “a combination of selective pressures associated with living in northern latitudes, the adoption of an agriculturalist diet [i.e., low in Vitamin D, which increases selection pressure in favor of lighter pigmentation], and assortative mating [i.e., preference for light pigmentation in mates] may sufficiently explain the observed change from a darker phenotype during the Eneolithic/Early Bronze age to a generally lighter one in modern Eastern Europeans, although other selective factors cannot be discounted.”^[32]

As discussed in Chapter 3, individualist marriage is far more conducive to assortative mating on the basis of partner's traits because of individual choice of marriage partner. The possible involvement of assortative mating would imply that light skin was seen as attractive in a potential partner, so that men and women with high mate value would choose partners with lighter skin. On the other hand, in collectivist cultures marriages are often to relatives and are arranged by families as an aspect of family strategizing within extended kinship groups. In such a marriage regime (often involving marriage to first

cousins), marriages do not necessarily reflect the preferences of the spouses.

The larger point is that, for a variety of possible reasons, selection for lighter eye, hair, and skin pigmentation occurred within Europe after the EF and I-E migrations. Thus there was an increase to fixation in the frequency of a gene associated with white skin color between the Mesolithic and the Bronze Age—a period of over ~3000 years.^[33] The gene for blue eyes was already present in Mesolithic populations (as noted above), but is absent in the proto-I-Es.

Moreover, the gene for lactose tolerance may have originated among the proto-I-Es.^[34] This gene would have been highly adaptive in a pastoral/dairy culture such as that of the Yamnaya. However, this gene was found in only 5 percent of Bronze Age Europeans, although the highest levels were in the Corded Ware culture (~20 percent) which is proposed as resulting from the Yamnaya migration (~28 percent of Yamnaya remains had this gene).

There is also a north-south gradient in height, with Europeans taller in the north. Mathieson et al. find these differences in Neolithic Europe, suggesting greater height stemming from the I-E influence which is stronger in the north and is associated with a diet high in dairy products; they also find selection for shorter stature in the south of Europe as an accommodation to their relatively low-quality farming diet.^[35] This gradient in height continues into modern times and reflects a genetic (and cultural) gradient that still exists in France (see Ch. 4).

GENETIC DIFFERENCES WITHIN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE MIRROR GEOGRAPHY

There are genetic differences between contemporary European populations that mirror geography.^[36] Despite a low level of genetic variation in general throughout Europe, people from the same geographic area cluster together—even, e.g., within the German-, French- and Italian-speaking areas of Switzerland.^[37] A principle components analysis reveals an adequate two-component solution. Of the two axes, a north-northwest to south-southeast axis explained twice as much variance (30 percent) as the second axis (a north-northeast to south-southwest axis).^[38]

Nelis et al. also found a northwest to southeast gradient, with Finland an outlier to the northeast and Sweden the closest country in Western Europe to Finland.^[39] These results are compatible with the proposal in Chapter 4 that the differences in family structure in Europe are influenced by a genetic

gradient from north-northwest to south-southeast.

Within Scandinavia, Norway and Sweden are clearly distinct from the Germanic populations of the continent, while Denmark is embedded with Germanic populations; Finland is an outlier, substantially further to the north and east. The authors caution that their results may underestimate genetic differentiation between areas of Europe because relatively uncommon alleles are under-sampled.

These results were replicated by Lao et al.^[40]—who again found two principle components correlated with geography, the first explaining 31.6 percent of the variance, the second 17.3 percent. Once again, Norway and Sweden (but not Denmark) are at the extreme northern end of the distribution, clustering with Finland—although the latter is an outlier. Interestingly, given the family structure data reviewed in Chapter 4, southern Italy is at the southern extreme of the genetic profiles and noticeably distinct from the more Germanic northern Italy—replicated by Nelis et al.^[41] Lao et al. also found north-south differences within Spain and Germany. On the other hand, their data from France used only one sample, from the southeastern part of France; they found this sample was substantially separated from the Germanic populations, thus providing genetic support for the north-south cline in family structure in France which plays a central role in the data discussed in Chapter 4.

SEX-CHROMOSOME DATA

Based on the material in Chapter 2 on the Indo-Europeans, it would be expected that Indo-European migrations would be highly sex-biased toward males, for several reasons. Most importantly, a basic unit of Indo-European culture was the *Männerbund*, an all-male war band that set out to achieve fame and fortune by conquering other territories. Also, there is no evidence that these Indo-European cultures eradicated the peoples whom they dominated; they used their position to extract services from them via servitude or some more mitigated status comparable to medieval European serfdom. Females would have been taken as mates and males would have been useful for labor. In the long run, upward mobility would be possible for males of the conquered group (e.g., those with military talent), and barriers to intermarriage would gradually ease, resulting in a mixed population. Moreover, steppe cultures were highly sex-typed, with males dominating burials, deities, and kinship terminology.^[42]

Despite these considerations, the genetic evidence for a predominance of Yamnaya Y chromosomes has been mixed. As noted above, around 60 percent of the Y-chromosomes from the Corded Ware culture derived from the Yamnaya, indicating the conquering males had relatively high reproductive success. Recently Goldberg et al. have provided evidence for robust sex-biased steppe migrations^[43] and have defended their results against criticism.^[44] Given the cultural considerations mentioned above and this new data, I am inclined to accept a strongly male-biased steppe migration. Moreover, such a scenario would be highly compatible with finding some Y-chromosomes from peoples who populated Europe prior to the steppe migrations, since males from conquered populations would be useful to the conquerors for labor and other services.

CONCLUSION

In Chapter 2 I discuss I-E culture as based on military conquest and domination of conquered peoples, but also as characterized by important features of individualism—that, for example, they created a free market culture where kinship was deemphasized, and individual talents and accomplishment valued.

However, I-E expansion across much of Asia—their conquests reached what is now western China as well as Iran and the Indian subcontinent—did not result in individualistic cultures. Similarly, the conquests of ancient Macedon and Rome in the Middle East had no lasting influence on the collectivist, extended kinship social organization that remains typical of the area today (see also Chapter 4). Even the centuries-long domination of the Roman Empire—an offshoot of I-E culture (see Appendix to Chapter 2)—in southern Europe did not result in individualism to the extent found in northwestern Europe. Indeed, family structure in southern Europe has been much more collectivist as far back as records go, and this pattern continues into the present (see Chapter 4).

This implies either that there must have been pre-existing tendencies toward individualism in northwest Europe prior to the I-E conquests, or that there was something unique about the physical environment in northwest Europe that resulted in individualism evolving in that area beginning after the I-E conquests but not in other areas conquered by the I-Es, which seems unlikely. Such individualist tendencies are not apparent in the EFs whose genetic legacy is far stronger in the south of Europe than the individualist

northwest, implying that the search should focus on the WHGs (possibly including the SHGs). As noted above, the contribution of the Late Mesolithic Ertebølle culture—a complex h-g culture based on a marine diet—to the genetic structure of contemporary populations remains an open question. The same is true of its successor, the Pitted Ware Culture, and the SHGs in general.

Such an individualism-promoting environmental feature would have to be absent not only from southern Europe but also from eastern Europe, including northeastern Europe and Russia. These regions were also conquered by peoples from the steppe but remain more inclined toward collectivist family structure, despite having a temperate climate (Ch. 4).

As discussed in Chapter 3, one possible environmental feature could have been the ability of northwestern European h-gs to develop complex cultures based on a rich marine-based diet but still requiring seasonal returns to the small, family-based groupings characteristic of h-gs. Complex h-g societies were common in many places: “quite robust evidence is now available for politically complex hunter-gatherer societies that endured for centuries on several continents.”^[45] Like the Ertebølle culture, these complex h-gs tended to cluster around resource-rich marine or riverine environments.

As noted at the outset, the genetic clines described here could also have been influenced by local selection after the major migratory events, i.e., genetic differences continuous with these pre-historic clines could have evolved further as the mixed populations from southern and northern Europe remained separated for long periods. For example, genetically based psychological predispositions or physical features originally more pronounced in one of the three basic groups could have been selected for in northwest Europe.

Moreover, the genetic basis of such traits may have involved relatively few genes, without major effects on genetic differences between groups over the entire autosome. When population geneticists examine genetic differences between populations, they focus not only on adaptive and maladaptive genes but also on genes that are adaptively neutral. Indeed, a large percentage of human genetic mutations are adaptively neutral or only slightly deleterious—Boyko et al. estimate 27–29 percent and 30–42 percent respectively.^[46] Autosomal percentages may thus result in misleading estimates of the contribution of particular groups to particular traits. As noted in a previous section, there is evidence of selection for light skin pigmentation and likely

for eye color involving very few genes. Such selection would have had minimal effect on the overall genetic distances between the studied populations.

Thus, if traits predisposing to individualism were more pronounced in WHGs and I-Es compared to EFs, these genes could spread in the population without a major effect on the general autosomal contribution of the EFs, so that, for example, the WHG autosomal contribution to contemporary Europeans may underestimate their influence on the genetic basis of psychological predispositions related to individualism. The same could also occur with physical features such as light skin, blond hair, and blue eyes, given that these traits may well have been sexually selected as aspects of physical attractiveness in individualist marriage (see Ch. 3). In any case, a theme of later chapters is that there are psychological differences related to individualism that reflect this north-south genetic cline.

In this regard, as discussed in Chapter 3, it is interesting that the Finnish people developed traits that are quite similar to those of their close neighbor Sweden, despite remaining genetically distinct from Swedes (with some admixture, particularly in Western Finland) and being a genetic outlier from Western Europeans generally—suggesting selection in situ in the northwest of Europe.

In summary, current evidence is compatible with a primordial WHG population present from ~45000ybp. In northern Europe by no later than 8000ybp (the date of the Motala samples from Sweden) part of this population evolved into a distinct SHG population with white skin and blue eyes. In Southern Europe the WHG population had dark skin and fair eyes. Early farmers from the Levant with white skin and brown eyes entered Europe ~8000ybp, eliminating the dark-skinned WHG's in the south of Europe (with some admixture) and intermingling to a lesser extent with the WHGs and perhaps SHGs in the north. Finally, white-skinned, brown eyed peoples from the Pontic Steppe region migrated into Europe ~4500ybp, militarily dominating other previously resident groups (Ch. 2), but eventually intermingling with them.

Substantial WHG (and possibly SHG) genetic representation persisted, however, into the modern era. The resurgence of hunter-gather genetic representation in the Early Bronze Age has been noted. The thesis developed in later chapters is that there has been a resurgence of h-gs, not genetically,

but culturally—that versions of h-g egalitarianism became increasingly dominant beginning in the seventeenth century with the rise of Puritanism in England, and that this culture dominates European and especially northwestern European-derived societies in the present era. The following two chapters are devoted to describing the very different cultures of these two groups of individualists, the aristocratic I-Es and the egalitarian h-gs.

THE INDO-EUROPEAN CULTURAL LEGACY: ARISTOCRATIC INDIVIDUALISM

Whereas the Faustian man is an “I” that in the last resort draws its own conclusions about the Infinite [and] whereas the Apollonian man, as one soma among many, represents only himself, the Magian man, with his spiritual kind of being, is only a part of a pneumatic “We” that, descending from above, is one and the same in all believers. As body and soul he belongs to not himself alone, but something else, something alien and higher, dwells in him, making him with all his glimpses and convictions just a member of a consensus which, as the emanation of God, excludes error, but excludes also all possibility of the self-asserting Ego. Truth is for him something other than for us. All our epistemological methods, resting upon the individual judgment, are for him madness and infatuation, and its scientific results a work of the Evil One, who has confused and deceived the spirit as to its true dispositions and purposes.

Oswald Spengler, in The Decline of the West^[47]

Cattle die, kinsmen die, and so shall you die too. But one thing I know that never dies: The Fame of a Dead Man’s Deeds.

Icelandic Viking proverb

The Indo-Europeans (I-Es) were highly militarized conquering groups that spread out from the Pontic Steppe region north of the Black Sea to dominate Europe for at least 3,500 years, ending only at the end of the Middle Ages in Western Europe and reverberating even beyond that. What I mean by this is that the social systems that the I-Es put in place had significant commonalities and were fundamentally unchanged over this very long time span. This section will describe the fundamentals of that social system, termed here aristocratic individualism for reasons that will become clear.

As Ricardo Duchesne notes, the Indo-European legacy is key to understanding the restless, aggressive, questing, innovative, “Faustian” soul of Europe. Indo-Europeans were a “uniquely aristocratic people dominated

by emerging chieftains for whom fighting to gain prestige was the all-pervading ethos. This culture [is] interpreted as ‘the Western state of nature’ and as the primordial source of Western restlessness.”^[48]

As noted in Chapter 1, current scholarly opinion is that the I-Es originated in the Pontic Steppe region of south Russia and Ukraine. In the Near East, Iran, and India, this conquering group was eventually absorbed by the local population, although, for example, there is some indication that the priestly Brahmin caste in India has greater representation of I-E ancestry than other castes in northern India.^[49] In Europe, they displaced the native languages but not the natives: Originally, at least, as in the other areas they conquered, they were alien elites ruling over the older Europeans.

INDO-EUROPEAN CULTURE

The novelty of Indo-European culture was that it was based neither on centralized kingship nor clan-type extended kinship groups, but on an aristocratic elite that was egalitarian within the group. Critically, this elite was not bound by kinship as would occur in a clan-based society, but by the pursuit of fame and fortune, particularly the former. The men who became leaders were not despots, but peers of other warriors—an egalitarianism among aristocrats. Successful warriors individuated themselves in dress, sporting beads, belts, etc., with a flair for ostentation. This resulted in a “vital, action-oriented, and linear picture of the world”^[50]—i.e., as moving forward in pursuit of the goal of increasing prestige. The leader was “first among equals,” commanding by voluntary consent rather than force, and being a successful leader meant having many clients pledge their loyalty.

These “groups of comrades” ... were singularly dedicated to predatory behavior and to “wolf-like” living by hunting and raiding, and to the performance of superior, even super-human deeds. The members were generally young, unmarried men, thirsting for adventure. The followers were sworn not to survive a war leader who was slain in battle, just as the leader was expected to show in all circumstances a personal example of courage and war-skills Only in reference to Indo-European aristocratic [warriors] ... can we speak in Hegelian terms of a fight to the death for the sake of *pure* prestige.”^[51]

The original I-Es, termed Proto-Indo-Europeans (PI-Es), underwent a

profound cultural shift from a hunter-gatherer economy to a herding economy by 7800–7200ybp.^[52] Hunter-gatherer groups tend to be egalitarian, but the shift to pastoralism resulted in social inequality. Herding also “required a flexible, opportunistic social organization”^[53] as well as the ability to defer gratification and plan ahead: it could only be done “by people who were committed morally and ethically to watching their families go hungry rather than eat their breeding stock.”^[54]

However, in addition to the shift to a pastoral economy, a critical aspect of PI-E success stemmed from the development of a militarized culture that proved to be highly effective in dominating other groups. This in turn was based on several important cultural attributes:

Technological Advances

Domestication of Horses. Horses were domesticated by 6800ybp.^[55] This was followed by horseback riding by 5700ybp and spreading outside the steppes between 5700 and 5000ybp.^[56] These cultural practices allowed much larger herds of sheep and cattle, but they were also an aspect of militarization, with the invention of bows that could be used while riding horses.^[57] Steppe horses were larger and stronger than onagers (derived from Asian wild asses) found in the Middle East; they were thus much more effective for military uses. The result was that after 5300ybp there was a decline in agriculture in Europe as land was given over to pasture and an increase in warfare.

Sophisticated Wagons. Along with horseback riding, the development of sophisticated wagons facilitated the expansion into the deep steppes—“living on their wheels.”^[58] It required wealth to produce wagons (wheels required highly skilled carpentry) and to maintain them (they required two specially trained horses). PI-E society therefore became more socially stratified, with the possession of wagons distinguishing elites.^[59]

The Secondary Products Revolution. The PI-Es also benefited from a “secondary products revolution” in which domesticated animals were used not only for meat (a primary product), but also dairy products such as milk, cheese, and yogurt. This offered a more nutritious diet than farming, produce tall, muscular warriors. Other secondary products included skins (leather), as well as riding, transport, and labor (pulling wagons).

Social/Cultural Practices

While there were doubtless important changes in technology over the span

from the earliest Indo-European societies to the European Middle Ages, many of the most basic social/cultural features of I-E-derived societies remained remarkably the same.

The Militarized Culture of the Indo-Europeans. The PI-Es developed a completely militarized culture. Boys were socialized for warfare and cattle raiding. Young boys “*had* to go out and become like a band of dogs or wolves—to raid their enemies.”^[60] All young men went out on raids as part of their initiation into the group. The aggressiveness of these groups increased with increased wealth and social inequality of the culture as a whole, resulting in increased bride-price—i.e., males were forced to raise ever larger amounts of resources in order to be able to afford to pay the family of a prospective wife.

At the center of PI-E society was the institution of the *Männerbund* (other terms: *korios*, *comitatus*), “the warrior brotherhood bound by oath to one another and to their ancestors during a ritually mandated raid.”^[61] Thus *Beowulf*, even though set in the Germanic/Scandinavian sixth century AD, depicts an “aristocratic ethos of companionship and equality.”^[62]

The formation of voluntary war-bands held together by oaths, camaraderie, and a common self-interest was a fundamental characteristic of these chiefdoms. This was a time when social status and rank were still openly determined by one’s heroic deeds and by the number of followers or clients one could afford.^[63]

I-E religion also had a military focus. Among Germanic groups, Odin is the god of the *Männerbünde*, the “god of battle rage.”^[64] Warriors in a state of battle rage are known as “berserkers.” The concept is connected to a belief in shape-shifting wherein the soul is disengaged from the body and can roam as a wolf or a bear, at which time it can engage in superhuman heroic deeds. Snorri Sturluson, the medieval chronicler of the Norse sagas writes: “Woden’s men went without hauberks [armor] and raged like dogs or wolves. They bit their shields and were strong like bears or bulls. They killed men but neither fire nor iron hurt them. This is called *berserkgangr*.”^[65] Young men were initiated into the *Männerbünde* by mock hanging and were taught berserker techniques.^[66]

Military success became a critical aspect of sexual competition among males. Successful males would be able to afford bride-price, which became

increasingly competitive. The myth of Triton, the god of cattle raiding, rationalized cattle raids with the belief that others' cattle rightfully belonged to those who made the correct sacrifices—i.e., to the Indo-European raiders themselves!^[67]

Indo-European culture was what one might term “hyper-masculine.” Lotte Hedeager’s *Iron Age Myth and Materiality: An Archaeology of Scandinavia, AD 400–1000* paints a picture of a completely militarized society in which male sexual penetration was a marker of power, while being penetrated was, for a male, the ultimate insult.^[68] Accusing a man of having been sodomized was a grievous accusation, with the same penalty as for murder. Older males lacking the power or ability to penetrate took on the status of women and were even ridiculed by slaves. Women were seen as legitimate spoils of war and raiding, and such women were typically enslaved.

The following passage from Hedeager gets at this hyper-masculine, completely militarized culture that appears to have been characteristic of I-E culture in northwestern Europe at least from 2500 BC until the Middle Ages:

In the extremely competitive and aggressive Scandinavian society in which blood feuds were taking place everywhere, often lasting for many years and several generations ..., the concept of honour evolved around reputation, respect and prestige. Social life and reputation were hierarchically organised and arranged according to dominance and submission, powerful and powerless. At the bottom of the social scale, female thralls [slaves] were routinely subjected to rape and traded as sexual subjects. In the account of a Viking market at Volga in 922, the Arab diplomat Ibn Fadlan describes how the Vikings (the Scandinavian Rus) regularly had sex with their slaves, often in public, and in groups of both sexes. This activity took place both in front of potential buyers and their own formal partners, whether wives or girlfriends, who seemed unaffected Rape of a free woman, however, was a serious matter

Within this social hierarchy, power was explicitly connected with metaphors for penetration—by the sword, penis, or tongue. Those who penetrated—with words, with weapons, or with the phallus—were the powerful (“males”); those who became penetrated were the powerless (“females”). In a social setting, sexuality provided a symbolic code for dominance and submission, throwing light on power and thus status differences The most severe accusations in the Old Norse society

evolved around “effeminacy” and penetration, implying that sexuality and hostility were two sides of the same coin.^[69]

Similarly, the Latin word “vagina,” from which the English word is derived, means sheath or scabbard—that which is penetrated by a sword.

Reciprocity as a Trait of I-E Culture. The aristocratic individualism of the PI-Es was based on reciprocity, not despotism or kinship ties. For example, at the heart of PI-E culture was the practice of gift-giving as a reward for military accomplishment. Successful leaders were expected to reward their followers handsomely.^[70] Oath-bound contracts of reciprocal relationships were characteristic of PI-Es and this practice continued with the various I-E groups that invaded Europe. These contracts formed the basis of patron-client relationships based on reputation—leaders could expect loyal service from their followers, and followers could expect equitable rewards for their service to the leader. This is critical because these relationships are based on talent and accomplishment, not ethnicity (i.e., rewarding people on the basis of closeness of kinship) or despotic subservience (where followers are essentially unfree).

Oath-bound contracts were not only typical of the aristocratic individualism of the *Männerbünde*: they extended to relationships of domination and subordination between military elites and conquered peoples, providing protection in return for service. In conjunction with the previous points, this is a prescription for feudal-type societies dominated by military elites with mutual obligations to the people they dominate, but in which kinship ties between elites and the people they dominate are relatively unimportant.

Breaking Down Bonds of Kinship. PI-E society developed institutions that tended to break down strong kinship bonds. David Anthony, e.g., writes that Yamnaya cultural practices related to guest-host relationships led in a direction away from kinship toward reciprocity. These reciprocal guest-host relationships “functioned as a bridge between social units (tribes, clans) that had ordinarily restricted these relationships to their kin or co-residents.”^[71] There were thus mechanisms to provide guest-host relationships beyond kinship where everyone had mutual obligations of hospitality; in a comment illustrating the pervasiveness and longevity of these practices, Anthony notes that this was a “way to incorporate outsiders as people with clearly defined rights and protections, as it was used in the *Odyssey* to medieval Europe”^[72]—

another indication of the persistence of I-E culture over very long periods of historical time.

The Rewards of Military Success. Besides the tangible rewards for success, successful warriors were honored in poetry. Successful leaders not only gave feasts and gifts to their followers, they were celebrated in poetry—their memory lived on long after their death. Odes proclaiming the generosity of patrons were very characteristic of widely dispersed I-E cultures (Vedic, Celtic, Greek, and Germanic), indicating an origin in late Proto-Indo-European.^[73] As Duchesne emphasizes, at a conscious level, I-E warfare was conducted principally to gain fame and glory—“The fame of a dead man’s deeds.”^[74] Nevertheless, to the victors remained the very tangible spoils resulting from successful military campaigns.

Indo-Europeanism as a Free-Market, Individualist Culture. For my purposes, it is especially important to note that the military cultures created by the I-Es were permeable—that they were based on individual accomplishment rather than kinship ties. Indeed, I-E societies recognized that kinship biases people’s perceptions and judgments. For example, in the Visigothic Code (AD 642–643) near relatives or other kinsmen could not testify in a legal case against a stranger. In Europe, where genetic differences between conquerors and their subjects were not great, barriers between groups broke down fairly rapidly. When the Visigoths conquered Spain, marriage between Goths and Romans was at first prohibited. However, the Visigothic Code provided for marriage between the two groups, breaking down ethnic barriers so that individuals could pursue marriage strategies based on perceived self-interest (typically individual or familial strategizing or personal attraction) rather than a requirement that marriage be within the kinship group.

On the other hand, intermixture between the I-Es and those they conquered had different consequences in the Near East, Iran, and India, presumably because the genetic distance between the I-Es and the natives in these areas was much greater than with Europeans and because the people they conquered were genetically prone to kinship-based collectivism. As a result, societies originally dominated by I-E elites in the East eventually became typical Oriental despotisms. As in Europe, when these marauding bands arrived in the Near East and India, there was significant interbreeding with the native populations. Thus the Indo-European Hittites fused with the native Hattic population in Anatolia, in India with the pre-existing Harappan culture,

and similarly in Iran. In all these areas they gave up the pastoral lifestyle for agriculture and developed despotic rule centered around a king who was “the only character with any individuality and heroic achievement.”^[75] All subjects and foreigners were required to prostrate themselves before him. This practice was common to virtually all the “state-centered hydraulic civilizations” (i.e., civilizations centered on irrigation agriculture—China, India, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Incans, Aztecs), but quite foreign to the Indo-European cultures of Europe.^[76]

Herodotus’s is a kind of *locus classicus* on this matter. Some Spartan envoys arrived in Susa and gained an audience with King Xerxes. The king’s bodyguards ordered them to prostrate themselves before the king and actually tried to force them do so. They refused, saying “they would not do any such deed, though they should be pushed down by them head foremost; for it was not their custom to do obeisance to a man.”^[77]

Exogamy and monogamy appear to be core features of the Yamnaya-derived I-E cultures of Europe. Indeed, the general cultural pattern of predatory bands of males seeking riches and females implies that such relationships would be exogamous, and, as noted in Chapter 1, this fits with the sex-chromosome data. Thus the Corded Ware culture of Central Europe (4900–2950ybp)—a Yamnaya-derived culture^[78]—practiced monogamy, quite possibly by abduction.^[79] A study of ~4600-year-old Corded Ware burials from Eulau (contemporary Germany) shows nuclear families, with family members facing each other, sometimes with their arms intertwined—an apparent marker of the importance of affection.^[80] Large percentages of adult women were of non-local origin, had a different diet during childhood, and showed more genetic variation than the males. And whereas the previous Neolithic groups in the area practiced collective burials (a marker of kin-based collectivism), both Yamnaya and Corded Ware cultures practiced individual burials in “small family mounds, reflecting the transmission among individual families of animals and other property between generations. In contrast to this, the collective, megalithic or similar type burials of Neolithic groups reflected collective, clan-like shared ownership of property, animals, and land.”^[81]

As noted, military leaders maintained their position by military success and by bestowing gifts upon their followers, with the most talented followers obtaining the greatest gifts. A corollary of this is that followers chose successful leaders and abandoned unsuccessful leaders. The system

functioned more or less as a free-market system based on merit rather than nepotism. As in all free-market systems, the fundamental principle is reciprocity, whether it is giving gifts commensurate with contribution to the exploits of the *Männerbund*, or, in the modern world, paying employees a wage commensurate with the value they add to the company on pain of defection to another company. And just as companies compete to obtain talented employees in the modern world, I-E military leaders competed to attract a following of talented warriors.

Reciprocity thus lies at the heart of societies based on individualism. Another important example is mating. Whereas kinship-based societies typically feature arranged marriage, often to relatives (e.g., first cousin marriage, common in the Middle East), individualist societies tend toward free choice of marriage partner based on personal attraction (e.g., traits such as physical beauty or intelligence) and other interests (e.g., economic), which in turn are based on the personal qualities of the marriage partner.

Congruent with a free-market model, Anthony likens the spread of I-E languages to a “franchising operation” rather than invasion:

The initial spread of Proto-Indo-European dialects probably was more like a franchising operation than an invasion. At least a few of the steppe chiefs must have moved into each new region, and their arrival might well have been accompanied by cattle raiding and violence. But equally important to their ultimate success were the advantages they enjoyed in institutions (patron-client and guest-host arrangements that incorporated outsiders as individuals with rights and protections) and perhaps in public performances associated with Indo-European rituals.^[82]

While this has more than a tinge of political correctness because it needlessly minimizes the role of violence in I-E conquests, it correctly emphasizes that the peoples conquered by I-E groups were not exterminated but dominated by new military elites that remained permeable; relationships were based on reciprocity, even though the relationships certainly favored the conquerors. But young men with military talent could still rise; physically and personally attractive young women could still engage in the age-old phenomenon of hypergamy (marrying higher status males).

There were, however, limits on social mobility. In a 1973 paper, Roger Pearson argues that social mobility was for the most part inter-generational

rather than intra-generational. “In many cases, such as among the Celts, Teutons, Indo-Aryans and Iranians, and also in Homeric Greece and Republican Rome, it can be demonstrated that marriage was predominantly endogamous within these classes [i.e., nobles, freemen, and slaves], thus effectively restricting intra-generational social mobility in favor of a caste-like structure.”^[83] “Caste-like” patterns of endogamy are attested for all these groups, with illicit offspring taking the status of the lower-status parent.

Despite the “caste-like” patterns, there was inter-generational social mobility whereby slaves could become freedmen, freedmen could become freemen, and freemen could even become nobles. This allowed “talented members of the lower castes” to rise without creating major disruptions in the social system.^[84] Kinship remained of some importance, and as a result it would take several generations for newly risen men to develop a strong kinship group. Indeed, Pearson provides evidence from a variety of I-E cultures that individuals’ reputation required at least three generations within a given status-group (e.g., freeman) to be full members of that group. Pearson notes that this is consistent with an Omaha-type kinship system that emphasizes vertical (ego, father, grandfather) rather than horizontal relationships more typical of clan-societies.^[85] Congruent with this, according to the Visigothic Code mentioned above, only in the second generation could a descendant of a freedman testify in court.

Nevertheless, as discussed below, I-E groups were certainly not impermeable by being limited to members of the kinship group; rather, they were based on individual accomplishment, particularly as seen in the *Männerbünde*.

In this sense, I-E groups must be considered fundamentally individualist. As Hans-Peter Hasenfratz notes, the boundaries between the three social classes in ancient Germanic societies were not rigid. Warriors had the most prestige in society and were recruited from the peasants and the sons of warriors. Moreover, “a slave could become free by acts of bravery; a peasant could become a noble, and a noble could become a king.”^[86]

It cannot be overemphasized that at the heart of Germanic society were the *Männerbünde*, the all-male war groups, where social ties among males were more important than social class and transcended the kinship group. Rewards for membership depended on competence in battle, and an important reward was sex obtained from captured females. Being a warrior was to be a man in the full sense of the word. Ruling and priestly functions were very closely

related, as in early Republican Rome.^[87] Kings could be killed if there was a bad year or bad harvest, and at times kings would offer themselves up in atonement, accepting responsibility for the fate of the group.^[88]

Similar social class divisions have been noted by other scholars. Bente Magnus points to three different classes in traditional Scandinavian society, the thrall (slave, serf), the free farmer, and the earl.^[89] Property was administered by individuals on behalf of the lineage, although by the Viking age (beginning ca. AD 800) “the power of the lineage over the land had diminished.”^[90] Corroborating the upward mobility possible in these societies, there were slaves who could become free if they worked the land. In settlements, there was usually one farm that was superior to the surrounding farms, “suggesting some sort of dominance.”^[91]

Another individualistic aspect of the *Männerbünde* that doubtless increased their dynamism was that inherited status counted for little. Around two-thirds of the wealth of the chief was buried or burned when he died, with the rest going to the living, so that even the sons of chiefs had to prove themselves by accumulating wealth and power. According to an Icelandic saga discussed by Hasenfratz, the sons of kings and earls could inherit land but not money. Money was buried with the father. Each had to prove himself in battle and raiding. “And even if sons inherited the lands, they were unable to sustain their status, if honour counted for anything, unless they put themselves and their men at risk and went into battle, thereby winning for himself, each in his turn, wealth and renown, and so following in the footsteps of his kinsmen.”^[92] Again, we see the importance of fame and honor obtained by military accomplishment.

Sippe and Männerbünde. The Germanic *Sippe* refers to a group of freeborn people with blood ties; the concept does not apply to slaves. Marriages occurred within the *Sippe*, and endogamous marriage was common. Even brother-sister marriages are described in the sagas, and one set of gods, the Vanir, were allowed to marry siblings.

This suggests a strongly kinship-based society. However, there were ways in which the importance of kinship was de-emphasized. Children were often fostered out to families of higher rank, creating ties that were not based on kinship. Taking guests for up to three nights was an accepted custom, sometimes providing a wife or other female to the visitor. Gift-giving also cemented social ties and obligated receivers to give more than they were given. At times, a non-biological sense of kinship can be seen: In one saga, a

man kills another man and is then forced to marry the decedent's sister and name the child after the decedent!^[93]

The most important of these forces de-emphasizing kinship was the *Männerbund* itself because it cut across the *Sippe* and was based, not on kinship ties, but on territorial ties among men of the same age. The *Männerbund* was superior to the *Sippe* in the sense that it was the upholder of “ensorious justice” if the familism of the *Sippe* got out of control.^[94] (The *Männerbund* was taken up by National Socialism as the ideal social form, superseding the family and based on honor and duty.^[95])

There were also *Sippe*-transcending institutions that originated as religious convocations that evolved into the *Althing* as a holy site where disputes between *Sippe* were ironed out, *wergild* paid, etc. Marriage outside the *Sippe* also occurred, sometimes leading to conflict with wife's *Sippe*, because wife's brothers felt an obligation to protect her. The conflicts engendered by this system may have been one reason Christianity was attractive to the ancient Germanics: it de-emphasized kinship obligations.^[96]

Public punishment was meted out by a “sib[i.e., *Sippe*]-transcending legal community” (in Iceland, the *Althing*)—for outlawry, execution,^[97] and for settling *wergild* claims. The *Männerbünde* would also exact *Sippe*-transcending punishment which could at times degenerate into terrorism.

While of undoubted importance, therefore, the kinship-based *Sippe* was subordinated to higher level institutions not based on kinship. Also suggesting the relative unimportance of the *Sippe*, David Herlihy notes that among the Germanic tribes, *Sippe* is “rarely encountered in the early sources.”^[98] In short, “the Germanic *Sippe* ... was weakening and losing functions and visibility on the Continent very early in the Middle Ages”; on the other hand, Ireland “long clung to its archaic institutions”^[99] (see discussion in Ch. 4).

ARISTOCRATIC INDIVIDUALISM IN ANCIENT GREECE

The free-market character of I-E society was inconsistent with despotic rule. If individuals are free to choose their leaders and defect from those who are inept or fail to reciprocate with generous gifts, then despotic rulers cannot arise. Despotism implies that others do not have freedom to pursue their interests. There is a vast difference between being first among equals and being a despot.

Both the society portrayed in Homer and Duchesne's description of Greek

culture of the Mycenaean period (1600–1100 BC) are in line with the aristocratic individualism hypothesis. Aristocrats are warriors who perform heroic deeds in search of immortal fame.^[100] Government is not despotic but instead involves extensive discussion and argument about what to do. Kings acted after consultation with other aristocrats. For Achilles and other Greek heroes, fate was self-chosen and sometimes tragic. “There is also a spirit of overweening confidence in man’s capacity to strive, in the midst of moments of fear and doubt, against the most difficult obstacles.”^[101] “The gods speak as if they were speaking to peers, ‘with chivalrous courtesy,’ offering their advice, telling them it is better to follow the gods, if they wish, while the heroes communicate and react to the gods without losing their freedom and honor.”^[102]

Amazingly, Hippocrates (460–370 BC), the founder of medicine, saw Greeks as fundamentally different from the Persians in ways strikingly congruent with Duchesne’s thesis: “Europeans ... were independent, willing to take risks, aggressive and warlike, while Asians were peaceful to the point of lacking initiative, ‘not their own masters ... but ruled by despots’”^[103]—another way of saying that their participation in the military was coerced, not voluntary.

I-E heroes in ancient Greece and elsewhere were individuals first and foremost—men who distinguished themselves from others by their feats in pursuit of individual renown, as shown by these lines from *Beowulf*:

As we must all expect to leave / our life on this earth, we must earn
some renown, /If we can before death; daring is the thing /for a fighting
man to be remembered by. /... A man must act so / when he means in a
fight to frame himself / a long lasting glory; it is not life he thinks of.^[104]

Moreover, like the free-market military cultures based on voluntarily chosen leaders, the Western urban cultures of antiquity retained a free-market approach to other areas of culture, in particular with regard to belief systems (ideologies) and science. Thus in classical Greece (i.e., after the Homeric period),

the ultimate basis of Greek civic and cultural life was the aristocratic ethos of individualism and competitive conflict which pervaded [Indo-European] culture. Ionian literature was far from the world of berserkers

but it was nonetheless just as intensively competitive. New works of drama, philosophy, and music were expounded in the first-person form as an adversarial or athletic contest in the pursuit of truth... . There were no Possessors of the Way in aristocratic Greece; no Chinese Sages decorously deferential to their superiors and expecting appropriate deference from their inferiors. The search for the truth was a free-for-all with each philosopher competing for intellectual prestige in a polemical tone that sought to discredit the theories of others while promoting one's own.^[105]

This underlines the individualistic nature of scientific endeavor. Scientific movements are highly permeable groups whose members are prone to defection if they find a better theory or if new data are uncovered—a free-market system of ideas. On the other hand, *The Culture of Critique* contrasts the Western individualist tradition of science with several twentieth-century intellectual movements composed of slavish followers centered around charismatic leaders who expounded dogmas that were not open to empirical disconfirmation.^[106] Individuals convinced by their own judgments to adopt different theories or reject fundamental dogmas (e.g., the Freudian Oedipal complex) were simply expelled, typically in a torrent of invective; dissent was not tolerated. Such movements far more resembled authoritarian ingroups centered around a despot rather than individualist truth-seeking.

But despite the individualism of the ancient Greeks, they also displayed a greater tendency toward exclusionary (ethnocentric) attitudes than the Romans^[107] or the Germanic groups that came to dominate Europe after the fall of the Western Empire (see below). In addition to a sense of belonging to the wider Greek culture, the Greeks had a strong sense of belonging to a particular city-state, and this belonging was rooted in a sense of common ethnicity deeply entwined with religious attitudes. The Greeks, unlike the Romans and despite their common language and culture, “never overcame the exclusionary nature of their institutions to form a lasting union.”^[108]

The *polis* was thus both exclusionary (serving only citizens, typically defined by blood) and communitarian (subscribing to a citizen-soldier ideal under which all were expected to sacrifice for the whole). The city-state meant for the Greeks the actual people (they always called themselves “the Athenians,” “the Spartans”), their ancestors, and their gods: “this explains the patriotism of the ancients, a vigorous sentiment which was for them the

supreme virtue and that which all the others culminated in”;^[109] “The piety of the ancients was love of country.”^[110] Guillaume Durocher:

From fairly early on, Athenian democracy became tinged with what Susan Lape calls a “racial ideology.”^[111] Whereas Herodotus had argued that the Athenian population was the product of a mixing between Hellenic settlers and Pelasgian natives, the Athenians claimed to be racially pure in contrast with the other Greeks, having supposedly sprung from the Attic soil as true *autochtones*.^[112]

Similarly, Sparta was essentially an ethnostate, with the highly xenophobic Spartans ruling over and enslaving a conquered people, the Helots, from whom they remained separate, with no intermarriage, for hundreds of years.^[113]

Thus, Greek patriotism based on religious beliefs and a sense of blood kinship was in practice very much focused on the individual city, making those interests absolutely supreme, with little consideration for imperial subjects, allies, or fellow Greeks in general.

ARISTOCRATIC INDIVIDUALISM AMONG THE GERMANIC PEOPLES AFTER THE FALL OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE

As the Western Roman Empire decayed, the West was infused with new lifeblood from the Germanic branch of the I-E family.

It was the vigor, boldness, and the acquisitiveness of Germanic warbands that kept the West alive. These lads were uncouth and unlettered, much given to quarrelsome rages, but they injected energy, daring, and indeed an uncomplicated and sincere love of freedom, a keen sense of honor and a restless passion for battle, adventure, and life.^[114]

Even during the putative nadir of Western freedom, the medieval period, the reciprocity so fundamental to I-E culture could be seen: “The *aristocratic* principle of sovereignty by consent was the hallmark of feudal government. The king was not above the aristocracy; he was first among equals.”^[115] Medieval society was a “society of estates”—“kingdoms, baronies, bishoprics, urban communes, guilds, universities, each with important duties and privileges.”^[116]

Thus, although unquestionably hierarchical and even exploitative,

medieval European societies had a strong sense that cultures *ought* to build a sense of social cohesion on the basis of reciprocity, so that for the most part, with the exception of slaves, even humble members near the bottom of the social hierarchy had a stake in the system. One might conceptualize this as an extension of the *Männerbund* philosophy whereby everyone had a stake in the success of the group. The ideal (and the considerable reality) is what Spanish historian Américo Castro labeled “hierarchic harmony.”^[117]

The Visigothic Code in Spain illustrates the desire for a non-despotic government and for social cohesion that results from taking account of the interests of everyone (except slaves). Regarding despotism:

It should be required that [the king] make diligent inquiry as to the soundness of his opinions. Then, it should be evident that he has acted not for private gain but for the benefit of the people; so that it may conclusively appear that the law has not been made for any private or personal advantage, but for the protection and profit of the whole body of citizens. (Title I, II)^[118]

And just as the *Männerbünde* had a high level of social cohesion through gift-giving by leaders so that everyone had a stake in military victory, social cohesion in Gothic society was seen as resulting from justice for all citizens and as motivating citizens to “strive against the enemy.” In individualistic societies citizens, see their self-interest as a stakeholder coinciding with the interest of the system as a whole. The wise king creates cohesion not by coercion, but by giving everyone a stake in the system:

Just laws are essential for social cohesion in the face of enemies. Without justice, people will not strive against the enemy. It’s not a matter of an abstract moral ideal, but a practical necessity... .

For the administration of the law is regulated by the disposition and character of the king; from the administration of the law proceeds the institution of morals, from the institution of morals, the concord of the citizens; from the concord of the citizens, the triumph over the enemy. So a good prince ruling well his kingdom, and making foreign conquests, maintaining peace at home, and overwhelming his foreign adversaries, is famed both as the ruler of his state and a victor over his enemies, and shall have for the future eternal renown; after terrestrial

wealth, a celestial kingdom; after the diadem and the purple, a crown of glory; nor shall he then cease to be king, for when he relinquished his earthly kingdom, and conquered a celestial one, he did not diminish, but rather increased his glory.^[119]

The prime exception was that slaves were not granted the rights associated with freemen. For example, slaves were not allowed to serve in the military, which was composed of freemen who had a stake in the system; concern about social cohesion did not apply to slaves.

The absence of despotism and the fundamental reciprocity at the heart of I-E culture can be seen in the legal code described in *Njals Saga*, which was written in the late thirteenth century and set between 960 and 1020 in pre-Christian Iceland.^[120] This Icelandic system was based upon the legal system of Nordic countries, since the Norse had settled Iceland; it clearly reflects an individualist mindset. In this saga, Njal, a lawyer, attempts to mediate, arbitrate, and litigate controversies among Icelanders, and the reader is introduced to the legal system commonly existing in Scandinavia Europe approximately one millennium ago:

- Lowly peasants could file suit against even powerful feudal lords and would get their day in court.
- Process servers were used to summon defendants to court by orally stating the claims made against them—and the defendants would accept service by repeating the claims verbatim.
- District courts would try cases, and if any party disagreed with the verdict, they could appeal to the Althing—a higher court—for review.
- A court would only have jurisdiction over a defendant if that defendant engaged in conduct in that jurisdiction or paid homage to that jurisdiction’s “godi”—feudal lord.
- Jurors would serve as factfinders, and parties could exercise peremptory challenges to excuse a certain number of prospective jurors from the trial for any reason or for no reason whatsoever.
- Lawyers could represent real parties in interest at hearings and could call witnesses to testify and question them; causes of action could be assigned to third parties, who could then litigate the cases on their own.
- A system of probate law existed whereby the estates of decedents were distributed to their heirs in an equitable manner; a placeholder called

“Jon” was used by Norse lawyers, just as lawyers today use “John Doe” for unknown parties.

- Husbands and wives could sue one another for divorce, indicating relative gender equality compared to Middle Eastern cultures;
- The elected “lawspeaker” would publish all laws by orally reciting them in public.
- Finally, there was a relatively well understood body of laws, rights, legal procedures, and specific penalties for criminal offenses.

How Ethnically Cohesive Were Germanic Groups in Late Classical and Early Medieval Europe?

Current scholarly opinion tends to de-emphasize the ethnic coherence of the various Germanic groups that succeeded the Roman Empire in Europe. Part of this is political correctness (an extreme version of which is Patrick J. Geary’s *The Myth of Nations*, explicitly motivated by the wish to rationalize current displacement-level immigration to Europe^[121]). Nevertheless, given the basic model of I-E conquest and subjugation of native populations by male military groups, as described above, it would not be at all surprising to find that these groups were not ethnically cohesive, at least originally. However, given the assimilative tendencies of I-Es and the prospects of upward mobility depending on personal accomplishment, and given that the original conquests were completed by ca. 4500ybp, there would have been enough time to create significantly cohesive ethnic groups even in cultures originally dominated by alien ruling elites.

Peter Heather’s *The Goths* is unusual in that it attempts to answer the fundamental issue of the ethnic cohesiveness of the various groups within and near the Roman Empire in the early centuries of the Christian era.^[122] It is now more or less universal among scholars to reject the idea that groups like the Goths were cohesive ethnic groups as represented, for example, in the work of Tacitus. An ethnic group in the strong sense would be united by having common ancestors and originating in a particular place.

Heather rejects a purely instrumental theory of ethnicity, such as that of Frederick Barth,^[123] in which people can easily change their ethnicity and are free to choose it; in this view, ethnic barriers are socially constructed rather than based on binding ties resulting from biological relatedness. This general view is typically combined with the idea that elites often foster ideologies of

ethnicity “to create a sense of solidarity in subject peoples bound to them.”^[124]

On the opposite end of the theoretical spectrum, primordialists emphasize that ethnicity is not easily changeable, nor is it typically seen as changeable. Heather takes a middle view that different theories of ethnicity are needed to apply to particular situations and that only empirical research can resolve which perspective best fits a particular situation—a view that I find quite sensible but which, apart from Heather’s work, is rarely applied.

The traditional view is that Goths originated in Scandinavia, spread south to Poland and the Baltic, and split into two separate groups, the Ostrogoths and Visigoths, that were led by two royal families, the Balthi and the Amals respectively. Heather suggests that the evidence is compatible with a few Gothic aristocratic clans migrating from Scandinavia to northern Poland.^[125] But, since this remains doubtful, he begins Gothic history with a group settled by the Vistula in northern Poland in the first century AD. In a comment illustrating Indo-European migrations of *Männerbünde*, he notes that “a whole series of armed groups left northern Poland to carve new niches for themselves, east and south-east of the Carpathians... . At least some of the action was carried forward by warbands: groups of young men on the make... . Tacitus signals that the warband was a standard feature of first-century Germanic society and it was still common in the fifth.”^[126]

Despite the central role of the *Männerbünde*, Heather proposes, based on archeological remains, that women and children formed part of the migration.^[127] Further, these groups exemplified aristocratic individualism as described above:

Processes of social differentiation had created, by the fourth century, a powerful political elite among the Goths, composed of a freeman class among whom there were already substantial differentials in wealth. These may have been both wide and rigid enough for us to think of greater freemen as at least quasi nobility. Controlling these men was far from easy. The best sources portray fourth-century Gothic leaders “urging” and “persuading” their followers rather than just issuing orders, and leaders’ counsels could be overruled.^[128]

By the fourth century, then, there was a “well-entrenched elite” in Germanic societies and among the Goths in particular.^[129] We can see the typical I-E pattern: writing in the first century AD, Tacitus notes that chiefs

had “retinues of young men of military age”^[130]—private armies; the main body for enforcement was, however, public—the *comitatus* composed of adult males and with military, judicial, and political functions. By the fourth century, Heather suggests a shift toward armies dominated by leaders with great social power rather than the *comitatus*.^[131]

Critically, Heather argues that the politically significant class among Goths in the fifth century “amounted to at least one-fifth (and perhaps rather more) of the total male population of 25,000–30,000.”^[132] This group is probably the freeman group referred to in the Germanic law codes of the early medieval period. This is no small inner circle but a fairly substantial group: “Power was not solely the preserve of a very restricted group of families.”^[133]

Consistent with much other data reviewed above, there were three broad classes across a wide range of Germanic groups, free, freed or half-free, and slaves.^[134] “The groups were, notionally at least, closed off from one another by strict laws against intermarriage, and the unfree classes were considerably disadvantaged. Characteristically they received heavier punishments for the same offense, and lacked legal autonomy.”^[135]

In discussing an influential view that group identity was carried by a “very restricted group of dominant noble clans,”^[136] Heather agrees that that is the case in the sixth and seventh centuries but doubts it for the fourth century which he characterizes as dominated by “an elite that “remained relatively numerous: a broad social caste of emergent nobles and freemen, rather than a very restricted noble class,”^[137] estimating the “fully enfranchised” Goths at between 5,000–10,000 in each generation.^[138] This fully enfranchised class had a much greater stake in the system: in their war with Byzantium (535–554 AD), the Goths got little help from the Romans, and non-elite Goths surrendered, but only when their women and children were captured did the elites become less motivated.

This suggests that as we move toward the Middle Ages, groups become more dominated by narrow clan-like elites ruling over others not considered part of the clan—that is, we find family-based elites which tend toward exploitation because they do not see themselves as connected to the rest of the people. Thus, by the seventh century in Visigothic Spain, this broad-based elite was replaced by a “dominant nobility with deeply entrenched rights.”^[139] Parallel processes occurred throughout the successor states in the Western Roman Empire: “By the end of the seventh century, the ‘Franks’ of Neustria were a cluster of a half-dozen or so interrelated clans.”^[140]

Thus, in the emerging societies of the Middle Ages, dominant elites seem to have operated as clans in opposition to the rest of society, the latter having no separate identity. “It is even possible that the division of Gothic society into distinct castes was itself the result of the processes of migration and conquest... . The conquering migrants, for instance, could have transformed themselves into an elite freeman caste by turning conquered indigenous populations, or elements of them, into subordinates, whether slave or freed.”^[141]

This contrasts with the situation when the Huns, an Asian people, dominated the Goths. Non-Hunnic groups remained separate and subordinate while still maintaining their group identity, presumably because of the genetic and cultural difference between Huns and Germanic peoples, and the relatively lesser tendency for the Huns, as a non-European people, to assimilate.

Heather proposes that being a Goth in the fourth century was open to anyone who accepted the rules. Goths were less like a people and more like an army; a common view among historians is that these groups tended to be predominantly (but not exclusively) male, but “were composed of a wide mixture of ethnic elements, not just Goths.”^[142] Citing evidence that women and children were in these groups, Heather notes that “this evidence makes it very difficult not to see [Gothic king] Theoderic’s following as a broadly based social group engaged in a large-scale migration of more or less the traditionally envisaged kind.”^[143]

Thus, fourth-century Gothic kingdoms

were already multi-ethnic... . They probably consisted of a defining migrant elite of quasi-nobles and freemen, the basic carriers of “Gothicness.” These migrants coexisted, however, with a whole series of subordinates, and boundaries between the groups were liable to fluctuation... . The fact that survival and profit in the face of Roman power provided a huge impetus to the creation of the new supergroups in part argues against the importance of pre-existing Gothic ethnicity. Belonging to a large group was what really mattered, not its composition. We might also expect the shared experiences of the Migration Period to have generated a degree of homogenization, i.e., the absorption of subordinates into the elite. Groups needed to stick together to survive.^[144]

I think it likely ... that there was a layer of common Gothic identity within Gothic individuals of the fourth century who enjoyed the crucial status of freemen. It was submerged, however, beneath other layers of identity of a more particular and separate kind (Tervingi, Greuthungi, etc.). Only when Huns and Romans had, between them, destroyed these outer layers, could a more general sense of Gothicism, given added point by circumstances of danger and opportunity, be utilized to help create the new supergroups. Even so, Gothicism was not such an exclusive concept that other would-be recruits were refused. The “Gothicism” of the new supergroups was thus a complicated mixture of claimed and recognized social status, pre-existing similarity, and the overriding press of circumstance.^[145]

Given the openness of Gothic societies to absorbing different groups, it is not surprising that the Goths assimilated with the original Roman landed gentry. At first the Romans turned to church occupations, retreated to libraries, or served in the Goth army, the latter “en masse.” Intermarriage with the Goths began, and there was general assimilation.

For example, in Italy, assimilation was widespread. Ostrogothic Italy was very Roman—King Theoderic (454–526) was enthralled by Roman culture and saw his kingdom as a continuation of the Roman Empire.^[146] His family pursued marriage alliances with other elites (among the Vandals, Visigoths, Burgundians) by marrying off female relatives. In Visigothic Spain, Heather argues that by AD 700 “the landowning class of the peninsula—a mixture of migrant Goths and indigenous Romans—had fought and married its way to unity and synthesis under a Gothic flag of convenience.”^[147]

As noted elsewhere, the principle of individual accomplishment prevailed over kinship ties: When Theoderic died, the Goths replaced his successor with a non-relative because Theoderic’s grandson Theodahad was a poor leader. “The new king, Wittigis, stressed that he belonged to Theoderic’s dynasty not by blood, but because his deeds were of similar stature.”^[148]

As typical of I-E societies, the bottom line for followers was not kinship but whether they would be rewarded by the spoils of conquest—an indication of the continued importance of gift-giving rather than kinship for holding together coalitions: As Heather notes, “a lord distributing due reward to the brave is straight out of Germanic heroic poetry.”^[149]

Ethnicity remained important during the early period after conquest.

Disputes between Goths and Romans were adjudicated before two judges, one from each group. But intermarriage eventually became common.^[150] By the time of Theoderic's death (AD 526), "the populations were still distinguishable, but a process of cultural fusion was well underway."

In summary, at their origins the Goths were significantly ethnic—in the fourth century around 20–50 percent being a freeman class with at least a sense of Gothic identity if not of biological kinship (the latter is not clearly addressed by Heather). However, group identity was most important under conditions of threat or expansion. After attaining dominance in Spain, this group identity tended to dissipate, replaced by a class-structured society where elites were composed of both Romans and Goths, with a great deal of intermarriage. Family strategizing related to social class became more important than group identity. This is a good example of the weakness of extended kinship bonds among Western peoples and the tendency to splinter in the absence of threat.

One might view this as a paradigm of what happened with the I-E groups generally. They typically achieved military dominance centered around elite warrior-leaders with a militarily significant group of followers. The elite classes were permeable, so after victory previous elites were allowed to persist and intermarriage occurred (e.g., Hispano-Romans with Goths in seventh-century Spain). Talented people from lower orders could rise into elite status.

Moreover, the original I-E group became less of an identity over time as society evolved to be more class-based. Under more settled circumstances, elites gradually shed their wider kinship connections, and kinship itself became more focused on close relatives. These later elites pursued family strategies where known kinship relations among close relatives were important, but the social structure of the society as a whole did not resemble a clan. By the High Middle Ages, elite family strategies become ossified, enshrining the principle of familial succession rather than succession based on talent and accomplishment.

CONCLUSION

The Indo-Europeans were an extraordinarily successful group that had by far the most influence on European culture over approximately 4,000 years, into the European Middle Ages and beyond. Armed with cutting edge

military and food technology, as well as with a culture that prized military accomplishment above all else and allowed for the upward mobility of the most adept warriors, the Indo-Europeans were an unstoppable force in the ancient world. In Europe, they encountered peoples who shared their individualism, if not other aspects of their culture. However, given that barriers against intermarriage rather quickly broke down, males from the older European peoples were able to rise in the I-E cultural environment. Thus it is that the blond, blue-eyed Viking raiders popularly understood to embody hyper-masculine, aggressive I-E culture were not primarily descended from the relatively dark-haired, dark-eyed steppe people who originally developed that culture.^[151]

The I-E contribution to the European genetic and cultural heritage is thus very great, however foreign it may be to the present culture of the West. And foreign it is: whereas I-E culture was intensively hierarchical, the present-day West is determinedly egalitarian, and not simply within an elite aristocratic class. Whereas I-E culture was completely militarized and prized only the warrior virtues, contemporary Western culture values a completely different set of personal qualities—empathy, financial success, and a relatively high position for women. The burden of other chapters of *Western Origins and Prospects* will be to chart the origins and development of the egalitarian strand of Western origins, its strengths, and its vulnerabilities.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2:

ROMAN CULTURE:

MILITARIZATION, ARISTOCRATIC GOVERNMENT,

AND OPENNESS TO CONQUERED PEOPLES

This appendix aims to show how the Indo-European ethos was instantiated in the Roman Republic. My general view is that by far the main forces influencing post-Roman European culture were the Germanic peoples and the hunter-gatherer culture of northwestern Europe, both of which were influenced by the Indo-European conquests (Chapters 3 and 4), and that Roman influence of European culture was, in the final analysis, much diminished and transmitted through the lens of Christianity, born during the Roman Empire and institutionalized as the Roman state religion early in the fourth century (Chapter 5). By the time of the Western Empire's fall, the Indo-European ethos that fueled Rome's rise had disappeared in favor of a culture that prized celibacy, chastity and martyrdom, and believed all humans were equal in the sight of God.

Moreover, during the course of the later Republic and Empire, the original population of Rome was largely replaced due to the decline of the founding stock and the influx of foreign peoples resulting from the policy of assimilation combined with a high population of slaves, many of whom were eventually manumitted. The Western Empire fell to the Germanic peoples who succeeded Rome in the early medieval period; these Germanic tribes, to a much greater extent than Rome after the rise of Christianity, had preserved a variant of the Indo-European cultural heritage.

The following is based mainly on my review of A Critical History of Early Rome by Gary Forsythe.^{[\[152\]](#)} It leaves no doubt that the Roman Republic began as a unique and fascinating Indo-European culture—but one which, possibly like the contemporary West, carried the seeds of its own destruction.

Gary Forsythe has written a critical history of the early Roman Republic—critical in the sense that he casts doubt on much of the received wisdom concerning that history. The picture that remains after he has removed what he regards as the questionable facets of the historical record provides a most

welcome portrait of an historically important variant of the Indo-European legacy: an intensely militarized republic with a non-despotic aristocratic government. Roman society during this period (509–264 BC) permitted upward mobility and was open to incorporating recently conquered peoples into the system with full citizenship rights. This openness continued into the later Republic and the Empire.

THE INDO-EUROPEAN ROOTS OF ROMAN CIVILIZATION:

THE MILITARY ETHOS OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

Essentially, the Mediterranean city-states established by Indo-European (I-E) peoples were more settled versions of the basic I-E social organization based on *Männerbünde*. Forsythe describes “war bands” dedicated to raiding and fighting neighbors as common throughout the Greek, Roman, Celtic, and Germanic world.^[153] Leadership was based on military ability, and followers were sworn to fight to the death. In the early Roman Republic, aristocratic clans may well have been *Männerbünde* in the classic sense: the “current view,” of which Forsythe is skeptical because of weak documentation, is that the battle of Cremera in 478 BC (a major Roman defeat 30 years after the founding of the Republic at the hands of Veii, an Etruscan city) was essentially undertaken by an aristocratic clan (the Fabians, who held consulships during the period) prior to the complete takeover of military organization by the state.^[154] In other words, during the earliest years of the Republic, these clans operated with some independence of the Roman state.

Presumably reflecting this *Männerbünde* organization, patron-client relationships were typical, with less wealthy people tied via reciprocal obligations to wealthy, powerful persons. This is likely a holdover from Indo-European culture in which warlords and their followers had mutual obligations. Forsythe notes that this mitigated social and economic disparities.^[155] There were multiple levels, so a single person might be patron to poorer people and client to someone wealthier and more powerful than himself: “later Roman society was loosely bound together by a vast interlocking network of such relationships.”^[156] Reflecting the non-despotic nature of Roman society (see below), patrons could be “accursed” for injustice against clients and hence killed or ostracized.

A hallmark of Indo-European culture is that military glory is prized above all else. Forsythe notes that around 311 BC, “Rome was a young and vigorous state headed by ambitious and energetic aristocrats, who were eager to utilize

the state's growing strength to enhance their own personal prestige and to further Rome's influence and power."^[157]

Various data ... present the picture of a Roman aristocracy self-conscious of their power and that of the Roman state, ambitious for and reveling in military glory, and eager to advertise and catalogue their achievements for their contemporaries and posterity... . [Among aristocratic families, there was] a strong sense of family pride, tradition, and continuity.^[158]

The Roman aristocracy was pervaded by a military ethos, according to which the greatest honor was won by victory in war, either by individual feats of valor or by commanding successful military operations. This ethos was not only maintained but even fueled by the competitive rivalry which characterized the Roman ruling elite... . Many of Rome's Italian allies likewise possessed a well-established military tradition, so that the profitability of successful warfare (slaves and booty) bound the Roman elite, the Roman adult male population, and Rome's allies together into a common interest in waging wars. The Roman state was therefore configured to pursue an aggressive foreign policy marked by calculated risk taking, opportunism, and military intervention. Consequently, during Republican times there were few years in which Roman curule magistrates were not leading armies and conducting military operations.^[159]

It is a noteworthy comment on human self-deception that Rome developed moral rationales for many of their wars (as has been common throughout the history of the West into contemporary times).

Later Roman historians in describing the causes of various wars usually magnified, if not actually fabricated, the culpability of the enemy and suppressed or distorted any wrongdoing on the part of the Romans... . The Roman senate is seen to have been well-versed in foreign wars and quite capable of manipulating situations or of out-maneuvering enemy states so as to have a just cause for war to buttress an expansionist policy.^[160]

A recent paper has argued that rationalization is an evolutionary adaptation

for humans.^[161] In the Roman case, such rationalization doubtless fueled ingroup pride.

Because of the prestige of a military career, aristocratic families tended to avoid the tribunate (which was composed of plebeians and dealt with intra-urban rather than military affairs), although lower-level aristocrats did become tribunes.

Forsythe also describes the fundamentally I-E social organization of the Gauls who occupied Rome in 390 BC. The Gauls were more loosely organized than the Romans or other Mediterranean city-states, but they also had a warrior elite dedicated to raiding:

Celtic marauding and overpopulation went hand in hand in enlarging the territorial extent of Celtic settlement and culture. Raids into new areas offered fresh opportunities for Celtic chieftains and their war bands to enrich themselves and to win prestige. At the same time, their plundering incursions often paved the way for more peaceful immigration and settlement; the Po Valley of northern Italy is perhaps the best example of this phenomenon.^[162]

This intense commitment to a military ethic can be seen in Rome's typical posture after defeat. When defeated by the Greek king Pyrrhus, rather than sue for peace, the Romans "respond[ed] with even greater effort to overcome the setback."^[163] When they eventually defeated Pyrrhus, Rome had arrived on the international scene, receiving an ambassador from Egypt.

THE ROMAN FAMILY

Larry Siedentop labels the dominant pre-Christian family structure of ancient Greece and Rome as Indo-European. It was a world in which "family was everything," the paterfamilias acting not only as magistrate with power over all family members, but also as its high priest. In effect, the basic unit was a set of "small family Churches."^[164] Worship of male ancestors was fundamental, so that in a very real sense, each family had its own religion. Although based on blood ties among males, an adopted son could become part of a family by accepting the ancestors of his adoptive family as his own (labeled "fictive kinship" by anthropologists), while "a son who abandoned the family ceased altogether to be a relation, becoming unknown."^[165]

This was a patrilineal system, with women marrying into another family

losing their original identity and adopting the ancestors of the husband. Importantly, the boundary of the family was also a moral boundary: “Initially at least, those outside the family circle were not deemed to share any attributes with those within. No common humanity was acknowledged, an attitude confirmed by the practice of enslavement.”^[166] Affection and charity were compartmentalized—restricted within the boundaries of the family. This resulted in a combined familial sense of duty, affection and religious belief—*pietas*.

Property belonged not to the individual but to the family, with the eldest son possessing the land in trust for ancestors and descendants. Daughters could not inherit. Society was thus an association of families, not individuals. The fundamental chasm was between public and familial, not public and private.

While the family so construed formed the base of the social system, there were also wider groupings, the *gens* (extended family), clans (Greek: phratries; Latin, *curiae*), and tribes in ever wider circles of genetic distance. These extended groups consisted of families tied together not by genetic relatedness but by religious ideology, indicating that biological kinship was not of overriding importance: “These wider associations acquired their own priesthood, assembly, and rites.”^[167] Cities developed when several of these larger groupings (tribes) came together and established a common worship. This did not erase the religious connotations of smaller-scale groups down to the family. “The city that emerged was thus a confederation of cults, an association superimposed on other associations, all modelled on the family and its worship.”^[168] It was not an association of individuals.

The religiously based rules prescribed action in all spheres of life, leaving no room for individual conscience. Laws were seen as following from religion rather than the voluntary decision of legislators. This produced intense patriotism, as religion, family, and territory were intertwined. “Everything that was important to him—his ancestors, his worship, his moral life, his pride and property—depended upon the survival and well-being of the city.”^[169] Such attachment to civic gods was the main reason for the difficulty of combining cities in Greece. Exile was an extreme punishment because an exiled person had no legitimate identity.

As in other Indo-European aristocratic societies, the barrier between the ruling class and those they ruled over eventually became porous, and upward mobility was possible, albeit slowly. The aristocratic model of citizenship

and the ethnic basis of aristocracy in Rome had decayed long before the Empire adopted Christianity (see Chapter 5).

There were also gradual changes toward ending primogeniture and reducing the power of the *paterfamilias* over extended branches of the family. Clients (little better than slaves originally) became free to own property.

Ideas of “natural hierarchy” and “natural inequality” are fundamentally aristocratic. Thus, Plato’s “just society” as depicted in *The Republic* was to be ruled by philosophers because they were truly rational, and he assumes there are natural differences in the capacity for rationality. This is the idea, expressed in the modern language of behavior genetics, that there are genetically based individual differences. Aristotle believed that some people were slaves “by nature,”^[170] i.e., that the hierarchy between masters and slaves was natural. Reflecting themes common in Indo-European culture,^[171] the ancients prized fame and glory (positive esteem from others) resulting from genuine virtue and military and political accomplishments, not indolence and love of luxury—but also not labor, because laborers were often slaves and the rightful booty of conquest.

ROMAN PUBLIC RELIGION

As noted above, an important aspect of religion involved “small family churches.” However, there was also a public religion that was “deeply embedded” in early Roman culture. Patricians were viewed as having “special religious knowledge.”^[172] Data point to “an early nexus involving priesthoods, the senate, the patriciate, and religious authority.”^[173] However, Rome gradually became more secular, so that the connections between patrician families and religion gradually became attenuated, and prominent plebeians were able to hold high religious office—an aspect of the general rise of plebeians to power and status in the Republic, and an example of the upward mobility possible in Indo-European-based cultures. The senate likely had a majority of priests before the second half of the fourth century BC, but after that “the increase in the number of magistracies is likely to have led to the secularization of the senate, as the prestige and importance of the priestly body of *patres* were eroded and there was an influx of senators with political and military backgrounds.”^[174]

THE ARISTOCRATIC, NON-DESPOTIC GOVERNMENT OF

ROME

By all accounts, the early history of Rome prior to the Republic is shrouded in legend. Nevertheless, Forsythe notes that during the period when kings ruled, there was no indication of a hereditary principle.^[175] Indeed, the Roman historian Livy wrote:

Kings once ruled the city. Nevertheless, it happened that they did not pass it on to members of their own house. Unrelated persons and some foreigners succeeded them, as Romulus was followed by Numa who came from the Sabines, a neighbor to be sure, but a foreigner at that time... . [Tarquinius Priscus] was prevented from holding public office in his own hometown due to his tainted blood because he was the offspring of Demaratus the Corinthian and a woman of Tarquinius, well-born but poor, so that she had to accept such a husband by necessity; but after he migrated to Rome, he obtained the kingship.^[176]

It is particularly interesting that a man barred from advancement in his hometown because of “tainted blood” could succeed in becoming king at Rome. The case of Servius Tullius was similar: an Etruscan who became king after migrating to Rome, “to the greatest advantage of the state.”^[177]

This is important because it indicates—consistent with other Indo-European cultures—that kings achieved their position on the basis of ability, probably as a result of election by their peers, and certainly not by heredity. As noted in this chapter, I-E society was a free-market system rather than a strongly kinship-based system: leaders of *Männerbünde* were able to recruit followers because of their ability to wage war successfully. Followers would be rewarded for their efforts, but would defect to other *Männerbünde* if they thought there were better opportunities elsewhere.

Roman kings were not generally despots, although there is some speculation that the last two kings behaved tyrannically;^[178] if so, this experience may be why the Romans rejected kingship in favor of republican institutions. For the most part, the king was “first among equals”—the system labeled “aristocratic egalitarianism” by Ricardo Duchesne.^[179] Kings were advised and likely elected by other aristocrats.

By the late sixth century BC, just prior to the Republic, Rome had a tripartite government—people, senate, and king. The people were divided into three geographically-based rather than kinship-based tribes, each with

ten *curiae* that formed the basis for both military recruitment and voting, i.e., were the earliest political and military structure of the Roman state. In early Rome, aristocrats advised the king; after the kings, it became a body in its own right, the senate. The senate elected an interim king, or *interrex*, “until the people were summoned to a meeting of the *comitia curiata* [a military assembly; see below] at which time a candidate proposed by the presiding *interrex* received the affirmative vote of the people (*lex curiata*) and the endorsement of the senate (*patrum auctoritas*).”^[180]

The two consuls established by the Republic as the most important political positions essentially inherited the military and judicial powers of the king, while the *rex sacrorum* inherited the king’s religious duties. Consuls had the power to raise troops and command them in war. Consuls were partners, not despots, and the actions of one could be blocked by the other. “Disagreement resulted in inaction.”^[181] However, in times of crisis a dictator could be appointed by one of the consuls in response to a decree of the senate, and probably ratified by the *comitia centuriata*. Unlike the consuls who had a one-year term, dictators only had a six-month term.

With the establishment of the Republic, Rome came to be dominated by an aristocracy. An important component of this ruling aristocracy was a group of old and prominent families, the patricians. For a time, the patricians attempted to make themselves into a closed caste and monopolize the consulate entirely. A law against marriage between patricians and plebeians was enacted in 449 BC, but overturned just five years later; it was widely seen as tyrannical by later Romans.^[182]

Another aspect of the aristocratic government of the Republic is that the highest offices (consuls and praetors) were elected by the *comitia centuriata*, a military convocation divided into centuries on the basis of wealth. Censors were responsible for assessing each head of household’s property and assigned him to a century. The wealthiest centuries voted first, and elections were usually decided before the poorer centuries could vote. The *comitia centuriata* had power to pass laws, declare war, ratify treaties, and served as a high court in capital cases.^[183]

Nevertheless, the plebeians had some political representation. Tribunes of the plebs were the most important office after the consuls. Their duties were confined to running the city—“legislative and judicial business before the assembled people.”^[184] “In later Roman political thought the plebeian tribunes were regarded as public watchdogs and the protectors of citizens’ rights.”^[185]

Most laws were enacted by these tribunes, but this was “usually pursuant to a decree of the senate.”^[186] In the later Republic, beginning with the time of the Gracchi (131–121 BC), there was greater conflict, with “seditious tribunes promoting popular issues in opposition to the senate.”^[187]

However, for much of the period of the Republic, there was genuine separation of powers. Forsythe attaches particular importance to the political settlements of 367 and 338 BC which launched Rome on to spectacular success. “Political power was distributed among the magistrates, the senate, and the assembly of citizens so as to form the mixed constitution which Polybius praised so highly.”^[188]

Another historian, Andrew Lintott, summarizes the separation of powers at Rome as follows:

At Rome it appears that the senate is the focus of politics. It is here that not only issues of foreign policy are debated but also matters like the quarrel between the praetor and the *pontifex maximus*. The senate is an accepted sounding board between the authority of the members of the executive, who would also for the most part be members of it.

However, it would be wrong to think of it as a unique or supreme authority. Indeed, it is characteristic of the Republic that there were multiple points of legitimate decision-making, which were normally not to be overturned by some higher authority (something that was to largely disappear under the monarchy of the Caesars). The magistrates—including the aediles, tribunes, questors ... and the commissioners for the founding and refounding of colonies—owe their position to the people in an assembly... . The popular vote might be subject to what were considered improper influences, but it also shows that such influences were not necessarily decisive.^[189]

THE OPENNESS OF ROMAN SOCIETY: SOCIAL MOBILITY AND INCORPORATING DIFFERENT PEOPLES

As emphasized in this chapter, Indo-European social structure was based on talent and ability. Upward mobility was possible, and I-E groups in Europe tended to have relatively weak, permeable barriers between conquerors and conquered peoples—barriers that could be breached by the talented. This was also true in Rome. Upward mobility was possible, as was downward mobility.

Plebeian Upward Mobility

The ill-fated attempt to establish a concept of citizenship reserved for patricians naturally came under fire from those excluded from its family-based system. The plebeians were originally composed of immigrants who had no sense of ancestors or relatedness to citizen families. They were a heterogeneous group that included the rural and urban poor, but also some wealthy, successful families that had achieved upward mobility.^[190] These wealthier plebeians especially had political ambitions of their own and pushed to expand the limits of citizenship and open up public offices to their class. From the latter fifth century, Rome's domestic politics was dominated by the "struggle of the orders," a class conflict between patricians and plebeians, with the plebeians gradually obtaining increased rights and political power.

Even early in the Republic, offices were divided between patricians and plebeians, with patricians holding the priesthoods of the *rex sacrorum*, the three major *flamens* (i.e, priests assigned to Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus), and the office of *interrex* (who supervised the state during the five-day period when consular elections were being held). Plebeians held the plebeian tribunate and plebeian aedileship (responsible for regulating festivals, regulating markets and maintaining public buildings). But there was equal power sharing for other offices: curule aedile (responsible for different festivals), consul, and censor, as well as for some religious offices of lesser importance. In general, the patricians gradually declined as families died out, but they retained "great prestige and political prominence."^[191] Plebeians and patricians would at times pool political assets and run for the consulship together.

By the middle of the fourth century BC the Roman aristocracy consisted of both plebeian and patrician families. From 342 BC, it was the practice that one consul would be a patrician and the other a plebeian. By 172 BC, due to the decline of many patrician families and the extinction of some, there were often two plebeian consuls "and henceforth the earlier sharing of the consulship was abandoned."^[192] The rise of the plebeians continued into the late Republic. When Sulla became dictator around 82 BC, he reduced the power of the plebeian tribunes and restored the power of the *comitia centuriata*, but this led to intense controversy and was abandoned in 70 BC.

Upward Social Mobility of Incorporated Peoples

From the earliest period of the Republic, there are examples of the social fluidity of the Roman aristocracy. Appius Claudius came to Rome from Sabine territory in 509 BC and became a member of the patriciate. L. Fulvius Curvus, from Tusculum became consul 60 years after Rome conquered Tusculum in 381 BC. The consulships from 293–280 BC include six new clans, with two more by 264 BC; at least five of these were non-Roman in origin, and the Roman clans were plebeian.

Openness to foreigners can also be seen in that Latium, comprising the nearby towns with similar language and culture, had rights of *commercium* (could own property in other towns), *connubium* (marriage), and *migrandi* (migration). This set a precedent for later times, when other, non-Latin peoples would be incorporated into Roman society with partial citizenship (*civitas sine suffragio*). Such peoples might later be upgraded to full citizenship: e.g., the Sabines were upgraded from *civitas sine suffragio* to full citizenship in 268 BC. This openness to other peoples was “a key element in Rome’s later imperial success.”^[193]

Instead of completely destroying the elites of conquered peoples, Rome often absorbed them, granting them at first partial, and later full, citizenship. The result was to bind “the diverse Italian peoples into a single nation.”^[194] All conquered peoples were required to provide soldiers, allowing Rome to continuously engage in warfare. If a person from a conquered area moved to Rome, he could receive full citizenship. New tribes were continually created from conquered groups, with the total number reaching 31 in 332 BC.^[195]

Those granted citizenship were assigned to a tribe and a century in the *comitia centuriata*, expanding the Roman population and ultimately Roman power. For example, when the Romans conquered the Etruscan city of Veii in 396 BC, they created four new tribes, with membership assigned by the Roman censor.

This process continued into the late Republic: the Social War of 90–88 BC resulted in full citizenship for non-Romans in central and southern Italy. Eventually citizenship began to be extended beyond Italy. “By the time of Julius Caesar’s assassination ... in 44 B.C. Italy had become Romanized, and the same process (albeit at a much slower pace) was already under way in the overseas provinces.”^[196]

The openness of the Roman system can also be seen in the treatment of freed slaves. Freed slaves became Roman citizens and became clients of their

former masters. Early on, slaves were closely related Latins captured in war and easily integrated, but the law was not changed even after slaves began coming predominantly from other cultures and ethnicities.

Whatever the origins of this practice, Rome never altered it. From the fourth century B.C. onwards, as Rome's conquest of Italy and the Mediterranean produced a massive influx of slaves, Roman society was constantly receiving into its midst new citizens of foreign origin, through manumission. Such openness contributed to Rome's later success as an imperial power capable of uniting diverse peoples into a workable social system.^[197]

By 264 BC (the start of the First Punic War), there were three classes of Romans: (1) citizens in an area stretching across central Italy; (2) the states allied with Rome (Etruscans, etc.), run by "landed elites who had the same basic social, economic, and political interests and outlook as the Roman aristocracy"; (3) Latin colonies established throughout Italy.^[198] All were part of the Roman military organization. Colonies and allies could run their own domestic affairs, but Rome controlled their foreign policy. Rome was thus said to be able to command 730,000 infantry and 72,700 cavalymen when it entered the First Punic War—an impressive force indeed. Rome had become a world power and was on a collision course with Carthage.

Finally, it is important to realize that the openness of Roman society was not generally true of other Mediterranean city-states, Greece in particular.

Even though Roman society was very hierarchical and not at all democratic, it was far more open than the city-states of Greece. As a result, Rome succeeded in uniting the very diverse peoples of Italy into a single confederation, whereas the states of mainland Greece, although bound together by a common language and culture, never overcame the exclusionary nature of their institutions to form a lasting union. Greek unity was achieved only when imposed by the superior force of a foreign power such as Macedon or Rome. ... This social and political receptivity was chiefly responsible for Rome's lasting success as an imperial power.^[199]

The Emperor Claudius (r. AD 41–54), as recorded by Tacitus, was well

aware of this contrast between Greece and Rome, as seen in his comments in a debate about whether the Gauls, already citizens, would be eligible for one of the highest honors of Roman society—membership in the senate. Claudius emphasized the long history of non-Romans assuming position and power at Rome (including his own ancestors), as well as their contributions to Rome and their sense of devotion to Rome, claiming that the new peoples would assimilate and contribute to Roman society.

In my own ancestors, the eldest of whom, Clausus, a Sabine by extraction, was made simultaneously a citizen and the head of a patrician house, I find encouragement to employ the same policy in my administration, by transferring hither all true excellence, let it be found where it will. For I am not unaware that the Julii came to us from Alba, the Coruncanii from Camerium, the Porcii from Tusculum; that ... members were drafted into the senate from Etruria, from Lucania, from the whole of Italy; and that finally Italy itself was extended to the Alps, in order that not individuals merely but countries and nationalities should form one body under the name of Romans. ... What else proved fatal to Lacedaemon and Athens, in spite of their power in arms, but their policy of holding the conquered aloof as alien-born? But the sagacity of our own founder Romulus was such that several times he fought and naturalized a people in the course of the same day. ... If you survey the whole of our wars, not one was finished within a shorter period than that against the Gauls: thenceforward there has been a continuous and loyal peace. Now that customs, culture, and the ties of marriage have blended them with ourselves, let them bring among us their gold and their riches instead of retaining them beyond the pale! ... Plebeian magistrates followed the patrician; Latin, the plebeian; magistrates from the other races of Italy, the Latin. ^[200]

Claudius's position won the day.

In the long run, welcoming foreigners resulted in Rome losing its ethnic homogeneity which likely contributed to a decline in the qualities that established and maintained Roman power as well as the increasing the social and political conflicts of the later Republic and the Empire. Tenney Frank reviewed the history of race-mixing at Rome by examining the likely origin of names on inscriptions, concluding that “it is probable that when [Juvenal

and Tacitus] wrote [i.e., late first century–early second century A.D.] a very small percentage of the free plebeians on the streets of Rome could prove unmixed Italian descent. By far the larger part—perhaps ninety percent—had Oriental blood in their veins.”^[201]

Tenney, writing in 1916 during the highwater mark of Darwinian social science (see Chapter 6), proposes several other causes of “‘race suicide,’ so freely gossiped about by writers of the empire.”^[202] These include the many wars in which the soldiers were of free-born native stock (and therefore performing military duties while slaves were free to reproduce), as well as low fertility of the upper classes. The latter is truly remarkable:

By combining epigraphical and literary references, a fairly full history of the noble families can be procured, and this reveals a startling inability of such families to perpetuate themselves. We know, for instance, in Caesar’s day [mid-first century B.C.] of forty-five patricians, only one of whom is represented by posterity when Hadrian came to power [117 A. D.]. The Aemilii, Fabii, Claudii, Manlii, Valerii, and all the rest, with the exception of the Cornelii, have disappeared. Augustus and Claudius [early first century A.D.] raised twenty-five families to the patriciate, and all but six of them disappear before Nerva’s reign [96–98 A. D.]. Of the families of nearly four hundred senators recorded in 65 A.D. under Nero, all trace of a half is lost by Nerva’s day, a generation later.^[203]

What lay behind and constantly reacted upon all such causes of Rome’s disintegration was, after all, to a considerable extent, the fact that the people who built Rome had given way to a different race. The lack of energy and enterprise, the failure of foresight and commonsense, the weakening of moral and political stamina, all were concomitant with the gradual diminution of the stock which, during the earlier days, had displayed these qualities. ...

We may even admit that had the new races had time to amalgamate and attain a political consciousness, a more brilliant and versatile civilization might have come to birth. That, however, is not the question. It is apparent that at least the political and moral qualities which counted most in the building of the Italian federation, the army organization, the provincial administrative system of the Republic, were the qualities most needed in holding the empire together. And however brilliant the endowment of the new citizens, these qualities they lacked.^[204]

A good sign of the population replacement—apparent in the United States in Tenney’s time and much more obvious today when so many monuments erected by the White majority (including statues of Christopher Columbus that had been erected in Italian neighborhoods^[205]) are being torn down—was that there was an increasing number of shrines dedicated to foreign gods.

One after another of the emperors gained popularity with the rabble by erecting a shrine to some foreign Baal, or a statue to Isis in his chapel, in much the same way that our cities are lining their park drives with tributes to Garibaldi, Pulaski, and who knows what-vitch.^[206]

CONCLUSION: ROME AS A FAILED GROUP EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

The Roman variant of the Indo-European cultural pattern during the Republic may be viewed as a strategy incorporating several central facets:

- the I-E military ethos—military prestige being the highest form of public aspiration, and aristocratic families competing intensely for military glory;
- patron-client relationships binding together people from different social classes into relations of mutual obligation and reciprocity, a practice deriving from the *Männerbünde* groups characteristic of other I-E cultures;
- non-despotic, aristocratic government, with separation of decision-making power and well-defined term limits;
- permeability of the social classes, so that social mobility was possible for talented plebeians;
- openness to incorporating new peoples into the power structure, without which Rome would not have been able to mount its powerful military campaigns.

Republican Rome was essentially a group of aristocratic clans competing for honor and glory by political maneuvering to achieve the consulship and thus be in command of military operations against neighboring groups. One might think of the Roman system as an urbanized version of the *Männerbund*

system, with a given number of competing families at any particular time, all living within a delimited geographical area. Since consuls were selected by a military convocation, this formalized political system typically had a similar result as the *Männerbund* system: selection of the man most capable of leading the army—the man whose leadership would be most likely to produce victory and thus the material rewards of conquest. At the same time, by having two consuls with short terms, the system was designed to prevent the domination of one family (unlike the case with later European aristocracies), helping to ensure that military accomplishment rather than heredity would be critical for success. The system thus had the essential features of a free market. Over time, this free market in talent was expanded to include plebeians and members of conquered peoples being elected to the highest offices of the state. Upward (as well as downward) mobility were possible.

Rome was a slave-holding society, with chattel slavery becoming common in the fourth century BC; slaves were a major component of war booty. However, the common practice of freeing slaves who then could aspire to citizenship was another marker of the openness and social fluidity of Roman society.

More importantly, the military was never based on slavery, as in ancient Persia. Military success, in turn, was good for all social classes of citizens, not just the elites. For example, besides the booty deriving from successful campaigns, Roman citizens were often sent as colonists into conquered areas. In the period from 338–291 BC Rome established 16 colonies involving around 50,000 people, including both Romans and non-Romans “who obtained Latin status by being colonists.”^[207] Forsythe reasonably suggests that the practice of colonization may have been a safety valve for poor, indebted Romans.

The result was that Roman power, unlike that of so many other ancient civilizations, was not based on despotism. Citizens of all social classes had a stake in the system; slaves could look forward to freedom; partial citizens could look forward to becoming full citizens and even being allowed, eventually, to rise to the senate.

Is the Roman strategy correctly considered a group evolutionary strategy aimed ultimately at enhancing the genetic legacy of those who practice it? I would suggest that it can be so considered so long as the incorporated peoples were closely related to the original founding stock. The first peoples

incorporated into Rome were closely related cities in Latium. The upward mobility of these peoples gave Rome greater military manpower and a larger pool of political talent. By the time of Claudius's speech, the question was incorporating other European-based groups. It could be considered analogous in today's world to advocating a pan-European union with freedom of movement within it, but restricting it to people who are part of the European gene pool. If such a strategy were pursued today, it would bind together a White population of well over a billion into a formidable cooperative group. This would indeed constitute a group evolutionary strategy to the extent it had the political will to keep other peoples out.

The problem, of course, comes from the fact that such a race-based policy is not the goal of current elites throughout the West, and we constantly hear arguments, similar to those used by Claudius, that such people contribute to the society. A race realist point of view would stress the genetic interests of Europeans first and foremost and the long-term danger to those interests for a group with relatively low fertility admitting millions of non-Europeans as citizens. It would also emphasize population differences in traits like IQ and assimilability (e.g., Muslims) and the costs of multiculturalism as leading to group conflict, lack of social cohesion, and unwillingness to contribute to public goods.

THE NORTHERN HUNTER-GATHERER CULTURAL LEGACY IN EUROPE: EGALITARIAN INDIVIDUALISM

A major thesis of this book is that two influential strands are necessary for understanding the central features of the peoples and cultures of Western Europe: an aristocratic warrior culture (termed “aristocratic individualism,” in which egalitarianism is limited to aristocratic peers and deriving ultimately from the Indo-Europeans), and the hunter-gatherer (h-g) strand (i.e., “egalitarian individualism,” deriving ultimately from primeval northern h-gs). This chapter provides an introduction to the latter of these two strands.

As noted in Chapter 1, h-g groups have contributed genetically to contemporary Europeans. This genetic influence is most apparent in the northwest of Europe, especially Scandinavia, with less evidence for h-g genetic influence in southern Europe. In this chapter I review the culture of northern h-gs, concluding that this group has had an important influence on contemporary European culture.

As described below, the Western world remains the only culture area characterized by all of the markers of individualism. Taken together, these tendencies are unique to the Western European culture area and the argument here is that they have an ethnic basis. I do not suppose that Western Europeans have any unique biological adaptations, only that we differ in degree in adaptations characteristic of all humans and that the differences are sufficient to enable the evolution of a unique human culture. By analogy, all humans have the distinctively human mental abilities of symbolic representation and language, but the races still display quantitative differences in IQ sufficient to produce major differences between their cultures.

EGALITARIANISM AS A DISTINGUISHABLE COMPONENT OF WESTERN CULTURE

As noted in Chapter 2, there were already strong strands of individualism in Indo-European-derived cultures. Thus the argument here is not that northern h-gs are the only basis of Western individualism, but that Indo-European individualism dovetailed significantly with that of h-gs they

encountered in northwest Europe. The major difference between these two strands is that I-E-derived cultures are strongly hierarchical and relatively egalitarian only within aristocratic peer groups (aristocratic individualism), while the h-g's were strongly egalitarian without qualification. The burden of this chapter is to make the case for this. The contrast and conflict between aristocratic (hierarchical) individualism and egalitarian individualism is of fundamental importance for my later argument.

Egalitarianism is a notable trait of hunter-gatherer groups around the world. Such groups have mechanisms that prevent despotism and ensure reciprocity, with punishment ranging from physical harm to shunning and ostracism.^[208] Christopher Boehm describes hunter-gatherer societies as *moral communities* in which women have a major role,^[209] and the idea that Western cultures, particularly since the seventeenth century, are moral communities based on a hunter-gatherer egalitarian ethic will play a major role here, particularly in Chapters 6-8. In such societies people are closely scrutinized to note deviations from social norms; violators are shunned, ridiculed, and ostracized. Decisions, including decisions to sanction a person, are by consensus. Adult males treat each other as equals.

THE ECOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE INDIVIDUALISM OF NORTHERN HUNTER-GATHERERS

The idea that h-gs have had a major influence on European culture dates from a proposal by biologist Fritz Lenz, a German biologist writing in the 1920s and '30s. Lenz argued that northern Europeans—Nordics—have been less subjected to between-group natural selection than other groups, particularly Middle Eastern populations. He proposed that this resulted from the harsh evolutionary pressures of the Ice Age, resulting in the Nordic peoples living in small groups and having a tendency toward social isolation.^[210] The intellectual abilities of these peoples are proposed to be due to the need to master the natural environment, resulting in selection for traits related to spatial and mechanical ability, structural design, and inventiveness, what psychologists label performance IQ as opposed to verbal IQ which is important for social influence and would be expected in a people who evolved in large groups. Modern Scandinavians are indeed high on spatial abilities.^[211]

Such a perspective would not imply that northern Europeans lack collectivist mechanisms for group competition, but only that these

mechanisms are relatively less elaborated and/or require a higher level of group conflict to trigger their expression.

This perspective is consistent with ecological theory. Under ecologically adverse circumstances, adaptations are directed more at coping with the physical environment than at competing with other groups. In such an environment, there would be less pressure for selection for extended kinship networks and collectivist groups.^[212] The evolutionary interpretation of ethnocentrism emphasizes its utility in between-group competition. Ethnocentrism is of no importance in combating the physical environment, and in any case, a harsh physical environment does not support large competing groups.

Northern European groups are part of the North Eurasian and Circumpolar culture area.^[213] This culture area derives from h-gs adapted to cold, ecologically adverse climates. In such climates there is pressure for male provisioning of the family and a tendency toward monogamy because the ecology did not support either polygyny or large groups for an evolutionarily significant period. These cultures are characterized by bilateral kinship relationships which recognize both the male and female lines and quite unlike the patrilineal system of the I-Es (Chapter 2). This suggests relative gender equality compared to I-E culture. There is also less emphasis on extended kinship relationships, and marriage tends to be exogamous, i.e., outside the kinship group. All of these characteristics are opposite those found in the Middle Old-World culture area, comprising the lower part of Eurasia and, to a lesser extent, southern Europe (see Table 1 and Chapter 4).

	<i>Northwestern European H-G Cultural Origins</i>	<i>Middle Old-World Cultural Origins</i>
Evolutionary History	Hunting, gathering	Pastoralism, agriculture

Kinship System	Bilateral; weakly patricentric	Unilineal; strongly patricentric
Family System	Nuclear family; simple household	Extended family; joint household
Marriage	Exogamous; monogamous	Endogamous, consanguineous; polygynous
Marriage Psychology	Individual choice based on personal characteristics of spouse	Utilitarian; based on family strategizing within kinship group
Position of Women	Relatively high	Relatively low
Ethnocentrism	Relatively low	Relatively high
Social Status	Mainly influenced by reputation	Mainly influenced by kinship group
Trust	Trust based on individual's reputation	Trust based mainly on kinship distance

***Contrasts between European and Middle Old-World
Cultural Forms.***

This scenario implies that northwest European peoples are more prone to individualism because they existed for a very long period in an ecological context that did not support large tribal groups based on extended kinship relations; there were no resources such as fertile river valleys that might be controlled on a year-round basis by a single kinship group.

These populations were hunters and gatherers, not agriculturalists. Because

of the relatively low level of economic production, hunting favors male provision of females.^[214] This is because the energetic requirements of the human brain can only be met with a high-quality diet. The human brain makes up only 2 percent of body mass but requires 20 percent of all energy, 70 percent in the fetal period.

The energetic requirements of the human brain led to pair bonding—the psychological basis of monogamy—in which there is cooperation between nurturing females and provisioning males beginning around 500,000 years ago. Hunting also required “considerable experience, quality education, and years of intensive practice”^[215]—in other words, high-investment parenting. It also favors intelligence because hunting for humans relies on cognitive abilities more than running ability or even strength.^[216] The hunting scenario is complex and ever-changing: every animal species demonstrates unique behavioral characteristics depending on intrinsic characteristics such as sex and age, and extrinsic conditions such as season, weather, topography, etc. And it calls for cooperation and maintaining a trustworthy reputation within the group—traits that will loom large in the discussion of psychological mechanisms of White dispossession in Chapter 8. All of these trends are intensified in northern areas because there is less energy available per unit area.

THE SOCIAL COMPLEXITY OF NORTHERN EUROPEAN HUNTER-GATHERERS

Importantly, the h-g groups in northern Europe during the Mesolithic (15000–5000 years ago)—well before the conquests of the Indo-Europeans—were not the simple band-type groups typical of most h-gs. They were quite large and complex.

The societies of the last hunters (and fishers and gatherers) of northern Europe appear to have evolved quickly toward increasing complexity in the period prior to the spread of agriculture. Complexity is defined by greater diversity (more things) and integration (more connections). Advances in technology, settlement, and subsistence are preserved in the archaeological record. During this period technology developed toward greater efficiency in transport, tools, and food procurement. Settlements were generally larger, more enduring, and more differentiated in the Mesolithic than in the preceding Paleolithic. Food procurement was both

more specialized and more diversified—specialized in terms of the technology and organization of foraging activities, and diversified in terms of the numbers and kinds of species and habitats exploited.^[217]

These complex h-g societies flourished around 8500 years ago. Their population density and social complexity enabled them to delay the advance of farming by 2000–3000 years—likely as a result of warfare.^[218]

After a rapid spread across Central Europe, [...] farming communities came to a halt in the North European Plain, leaving the coastal areas of the North Sea occupied by hunter-gatherers... .

This could not have been due to ecological conditions. The frontier extends across a uniform geographical area, and the soils of southern Scandinavia are, in many places, light, fertile, and favorable for cultivation... . The reason for the delay must be sought in the late Mesolithic communities of the region. Hunter-gatherers in the southern Baltic region are likely to have had a greater population density than central European foragers ... , larger and more permanent settlements... , and a complex economic pattern involving specialized extraction camps, seasonal scheduling, and seasonally intensive use of specific resources.^[219]

Critically, in most areas, *residency was seasonal, not permanent*.

In certain areas such as the seaboard of central West Norway, particularly resource-rich marine and terrestrial environments *may* have made it possible to stay within restricted parts of the region all the year round on a diffuse sedentary basis.” But most areas had “a permanent or semi-permanent *base camp* on the coast, a certain number of extended *extraction sites* for seasonal hunting, gathering and fishing activities, a larger amount of *transitory sites*, and an almost indefinite number of *special purpose sites* or single-activity loci. ... Transitory sites form links of paramount importance in the chain.”^[220]

Thus, there was social complexity in a non-agricultural context characterized by transitory residence, with small, face-to-face groups dispersing on a seasonal basis and thus preserving the h-g social organization.

This contrasts sharply with the classical agricultural civilizations of the ancient world as well as many other complex h-g societies that were strongly hierarchical and territorial, with elites able to control a stationary resource.^[221] The complex h-g societies of northern Europe did not have any stable resource capable of being controlled by a lineage group or military elite on a year-round basis; extended kinship relationships therefore assumed less importance. Indeed, all the original ancient agricultural societies developed around defensible, stable land areas, typically around fertile river basins—the Euphrates, Nile, Indus, Yangtze rivers. However, in northern Europe, despite their complexity, these h-g groups were not able to remain in one area for the entire year, thus maintaining relatively small, family-based, face-to-face groupings for part of the year. It was in these small groupings that egalitarian individualism survived in a world that was becoming dominated by agriculture.

EGALITARIANISM AS A FUNDAMENTAL TRAIT OF NORTHERN HUNTER-GATHERERS

I suggest that this social complexity involving large populations of non-kin inhabiting resource-rich areas that could not be controlled by any one large kinship group on a year-round basis resulted in a continuation of the egalitarian tendencies seen in small h-g groups around the world. Northern European groups were periodically forced to split up into smaller, more family-based groups in which despotism was strongly controlled; when interacting within the larger social setting on a seasonal basis, no one group could control the area; the context did not allow any departure from egalitarian social structure. On the other hand, in many other complex h-g societies, whole villages would sometimes move between summer and winter territories if the resource was seasonal, with the result that chiefdoms were able to exert control over particular territories.^[222] Status competition in such societies was intense. For example:

The territories of Northwest Coast hunter-gatherers were not simply a series of resource nodes over which intricate competitions took place. It was the right to utilize (and to ensure the productivity of) the places themselves that was the focus of intense ritual competition among lineage groups and elites.^[223]

The complex h-gs of the northwest coast of North America were thus not at all egalitarian; patrilineal extended kinship relationships were important and cousin marriage common, including first cousin marriage in some groups.^[224]

In Northern Europe, on the other hand, h-g groups were forced to interact extensively with non-kin and strangers for much of the year, which led to an emphasis on trust and maintaining a good reputation within the larger non-kinship-based group.^[225] Yet since such groups dispersed into smaller groups for part of the year, there was no selection against egalitarianism.

In such large but seasonally migrating groups, the ecological conditions favored not only egalitarianism but also monogamy, since one man would not be able to control enough resources on a prolonged basis to enable polygyny. In Europe, the tendency toward monogamy was thus far more genetically and culturally fixed. As in h-g groups generally, lower-status males would be keen to lessen the reproductive any advantage held by others in the group.^[226]

Thus an important thrust of Western culture has been to regulate behavior in order to create a relatively more egalitarian social structure—in other words, to recreate the conditions of h-g culture. As discussed in Chapter 5, this tendency was reinforced by the Church during the Middle Ages for its own reasons.

Such egalitarian social practices are common in h-g groups around the world^[227] and support the general view that this important strand of European culture, especially apparent after it came to power beginning in the seventeenth century (Chapter 6), reflects the culture of northern h-gs. Of particular interest is the extreme egalitarianism of contemporary Scandinavian societies discussed in Chapter 8.

EXOGENY AS CHARACTERISTIC OF WESTERN MARRIAGE

Whereas kinship-based cultures tend toward marrying relatives, often first cousins, marriage in individualist societies is based more on personal attraction. One can speculate about marriages occurring to partners in the larger groups that gathered together on a seasonal basis described above. Within such a context, marriage would likely be more based on personal attraction—the physical traits (physical attractiveness, strength, health) and personality (e.g., warmth and affection, Conscientiousness, honesty, courage) of a prospective partner than they would in a kinship-based society where the all-important goal is to strengthen the descent group.

This proposed emphasis on personal attraction is compatible with the

finding that there are around 19 genetic mutations related to physical appearance in European populations, notably blond hair and blue eyes.^[228] There is far more diversity in hair color in European populations than any other. This means that Europeans have been under sexual selection for these traits, i.e., the traits are attractive to mates but have no functional significance. The classic example of a sexually selected trait is the peacock's elaborate tail; it makes him a poor flyer, but persists because it is attractive to females. Traits seen as sexually attractive by the opposite sex spread in the population even when not otherwise beneficial.

These findings are also compatible with Frank Salter's hypothesis that recessive genes, such as those for blond hair and blue eyes, are part of an individualist mating pattern because males who invest in their children have more confidence in paternity if their children look like them.^[229] Recessive features would make it easier to discover the offspring of unfaithful females. Males who invest in their children must be vitally concerned about paternity, and individualist societies tend to lack the strong external social controls common in collectivist cultures (e.g., purdah in many South Asian Hindu and Muslim cultures) in which women of reproductive age are sequestered or constantly supervised.

Marriage for Europeans was thus based more on individual choice than on cementing kinship relationships by, e.g., marrying first cousins and other kin whatever their traits (which is the pattern in much of the rest of the world). Again, as a result of individualism, Western relationships, including marriage, are more market-oriented (predisposing to capitalism as an economic system): those with relatively attractive traits do better on the marriage market.

LOVE AS CENTRAL TO WESTERN MARRIAGE

Love—another aspect of individual choice—has been valued far more in the West than in the other cultures of the world. Marriage in collectivist societies (i.e., the vast majority of human societies; see Chapter 4) is based on marrying relatives fairly independently of their personal characteristics.^[230]

In European societies dating as far back as records can be found, spouses were chosen based on a variety of personal characteristics, including the personality trait of Love/Nurturance underlying close relationships of affection and intimacy.^[231] This tendency toward warmth and affection can even be seen in mother-infant interactions: while African mothers are

sensitive and responsive to babies' needs, mother-child interactions in prototypical African cultures are devoid of the warmth and affection that are typical in European cultures.^[232]

This fits well with John Murray Cuddihy's comment on a long line of Jewish intellectuals who viewed love as the product of an alien culture, as indeed it was.^[233] For example, he quotes one of Freud's disciples, Theodor Reik: "Love or romance had no place in the Judengasse [Jewish quarter]." Congruent with the above theoretical discussion, selection pressures in harsh environments combined with individual choice of marriage partner (i.e., personal characteristics being more important than kinship status) would also lead Europeans to value love as the basis of marriage—analyzed as a trait that makes close relationships between spouses mutually and intrinsically rewarding, leading to paternity confidence and the consequent willingness of fathers to provision the family, and to close relationships between parents and their children.

John Money has noted the relatively greater tendency of northern European groups toward romantic love as the basis of marriage.^[234] At the psychological level, the evolutionary basis of individualism thus involves mechanisms such as romantic love and physical attractiveness in which mating behavior is intrinsically rewarding^[235] rather than imposed by family strategizing or coercive practices such as purdah, as in collectivist cultures.

Wealth and social status have also been important marriage criteria in Western societies, particularly for the propertied classes, but even among the propertied classes there has been a trend toward the companionate marriage based on affection and consent between the partners. In the eighteenth century and thereafter, close relationships based on affection and love became universally seen as the appropriate basis for monogamous marriage in all social classes, even including landed aristocrats.^[236]

PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WEIRD PEOPLE AND THE REST

Cross-cultural research shows differences in a wide range of traits related ultimately to individualism. Joseph Henrich and colleagues reviewed research showing differences between subjects from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic (WEIRD) nations and subjects in a wide range of other cultures on social traits (fairness, cooperation, moral reasoning, self-concept and related motivations), perception (visual

perception and spatial reasoning) and cognition (categorization and inferential induction, reasoning styles).^[237]

Social Exchange and Altruistic Punishment

Regarding social behavior, much research has centered around the ultimatum game where anonymous strangers have a one-shot interaction for a sum of real money. One of the pair—the proposer—offers a portion of this sum (from zero to the entire sum) to the second subject. The other subject must decide whether to accept or reject the offer. If he accepts, he gets the amount of the offer and the proposer takes the remainder; if he rejects, both players get zero. If subjects are motivated purely by self-interest, responders should always accept any positive offer; knowing this, a self-interested proposer should offer anything greater than zero.

Subjects from the U.S., which Henrich et al. found to be the most individualist society in their sample, generally offer between 40–50 percent, and offers of less than 30 percent are typically rejected even though doing so is irrational and a form of altruistic punishment—i.e., the person refusing the offer is punishing the proposer at cost to self. Evolutionists have argued that such tendencies could only have evolved among people who knew the reputation of those they were dealing with—humans who evolved in small groups where the vast majority of interactions was with familiar people. Whereas American subjects make high offers and reject low offers, people in small-scale societies tended to make small offers that were not rejected. This suggests that people in highly individualist societies are accustomed to interacting with strangers (or evolved in an environment where interactions with strangers was the norm). Hence, they make higher offers, knowing that the stranger will punish them if they make low offers.

This situation therefore models an individualistic culture because participants are strangers with no kinship ties. It implies that individualists are willing to punish people whom they see as unfair at a cost to self. For example, a study found that in games with multiple rounds (as opposed to the one-shot ultimatum game) subjects in Western countries who made high offers tended to punish people who did not, even though they incurred a cost in doing so, and that punished individuals subsequently made higher offers.⁶⁶ The researchers suggest that people from individualistic cultures have an evolved negative emotional reaction to free riding that results in their punishing such people even at a cost to themselves—hence the term

“altruistic punishment.” Importantly, the punished individuals changed their ways and donated more in future games even when they knew that the participants in later rounds were not the same as in previous rounds. The theme of altruistic punishment will re-emerge in Chapters 6–8 in discussions of punishment of individuals and groups that depart from a moral consensus.

Another study on a wider range of cultures replicated the finding on donation and the pro-cooperation effects of being punished. However, subjects from non-Western countries donated less (were less cooperative) to start with and were more likely to respond to punishment with revenge rather than increased cooperation. The authors suggest that “because in our experiment all participants were strangers to one another, people in collectivist societies might be more inclined than people in individualistic societies to perceive other participants as out-group members. Therefore, antisocial punishment [revenge] might be stronger in collectivist than in individualistic societies.”^[238] Conversely, individualists are less likely to perceive others as members of an outgroup and hence are less likely to exact revenge.

Results from the dictator game are also revealing. Here one person can decide how much to give to the other person but the other person cannot reject the offer. Subjects in the U.S. tend to offer around 47 percent of the amount, substantially higher than people in small-scale non-Western societies. Again, the results are compatible with the proposal that Westerners evolved in an environment where interacting with strangers was the norm but in which people tend to be generous because they are concerned about their reputation in future interactions.

This research provides a model for the evolution of cooperation among individualistic peoples. The results are most applicable to individualistic groups because such groups are not based on extended kinship relationships; individuals interact with non-kin, and are therefore much more prone to defection (i.e., non-cooperation). As a result, cooperation can only occur if people are willing to punish non-cooperators and provide attractive offers in games like the ultimatum game. In general, high levels of altruistic punishment are most likely to be found in individualistic societies.

These results are least applicable to highly collectivist groups which in traditional societies were based on extended kinship relationships, known kinship linkages, and repeated interactions among members. In such situations, actors know the people with whom they are cooperating and

anticipate future cooperation because they are enmeshed in extended kinship networks. They would make fair offers only to people that they know and would not reject offers from known others.

Europeans are thus exactly the sort of groups modeled by this research: They exhibit high levels of cooperation with strangers rather than with extended family members, and they are prone to market relations and individualism.

This suggests the fascinating possibility that a key strategy for any group intending to turn Europeans against themselves would be to trigger their strong tendency toward altruistic punishment by convincing them of the moral blameworthiness of their own people. Altruistic punishment is essentially a moral condemnation of the other person as unfair. Because Europeans are individualists at heart, they readily exhibit moral anger against their own people once they are seen as defectors from a moral consensus and therefore blameworthy—a manifestation of Europeans' stronger tendency toward altruistic punishment deriving from their evolutionary past as hunter-gatherers. In altruistic punishment, relative genetic distance is irrelevant. Free-riders are seen as strangers in a market situation; i.e., they have no familial or tribal connection with the altruistic punisher. This scenario is discussed further in Chapter 6 which focuses on the Puritans as exemplars of this tendency toward altruistic punishment.

Other Psychological Tendencies of WEIRD People

WEIRD people tend to view themselves as independent and self-contained rather than enmeshed in social relationships and with a strong sense of social roles. They see themselves as having various personality traits (e.g., introversion/extraversion) that explain their behavior rather than having various socially prescribed roles (e.g., behavior appropriate for males but not females). They also tend to have higher self-image and are more likely to engage in self-serving biases, whereas in many non-Western societies, especially East Asian, people are more self-effacing. WEIRD people value a sense of freedom and are more likely to believe that their actions are freely chosen. On the other hand, people in non-Western societies have less of a sense that their actions are freely chosen and are more willing to rely on trusted others to make decisions for them. Moreover, in studies where subjects are paired with several other people who claim something that is

obviously incorrect, Westerners are more likely to dissent from the consensus (although even most Westerners go along with the consensus).

Moral Reasoning. An illustrative contrast between Western and non-Western societies can be found in the area of moral reasoning. In non-Western societies based on extended kinship, morality is defined in terms of whether an action satisfies obligations within the family or kinship group, whereas in individualist societies, morality is thought of as satisfying abstract notions of justice such as Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative: Act according to the maxim that you could wish all other rational people to follow, as if it were a universal law.

The moral implications of the individualism/collectivism distinction can be seen by a study contrasting India (a collectivist culture) and the United States (an individualist culture). Young adults and children are asked what they would do in the following situation:

Ben was in Los Angeles on business. When his meetings were over, he went to the train station. Ben planned to travel to San Francisco in order to attend the wedding of his best friend. He needed to catch the very next train if he was to be in time for the ceremony, as he had to deliver the wedding rings. However, Ben's wallet was stolen in the train station. He lost all of his money as well as his ticket to San Francisco. Ben approached several officials as well as passengers at the train station and asked them to loan him money to buy a new ticket. But, because he was a stranger, no one was willing to lend him the money he needed. While Ben was sitting on a bench trying to decide what to do next, a well-dressed man sitting next to him walked away for a minute. Looking over at where the man had been sitting, Ben noticed that the man had left his coat unattended. Sticking out of the man's coat pocket was a train ticket to San Francisco. Ben knew that he could take the ticket and use it to travel to San Francisco on the next train. He also saw that the man had more than enough money in his coat pocket to buy another train ticket.

Indian subjects were more than twice as likely to decide to take the ticket in order to fulfill their social obligations (around 80 percent to 40 percent)—i.e., social obligations that in collectivist cultures are embedded in kinship relations.^[239] Children in the United States, on the other hand, tended to say that the man should not steal the train ticket because stealing violates

principles of justice that apply to everyone. Thus, for children from India, morality is defined by social obligations (prototypically obligations toward family members), while for children in the United States, morality is defined more by abstract principles of justice. Henrich et al. note that even highly educated people in collectivist cultures fail to demonstrate principled moral reasoning.

Cognitive Differences. WEIRD people also tend to have important cognitive differences from non-Westerners. We tend more toward analytical reasoning (detaching objects from context, attending to the intrinsic characteristics of objects, and developing rules for explaining and predicting phenomena) as opposed to holistic reasoning (attending to relationships between objects and their surrounding field). Analytic thinking is associated with thinking of oneself as independent, whereas holistic thinking is linked to thinking of oneself as interdependent with other people. For example, memory for objects is worse among East Asians if the background is removed compared to Westerners, implying that Westerners pay less attention to the background and relationships between background and objects in it. Moreover, Westerners tend to categorize objects on the basis of rules that are independent of function and hence more abstract whereas non-Westerners are more likely to categorize on the basis of function and contextual relationship.

These differences in a wide range of areas strongly suggest a biological basis for Western individualism. The differences between individualist and collectivist cultures—whether in fairness and altruistic punishment, moral reasoning, cognition, or perception—are all “of a piece;” they all fit into a consistent pattern in which Westerners detach themselves from social, cognitive, and perceptual contexts, whereas non-Westerners see the world in a deeply embedded manner. This pattern is highly consistent with Western peoples being more prone to scientific reasoning—a phenomenon discussed in Chapter 9.

CONCLUSION

The egalitarian-individualist strand of Western culture is an important component of the current cultural climate of the West. The thesis here is that egalitarian individualism, along with aristocratic individualism, are critical for understanding the dynamism of the West, particularly in the post-medieval world. The conflicts between these strands will be the subject of

later chapters. However, the following chapter focuses on the unique family patterns of Western Europe as a necessary prelude to that discussion.

THE FAMILIAL BASIS OF EUROPEAN INDIVIDUALISM^[240]

There is a consensus among historians of the family that the family structure of northwest Europe is unique: Mary S. Hartman has labeled it a “strange” and “aberrant” pattern.^[241] However, there is dispute about exactly how early this family pattern can be discerned and about its causes. One view common among historians had been that European uniqueness derived from the creation of capitalism and a system of national states^[242]—a blank slate, top-down perspective that posits a central role for elites. But family historians have produced evidence that the unique family structure long predated these features of Western modernization and, in fact, had a central causal role in creating the modern world.^[243] This latter perspective fits well with the biological view developed here because it isolates family structure as a central variable amenable to evolutionary/biological analysis.

MARRIAGE IN WESTERN EUROPE: SOME BASIC DIFFERENCES

The standard marriage model in non-Western societies with intensive agriculture, including even southern and eastern Europe, was for parental control of marriage, with the woman considerably younger than the man (7–10 years on average). The couple would move into the same residence as the parents of the groom, resulting in multi-family households (often labeled joint families) in which individuals were enmeshed in patrilineal extended kinship networks. It was unusual for people not to marry. In southern and eastern Europe such families were monogamous, but this was often not the case in other areas, such as the Middle East.

There were major differences between areas with joint families and the family pattern in England, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, northern France, German-speaking areas and northern Italy (settled by the Germanic

Lombards). These differences date at least from the Middle Ages and I will argue that they go back to prehistory and likely have an evolutionary origin.

In northwest Europe, (1) marriage was monogamous; as noted in Chapters 2 and 3, monogamy is a primeval feature of Indo-European-derived (e.g., Corded Ware culture) and hunter-gatherer-derived Europeans; (2) late marriage was common (except for the aristocracy); (3) the partners were similar in age; (4) unmarried individuals, especially women, were relatively common; (5) critically, the married couple set up their household independently of their parents and their extended families; and (6) except for elites (which only conformed to the pattern much later), marriage was not arranged by parents but was entered into by individual choice of partners.^[244] Because aristocratic families deviated from this pattern in important ways, this marriage regime cannot be seen as a top-down cultural shift.

Both household types tended to have similar numbers of members, but the difference was that in northwest Europe, the additional people beyond the immediate family were servants, not relatives.^[245] Thus the northwest European pattern was a family that was cut off from extended kinship networks, quite unlike the pattern in the rest of the world's cultures based on intensive agriculture. Further, since individuals set up their own economically independent households, the northwest European family pattern encouraged saving during the pre-marriage years and planning for the future when marriage would be possible.^[246]

Because of the importance of property and rank, marriages among the aristocracy were less often based on personal characteristics, and it wasn't until the eighteenth century that it was assumed even among the high aristocracy that marriage ought to involve affection and companionship.^[247] This reflected the Church's policy on marriage which included a strong emphasis on consent and affection between the partners. By the eighteenth century, close relationships based on affection and love became universally seen as the appropriate basis for monogamous marriage in all social classes, including landed aristocrats.^[248] As in Jane Austen novels, among the propertied classes the ideal was a marriage that combined property with the bonds of personal attraction, including romantic love first and foremost.

This contrasts strongly with non-Western societies. "Whereas in industrial Western societies the emotional relationship between man and wife is primary, it is not the pivot of social structure in the majority of societies."^[249] Indeed, this is a general point of contrast between Eastern and Western

stratified societies.^[250] The idealization of romantic love as the basis of monogamous marriage has also periodically characterized Western secular intellectual movements, such as the Stoics of late antiquity and nineteenth-century Romanticism.^[251] It is not that love and affection between mates do not exist in other societies; it is just that there is greater emphasis on this in Western societies, to the point that it is a prime condition for marriage. And it is not that considerations of wealth and social status are unimportant in Western societies; it is only that romantic love and personal attraction became necessary conditions for choosing an appropriate partner, eventually even among the aristocracy.

The practice of taking in unrelated servants merits considerable attention because a simple economic explanation seems inadequate. Between thirty and forty percent of the youth in pre-industrial England were in service, the largest single occupational group until the twentieth century.^[252] The practice of taking in servants went beyond simply providing for one's needs by bringing in outsiders. People would sometimes have their children go to work as servants elsewhere while at the same time taking in unrelated servants.^[253] It was not just the children of the poor and landless who became servants; even large-scale, successful farmers sent their children to be servants elsewhere. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries individuals often took in servants early in their marriage, before their own children could help out, and then passed their children on as servants to others when they were older and there was more than enough help.^[254]

This suggests a deeply ingrained cultural practice which resulted in a high level of non-kinship-based reciprocity. The practice also bespeaks a relative lack of ethnocentrism, because people are taking in non-relatives as household members even when relatives are available. These pre-industrial societies were not organized around extended kinship, and it is easy to see that they are pre-adapted to the industrial revolution and the modern world generally. In the rest of Eurasia, there was a much stronger strong tendency for households to consist of kin.^[255]

It is intriguing that hunter-gatherer societies living in harsh climates often have very elaborate systems of reciprocity aimed at sharing resources such as meat. I suspect that the system of non-kinship-based reciprocity so typical of pre-industrial northwest Europe as seen in the practice of taking in unrelated servants was another relic of a prolonged evolution in harsh northern climates.

Whereas Hartman and others emphasize late marriage as the key feature of Western families,^[256] perhaps because of a heightened concern for feminist issues, an evolutionary analysis would also emphasize the cutting off from the wider kinship group, while seeing late marriage as a consequence of an individualist marriage regime featuring individual choice of marriage partner in a context where married partners were required to set up an economically viable independent household. In an individualist marriage regime, individuals are to a much greater extent enmeshed with non-relatives and forced to make their own plans for the future, including their own retirement. Couples had to have an expectation of economic viability, which, depending on economic conditions, may not have been possible until prospective partners were well into their twenties. It was common that a substantial number were never being able to marry. As noted, unmarried people, especially women, were uncommon in traditional societies with collectivist marriage patterns.

However, this cutting off from extended kinship would also naturally lead to a higher position for women than in a patrilocal multifamily household dominated by older males and secondarily by mothers-in-law. The long-term historical trend in northwest Europe was that conjugal marriage in the absence of extended kinship ties resulted in convergence of men's and women's lives, as spouses became partners, and less preference for sons over daughters.^[257]

In what follows, the contrasting types of family will be labeled individualist and collectivist, with the understanding that there are gradations between these types. These range from the intensive collectivism typical of the Middle East and much of the non-European world, to the moderate collectivism of much of southern Europe, to what might be termed "moderate individualism" characteristic of the German lands and many parts of Britain, to the extreme individualism found in Scandinavia.

DESCRIPTIVE DATA ON FAMILY PATTERNS IN NORTHWESTERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPE

Chapters 2 and 3 emphasize that both Indo-European culture and the hunter-gatherer culture of northwestern Europe had strong strands of individualism. The general thesis here is that the invading Indo-European groups, already substantially predisposed toward individualism themselves (i.e., aristocratic individualism), encountered peoples who were also

predisposed toward individualism, albeit of a different type (egalitarian individualism stemming from their hunter-gatherer past in the north of Europe). On the other hand, the south of Europe, settled originally by farmers originating in the Middle East, retained its moderate collectivism into the present despite the influences of the main groups shaping European history—quite possibly due to genetic tendencies inherited from their Middle Eastern ancestors.^[258]

The relative strength of extended kinship ties is thus central to this analysis. Patrick Heady divides European kinship patterns into three categories, strong (Croatia, Russia, Italy, Greece, Poland, Spain—here labeled “moderate collectivism”), weak (France, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Switzerland—“moderate individualism”), and very weak (Sweden, Denmark—“strong individualism”), running in a cline from southeast to northwest.^[259] Families in the moderate collectivism area tend to live near their parents (often residing in the same house), marry people from the same area, help each other more (including financial aid), and have stronger distinctions between male and female roles. Heady labels this pattern “parentally anchored and locally involved,” the extreme opposite being “origin free and locally detached.”

Sweden is characterized by the weakest family system. Indeed, Maria Iacovu and Alexandra Skew provide a sharp contrast between the most extreme family forms in Europe, noting that in Scandinavia there is “almost a complete absence of the extended family.”^[260]

The Scandinavian countries are characterized by small households (particularly single-adult and lone-parent households), early residential independence for young people and extended residential independence for elderly people; cohabitation as an alternative to marriage; and an almost complete absence of the extended family. At the other end, the Southern European countries are characterised by relatively low levels of non-marital cohabitation, by extended co-residence between parents and their adult children, and by elderly people with their adult offspring; this, together with a much lower incidence of lone-parent families, make for much larger household sizes.

Thus the fundamental cline in family patterns places the most extreme forms of individualism in the far northwest. This categorization system is

essentially a more fine-grained version of the well-known Hajnal line which separates European family types into only two categories, east and west of a line between St. Petersburg and Trieste.^[261]

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODERATELY INDIVIDUALIST FAMILY SYSTEM OF NORTHWEST EUROPE

Hartman emphasizes that the nuclear family resulted in people having to plan their own lives. Women, for example, would avoid pregnancy before marriage by not having sex. (Despite late marriage, illegitimacy was “extremely low.”^[262]) This implied a long period of voluntary sexual restraint prior to marriage—likely resulting in selection against those, especially women,^[263] who had sex outside marriage, although courts typically stood ready to force marriages for women with a child born out of wedlock in order to avoid having them becoming public charges. The low level of illegitimacy in a situation where people had significant freedom to plan their own lives implies a strong role for (and likely eugenic selection for) the personality trait of effortful control of impulses (i.e., Conscientiousness; see Chapter 8).^[264] Such eugenic pressures would not exist in a collectivist society where early marriage was the rule and there were strong external controls on female behavior, such as the purdah.

An important aspect of planning was individual consent to marriage, a characteristic of Western marriage at least since the Middle Ages and likely primordially. Individual consent is expected to result in individuals weighing more heavily the personal characteristics of a prospective mate. One effect of this is greater age parity in marriage partners. Relative age parity of spouses combined with a late age of marriage are markers of the Western European system of marriage.^[265]

Within the simple household system, marriage became much less a matter of political alliance between and within kinship groups, or a purely economic affair, or simply an aspect of sexual competition (which resulted in concubinage and polygyny throughout much of the non-European world). Rather it was based on interpersonal attraction, including traits like Conscientiousness, intelligence, interpersonal warmth and affection, and physical appearance (including traits related to fertility, such as female waist-hip ratio which has been related to women’s health, fecundity, and cognitive ability^[266]). Affection within marriage became a cultural norm with the rise of the simple household. The Western phenomenon of courtship (unique among

the cultures of Eurasia and Africa) provided a period in which prospective mates could assess personal compatibility; in Malthus' terms, an opportunity was given for both sexes for "finding out kindred disposition, and of forming those strong and lasting attachments without which the married state is generally more productive of misery than of happiness."^[267]

Thus nuclear families meant a greater reliance on individual planning and effort. Whereas social roles, marriage partner (often first cousins), and age of women's marriage are largely pre-determined in collectivist cultures, in the individualist areas of Europe, men and women were free to choose a marriage partner, and they had to decide when to get married, the latter decision normatively made only after securing a viable economic niche. At least by the fourteenth century in England, most people worked for wages paid by non-relatives, and in general children were "expected to leave home, accumulate their own wealth, choose their own marriage partners and locate and occupy their own economic niche."^[268] There was widespread ownership of land. Even "unfree tenant families by the late medieval era in northwestern Europe had long had effective control over the land they worked. While lords retained ultimate jurisdiction, families kept the land from one generation to the next, making their own arrangements for passing it on to heirs. ... Despite legal developments in Western Europe denying inheritance rights to unfree peasants and setting out more individualized notions of property, manorial courts and the church long upheld older custom."^[269] Oldest sons inherited land, but younger sons and daughters received moveable goods.

Dating the Origins of the Individualist Family

Almost alone among barbarians, [the Germans] are content with one wife, except a very few among them, and these not from sensuality, but because their noble birth procures for them many offers of alliance. ... Lest the woman should think herself to stand apart from aspirations after noble deeds and from the perils of war, she is reminded by the ceremony which inaugurates marriage that she is her husband's *partner* in toil and danger, destined to suffer and to dare with him alike both in peace and in war. The yoked oxen, the harnessed steed, the gift of arms, proclaim this fact."^[270]

Separate households "dominate northwestern Europe as far back as medieval records go."^[271] In other words, this pattern may be primordial

among the peoples of northwest Europe—which fits well with the present perspective that the roots of these patterns lie in the evolutionary/biological realm. As Peter Laslett notes, “the further we go back, so it appears at the moment, the more elusive the origins of the interrelated characteristics of the Western family. As of the present state of knowledge, we cannot say when ‘the West’ diverged from the other parts of Europe.”^[272] Hartman, writing in 2004, maintains that this comment “still holds.”^[273] Further, there is no evidence that the northwest European family pattern is part of a historical progression or that different aspects of the northwest European family pattern or the pattern itself represent a developmental continuum.

Importantly, David Herlihy notes that Tacitus had remarked that late marriage was common among the Germanic tribes (i.e., long before the Frankish Empire of early Middle Ages) and speculates that this pattern then became the norm after the fall of the Roman Empire—obviously congruent with the evolutionary/biological scenario proposed here. Searching for medieval contextual influences as the sole explanation of the late-marriage pattern of northwest Europe seems misguided, given the tendencies toward individualism in both Indo-European (Chapter 2) and northern hunter-gatherer (Chapter 3) culture.

Further, there is some indication that nuclear families were the norm in the western Roman Empire:

On the basis of the tombstone inscriptions we have come to the conclusion that for the populations putting up tombstones throughout the western provinces the nuclear family was the primary focus of certain types of familial obligation. Grandparents, uncles and other extended family members appear too infrequently as commemorators for us to believe that they were regarded as part of the core family unit.^[274]

Tombstone inscriptions indicate that nuclear family inscriptions constitute about 75–90 percent of the total, with little variation chronologically, geographically, or by social class:

The facts that (i) extended family members, especially the paternal *avus* [uncle], are absolutely few in number in funerary dedications, that (2) paternal grandfathers are relatively few in comparison with the number alive and able to participate in the dedication, and that (3) the paternal

avus is not even the most common type in commemorations involving grandparents—all these facts point away from the patriarchal family being a common reality in the population of the western empire erecting tombstones.^[275]

Other evidence indicates that the basic family was the mother-father-child triad; among the elite, sons commonly set up their own households rather than remain in their father's domicile. "On the basis of our evidence, it seems a reasonable hypothesis that the continuity of the nuclear family goes back much further in time and that it was characteristic of many regions of western Europe as early as the Roman Empire."^[276]

Another marker of the individualist family is exogamy rather than marrying close kin as is typical in collectivist societies. Exogamy was the rule in western Europe even in Roman times:

There is strong evidence for continuity of the general practice of exogamy in the western Roman empire from the pre-Christian period (first three centuries after Christ) to the era of the establishment of Christianity as the state religion; endogamous marriage was rare, if it occurred at all. Despite legal rules permitting cousin marriage in the pagan era, parallel and cross-cousin marriages were rare among aristocrats, as were parallel-cousin marriages among modest inhabitants of the western empire. Consequently, the Christian ban on marriages within the sixth degree of kinship had little impact. The dispersed pattern of property holding offered pagan aristocrats no incentive to marry within the family to protect consolidated estates; their financial interests were met by marriage within the same class. ... The Church's ban on endogamy should not be interpreted as part of an effort to disrupt transmission of property within the family: no such effort was necessary because for centuries pagan aristocrats had been using the will to disperse their wealth widely. The Church need only have replaced the emperor as the principal institutional beneficiary of these wills in order to enrich itself.^[277] ...

In sum, when the Church moved to formalise an extended incest prohibition in the fourth century, it was not acting to disrupt a widespread practice of close-kin endogamy in the western Roman empire. In fact, Augustine, in his discussion in the *City of God*

concerning the recent extension of the incest rule, clearly indicates the opposite. He states categorically that marriage between cousins always had been *raro per mores* ('rare in customary practice'), well before the imposition of the new prohibitions.^[278]

Finally, the practice of partible inheritance included daughters, with daughters receiving a full share of the patrimony, as revealed by laws on intestate succession.^[279] This is further evidence that the patrilineal extended family based on kinship and endogamous marriage was not at all characteristic of Roman society in Western Europe.

Disadvantages of the Individualist Family

If one supposes that the complete dominance of the collectivist, early-marriage pattern in a very wide variety of cultures around the world is an adaptive response or at least a natural consequence of plow agriculture, why should northwest Europe be an exception? At the outset it is important to note that the late-marriage regime of northwest Europe doesn't really make sense as the ideal form of marriage for an agricultural society—it is a “risky system of postponed marriage.”^[280]

Assuming an evolved basis for northwest European family structure, the proposal that the late-marriage regime is risky implies a lack of fit between this family structure and the context of the early Middle Ages. Lack of fit between novel environments and genetic tendencies is a common phenomenon noted by evolutionists. Genetic proclivities change relatively slowly, resulting in evolutionary inertia, so that organisms may be poorly adapted to their new environments. For example, it has been proposed that some sex differences, such as that boys are more prone to externalizing psychiatric disorders than girls, are the result of sexual selection for these traits in our evolutionary past.^[281] The externalization of psychiatric disorders includes conduct disorder, oppositional/defiant disorder, risk-taking, aggression, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Such tendencies are a poor fit with contemporary society characterized by educational systems where children are required to inhibit their impulses, sit still and pay attention for long periods, with the result that girls perform better than boys throughout the educational system, from kindergarten through college. People with externalizing disorders are much more likely not only to fail in the educational system but to be incarcerated and have downward social

mobility.

In the present case, genetically based tendencies toward the late-marriage regime would be expected to change only slowly as a result of selection pressures toward the non-risky, collectivist family patterns of the rest of the Eurasian world, thus resulting in a poor fit. In the event, however, the evidence reviewed here indicates that the late-marriage regime survived this lack of fit during the medieval period and essentially created the modern world.

The risks of the late-marriage pattern are obvious. The long premarital period prior to marriage, particularly when women often worked outside the home and households typically included non-relatives, meant that women were more likely to have illegitimate pregnancies with minimal paternal support for the child. Sexual assault and out-of-wedlock pregnancies (the latter a cause for shame and ostracism in traditional Western societies) were more likely where young people went into service in households of non-relatives. Late marriage also would be linked to lowered lifetime fertility and less reliable production of heirs.^[282]

Moreover, the individualist marriage pattern is also not ideal for supporting people in old age, since older people were expected to make their own arrangements for retirement, whereas in collectivist cultures it was understood that parents would continue to live on the family property. In northwest Europe, contracts stipulating separate living quarters for parents or at least a separate room with a private entrance were common.^[283] If the older generation had used its power, as they did in collectivist cultures (where parents had a right to continue to live on the family property), they would have likely developed a better system to ensure their interests in old age.

Moreover, Richard M. Smith claims that the very different patterns seen in the north and south of Europe “remained geographically differentiated over millennia.”^[284] If we assume that the northwest European pattern has a number of critical disadvantages for those practicing it compared to the collectivist model, and if the moderately collectivist pattern persisted in much of Western Christendom in the south and east of Europe, and if the northwest European individualist pattern can be found at the very origins of record keeping, then it must be considered a strong possibility that the northwest European pattern has its roots in prehistory.

I conclude that the individualist family pattern is unlikely to be freely chosen because of incentives provided by lords, as discussed in the following.

This is compatible with a theory that European individualism results from the evolutionary prehistory of these groups and results in a misfit with medieval environments compared to collectivist family structure.

Contextual Influences Proposed as Causing Moderate Individualism.

Hartman follows Michael Mitterauer in proposing to account for the unique family pattern in northwest Europe as due to the manorial system which developed after the fall of the Western Roman Empire. The classic manorial system appeared during the Carolingian period “in the heartland of the Frankish Empire.”^[285] The key word here is “heartland” of the Empire, centered in Austrasia in what is now northern France and Germany, established by 481; most of modern-day France was added by the conquests of Clovis in the early sixth century, and the remainder by 536. Charlemagne’s conquests in the late eighth century included Saxony and Bavaria, both part of the northwest European family pattern. Thus, despite being part of the Frankish Empire for longer than Saxony and Bavaria, southern European family structure and patterns of land-ownership, notably including France southwest of a geographical line stretching from Saint Malo to Geneva, continued to diverge strongly from northwestern Europe (see map below).

Mitterauer claims that the manorial system was “fundamentally novel.”^[286] Whereas in much of southern Europe land ownership remained centered on kinship groups, the classic manorial system was bipartite: the lord’s manor and peasant plots. Peasants owned or leased their plots but had service and corvée obligations. It was a quasi-family arrangement, implying “various social rights and duties extending far beyond economic cooperation.”^[287] Indeed, the term *familia* was used to refer to the system as a whole, indicating “the high priority given to social relationships within the manorial system.”

A key difference from Roman times is the relative lack of slaves: There were “traces” of the old Roman *villa rustica* system,^[288] which was far more dependent on slaves (*servi casati*), and there were also *coloni* who were free but tied to the land and obligated to provide services. The move away from slavery to having peasants own or lease the land benefited lords because they had fewer obligations than toward slaves; peasants gained because they farmed their own land, and were therefore incentivized, but of course, they still had obligations to the lord. Gradually, services were replaced by rents, and in-kind rents were transformed into payments of money.^[289]

The distinction between those who were essentially slaves and those who were free but with labor obligations is also found in the manorial areas of medieval central England. Manorialization occurred in open-field areas interspersed with “large, compact villages.”^[290] Individual holdings were in scattered strips with nearly equal acreage “class by class.” As on the Continent in manorialized areas, peasants tied to the manor were either classed as slaves or as free but having heavy labor obligations to a lord, villeinage^[291] or socage^[292] respectively. Villeins normally bequeathed their holdings to a son.

The manorial system featuring single-family inheritance of land is at odds with tribal ownership of land based on clan and kinship. The point of the family was to carry out the tasks that needed performing rather than to serve as “the coresidency of a descent community based on everyone’s being related.”^[293] The basic unit was the a simple household consisting of wife, husband and children and, as is typical of such families, kinship was traced in both the maternal and paternal line (bilateral kinship), whereas patrilineal kinship (kinship reckoned mainly through the father) predominates in collectivist cultures.

The critical proposal of Mitterauer’s causal model is that with the decline of the Roman Empire and consequent depopulation and lack of slaves, landowners had to compete to find people willing to work their land; so they began offering them considerable autonomy, including the ability to pass land on to heirs. As David Herlihy noted, “the slave economy of antiquity was giving away to an agriculture based, at least in part, on incentives.”^[294] Records indicate that this shift coincided with the shift to a later age of marriage which Herlihy proposes is adaptive because it lengthened generation time and thus made three- or four-generation households less likely. However, given the disadvantages of late marriage noted above, it is difficult to see why lengthening the generation time would be adaptive in northwest Europe but not in the south and east of Europe, much less in other areas dominated by the collectivist pattern.

In order to be an adequate explanation of European uniqueness, conditions such as depopulation must have been unique to northwest Europe. Hartman proposes that northwest Europe was the only area on the entire Eurasian continent with depopulated, underdeveloped land, therefore providing the context in which lords provided incentives such as individual inheritance of land.^[295] Under these circumstances, individuals may have wanted to postpone

daughters' marriages in order to have them work longer on the family land.

However, in response, it seems unlikely that no other area in Eurasia over a 2000-year span had become depopulated due to factors such as war, pestilence, or famine. For example, famines accompanied by depopulation and unused arable land and scarcity of labor occurred in the pre-colonial and early colonial eras in India. The famine of 1768–1770, e.g., resulted in loss of one third of the population of Bengal, and landowners responded by offering incentives such as reduced rent. An historian of India, Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri, writes that “the scarcity of tenants completely transposed the relationship of landlord and tenant in Bengal;”^[296] but this did not result in the development of individualist family structures. Kenneth Pomeranz similarly notes that “warfare, plague, depression and depopulation” in seventeenth-century China did not alter the fundamentally clan-based social structure.^[297]

Moreover, land was inherited in the collectivist cultures of southern and eastern Europe as well, the only difference being that in these areas it remained within the extended patriline rather than being ceded to individual heirs. One must explain why laborers would be attracted to individualist inheritance practices rather than to inheritance by a kinship group—i.e., the phenomenon presupposes the individualist tendencies that need explaining.

Further, contrary to Hartman's contention, the moderately collectivist cultures of southern Europe utilized women's labor as well, so it is difficult to see how families in northwest Europe benefited from having daughters marrying late. After all, although it is true that a daughter's work would be lost to her family if she married at a young age, her natal family would also receive daughters-in-law who would then begin working for their new families, as described below for medieval Montaignou in the south of France. And marrying off daughters early avoids all the risk factors associated with late marriage noted above. I conclude that these cannot be the deciding features.

Hartman claims that these risk factors would have been mitigated by “a new capacity for sustained productivity [that] would have reduced pressures for women's early marriage as a means to ensure heirs and workers.”^[298] But sustained productivity was also achieved in early marriage cultures under circumstances that better ensured heirs and workers.

Hartman also notes that “exposure of their daughters to sexual assaults would not, initially anyway, have been the problem it would become with the emergence of life-cycle service.”^[299] But then, one wonders why normative

life-cycle service in the homes of non-relatives ever developed. Rather than rely on extended kin, families in northwest Europe employed non-relatives, a practice that, according to Hartman “slowly developed into life-cycle service.”^[300] This means that even prior to when life-cycle service became a norm, families were not organized around extended kinship groups—despite the ability of collectivist systems to supply labor needs, as seen by their prevalence throughout the rest of the world. Thus one must explain why employing non-relatives and life-cycle service in the households of non-relatives developed at all in northwest Europe given that, from an evolutionary point of view, non-relatives have less confluence of interest with their employer than relatives, not to mention the greater vulnerability of females to unwanted pregnancies and sexual assault in the employ of non-relatives.

The idea that simply providing incentives for people working the land would give rise to individualism also runs up against data showing that collectivist cultures, particularly in the Middle East, are highly resistant to assimilation of Western individualist norms.^[301] Middle Eastern cultures were dominated for centuries by Greek and Roman conquerors, but this had no influence on the collectivist, clan-based, extended kinship social organization that remains typical of the area today. Cousin marriage, an excellent marker of these tendencies because it shows a preference for endogamy within a male kinship lineage (patrilineage), originated in Middle Eastern prehistory and continues into the present era despite centuries of domination by Western powers.^[302] In view of the recent surge of Middle Eastern Muslim immigration to Europe, this incapacity for assimilation to Western norms is likely to represent a long-term problem for the West.

MODERATE COLLECTIVISM IN SOUTHERN EUROPE VERSUS MODERATE INDIVIDUALISM IN NORTHWEST EUROPE

Joint families in which brothers and their spouses and children living in the same household are typical of southern Europe. Life-cycle service in the households of non-relatives was not characteristic of medieval Montaignou in southern France, as described in Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's classic study.^[303] If a daughter left in marriage, she would be replaced by an in-marriage daughter-in-law, thus compensating for the loss of the daughter's labor.^[304] Marriage was endogamous within the village, which, in conjunction with arranged marriages, ensured that property remained in the patriline. Age at marriage was early, at puberty, with substantially older men in their mid- to late-twenties. This contrasts with the late-marriage pattern where it was difficult to keep property in the male line because generations were more separated in age, automatically limiting the number of potential male heirs and increasing the likelihood that a widow would inherit the property.

Placing the southern French town of Montaignou in context, it has long been known that there are major differences within France corresponding to the division between the Germanic peoples who predominated northeast of "the eternal line" which connects Saint Malo and Geneva and the rest of France.^[305] The northeast developed large-scale agriculture capable of feeding the growing towns and cities prior to the agricultural revolution of the eighteenth century. It was supported by a large array of skilled craftsmen in the towns, and a large class of mid-level ploughmen who "owned horses, copper bowls, glass goblets and often shoes; their children had fat cheeks and broad shoulders, and their babies wore tiny shoes. None of these children had the swollen bellies of the rachitics of the Third World."^[306] The northeast thus became the center of French industrialization and world trade.

Southwest of the St. Malo-Geneva line, however, “rural life became completely de-urbanized. Western and southwestern France became ‘wild’ with dispersed habitation, by virtue of an antithesis that had long been familiar: poor peasants scattered throughout the countryside, rustic and uncivilized to a degree, living ... among their fields and meadows in isolation, outside the community of others.”^[307] This area was never fully manorialized despite being under Frankish control since early in the sixth century. “Vassalage and the *seigneurie* appear fully developed only in the big-village, open-field country between the Loire and the borders of Flanders.”^[308] This fits with the proposal that the Germanic peoples of the north created a manorial culture long predating the medieval period—a culture that was not exportable to non-Germanic areas despite militarily dominating these areas.

The northeast also differed from the southwest in literacy rates: in the early nineteenth century while literacy rates for France as a whole were approximately 50 percent, the rate in the northeast was close to 100 percent, and differences occurred at least from the seventeenth century. Moreover, there was a pronounced difference in stature, with the northeasterners being taller by almost two centimeters in an eighteenth-century sample of military recruits. Ladurie notes that the difference in the entire population was probably larger, because the army would not accept many of the shorter men from the southwest. Finally, in addition to these differences mentioned by Ladurie, Peter Laslett and other family historians have noted that the trend toward the economically independent nuclear family was more prominent in the north, while there was a tendency toward joint families as one moves to the south.^[309]

In colonial Salem, Massachusetts the moderate individualist pattern typical of areas northeast of the St. Malo-Geneva line prevailed. Whereas in southern France and much of southern Europe all women married, in Salem unmarried women were common (even after the skewed sex ratio due to higher male childhood mortality had dissipated). Women were under less supervision and more vulnerable to rape in Salem—another drawback of the individualist pattern noted above. In Salem, men’s and women’s lives increasingly converged and women had higher status than in southern Europe. In Montaillou, people lived in completely different “sexual universes.” In Salem there was “an intense focus on planning for the future,” and inheriting land became less and less important as the capitalist economy accelerated, and men pursued identities in the professions and in business

within a contractual social order.^[310] Whereas in Montaillou, men's lives were determined by decisions made within the clan involving the only two possible vocations (shepherding or farming), in Salem men entered into the economy by interacting with non-relatives, with over 50 possible occupations.^[311] Women in Salem also had work opportunities outside the home (midwife, school teacher, etc.), but this was not the case in Montaillou.

In Salem, women became "deputy husbands," often doing "men's work" and taking a partnership role in family decisions and economic undertakings (e.g., managing family businesses). Men relied more on their wives than on their male kin, and in general sex differences were relatively blurred compared to Montaillou. Marriage was more egalitarian in Salem, with more of a "shared division of power between husbands and wives."^[312] And corresponding to greater egalitarianism between the sexes, there was less blatant misogyny in Salem, whereas in Montaillou open misogyny and wife beating were common. Whereas in Montaillou women without a clan to protect them were preyed upon, in Salem women had some legal protection even from husbands, and they could run away and seek a divorce. Women assumed substantial responsibility for their own chastity—necessary because women interacted with more non-relatives than in Montaillou.^[313]

In Montailou the Church often opposed the interests of the clan but never really changed the system, apart from enforcing the ban on marrying first cousins, but ignoring the prohibition on marrying second cousins^[314]—indicating the Church cannot be considered the principal cause of family patterns in Europe.

This freedom from extended kinship ties in the northwest also unleashed the acquisitive drives of individuals, leading to large individual differences in success in acquiring land and other forms of wealth.^[315] As argued by Gregory Clark in his *Farewell to Alms*, this in turn led to natural selection for industriousness and intelligence in the pre-nineteenth century context where wealth was positively correlated with number of children.^{[316], [317]}

The differences between northwest and southern Europe have been persistent in the contemporary era, although there has been some change in southern Europe. In the south, leaving home typically coincides closely with marriage and finding a job.^[318] Economic distress tends to be shared by the entire family in the south, but only the directly affected individuals in the north. Older people prefer to live with their family in the south (75 percent), not the north (25 percent), and in the U.S. elderly people who live with their children tend to come from southern European family backgrounds. They tend to be more socially conservative than people with northern European backgrounds.

Because of weaker family ties, there are higher levels of homelessness in northern Europe (because people tend to be left to fend for themselves), as well as higher levels of loneliness and suicide. On the other hand, individual initiative and dynamism are much more characteristic of northwest European societies, traits that are “so important for democracy and civil society in the West.”^[319]

Egalitarian Trends in Northwest Europe

Finally, because of the contemporary importance of an ideology of egalitarianism throughout the West, it is important to note an increasing egalitarianism developing after the Middle Ages in northwest Europe. “The story here that has only begun to be told is nonetheless one of the emergence of a popular egalitarian movement that was uniquely northwestern European in its origins.”^[320] This is usually explained by elite diffusion, but Hartman argues that “more important for the appearance of equality as a popular political ideal was the shared domestic governance most people had

experienced from the Middle Ages.”^[321] Hartman emphasizes that, despite ups and downs in particular historic eras, there was a general trend in northwest Europe for men’s and women’s lives to become more similar—a trend that continues into the present.^[322] Paternal authority, never as strong as in southern Europe, became even weaker.

By the end of the seventeenth century, almost half of workers in northwest Europe were wage earners in independent nuclear families without extensive kinship ties, and therefore had to rely on themselves rather than kin. This led to increasing influence for women within the family and to ideologies of egalitarianism and individual rights.^[323]

As noted, the moderate individualist societies of northwest Europe were conducive to women acting independently and having a more equal relationship with their husbands. Even in the nineteenth century, a time when many historians have said women had lower status and withdrew from work, women were partners and “were required to keep households afloat”^[324] “One irony is that long-range planning, risk-taking, personal responsibility, and independence have yet to be recognized as mass behaviors generated by the demands of life in distinctive sorts of households—in other words, as normative conduct required of everyone in late-marriage, weak-family settings.”^[325]

NORTHWEST EUROPEAN NON-MANORIALIZED AREAS

Another difficulty for the theory that manorialism produced European individualism is that several highly individualistic areas of northwest Europe never developed a manorial system. It is therefore a difficult but critical question as to why this happened given that, as noted above, the manorial system has been proposed as the most important causal factor in the development of European individualism. In areas near the North Sea (Friesland), there was instead a grazing economy involving strong associations of peasants, and lords did not have as much power—proposed within the contextualist perspective as due to a marshy topography where open-field agriculture was not possible.^[326]

The open-field system was not found in East Anglia, Kent, or other areas of the “ancient countryside” which were characterized by “scattered and isolated settlements.”^[327] East Anglia was populated mainly by emigrants from Friesland, Kent by emigrants from Jutland. Manorialism leaves unexplained how these areas eventually became characterized by the moderately

individualist family structure typical of Germanic peoples. Moreover, the wetlands common in East Anglia were drained and yielded to intensive agriculture, so that, for example, Norfolk county in East Anglia was as developed and populated in 1300 as 500 years later, so the topography was suitable for open-field agriculture.^[328]

On the other hand, in central England, dominated by the Germanic Saxons, the manorial system of open-field agriculture developed early. Manorialism never developed in southern France or in Byzantine areas of (southern) Italy, but did in Longobardia (settled by the Germanic Lombards). A recent study comparing northern and southern Italy found more intensive kinship relations in southern Italy as well as less prevalence of donating blood.^[329] Individualists are more willing to contribute to public goods like blood donations that will help strangers.

GERMANIC VERSUS IRISH KINSHIP

Germanic Kinship

In Germanic areas, the *Sippe* (the Germanic kindred network) is “rarely encountered in the early sources,”^[330] indicating a lessened emphasis on extended kinship dating from the earliest periods. “By the time *Sippe* appears in historical texts, it is already a structure in decline.”^[331] The most explicit early references occur in laws and charters of Lombards, Bavarians, and Alamanni, but these are in the Christian era. *Sippen* adjudicated disputes and may have had some “residual rights” to the property of its members.^[332] Herlihy suggests a *Sippe* included around 50 families and that they were constantly reforming and splitting. Like the Irish sept discussed below, the *Sippe* had a territory, but within the territory there was individual ownership.^[333] This last point also undercuts the theory that the manorial system gave rise to individual property ownership as a result of incentives provided by lords under conditions of depopulation. Among both the Irish and the Germans, individual ownership of land co-existed with the kinship groups (septs and *Sippen* respectively), indicating that this aspect of individualism predated the manorial system.

Indeed, Herlihy claims that the *Sippe* was never of prime importance:

The larger kin group and households of some type had existed side by side since time immemorial. Moreover, the *Sippe* always played a secondary role in production and reproduction, the two functions which households have classically assumed. And these basic functions, often mentioned in the documentation, lend to households a special visibility. It was not the small household that replaced the *Sippe*; rather, larger social groupings, based on territory, edged it into the shadows. *And the households continued to be centers of production and reproduction, even as the larger society was changing.*^[334]

The Germanic *Sippe* ... was weakening and losing functions and visibility on the Continent very early in the Middle Ages, [while Ireland] long clung to its archaic institutions.^[335]

This fits with the general point that the Germanic Indo-European cultures (and related Scandinavian cultures) had institutions above family-based structures, in particular, the *Männerbünde* (see Chapter 2).

Irish Kinship

The Irish did not develop a manorial system despite a varied topography; although there were some similarities to manorialism, it “did not generate a *familia*.”^[336] They had what would appear to be a system intermediate between the moderate collectivism of southern Europe and the moderate individualism of Germanic areas. The Irish were divided into tribes and septs (similar to the Germanic *Sippe*). Lineage was important: there was strong memory for lineages, typically including the founder within living memory, suggesting instability and continual splitting and reforming.^[337]

Septs had recognized boundaries that were defended against outsiders—a marker of collectivism. Nevertheless, within the sept, ownership of land was individual, not communal, so there were differences in wealth. Septs likely consisted of 120–256 households. Marriage was monogamous, and there was considerable emphasis on the avunculate (i.e., a close relationship between a brother and his sister’s son). Evolutionary anthropologists have explained the avunculate as a means of dealing with paternity uncertainty: a woman is virtually certain that a child is hers and a brother can be certain that he is biologically related to his sister; as a result, kinship traced through the mother is more certain than through the father. Congruent with this, Herlihy notes that sexual relationships outside marriage were accepted.^[338]

Unlike Germanic cultures, the fundamentally kinship-based nature of Irish culture can be seen even quite late in the historical record. Data from 1450–1550 indicate major differences between the Gaelic areas of Ireland and the Anglo-Norman areas, with non-kinship based religious confraternities commonly occurring in the Anglo-Norman areas but absent in the Gaelic areas—likely due to the “exceptional strength” of kinship institutions in the Gaelic areas.^[339] “The *erenagh* clan ... provided a ready-made kinship network, the absence of which would have necessitated the creation of artificial bonds of fraternity and sorority.”^[340]

THE ETHNIC ARGUMENT

These points are consistent with an ethnic perspective on family structure in which the manorial system is an ethnic creation of the Germanic peoples, as opposed to a blank slate perspective in which the manorial system—conceptualized as an accident of history—created a context in which individualism flourished.

To elaborate: the implicit theory in the background of the contextualist perspective is a universalist model in which all humans have the same

tendencies to embrace individualism if given the opportunity provided uniquely by the manorial system which came into being as a response to a unique set of conditions which followed the decline of the Western Roman Empire. My response is that there were already strong tendencies toward individualism in Europe among prototypical Indo-European groups, certainly including the Germanic groups, which likely gave rise to the manorial system in the first place.

It is noteworthy that in *Germania* (c. 100 AD) Tacitus describes relationships between masters and slaves in a manner remarkably consistent with the manorial system of the early Middle Ages:

The other slaves [i.e., those who did not voluntarily become slaves as a result of losing a dangerous game of skill] are not employed after our [Roman] manner with distinct domestic duties assigned to them, but each one has the management of a house and home of his own. The master requires from the slave a certain quantity of grain, of cattle, and of clothing, as he would from a tenant, and this is the limit of subjection.
[\[341\]](#)

This embodies the essence of the manorial system, with slaves having substantial autonomy while nevertheless having obligations to the lord; if Tacitus is correct, this system long preceded incorporation of the Germanic tribes into the Empire. Similarly, George Caspar Homans notes that “Wessex and Mercia may have known for ages, in England and in the German homeland, a rural social order that more nearly resembled what later came to be thought of as typical of a manor than ever did the society of East Anglia, Kent, and Friesland.”[\[342\]](#) Homans thus agrees with Tacitus: the essentials of the manorial system may well have existed centuries before the medieval period in Germanic areas.

As noted above, Tacitus also states that the late-marriage pattern was apparent among the German tribes in his time. This was quite unlike the practice in the Roman Empire where girls were typically married shortly after menarche.
[\[343\]](#)

The ethnic perspective is also consistent with the fact that in southern Europe, family structure was based on kinship relations despite being part of the Frankish Empire and having a system where lords were due rents and other obligations. In other words, if the essence of manorialism is a system of rents

and obligations to a lord, such a system did not lessen the importance of kinship relations in southern France and Italy. As Hartman notes, “despite the influence of Church, lord, and monarch, the village leadership on a day-to-day-basis came from the heads of the forty or so ostals” (i.e., land parcels dominated by particular kinship groups).^[344] In Montaillou the lord did impose a variety of taxes and rents on the ostals,^[345] as in the manorial system, but the land remained in the control of the kinship group—whereas in the Frankish heartland it was owned by individual nuclear families. In other words, in the south the system of rents accommodated to the moderately collectivist family environment, while in the north the system of rents accommodated to the moderately individualist environment. Elite domination did not change family structure but accommodated to it.

I conclude that, consistent with Tacitus’s remarks, the Germanic peoples had a greater tendency toward creating the manorial system than other groups and that the system was in place long before the Frankish conquests of the early medieval period. Germans also had a greater tendency toward individualism than the Irish (and southern and eastern Europeans) long before the establishment of the manorial system in the early medieval period.

Nevertheless, in the Middle Ages in conditions of depopulation and the consequent need for labor, lords may well have been incentivized to grant families more individual autonomy. Unlike the situation of labor shortage in India mentioned above, under these conditions the natural tendencies of northwest Europeans came to the fore and the power of the wider kinship group declined further. The system had already established patterns of individual inheritance that generated differences in family wealth, and they therefore eschewed whatever remained of the ties of the wider kinship group with relative ease. They naturally adopted personal responsibility rather than collectivist familism because it was already ingrained in their culture; the *Sippe* faded into a historical memory.

The importance of incentives provided to laborers in facilitating individualism (but not causing it) can be seen in Holland where lords offered attractive terms to settlers willing to farm newly cultivable land:

The consequences of this process were significant for large parts of Holland from the tenth century onwards. Both the Bishop of Utrecht and the Count of Holland (but sometimes also local lords) lured colonists to the scarcely inhabited marshes by offering personal freedom from

serfdom and full peasant property rights to the land. The rural people who reclaimed the Holland peat lands between the tenth and fifteenth centuries barely knew of the manor or seignorial dues, although admittedly recent archaeological evidence has pointed to the existence of some limited manorial [estates] from as early as the ninth century. In fact, many of the colonists in the Holland peat-lands originated from heavily manorialised societies and looked to escape the constrictions of serfdom further inland. Each colonist received a standardised strip of land of their own but also enjoyed favourable jurisdictions over the waste (*recht van opstrek*) which allowed all colonists to reclaim as much of the marshes as they wanted by extending their linear plots until they met up with a natural boundary or were stopped by another property

The same process can be traced for the Frisian and German coastal marshes too. Through this reclamation context, there also developed a peasant society characterised by highly egalitarian distribution of property. Landownership was small-scale and in the hands of peasant farmers themselves, with agriculture in the initial phases highly unspecialised. Aristocratic landownership was minimal; only 5–10 percent of the total area in the late Middle Ages. This free peasant property structure remained in place from the moment that reclamation took off up to the 1500s.

The reclamation of the marshes of medieval Holland created legally free and relatively egalitarian societies, which in turn impacted on the modes of exploitation undertaken there. Land was worked by the people that colonised it and owned it almost outright—the peasants. What emerged from the earliest moments of colonisation all the way through to the 1500s was a proliferation of small to medium-sized farms, which were exploited by the peasant household directly. ...

Medieval Holland was characterised by egalitarian distribution of property, high levels of freedom and autonomy for its inhabitants, secure rights to property and a modern system of property transfer, a wide range of specialised and commercialised (non-agricultural) economic activities, and a flexible and unrestricted market for commodities and capital. ^[346]

It is noteworthy that Friesland is included in this summary, because Frisians emigrated to East Anglia in the fifth century—500 years before the

Dutch land reclamation project. However, in East Anglia they also resisted manorialism. In support of this fifth-century emigration scenario, Homans notes linguistic evidence as well as contemporary written sources (e.g., Bede), and archeology.^[347] In these areas, unlike manorialized areas, there were independent holdings (i.e., without labor obligations to a lord) located near small villages (“hamlets”).^[348] Over time, the holdings became unequal, so that by the end of the thirteenth century “irregularity is the rule rather than the exception.”^[349] Such conditions were not conducive to manorialism.

If a man of war in the Dark Ages wished to get support for himself and his followers in the form of heavy work-services on demesne land, how much more easy to exploit the big open-field village whose members were already accustomed to large-scale cooperation in communal agriculture, than the small, independent, loosely organized plowlands of East Anglia, Kent, and Friesland.^[350]

A critical point, however, that arises from this is that despite living outside the zone of manorialization, the East Anglians, ancestors of the Puritans of Salem, became exemplars of the northwest European family system. Indeed, Puritan Salem is seen as paradigmatic of the individualist Western family by Hartman. This is a further objection to the theory that the manorial system gave rise to the individualist family.

Still, at least by the time of the Norman Conquest of England and likely dating from the original fifth-century migrations,^[351] there is evidence for a greater role of extended kinship in Kent (settled by the Jutes, a Germanic people, likely from Jutland) and East Anglia (settled mainly by Angles from Friesland) than in the manorialized areas of central England—a pattern that resembled patterns on “the southern shore of the Channel, notably between the Old Saxon area of Germany and the Frankish-Frisian area.”^[352] Homans finds that Friesland had a joint family structure with partible inheritance, with property left undivided among the heirs (brothers) and worked jointly, or it was divided among the heirs. Land was held by a patrilineal kinship group and inheritance (termed ‘gavelkind’) was partible, divided among heirs (often brothers); if one of the brothers died without issue, then his land returned to the group. This ultimately led to holdings too small to be viable.^[353]

Thus, despite giving rise to the Puritans whose family system was definitely within the Western European individualist tradition, East Anglia

and Friesland appear to originally have had a system that resembled in some ways the family system of southern France: “It looks as if we had to do with joint-family communities like [French sociologist Frédéric] Le Play described as still existing in the Auvergne [in France south of the St. Malo-Geneva line] in the nineteenth century: groups of men claiming descent from a common patrilineal ancestor, living in one house or a small group of houses and managing in common a compact body of land, under the leadership of the oldest or ablest male of each successive senior generation.”^[354] Marriage in East Anglia was earlier than in the manorialized areas of England, and this area had a higher rate of natural increase,^[355] putting pressure on land as plots were subdivided because of partible inheritance. In this system there were very few villeins owing labor services to a lord. Indeed, the free peasants of East Anglia (Norfolk and Suffolk counties) had approximately half the total of freemen in all of England as assessed in the Domesday Book (1086).^[356]

This suggests a developmental sequence among these groups, originating with a more collectivist family structure than found in the manorial areas, but then developing into an individualist structure, without manorialism ever being part of the picture. This in turn would imply the following:

1. Manorialism is not critical to the development of individualist families in northern Europe, given that the Frisians and their offshoots (e.g., East Anglians) eventually developed individualist families in the absence of manorialism, as well as the evidence for individualist family patterns long pre-dating early medieval manorialization among the Germanic peoples and in the Western Roman Empire. As a result of not being part of the manorial system, East Anglians did not owe services to a lord and had relatively greater individual freedom—a central issue in Chapter 6 on the Puritans. On the other hand, despite the similarity in the importance of extended family in both East Anglia and Montaignou, an important difference is that in Montaignou the lord imposed a variety of taxes and rents on the ostals,^[357] whereas this did not occur in East Anglia. East Anglians therefore did not have a tradition of submission to a lord.
2. However, it is likely manorialism sped up the rise of the individualist family, given that non-manorialized areas such as East Anglia, and Kent lagged behind manorialized areas in moving away from familial collectivism. Even so, people from these areas became exemplars of

individualist families, *pace* Hartman's work on the New England Puritans.

3. The most likely reason for the differences between northern and southern Europe, which have persisted from time immemorial to the present, is an ethnic cline, the same cline which has been documented for height.^[358] The non-manorialized areas of southern Europe retained elements of the collectivist family pattern long after its disappearance in manorialized and non-manorialized areas of northern Europe—indeed, into the contemporary era. Again, the suggestion is that northern Europeans have more of an ethnically based tendency toward individualism than southern Europeans.
4. Finally, as discussed in the following section, the most extreme forms of individualism are found in Scandinavia which never had a manorial system.

STATE-SUPPORTED EXTREME INDIVIDUALISM IN SCANDINAVIA

As noted above, the Scandinavians have the most individualist family patterns in all of Europe.^[359] This may seem paradoxical in view of Sweden's socialist economic policies and powerful tendencies toward egalitarianism, conformism, and law-abidingness, but the logic is quite clear:

What is unique about Swedish social policy is neither the extent to which the state has intervened in society nor the generous insurance schemes, but the underlying moral logic. Though the path in no way has been straight, one can discern over the course of the twentieth century an overarching ambition to liberate the individual citizen from all forms of subordination and dependency in civil society: the poor from charity, the workers from their employers, wives from their husbands, children from parents (and vice versa when the parents have become elderly).

In practice, the primacy of individual autonomy has been institutionalized through a plethora of laws and practices Interdependency within the family has been minimized through individual taxation of spouses, family law reforms have revoked obligations to support elderly parents, more or less universal day care makes it possible for women to work, student loans which are blind in relation to the income of parents or spouse give young adults a large

degree of autonomy in relation to their families, and children are given a more independent status through the abolition of corporal punishment and a strong emphasis on children's rights. All in all, this legislation has made Sweden into the least family-dependent and the most individualized society on the face of the earth.^[360]

In this regime, families become “voluntary associations”—despite continuing to exhibit high-investment parenting as indicated by high levels of time spent with children. Nordic families are relatively prone to “independence (of children), individualism, and (gender) equality.”^[361] The “Swedish theory of love” is that partners should not be dependent on each other—that true love means not entering a relationship as dependent on any way (e.g., financially) on the other person.^[362] Surveys of values confirm that Nordic societies cluster together in scoring high on “emancipatory self-expression.”^[363] Nordic societies also cluster at the top of social trust, despite also being high on secular/rational values and despite trust typically being associated with religiosity.^[364] Finally, the high standing on “generalized trust” provides economic advantages because it lowers “transaction costs”—less need for written contracts and legal protections, law suits, etc.^[365]

These trends toward individual freedom and lack of dependency on superiors go back at least to the medieval period. Michael Roberts noted that the peasant in medieval Sweden “retained his social and political freedom to a greater degree, played a greater part in the politics of the country, and was altogether a more considerable person, than in any other western European country.”^[366] Similarly, Lars Trägårdh:

The respect for law and a positive view of the state are historically linked to the relative freedom of the Swedish peasantry. The weakness, not to say absence of feudal institutions, corresponds with a history of self-reliance, self-rule, land ownership, representation as an estate in parliament, and the consequent willingness and ability to participate in the political affairs of the country. There is, of course, a strong mythological aspect to this oft-claimed lack of feudal traditions in Sweden. ...

[Nevertheless,] the consequence of the relative inclusion and empowerment was that their status as *subjects* was balanced by their position as *citizens*. As an estate in parliament, they had a part in passing

laws which in this way gained popular legitimacy. Furthermore, since the peasants and the King (at times joined by the Clergy) often were joined in a common struggle against their common adversary, the Nobility, many peasants came to view the State, in the figure of the King as in some sense being “on their side.” To be sure, in actuality political alliances shifted, some Kings were more powerful than others and the Nobility was at times close to achieving the kind of subjugation of the peasantry that was the norm in much of the rest of Europe. But all things told, the peasant struggle to retain their legal, political and property rights was remarkably successful, and by the time that democratic and liberal ideas made their way to Sweden from the Continent in the nineteenth century, they were effectively fused with these politically strong yeoman traditions.^[367]

This passage fits well with the writing of nineteenth-century historian Erik Gustaf Geijer (1783–1847). Geijer noted that feudalism (consisting of hereditary rights of the nobility and serfdom for peasants) developed in most Germanic societies beginning with the conquests of the Franks; however, “in Scandinavia itself, ... the fiefs [i.e., land parcels granted to the nobility] never became hereditary, even less was serfdom introduced among the people.”^[368] Moreover, traditional Swedish kingship was not oppressive: Geijer “was a firm believer in constitutional monarchy with a strong personal influence of a potent king—emphasizing the unique bond between the monarch and *his* people that Geijer regarded as an historical fact in Sweden.”^[369]

The king did not act as the highest conciliator nor judge the free man in the absence of his equals, for all the judgments were given with the people or, what is the same thing, with an elected *jury*. In war the king was the commander, though the people did not follow him unconditionally in anything except what it had itself taken part in deciding or which the presence of the enemy in the land made necessary. All other warfare was not a national war but merely a feud, in which the king could also *freely* engage with *his* men, that is those who owed him particular allegiance (*fideles*) [i.e., the king’s “permanent war-band”^[370] or “*comitatus*,”^[371] i.e., a *Männerbünd*] or allied themselves temporarily with him. For no free man, even if subject to a king, was the king’s man, but his own. To be called the former required a specific relationship.^[372]

The warrior nobility was a nobility of service and of the court and for a long time did not, and only with the expansion of royal power, gain any preferential rights with regard to the people. Nor were any of the advantages that accompanied it hereditary or even permanent in respect of a given person.^[373]

Geijer claims that “in Scandinavia we know the original government to have been ruled by priests,” and he contrasts this priestly regime with “the first ‘Odinic’ rulers.”^[374] As noted in Chapter 2, Odin was the “god of battle rage” and strongly associated with the Indo-European warrior culture.^[375]

The rule of law rather than despotism by kings was the norm: “Rule of law was essential to the social contract that underpinned the emerging Swedish state, and adherence to the law by the king and his administration was essential to the legitimacy of the state.”^[376] The values embedded in the law became internalized social norms.

The acceptance of strong state controls supporting egalitarianism is thus seen by the Swedes as necessary precisely for achieving individual autonomy:

From the perspective of what might be termed the Swedish ideology, active interventionism on the part of the state to promote egalitarian conditions is not a threat to individual autonomy but rather the obverse: a necessary prerequisite to free the citizens from demeaning and humbling dependence on one another. As a culture and a political system, Sweden cannot simply be described as communitarian, that is, as a society in which the citizens prize their voluntary association with one another above their empowerment as individuals. In fact, the official rhetoric about solidarity and social democracy notwithstanding, Sweden is not first and foremost a warm *Gemeinschaft* composed of altruists who are exceptionally caring or loving, but a rather hyper-modern *Gesellschaft* of self-realizing individuals who believe that a strong state and stable social norms will keep their neighbor out of both their lives and their backyards.^[377]

At the level of the family, Berggren and Trägårdh agree with Patrick Heady^[378] (see above) that Sweden “stands out” from the Western European family system. As noted above, a key aspect of the Swedish system is that

young people had to assume individual responsibility for their marriages and for getting on in the world: “Young people were controlled by internalized systems of self-control, not least the tradition of ‘night bundling’ which, though in no way unique to Sweden, was very widespread and prominent.”^[379]

Sweden is thus on the extreme end of individualism. “Sweden—and to a somewhat lesser extent the rest of Scandinavia—[became] the least family-oriented and most individualized society on the face of the earth, scoring at the extreme end of emancipatory self-expression values and secular-rational values.”^[380] The downside includes high levels of divorce, lack of filial piety, “alarming rates of stress and psychological ill-health,” and an individualist youth culture that in the contemporary world is able to be exploited by commercial interests and much given to sexual promiscuity and drugs.^[381]

CONCLUSION

The central argument here is that the origins of the unique northwest European family structure lie in biological influences stemming from a combination of Indo-European peoples originating on the steppes of Southeast Europe and hunter-gather peoples whose evolutionary past lies in Northwest Europe itself.

1. The widespread practice of placing servants in households of non-relatives cannot be explained in purely economic terms as a response to medieval manorialism. However, it is compatible with elaborate systems of non-kinship-based reciprocity that have been noted in hunter-gatherer culture living in harsh environments (Chapter 3) as well as a characteristic of Proto-Indo-European cultures and their descendants (Chapter 2) dating back thousands of years.
2. Also compatible with primordialist explanations, historians are unable to firmly date the origins of the individualist family. In combination with Tacitus’s observations regarding Germanic slavery (which, as noted, was essentially manorialism), the fact that customs of monogamy, late marriage and individualist inheritance patterns long preceded the early Middle Ages suggests that the individualist family pattern is rooted in the evolutionary history of the Germanic peoples.
3. The individualist family is a poor fit with the manorial system because of its lesser ability, compared to collectivist families, to protect females from unwanted sexual advances and to ensure an adequate retirement for

parents. Late marriage for females also results in lower fertility and makes the production of heirs less likely.

4. The very different family forms in northwest versus much of southern Europe persisted in near proximity despite the same religion (until the Reformation, which mainly occurred in the Germanic areas of northwest Europe) and despite manorialism in both areas as a result of the Frankish conquests. Similarly, the collectivism of Middle Eastern families persisted despite prolonged occupation by individualist Western cultures.
5. A contextual explanation in terms of depopulation motivating landlords to grant concessions to families fails because similar conditions in other parts of Eurasia failed to result in individualist families.
6. There is a cline within northwest Europe such that the most individualist family patterns occur in Scandinavia, particularly Sweden which never underwent manorialism.

The emphasis here is the northwest-southeast difference in family patterns. This perspective allows for a more fine-grained analysis than suggested by the Hajnal Line, which lumps northwestern and southwestern Europe west of a line from Trieste to St. Petersburg into the same category, with the exception of Ireland, southern Iberia, and southern Italy. That division, e.g., includes southern and northern France in the same category despite the very large differences noted here.

The deviation of Ireland from the northwest European pattern and the conformity of the German-speaking areas of early medieval northern Italy to the northwest European pattern were discussed above. This material suggests that the moderate individualist northwest European family pattern is fundamentally an ethnic creation of the Germanic peoples, who have less of the Middle Eastern farmer genetic ancestry that is highest in southern Europe, and more Indo-European and hunter-gatherer ancestry—both more common in northern than southern Europe.

In conclusion, an ethnically based northwest-southeast gradient is the main dimension explaining variation in family structure within Western Europe. Of course, viewed in a broader context—in comparison, say, to the Middle East—*all* of Europe, including Eastern Europe, is relatively individualistic.

THE CHURCH IN EUROPEAN HISTORY

The Catholic Church is a unique institution, not only in Western history, but in world history. When Marco Polo visited the Chinese in the thirteenth century and when Cortez arrived among the Aztecs in 1519, they found a great many similarities with their own society, including a hereditary nobility, priests, warriors, craftsmen, and peasants all living off an agricultural economy. There was thus an overwhelming convergence among the societies. But they did not find a religious establishment that claimed to be superior to the secular establishment and was successfully regulating the reproductive behavior of the secular elite. Nor did they find a king like Louis IX (St. Louis) who ruled France while living like a monk with his one wife and went on a Crusade to free the Holy Land from the Muslims.

When confronted by an overwhelming convergence among all stratified societies combined with a possible point of divergence, the temptation is to argue that the divergence is illusory and date it to a much later period when there was a clear ecological difference between Western and non-Western societies (e.g., industrialization), as some theorists have done.^[382] However, there is no reason to suppose that high levels of convergence among all traditional stratified societies of the world could not be accompanied by an important point of divergence in the case of Western societies. A thesis of this chapter is that, viewed in cross-cultural perspective, the Catholic Church is a unique institution that has had important influence on the course of Western history. This influence was directed at altering Western culture away from extended kinship networks and other collectivist institutions, motivated ultimately by the desire to extend its own power. However, although the Church promoted individualism and doubtless influenced Western culture in that direction, this influence built on individualistic tendencies that long predated Christianity and were due ultimately to ethnic tendencies toward individualism unique to European peoples (Chapters 1–4).

Although the perspective developed here emphasizes ethnicity as a critical variable, culture is also important, and quite clearly the influence of the

Church must be seen as a cultural influence. In particular, beginning in the ancient world, the ideologies associated with Christianity had a profound effect on the West. Here I begin by sketching a theoretical framework based on evolutionary psychology for understanding how ideologies can have an impact on history, i.e., how idealist influences on history are possible.

IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSING: HOW IDEOLOGY MOTIVATES BEHAVIOR

Such a view is based on psychological research indicating two very different types of psychological processing: implicit and explicit (also discussed in Chapter 8). These modes may be contrasted on a number of dimensions.^[383] Implicit processing is automatic, effortless, relatively fast, and involves parallel processing of large amounts of information; it characterizes the modules described by evolutionary psychologists and focuses on mechanisms that respond in a reflexive manner to particular environments (e.g., the eye blink reflex in response to light; sexual desire in response to sexual imagery). Explicit processing is conscious, controllable, effortful, relatively slow, and involves serial processing of relatively small amounts of information. Explicit processing is involved in the operation of the mechanisms of general intelligence^[384] as well as in controlling emotional states and behavioral tendencies.^[385] It is also central to conceptualizing ideologies and how they can motivate behavior.

Religious beliefs are able to motivate behavior because of the ability of explicit representations of religious thoughts (e.g., the traditional Catholic teaching of eternal punishment in Hell as a result of mortal sin) to control sub-cortical modular mechanisms (e.g., sexual desire). In other words, the affective states and action tendencies mediated by implicit processing are controllable by higher brain centers located in the cortex.^[386] For example, people are able to effortfully suppress sexual thoughts, even though there is a strong evolutionary basis for males in particular becoming aroused by sexual imagery.^[387] Thus, under experimental conditions, male subjects who were instructed to distance themselves from sexually arousing imagery were able to suppress their sexual arousal.^[388] Imagine that instead of a psychologist giving instructions, people were subjected to religious ideas that such thoughts were sinful and would be punished by God.

Ideologies such as the Christian ideology of the sinfulness of sexual thoughts are a particularly important form of explicit processing that may result in top-down control over behavior. That is, explicit construals of the

world may motivate behavior.^[389] For example, explicit construals of costs and benefits of religiously relevant actions mediated by human language and the ability of humans to create explicit representations of events may influence individuals to avoid religiously proscribed food or refrain from fornication or adultery in the belief that such actions would lead to punishments in the afterlife.

Ideologies, including religious ideologies, characterize a significant number of people and motivate their behavior in a top-down manner—i.e., the higher cognitive functions involving explicit processing located primarily in the prefrontal cortex are able to control the more primitive (modular, reflexive) parts of the brain such as structures underlying sexual desire. Ideologies are coherent sets of beliefs.^[390] These explicitly held beliefs are able to exert a control function over behavior and evolved predispositions.

There is no reason to suppose that ideologies are necessarily adaptive.^[391] Ideologies often characterize the vast majority of people who belong to voluntary subgroups within a society (e.g., a particular religious sect). Moreover, ideologies are often intimately intertwined with various social controls—rationalizing the controls but also benefitting from the power of social controls to enforce ideological conformity in schools or in religious institutions. The next section illustrates these themes as applied to regulating monogamy in Western Europe.

IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL CONTROLS SUPPORTING MONOGAMY IN WESTERN EUROPE

My background is in evolutionary biology, and one of the first questions that struck me when I was exposed to the evolutionary theory of sex was to wonder why Western cultures tend toward monogamy. The evolutionary theory of sex is quite simple: Females must invest greatly in reproduction—pregnancy, lactation, and often childcare—require an extraordinary amount of time. As a result, the reproduction of females is highly limited. Even under the best of conditions women could have, say, twenty children. But the act of reproduction is cheap for men. As a result, males benefit from multiple mates, and it is expected that males with wealth and power would use their wealth and power to secure as many mates as possible. In short, intensive polygyny by wealthy, powerful males is an optimal male strategy, i.e., it is behavior that optimizes individual male reproductive success under most conditions.

This theory is well supported. There are strong associations between wealth and reproductive success in traditional societies from around the world. Wealthy, powerful males are able to control very large numbers of females. The elite males of all of the traditional civilizations around the world, including those of China, India, Muslim societies, the New World civilizations, ancient Egypt, and ancient Israel, often had hundreds and even thousands of concubines. The Emperor of China had thousands of concubines, and the Sultan of Morocco is in the *Guinness Book of World Records* as having 888 children. In sub-Saharan Africa with its relatively low level of economic production, women were generally able to rear children without male provisioning, and the result was low-level polygyny in which males competed to control as many women as possible. In all of these societies, the children from these relationships were legitimate. They could inherit property and were not scorned by the public.

To be sure, there are other societies where monogamy is the norm. It is common to distinguish ecologically imposed monogamy from socially imposed monogamy. In general, ecologically imposed monogamy is found in societies that have been forced to adapt to very harsh ecological conditions such as deserts and extreme cold because economic production is quite limited.^[392] Under such harsh conditions, males can't control the surplus value created by other males (in Marxist terms), as elites often did in agricultural societies where agricultural labor enabled lavish lifestyles of the powerful. As a result, in harsh environments, it would be impossible for males to control additional females beyond what they can support via their own efforts, and their investment would therefore perforce be directed to the children of one woman. Moreover, under harsh conditions a woman would be unable to rear children by herself but would require provisioning from a male.

If these conditions persisted for an evolutionarily significant time, one might expect to find that the population would develop a strong tendency toward monogamy. In fact, as argued in Chapter 3, there is likely a genetic basis for Western monogamy resulting from evolution for a significantly long period in the harsh ecological conditions of northern Europe during the last Ice Age. This would ensure a psychological tendency toward monogamy even in the face of altered ecological conditions.

However, the genetic basis for monogamy never resulted in what ecologists term "obligate monogamy" in which a species is genetically channeled into a narrow reproductive niche. Many males in the West, like

males in other societies, clearly retained a taste for sexual variety and even power over women (as noted below, Henry I of England [early twelfth century] had 20–25 illegitimate children).

Thus, despite genetic tendencies toward monogamy, one would expect that elite males in the West would pursue non-monogamous relationships. However, as summarized below, the historical record indicates that the sexual behavior of elite males came under the purview of the Church, and it energetically regulated the marriage and reproductive behavior of these men. In some historical eras it also policed the sexual behavior of its own personnel so that celibacy became the norm. To the extent that the Church was successful, Western monogamy would be an example of what Richard Alexander termed “socially imposed monogamy” to refer to situations where monogamy occurs even in the absence of harsh ecological conditions. ^[393]

Whereas all of the other economically advanced cultures of the world have been typified by polygyny by successful males, Western societies beginning with the ancient Greeks and Romans and extending up to the present have had a powerful tendency toward monogamy. ^[394] Thus the Catholic Church cannot be seen as originating monogamy, but, as indicated in the following, it did have a central role in maintaining monogamy at least through the Middle Ages.

The Catholic Church was the heir to Roman civilization where monogamy was ingrained in law and custom, and during the Middle Ages it took it upon itself to impose monogamy on the emerging European aristocracy. ^[395] Relatively low-level polygyny (in comparison to other societies based on intensive agriculture such as China, India, the Middle East, and Meso-America) did exist in Europe, and during the Middle Ages it became the object of conflict between the Church and the aristocracy. The Church was “the most influential and important governmental institution [of Europe] during the medieval period,” and a major aspect of this power over the secular aristocracy involved the regulation of sex and reproduction. ^[396]

The result was that the same rules of sexual conduct were imposed on both rich and poor. The program of the Church “required above all that laymen, especially the most powerful among them, should submit to the authority of the Church and allow it to supervise their morals, especially their sexual morals. It was by this means, through marriage, that the aristocracy could be kept under control. All matrimonial problems had to be submitted to and resolved by the Church alone.” ^[397]

Reconciling the behavior of the Church with evolutionary psychology requires comment. During at least some periods (see below) the Church was led by celibate men who sought power over the aristocracy. An evolutionist expects political power to be translated into reproductive success, but although that did occur in some eras, it was certainly not during the High Middle Ages. The desire for power is a human universal but, like all human desires, it need not be linked with reproductive success. Similarly, people desire sex, but engaging in sex does not necessarily lead to having lots of children even though Mother Nature designed it that way. And in the case of the Church, much of its power during the High Middle Ages (~1000 to ~1250)—the peak of its power—derived from the popular image that it was staffed by men who had eschewed reproduction.

In other words, the power of the Church ultimately relied on acceptance of a religious ideology which, as discussed below, was likely attractive in large part because the people most responsible for propagating it—the prelates and monks—were perceived as altruistic, not self-interested. The medieval Church successfully conveyed the image that it was not concerned with controlling women or having a high level of reproductive success. However, this had by no means always been the case. Critically important was the papal revolution of the eleventh century.

THE PAPAL REVOLUTION: ESTABLISHING THE IMAGE OF THE CHURCH AS AN ALTRUISTIC INSTITUTION

An evolutionary perspective views self-interest as a fundamental principle. Altruists by definition are at a reproductive disadvantage within their groups, giving more to others than they receive in return. To be sure, groups can structure themselves so that people are indoctrinated or forced to conform to group interests via social controls—the fundamental insight of cultural group selection.^[398] But even in such a case, it is assumed that the default condition is self-interest—self-interest that needs to be controlled and channeled in the interests of the group.

Reams of psychological research vindicate the fundamental importance of self-interest. Apart from close relatives (particularly children), reciprocity is the fundamental norm of human interactions.^[399] People thus do not expect others to behave in an altruistic manner, generously giving of themselves with no expectation of tangible reward. Thus it is not surprising that when people do behave altruistically, they are given high praise and are rewarded with an enhanced reputation.

Acclaim in the media and in one's face-to-face world certainly has psychological rewards rooted in our evolutionary biology: humans naturally desire social approval. Those applauding such behavior implicitly realize that self-sacrificing behavior goes against natural tendencies, and in general, these altruists are not behaving in a manner that optimizes biological fitness.^[400] In any case, as noted below, after the papal revolution, parents—many of them wealthy—often disapproved of their child's decision to join a religious order, presumably because, like most parents, they wanted grandchildren.

Similarly, the power and influence of the Church during the High Middle Ages was immeasurably aided by an image of reproductive altruism. However, prior to reviewing these data, some background information is in order.

The collapse of the Carolingian Empire in 888 left a vacuum of central authority, presenting new challenges for the Church. It responded by attempting to be a unifying, centralizing force itself, but this was difficult because during the Carolingian period, the Church had become compromised by secular elites—the pope a “mere plaything of local aristocratic families.”^[401] In West Francia (i.e., proto-France), bishops were being appointed by secular military elites; these bishops and abbots then gave away Church properties to the followers of those elites; Church offices were often purchased (simony), and clergy were often married or kept concubines, violating the practice of celibacy. Writing of the French Church in 742, Saint Boniface complained to the pope about “so-called deacons who have spent their lives since boyhood in debauchery, adultery, and every kind of filthiness, who entered the diaconate with this reputation, and who now, while they have four or five concubines in their beds, still read the gospel.”^[402]

What followed was extremely important for the subsequent influence of Christianity on the West. One can imagine that if secular military elites continued to control the clergy within their domains, there would have been a continuation of basic Indo-European social organization in which the Church and society at large were dominated by an aristocratic military elite.

However, seeing its power and influence on the wane because of political fractionation resulting from the end of the Carolingian Empire and because of perceived corruption and subservience to the aristocracy, the Church responded by reforming itself and aggressively claiming sovereignty over secular authorities. This was facilitated by the public image (and substantial reality) that the Church during the High Middle Ages was a reproductively

altruistic institution. An important harbinger of things to come was the action of Pope Nicholas I (a key contributor to idea of papal supremacy) in the mid-ninth century to prevent the attempt by Lothar, king of Lorraine, to divorce his childless wife and marry a woman with whom he had children—a practice that would have been entirely legitimate in pre-Christian Germanic society.

Larry Siedentop proposes that three things were necessary for the papal revolution: an elite that had successfully reformed itself (thereby credibly presenting an altruistic image, so essential for public support), a credible claim of papal supremacy, and a well-developed body of canon law. Beginning in 1073, the papacy devolved to “monkish popes”—popes with a monastic background.^[403] Papal councils became more frequent, papal legates more numerous, and papal correspondence more extensive. The Church developed a relatively sophisticated legal system that was far more predictable and organized than secular legal systems of the period. The huge amount of litigation strengthened its claims to supreme legislative and judicial authority.

The monasteries (most importantly, Cluny in the early tenth century) took the lead in reform at a time when the episcopacy was corrupt. Cluny restored the prestige of monasticism “as a truly Christian life.”^[404] As in previous eras, the model of monasticism was most successful in propagating an emotionally compelling image of the Church, stimulating “a remarkable outburst of lay piety.”

As indicated by the example of King Lothar, a central aspect of the papal revolution was the Church’s stand on marriage: consent between spouses, no divorce, elaborate rules against consanguineous marriages (which had the effect of lessening the power of extended kinship relations, as aristocratic families were forced to look far afield for mates), and less power for the paterfamilias. Essentially, the Church was choosing marriage as a key battleground in its effort to increase its power over secular rulers, presumably because issues of marriage and sexuality lent themselves to moral and religious strictures. By interpreting marriage as a sacrament and thus within its proper purview, the Church had an important weapon for extending its power over secular elites.

Critical to the success of the Church was that from mid-eleventh to the mid-thirteenth century there was a successful reform away from the abuses resulting from secular control over Church offices. Reform was inspired by

the prestige and power of monasteries, especially Cluny, with their ascetic lifestyle, and “the creation of a clerical elite determined on systematic reform.”^[405] Pope Leo IX (pope from 1049 to 1054) was central, e.g., to reestablishing clerical celibacy and opposing simony. Several popes during this period had monastic backgrounds, and Leo IX, who was not a monk himself, was an enthusiastic promoter of the monastic order of Cluny. Ultimately, the credibility of the Church depended on an image of ascetic, celibate clergy; this was substantially achieved during the High Middle Ages.

“From the beginnings of monasticism in Western Europe monks had enjoyed a special standing among the poor. They aroused respect and even affection because they were understood as representing the Christian life more fully than any other group, including—perhaps especially—the secular clergy.”^[406] There was a pattern of “religious radicalism” advocating ascetic life, condemning high living.

The Church therefore projected the image of chastity and altruism while assiduously pursuing power over secular elites. Its power and wealth were not directed at reproductive success. Reform of the sexual behavior of the clergy was real. No English prelate of the thirteenth century is known to have had a wife or family. Married clergy even at lower levels were exceptional during this period in England, and low levels of clerical incontinence continued into the Reformation.

True reproductive altruism appears to have been a factor in the very widespread attraction of extremely ascetic monastic lifestyles and contributed greatly to the public’s perception of the Church during the high Middle Ages. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries thousands of monasteries were founded. Composed of celibate and ascetic males and recruited mainly from the more affluent classes, monasteries “set the tone in the spirituality of the whole Church, in education and in art, [and] in the transmission of culture.”^[407] The image of monastic altruism was also fostered by an ideology in which the prayers of monks were believed to aid all Christians.

These orders provided a very popular public image of the Church. During the thirteenth century, mendicant friars,^[408] such as the Dominicans and Franciscans, were instrumental in reforming the Church to extend the power of the Pope, to enforce rules on clerical celibacy, to preach against nepotism and simony, and to give the Church substantial authority over secular powers, including the ability to regulate sexual relationships. “The voluntary poverty and self-imposed destitution that identified the early Mendicants with the

humblest and most deprived sections of the population, in loud contrast to the careerism and ostentation of the secular clergy and the corporate wealth and exclusiveness of the monasteries, moved the conscience and touched the generosity of commercial communities.”^[409]

It is one of the most remarkable phenomena in the whole of history that in the high Middle Ages ... many members of the highest and wealthiest or at least prosperous strata of society, who had the best chances of enjoying earthly pleasures to the full, renounced them. ... The flow of new candidates was particularly impressive in those places where the rules of monastic life had been restored to their ancient strictness, imposed more rigorously or even redefined more severely. ... We must assume that the main motive for the choice of a monastic life was always the eschatological ideal of monasticism, even if this may have lost something of its driving force in the course of a long life or was mixed with other motives from the start.^[410]

Whatever the motivations involved, these societies of celibate and ascetic males “set the tone of the spirituality of the whole Church, in education and in art [and] in the transmission of culture.”^[411] Miccoli notes that five of the six popes during the critical reform period of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries had a monastic background and that their influence was directed at attaining monastic hegemony over all of society. It was

a powerful movement to gain command of all life in society and organize it according to monastic views. The legacy of the Church Fathers and the early Middle Ages was reinterpreted and reformulated in terms of monastic hegemony: theology, cosmology, anthropology, morality, and the law were recast to provide a foundation and justification for the preeminence of monks with the rigid social categories that subdivided and disciplined society.^[412]

During the thirteenth century, the mendicant friars were typically recruited from the aristocracy, the landed gentry, and other affluent families. Their parents often disapproved of their decision, presumably because, like most parents, they wanted biological descendants. “It was a nightmare for well-to-do families that their children might become friars.”^[413] These families began

to avoid sending their children to universities because of well-founded fears that they would be recruited into a religious life.

Thus, at the center of society was an institution with an ideology that people ought to be altruistic and ought to be celibate even when they were born to wealth. This explains popular acceptance of the authority of the Church in matters of marriage and sex. The Church had evidently seized the moral and ideological high ground of the society, so that decisions to adopt a monastic lifestyle were highly regarded and seen as a sure path to the rewards of an afterlife.

Whatever else one might say about Western Europe during this period, eugenics was not a part of the picture, and in general, this phenomenon is a paradigmatic example of the importance of ideology in the history of the West. The powerful religious identifications of the period revolving around the belief that asceticism and a life of service—“one of the most remarkable phenomena in the whole of history”^[414]— would reap rewards in the next life likely lay in the background of much of the intense motivation of the period.

THE PAPAL REVOLUTION: THE CHURCH’S POWER OVER SECULAR ELITES

Along with the acceptance of celibacy and asceticism, there was a concern to extend the power of the church—“a powerful movement to gain command of all life in society and organize it according to monastic views.”^[415] It is this drive to increase its own power at the expense of other potential sources of power—kings and the aristocracy, extended kinship groups—that best explains the behavior of the medieval Church. This desire for power is a human universal entirely congruent with evolutionary thinking, except that in this case, it was not accompanied by the usual accouterments of power: reproductive success and control over women.

There is a long history of popes disciplining or at least attempting to discipline secular rulers. In 390, St. Ambrose, Archbishop of Milan, excommunicated Emperor Theodosius because of a massacre in Greece, with Theodosius submitting by doing penance at the cathedral of Milan. By the Middle Ages, the Church had already had a long history of involvement in civic affairs stemming from its role during the barbarian invasions. But the real revolution began in the mid-eleventh century with stronger papal control over bishops. The papacy came to be elected by the College of Cardinals in 1059, rather than simply being auctioned off to powerful Roman families.

Pope Gregory VII, pope from 1073–1085, completed the revolution with

his conflict with the German emperor, Henry IV. His *Dictatus Papae* laid out the claims for papal authority over investiture (i.e., appointing local clergy, which had previously been a power of the German emperors), even claiming the ability to depose emperors. Gregory established the Church as a legal system based on its “moral primacy.”^[416] He not only had power to excommunicate, but at times encouraged subjects not to obey rulers.

The papal revolution resulted in a clear distinction between secular and sacred. Whereas prior to the revolution, kings routinely felt able to appoint clerics and interfere in ecclesiastical affairs, the success of the revolution meant this was no longer possible.

The Church never completely won the battle over investiture, but in general the secular authorities acknowledged its autonomy. The Church presented itself as the final court of appeal for Western Europe. The perceived need for a legal framework for the Church renewed interest in Roman law, but canon law interpreted Roman law to conform to Christian moral intuitions. Gratian (mid-twelfth-century), a principal codifier of canon law, assumed that equality and reciprocity were antecedent to laws; this contrasted with Roman law which prioritized a person’s status (e.g., *paterfamilias*), therefore assuming natural inequality—an aristocratic worldview. Pope Innocent III, writing in the early thirteenth century, stated “You shall judge the great as well as the little and there shall be no difference of persons.”^[417]

Canon law thus had a strongly egalitarian tenor—status, which had been central to ancient law—was irrelevant. Ecclesiastical ideology thus facilitated the Western liberal tradition. Aristocrats and commoners had the same moral standing. Moreover, canon law was recruited to lessen the power of kinship groups by also rejecting the privileged status of testimony from family and friends (which had led to more powerful families getting favorable judgments). In general, “this moral vantage point [emphasizing “equality and reciprocity”] fostered a mildness in canon law which distinguished it not only from customary and feudal law but also from Roman civil law.”^[418] Canon law emphasized public punishments aimed at inducing guilt—“to reach and stir the conscience of the offender.”^[419] Guilty people act on the basis of an internally accepted moral standard; they feel guilty whether or not their actions become publicly known.

Other aspects of canon law directly challenged traditional Germanic practices and thus key privileges of aristocratic elites. There was an emphasis

on (1) marriage being based on consent of spouses even in opposition to parental wishes; (2) prohibiting divorce even if the marriage was infertile; and (3) delegitimizing concubinage by preventing bastards from inheriting; for example, in 1202 the pope ruled against a count who sought a dispensation so that his bastard son could inherit.

In general, consent and voluntary association assumed central importance. Unlike in the ancient world, private societies such as guilds, or even towns and cities, did not have to be approved by authorities but were based simply on associations among members. Such corporations could have judicial and legislative authority over their members, thus diminishing the power of aristocracy. Major decisions had to be made with consent of members rather than representatives. (In Roman law representatives were appointed by authorities.) Corporations thus were voluntary associations that existed by consent of their members.

The battle between the Church and secular rulers ended in a stand-off, with two structures of authority being acknowledged. Nevertheless, Siedentop claims that the Church as a unified legal system doomed feudalism with its widely dispersed centers of power, “initiating the process that led to European nation-states.”^[420] The interests of both kings and the Church opposed feudalism.

MEDIEVAL ECCLESIASTICAL COLLECTIVISM

The medieval Church was a unique feature of Western culture, but in critical ways it was most un-Western. This is because medieval Europe was a collectivist society with a strong sense of group identification and commitment. This conflicts with the general thrust of this book: that Western societies are unique in their commitment to individualism—that in fact individualism is a defining feature of Western civilization. Indeed, the decline of ecclesiastical collectivism was very likely a precondition to the full flowering of individualism in the West in the areas most pre-disposed to it: northwest Europe inhabited by the Germanic and Scandinavian peoples.

The collectivism of Western European society in the High Middle Ages was real. There was intense group identification and group commitment to Christianity among all levels of society, as indicated, for example, by the multitudes of pilgrims and the outpouring of religious fervor and ingroup fervor that accompanied the Crusades aimed at freeing the Holy Land from Muslim control. The medieval Church often had a strong sense of Christian

group economic interests *vis-à-vis* the Jews, and often worked vigorously to exclude Jews from economic and political influence and to prevent social intercourse between Christians and Jews.^[421]

As described above, there were also high levels of reproductive altruism, particularly among the mendicant friars, many other religious personnel, and eventually even the secular elite, e.g., Louis IX of France—St. Louis. St. Louis was not only a paragon of voluntary restraint and proper Christian sexual behavior; he also had a powerful sense of Christian group economic interests *vis-à-vis* the Jews and was heavily involved in the crusades to return the Holy Land to Christian control.^[422] Europeans considered themselves part of a Christian ingroup arrayed against non-Christian out-groups (particularly Muslims and Jews) who were seen as powerful and threatening enemies.

There were indeed gaps between reality and the ideal of a unified Christian society based on the power of the Church and sexual restraint among the elite. But these gaps must be balanced by the recognition that many medieval Christians, and especially the central actors in medieval society, such as the monastic movements, the mendicant friars, the reforming popes, the fervent Crusaders, the pious pilgrims, and even many elite aristocrats, saw themselves as part of a highly unified, supranational collectivity. It is this fundamentally collectivist orientation—so foreign to contemporary Western life—that renders the high levels of group commitment and altruism characteristic of the medieval period comprehensible in psychological terms.^[423]

As discussed below, this medieval religious collectivism combined with the desire for power by the Church actually facilitated Western individualism and the liberal tradition in the long run because, as a hegemonic entity, the Church battled against other, opposing collectivities (e.g., kinship groups, secular kingdoms), leading eventually to a conception of Christendom as a collection of individual, morally equal souls united by their religious identification and paving the way ultimately for Protestantism and the Enlightenment.

SOCIAL CONTROLS AND IDEOLOGY MAINTAINING SOCIALLY IMPOSED MONOGAMY

Policing Sexual Behavior in the Middle Ages and Later

One of the prime goals of the medieval Church was to police sexual behavior outside of monogamous marriage. Policing sexual violations was an

important function of the ecclesiastical courts beginning in the Middle Ages and extending at least to the end of the seventeenth century. These courts were very active in seventeenth-century England prosecuting cases of fornication, adultery, incest, and illicit cohabitation. Although the effectiveness of these ecclesiastical sanctions varied by region and period, there were examples of devastating consequences in which “the victim was hounded by his fellows, deprived of his living by a community boycott, and treated as an outcast.”

In the seventeenth century the High Commission of the Ecclesiastical Court system could impose sanctions, including for adultery, on the propertied who could expect to be immune from other judicial processes: “This enforcement of equality before the law did not endear the court to those who mattered in seventeenth-century England.”^[424] The secular authorities, such as justices of the peace, also stood ready to prosecute such offenses. For example, pursuant to Elizabethan statutes, justices of the peace in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries commonly sentenced sexual offenders of both sexes to a public whipping while stripped to waist (the woman “until her back be bloody”) and placed in the stocks.^[425]

Ideologies Promoting Monogamy

Although ultimately relying on social controls, the Medieval Church developed elaborate ideologies to promote monogamy and sexual restraint. In general, these writings emphasized the moral superiority of celibacy and the sinfulness of extra-marital sex of any kind. All sexual relationships apart from monogamous marriage were universally condemned by religious authority throughout the early modern period into contemporary times. Marital sex was viewed as a regrettable and sinful necessity, and even excess passion towards one’s wife was considered adultery. One aspect of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment was an intellectual movement for greater sexual freedom, but this was confined to the elite and was short-lived. A powerful anti-hedonist religious sexual ideology rose to prominence once again in the nineteenth century.

Conclusion

Beginning in the Middle Ages an elaborate system of social controls and ideologies resulted in the more or less complete imposition of monogamy in large areas of Western Europe. “The great social achievement of the early

Middle Ages was the imposition of the same rules of sexual and domestic conduct on both rich and poor. The King in his palace, the peasant in his hovel: neither was exempt.”^[426] Nevertheless, the system was by no means completely egalitarian. There was a positive association between wealth and reproductive success throughout pre-industrial Europe.

In Western Europe there has been a remarkable continuity within a varied set of institutions, which have penalized polygyny and channeled non-monogamous sexuality into non-reproductive outlets or suppressed it altogether. Despite changes in these institutions and despite vast changes in political and economic conditions, Western family institutions, facilitated by a unique evolutionary history (see Chapter 4) have clearly aimed at the social imposition of monogamy. By and large, this effort has been successful.

EFFECTS OF MONOGAMY

Monogamy as a Precondition for the European “Low-Pressure” Demographic Profile and the Industrial Revolution

Monogamy is a central aspect of Western uniqueness and may well be a necessary condition for the unique European “low-pressure” demographic profile.^[427] In a sexually competitive society such as classical China, female servants would also be concubines of the head of the household,^[428] so that household resources could be directly translated into reproduction. In the northwest European model, wealthy males were supporting far more non-relatives than in the sexually competitive societies of Eurasia.

There are sound reasons for supposing that monogamy was a necessary condition for the peculiarly European “low-pressure” demographic profile described by Wrigley and Schofield.^[429] This demographic profile results from late marriage and celibacy of large percentages of females during times of economic scarcity. The theoretical connection with monogamy is that monogamous marriage results in a situation where the poor of both sexes are unable to mate, whereas in polygynous systems an excess of poor females merely lowers the price of concubines for wealthy males. Thus, for example, Wrigley and Schofield find that toward the end of the seventeenth century approximately 23 percent of individuals of both sexes remained unmarried between ages 40–44, but that, as a result of altered economic opportunities, this percentage dropped at the beginning of the eighteenth century to 9 percent, and there was a corresponding decline in age of marriage.^[430] Like

monogamy, this pattern was unique among the stratified societies of Eurasia.

In turn, the low-pressure demographic profile appears to have had economic consequences. Not only was the marriage rate the main damper on population growth but, especially in England, it had a tendency to lag well behind favorable economic changes so that there was a tendency for capital accumulation during good times rather than a constant pressure of population on food supply:

The fact that the rolling adjustment between economic and demographic fluctuations took place in such a leisurely fashion, tending to produce large if gradual swings in real wages, represented an opportunity to break clear from the low-level income trap which is sometimes supposed to have inhibited all pre-industrial nations. A long period of rising real wages, by changing the structure of demand, will tend to give a disproportionately strong boost to demand for commodities other than the basic necessities of life, and so to sectors of the economy whose growth is especially important if an industrial revolution is to occur.^[431]

There is thus some reason to suppose that monogamy, by resulting in a low-pressure demographic profile, was a necessary condition for industrialization. This argument suggests that monogamy may indeed have been a central aspect of the necessary architecture of Western modernization.

Similarly, in a paper on age of marriage and its effects in a wide range of areas, it is concluded that without the late-marriage regime, living standards in England would not have improved until 1870.

Later marriage not only constrained the number of births but also provided greater opportunities for female informal learning, especially through 'service'. A high proportion of unmarried females between the ages of 15 and 25 left home and worked elsewhere, instead of bearing children, as in other societies. This widened female horizons compared with a passage from the parental household directly into demanding motherhood and housekeeping [as occurred in the joint families of southern Europe]. Throughout this period the family was the principal institution for educating and training future workers. Schooling was not compulsory until 1880 in England. In the early nineteenth century few children attended any school regularly and few remained at school for

more than one and a half years. Such skills and work discipline as were learned were passed on and built up over the generations primarily by the family. [We show] how, over the centuries, the gradual rise of this human capital raised productivity and eventually brought about the Industrial Revolution.^[432]

Monogamy and Investment in Children

Polygynous mating systems tend to result in resources being devoted to reproduction and relatively less to investment in children. For a male in a polygynous society it is attractive to invest in another wife or concubine and her low investment offspring.^[433] Investment in additional concubines tends to have a large reproductive payoff and requires little investment in children. Offspring of concubines were typically given relatively small inheritances and allowed to descend the social ladder. There is a low sex ratio of offspring among harem women—a preponderance of daughters.^[434] In theoretical terms this implies a bias toward low-investment offspring because in general it is easier for females to be able to mate.^[435] Although the daughters of these concubines will have low social status compared to their father, they will tend to mate. On the other hand, sons of the upper classes were targets of dowry competition for lower status families. In either case, there is little need for fathers to invest time, energy, or money in the offspring of their concubines.

Monogamy, however, restricts the investment of individual males to the offspring of one woman. With the decline in extended kinship relations (see below) and the institutionalization of monogamy for all social classes, support for children came to rest completely upon the independent nuclear family. As described below, this family, based on the simple household was the critical precursor of Western modernization.

CHRISTIANITY IN OPPOSITION TO THE ANCIENT GRECO-ROMAN ARISTOCRATIC SOCIAL ORDER

Roman family structure was discussed in the Appendix to Chapter 2. Larry Siedentop argues that St. Paul fundamentally turned this world of natural hierarchy upside down.^[436] Within Christian ideology the individual replaced the ancient Indo-European family as the seat of moral legitimacy. Christian ideology was intended for all humans, resulting in a sense of moral egalitarianism, at least within the Christian community, rather than natural hierarchy. Individual souls were seen as having moral agency and equal value

in the eyes of God.

Nevertheless, Christianity did not invent moral universalism but rather built on intellectual currents that had already developed within the Greco-Roman world:

[Christian universalism was] profoundly indebted to developments in Greek thought. For the discourse of citizenship in the polis had initiated a distancing of persons from mere family and tribal identities, while later Hellenistic philosophy had introduced an even more wide-ranging, speculative ‘universalist’ idiom. That intellectual breadth had, in turn, been reinforced by the subjection of so much of the Mediterranean world to a single power, Rome.^[437]

In other words, the tendencies toward universalism were already developing prior to Christianity *within* Western societies beyond those already apparent in ancient aristocratic culture, likely ultimately exacerbated by the large influx into Greco-Roman societies of peoples with no family connections to the original aristocratic elements. This is not surprising given the tendency for group boundaries to become permeable over time in Indo-European cultures.^[438]

Siedentop argues that the social roles ascribed by natural inequality no longer defined the person; people were now defined subjectively, by their conscience and intentions in performing an act, and they were free to make voluntary associations and assume voluntary roles in a no longer rigidly hierarchical, hereditary system.

Another subversive aspect of Christianity was that Christian heroes were martyrs, whereas Indo-European heroes were aristocratic warriors —“Springing from a leading family and often associated with the foundation of cities, the ancient hero was typically male, strong, wily, successful.”^[439] Christian martyrs were the opposite, but they “gained a hold over popular imagination.”^[440]

Siedentop emphasizes the cruelty and lack of restraints on the powerful in the ancient world. Christians by the end of the third century “became spokesmen for the lower classes,” developing a “rhetoric founded on ‘love of the poor’”—a “kind of Christian populism.”^[441] Bishops reached out to “the servile, destitute, and foreign born, to groups without standing in the hierarchy of citizens. They were offered a home. It was an irresistible

offer.”^[442]

“The equality of souls in search of salvation was at the heart of Christian beliefs.”^[443] Such beliefs began to have a wide social influence in Roman society in the second century.^[444] As an indication of how much Christian attitudes had pervaded Roman society, when Julian tried to restore paganism in the mid-fourth century, “the new priesthood he sought to create was to have as its test ‘the love of God and of fellow men’, while ‘charity’ was to be its vocation”^[445]—hardly an aristocratic world view. Rather, it was a world that “at least approximated to Christian moral intuitions.”^[446]

The eclipse of the aristocratic world of military achievement continued in the fourth century when monasticism began to be organized on principles utterly opposed to the traditional aristocratic ethic involving the pursuit of wealth and worldly success. Convents were established; it became common for women in upper-class families to take vows of virginity. And the aristocratic worldview of disdain for work was rejected; work had dignity. St. Basil (c. 330–c. 378) based his monastic community on equality and reciprocity, lack of personal property, and public service (e.g., in schools or hospitals). The disrepute that monasticism fell into in the sixteenth century,

makes it hard to recapture the prestige it had in earlier centuries. Yet at the end of antiquity the image it offered of a social order founded on equality, limiting the role of force and honouring work, while devoting itself to prayer and acts of charity, gave it a powerful hold over minds. Monasticism preserved the image of a regular society when the *pax romana* was being undermined, first by the overthrow of the Western empire (476) after the Germanic invasions, and then by Muslim conquests in the East.^[447]

The eclipse of the aristocratic worldview can also be seen in Christian philosophy. Because of his emphasis on the will (which mediated between appetite [based on evolved desires] and reason [based on the higher brain processes and decision making]), some have attributed the rise of individualism to St. Augustine. Whereas a bedrock proposition of ancient Greek philosophers was that reason was motivating, Augustine argued that reason doesn’t act in isolation, and is influenced by emotions (e.g., “delight,”^[448] love, or hatred—a proposal that any modern psychologist would agree with). Augustine rejected natural inequality because all are subject to

God's power, even though intuitively he thought that people with higher intellect or fewer sins had more value. Augustine thus "completes the demolition of ancient rationalism. The patriarchal family, the aristocratic society underlying the polis, the cosmos as a hierarchy of ends or purposes: all of these became suspect and vulnerable without its support."^[449] Ancient rationalism was replaced by the need for prayer, "for through prayer humans can seek the support of grace for their better intentions."^[450] Humans need "divine support" to act uprightly.^[451] Yet we can never achieve moral perfection.

There is thus a close connection between individualism and the notion of moral perfection as something always to be sought but never attained. "For Augustine (and Kant), none of us can ever claim to be a success in moral terms. We all fail, and it is this failure—tragic, but also humbling—that contains a powerful egalitarian message."^[452] In any case, moral perfection becomes the ultimate measure of a person's worth—something that should be kept in mind in the present age when subscribing to multicultural ideology and replacement-level immigration has been successfully propagated as a moral imperative throughout the West. The importance of maintaining a reputation as a morally upright person is a major theme of Chapters 6–8 which emphasize the rise of moral communities as fundamental to social organization in the West, the ultimate eclipse of the aristocratic worldview, and the psychological mechanisms underlying moral communities.

Christianity, by lessening the power of the paterfamilias, also meant less power of fathers over children and a higher status for women. Wealthy women were crucial to the success of early Church, and adultery was seen as a sin for both men and women rather than only a transgression for women (as is generally the case cross-culturally). There were also humanitarian changes in the law of slavery due to Christian influence, although Siedentop does not claim that Christianity ended slavery. There were both Christian apologists (e.g., Augustine) and opponents of slavery (e.g., Gregory of Nyssa^[453]).

Nevertheless, there was a profound egalitarian thrust of Christianity in the late Roman Empire. The rhetoric of urban bishops was highly inclusive: "It was a rhetoric that encouraged women, the urban poor and even slaves to feel part of the city in a way that had not previously been possible."^[454]

CHRISTIANITY IN POST-ROMAN EUROPE

In *The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity*,^[455] James Russell

describes Christianization as accommodative and gradual, typically not beginning with a requirement that converts accept all Christian doctrines, and in particular, exempting the “Indo-European warrior code” that was at the heart of the culture of the Germanic peoples.^[456] The Germanization of Christianity

was primarily a consequence of the deliberate inculturation of Germanic religiocultural attitudes within Christianity by Christian missionaries. This process of accommodation resulted in the essential transformation of Christianity from a universal salvation religion to a Germanic, and eventually European, folk religion. The sociopsychological response of the Germanic peoples to this enculturated form of Christianity included the acceptance of those traditionally Christian elements which coincided with Germanic religiosity and the resolution of dissonant elements by reinterpreting them in accordance with the Germanic ethos and world-view.^[457]

Christianity did not attempt to eradicate the world-accepting, fundamentally Indo-European Germanic warrior culture, where everlasting fame from earthly deeds was sought after, in favor of promoting Christian other-worldly hope for salvation. Rather, popes harnessed the warrior spirit in the interests of spreading Christianity—for example, Bernard of Clairvaux’s tract for the Knights Templars justified killing non-Christians. In other cases, Christianization reinterpreted previously existing Germanic concepts—e.g., the king’s sacred *Heil* (charisma), which was bound up with the health of the kingdom, became imbued with connotations of holiness and individual salvation.^[458] The Old English word for the leader of a *comitatus* (*männerbund*) was translated as *dominus*, the Latin term meaning ‘lord’ and also used to refer to Christ.

Christianity was also more individualistic than traditional Germanic beliefs in the sense that it prized individual salvation rather than a folk-centered religious orientation that emphasized the community.^[459] Traditional Germanic ethical standards “appear to have been ultimately derived from a sociobiological drive for group survival through ingroup altruism. Ethical misconduct thus consisted primarily in violating the code of honor of one’s kindred or one’s *comitatus*.”^[460] Violation of these standards was a stain on the entire kindred, while heroic acts reflected positively on the kindred. As

indicated above, the Church acted to break down extended kinship relations and to generally promote individualism in all spheres of European life, albeit within a context in which there were pre-existing tendencies toward individualism among the Germanic peoples (see Chapter 4).

Nevertheless, Christianization was quite limited, at least by the mid-eighth century:^[461] “From the persistence of Germanic attitudes and values in the secular Germanic literature, and the Germanization of liturgical practices and hagiographic canons, it appears that the success of such a world-view transformation effort was limited.”^[462] Of course, this does not imply that a more thorough Christianization had not occurred by the High Middle Ages; nor does it imply that Christian influence in the direction of egalitarian individualism and the ultimate eclipse of the aristocratic worldview did not continue in later centuries.

THE CHURCH IN PURSUIT OF POWER

As noted above, the Church energetically pursued policies opposed to the reproductive interests of the aristocracy. This behavior of the Church in the post-Roman world is understandable in terms of seeking power. But besides the campaign to regulate the marriages of the aristocracy, the Church also acted to diminish the power of extended kinship groups and often championed the rights of individuals and cities against feudal lords. *Any institution seeking power for itself seeks to diminish other power centers, and the Church was no exception.* In this campaign, the ideology of moral egalitarianism was a powerful weapon.

The Church’s Ideology of Moral Egalitarianism as an Instrument of Furthering Its Power

Trends toward egalitarianism in opposition to aristocratic interests were encouraged by the Church’s ideology of moral egalitarianism. This campaign reached even to reconceptualizing morality itself. For example, Christianity favored explanations by intention because it privileged the inner conscience, whereas Germanic law codes emphasized damages regardless of intention. The Church combatted the inegalitarian (aristocratic) Germanic idea that different people had different value for punishment, maintaining that rank or status as free or enslaved shouldn’t matter. Siedentop argues that canon law sought generalizations because of their universalist ideology: people were fundamentally the same—had the same rights, etc. “Law should be understood as applying to ‘all (souls) equally.’”^[463] Roman law avoided

abstractions because, since people were seen as having different natural rights due to natural status differences, generalizations were not possible.

Natural law came to be understood as implying natural rights of individuals (e.g., the right to a fair trial), not as mandating natural inequality based on different status, talent, or intellectual ability. Thus, Gratian and others argued that all humans have an “intrinsic moral nature.”^[464] Such thinking “laid the foundation of modern liberalism.”^[465]

The Visigothic Code in particular (decreed in 642–643 by the Visigothic Kingdom which ruled southwestern France and the Iberian Peninsula) was deeply influenced by the clergy and was more egalitarian than other Germanic codes. Christian intuitions of moral universalism “began to impinge on the Carolingian conception of the proper relations between rulers and the ruled. ... But only within limits.”^[466] For example, Charlemagne was famously ruthless against unbelievers—Saxons and Muslims—despite the idea that everyone is moral agent. Christian influences on the laws on slavery reigned in the power of masters—slaves could only suffer capital punishment with a public trial; married slaves could not be separated. There was thus a blend of Germanic customs and Christian influences.

By the fourteenth century, several rights were defended—property, consent to government, self-defense, marriage, and procedural rights. Canonists moved in the direction that the right to property entailed the duty to share in time of need. This led to the idea that the poor had rights—the intellectual ancestor to the modern welfare state. Rulers had limitations on what they could do beyond the reciprocal obligations of vassalage.

Indeed, despite the importance of powerful ingroup-outgroup conflicts between Christians and with both Muslims and Jews, natural rights were defined as even applying to infidels—an indication of the pervasive universalism of medieval Christianity. Innocent IV: “All men, faithful and unfaithful alike, are Christ’s sheep by creation even though they are not of the fold of the Church.”^[467]

By the second half of eleventh century, Europe “was acquiring a moral identity” centered around Christian intuitions of moral egalitarianism.^[468] The Crusades, a collective Christian enterprise against Muslims as a negatively evaluated outgroup were a defining event resulting in a shared Christian identity that overrode the different regional identities within Europe—a form of Christian collectivism in opposition to Muslims as a negatively evaluated outgroup. This is why the murder of Archbishop Thomas Becket in

1170 had repercussions throughout Europe, his place of death becoming a pilgrimage site.

Essentially the Church had created a moral community based on Christian egalitarian universalism. Within this moral community, all other identities, such as ethnic, social class, or regional identities (e.g., being a member of a particular kingdom), had lesser moral standing.

Church Policy in Opposition to the Power of Extended Kinship Groups

As in the case of monogamy, the Church also had a role in the decline of the power of extended kinship relationships. In this case, however, Church policy was aided by the rise of strong central governments, which also discouraged the power of the extended family and ultimately replaced it in the role of guaranteeing individual interests.

From an evolutionary perspective one can scarcely overestimate the potential importance of kinship. Because of biological relatedness, kin are expected to have common interests and lower thresholds for cooperation and even self-sacrificing behavior. The Germanic tribes who settled much of Western Europe toward the end of the Roman Empire were organized as kinship groups based on biological relatedness among males, although there were also overarching social structures not based on kinship, such as the *männerbünde*.

Since the early Germans could not rely upon the protection and assistance of a bureaucratic empire when they were threatened with attack or famine, it was incumbent upon each man and woman of the community to adhere to the fundamental sociobiological principle of group survival embodied in the bonds of familial and communal solidarity.^[469]

It was this world of tribally based kinship groups that the kings and the Church wanted to eradicate.

The general thrust of Chapters 2–4 is that European groups, especially in the northwest of Europe, were less prone to extended kinship relations than other cultures long predating Christian influence, likely as a consequence of their unique evolutionary history. As a result, although extended kinship did play a role in early medieval Europe, it was not as powerful as in many other

cultures (see especially Chapter 4). Nevertheless, it is certainly of interest to document the role of the Church in encouraging the trend away from extended kinship solidarity. Given that Europeans are relatively prone to individualism, there is the expectation that they would be relatively prone to shed ties to extended kin under conditions in which their individual interests are met.

The picture one gets is the gradual development in the West of an aristocracy based on the simple household and freed from obligations to collateral kin dominating a peasantry characterized by the simple family and embedded in a society of neighbors and friends rather than in an extended kinship group. This social structure was an achievement of the late Middle Ages. Extended kinship relations were not important among the peasantry in late medieval England or France.^[470]

The Church contributed to the eradication of extended kinship ties in Western Europe by opposing consanguineous marriage (marriage of blood relatives) and supporting marriage based solely on consent of the partners. In the case of consanguinity, the Church prohibited marriage between an ever-expanding set of individuals. In the sixth century the prohibition was extended to second cousins and by the eleventh century it was extended to sixth cousins, i.e., individuals with a common great-great-great-great grandfather. Clearly these prohibitions on consanguinity go far beyond those predicted by evolutionary theory.^[471] Moreover, biological relatedness was not even relevant, since marriage was forbidden to similarly distant affinal relatives (i.e., relatives by marriage) as well as to individuals with spiritual kinship (i.e., relatives of godparents). These rules must therefore be conceptualized as ideology in pursuit of power: the effect of the policy was to undermine extensive kinship networks and to create an aristocracy freed from obligations to the wider kin group.

Whatever the rationale given to these prohibitions by the Church, there is evidence that the aristocracy obeyed the ecclesiastical rules. There were very few marriages closer than fourth or fifth cousins among the French nobility of the tenth and eleventh centuries.^[472] These practices weakened the extended kinship group, since the expanded range of incestuous marriages prevented the solidarity of extended kinship groups by excluding “the reinforcing of blood with marriage.”^[473] The result was that biological relatedness was spread diffusely throughout the nobility rather than concentrated at the top. The direct descendants of the family rather than the wider kinship group also

benefited: “Men in high secular positions ... strove to consolidate their fortunes and their families in order to secure as much as possible for their direct descendants to the detriment of wider kin.”^[474]

In addition to its policy on consanguinity, the Church’s doctrine of consent in marriage acted as a force against extended kinship relationships. “The family, the tribe, the clan, were subordinated to the individual. If one wanted to marry enough, one could choose one’s own mate and the Church would vindicate one’s choice.”^[475] Marriage came about as a result of consent and was ratified by sexual intercourse. By removing the fundamental nature of marriage from the control of the family and the secular lord to the individuals involved, the Church established its authority against the traditional ties of kinship and family. Freedom of choice of marriage partner was the rule in England throughout the modern period and parental control was exercised only in the top one percent of the population.^[476]

The Church’s Encouragement of Diverse Centers of Power

Medieval towns and cities began to govern themselves and thus be independent or semi-independent power centers. In general, the towns and cities tended to be more egalitarian than feudal systems, and they differed dramatically from the Greek and Roman models of cities based on aristocratic dominance. These new power centers often had bloody conflicts with feudal lords, with Church policy tending to favor the cities.^[477] Thus, people fleeing serfdom often took refuge in cities and were protected by the Church.

Nevertheless, Henri Pirenne notes examples where the Church opposed the interests of the cities, either because they controlled the cities (episcopal cities), or because they were in thrall to the nobles who controlled the cities (prior to the full consequences of the papal revolution), or because of their general lack of sympathy with trade. Thus, while many bishops “distinguished themselves ... by their manifest solicitude for the public weal,” “episcopal cities were the first to be the scene of combat” between the burgers and other levels of power—again indicating that the Church was intent on maximizing its own power. In the late eleventh century and early twelfth centuries, “the middle class and the bishops lived in a state of permanent hostility and, as it were, on the point of open war. Force alone was able to prevail between such adversaries.”^[478]

But many bishops were caught between the interests of the nobles who had patronized them and the rising townspeople. In this conflict, the townspeople had powerful allies in monarchs attempting to reign in the power of the nobility. Eventually many towns gradually achieved freedom from feudal overlords. These towns did not have complete sovereignty—kings had rights over them, such as adjudicating capital offences, but they were often free of feudal obligations or royal taxes. These urban areas created a middle class that “contained the seeds of a modern constitutional order,”^[479] although oligarchic tendencies existed as well.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE RATIONAL TRADITION OF WEST

Beginning in the Greco-Roman world of antiquity, disputation and logical argument have been far more characteristic Western cultures than any other. As Ricardo Duchesne has pointed out, although the Chinese made many practical discoveries, they never developed the idea of a rational, orderly universe guided by universal laws comprehensible to humans. Nor did they ever develop a “deductive method of rigorous demonstration according to which a conclusion, a theorem, was proven by reasoning from a series of self-evident axioms.”^[480]

Despite a lesser role for reason in Christian thinking and periods of dogmatism in which, for example, heretics were dealt with harshly, the spirit of disputation and logical argument so apparent among the Greeks persisted within Christianity: “Christian convictions were submitted to the disciplines of logic and metaphysical speculation to the requirements of disciplined argument.”^[481] “The habit of disputation—of disciplined argument—was preserved by the Church in later antiquity The habit of disputation became engrained in the life of the Church.”^[482]

This rational worldview was accompanied by intense, individualistic competition in the market of ideas, as recounted in Chapter 2 for classical Greece and with the development of science discussed in Chapter 9 which emphasizes the individualistic nature of scientific endeavor. The philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas is a good illustration of the importance of rationality even in the area of religion, an area particularly prone to dogmatism. Heavily influenced by Aristotle, Thomas developed rational proofs for the existence of God. No other intellectual tradition has ever attempted this.

The Realism Versus Nominalism Debate

A good example of Western disputation with great relevance to egalitarian ideology was the debate between realism and nominalism associated with two mendicant orders, the Dominicans and the Franciscans, respectively. These orders had a high profile in the cities and were very popular among the poor; they developed rapidly in the thirteenth century and had a prominent role in establishing the intellectual milieu at universities.

The Dominican tradition, associated mainly with Aquinas, was Aristotelian and biased toward rationalism, reflecting the world view of the ancients based on natural inequality. On the other hand, Siedentop sees the Franciscan tradition beginning in the fourteenth century with Duns Scotus and especially William of Ockham as carrying on the tradition of Christian egalitarianism, inspired by St. Augustine. The Franciscan tradition was based on nominalism (the philosophy that classes are constructions of the human mind and that only particular objects exist) and empiricism (the view that facts could be discovered by experience rather than deduced rationally from first principles). For the Franciscans, a morally upright will (intentions) was more important than reasoning ability, whereas the ancients saw reasoning ability as unevenly distributed among people, leading to natural inequality. Will was under voluntary control and thus available to everyone. The nominalists asserted that reason had no motivating power; it “could and should shape action, but it could not determine action.”^[483] Proper action required grace.

The Franciscan tradition, following Augustine, saw moral inequality as the common assumption of ancient philosophy.

Whether the assumption of natural inequality took the form of Plato’s guardians, warriors, and workers, Aristotle’s division into citizens and slaves (‘living tools’), or the Stoics’ aristocratic view that only a few could ever attain ‘true’ knowledge and virtue, that assumption effectively ruled out the moral universalism that, for Augustine, was the crux of Paul’s message.^[484]

Contrary to the Aristotelians, Ockham distrusted the ability of humans to explain the world as resulting from “rational necessity.”^[485] God could have made things differently—“God’s freedom.” Ockham’s nominalism thus “celebrated contingency rather than rational necessity.”^[486] He therefore championed inductive reasoning verified by the senses rather than deductive reasoning from first principles. If God was free to make the world any way

He wanted to, then reality is contingent and must be discovered by observation and experiment.

Nominalists paved the way for empirical science by rejecting Aristotle's idea of "final causes" (goals, purposes) and emphasizing efficient (mechanical) causes (in a manner quite similar to David Hume's classic analysis of causality). They demanded empirical proof rather than seeking logical entailment.

As noted above, Christian theorists emphasized individual conscience rather than damages as central to morality. Thus, they recognized that individuals can make mistakes in good conscience. It is conscience (intention) that makes an act moral or not, not mere conformity to convention—"even if they are doctrines and institutions of the Church."^[487]

The nominalist emphasis on human freedom and individual conscience had profound implications congruent with the general idea that it was in the Church's interest to promote individualism. Church canonists developed the idea that legitimacy—even the legitimacy of the Church—depended on consent, not coercion or power. This led to theories of representative government and corporations as consisting of consenting individuals with equal status. Bishops did not have *dominium* in the ancient sense (domination over subordinates), but rather the entire community of believers had dominion over the Church. Representatives should "have a mandate" from those represented. The connections of these ideas to the rise of Protestantism and the eventual rise of egalitarian individualism are obvious.

CHRISTIANITY AND POST-MEDIEVAL EUROPE

Siedentop argues that Christian moral intuitions centered around individual conscience and moral egalitarianism ultimately caused the downfall of the Church as a hegemonic religious institution. Liberal thought "emerged as the moral intuitions generated by Christianity were turned against an authoritarian model of the Church."^[488] By the fourteenth century, there were calls for representative government within the Church. These were resisted by the papacy, resulting in widespread "agitation" against the Church (e.g., Hussites in Bohemia, Lollards in England). These were essentially democratic movements that rejected the top-down structure of the Church, promoted individual devotion, and campaigned to be able to read scriptures in native languages—harbingers of Protestantism.

Thus basic liberal ideas that had been propagated by the Church predated

Protestantism but were contradicted by the Church's own collectivist structure. In the end, those liberal ideas—equality of status, individual liberty, freedom of conscience, and representative government—opposed the interests of the Church as well as most Protestant sects. This resulted in the religious wars of the Reformation, after which there came to be general skepticism about the wisdom of enforcing religious orthodoxy. These trends continued, so that by the eighteenth century, clericalism was seen as the enemy of liberal secularism. The attitude developed that “uncoerced belief provides the foundation for ‘legitimate’ authority.”^[489]

However, given the biological thrust of my thinking, I can't help being struck by nineteenth-century historian Thomas Macaulay's comment in his *History of England*, emphasizing the special characteristics of the “German race”:

The Reformation had been a national as well as a moral revolt. It had been not only an insurrection of the laity against the clergy, but also an insurrection of all the branches of the great German race against an alien domination. It is a most significant circumstance, that no large society of which the tongue is not Teutonic has ever turned Protestant, and that, wherever a language derived from that of ancient Rome is spoken, the religion of modern Rome to this day prevails.^[490]

The Reformation and the end of “alien domination” of the collectivist Church ultimately unleashed the full flowering of egalitarian individualism in northwestern Europeans discussed in the following chapter.

CONCLUSION: THE CHURCH FACILITATED BUT DID NOT CAUSE WESTERN INDIVIDUALISM

Siedentop presents a strong case for a role of Christianity in the development of the Western individualism beginning in the ancient world. However, there is evidence, some of it mentioned by Siedentop, that the roots of European egalitarianism and individualism are far deeper.

Monogamy (which implies sexual egalitarianism), is a unique aspect of Western culture, long predating Christianity. Early Roman marriage practices departed from Indo-European patterns by eschewing bridewealth (payment from the groom) a practice common in tribal societies around the world and closely linked to male sexual competition (wealthy males are able to purchase more females). Roman monogamy was maintained by controls on sexual

behavior (bigamy and polygyny were illegal), laws relating to legitimacy (bastards suffered social opprobrium; marriage with slaves was typically prohibited); inheritance laws penalized children who were not the products of monogamous marriage (bastards could not inherit; the children of slaves retained the status of the mother).^[491] In an intensively polygynous society such as classical China, none of these occurred, so that, for example, the offspring of a concubine were entirely legitimate and could inherit property, depending on the wishes of the father.

There were also ideological components of Roman monogamy, with prestigious people and institutions expected to be monogamous or forego reproduction. At the beginning of the Republic and until 254 BC, the highest religious office, pontifex maximus, could only be held by patricians and was very prestigious and much sought after. These high priests were required to have monogamous marriages (termed *confarreatio*) that could only be dissolved by death; although divorce in a *confarreatio* marriage became possible in the later Republic, it remained rare and difficult to achieve. Originally, the high priest of Jupiter (*flamen dialis*) was required to marry a virgin and to have parents who had been married by *confarreatio* (relaxed when plebeians were allowed to hold the office); their marriages remained indissoluble throughout the Republic. Vestal Virgins, who were highly venerated as part of the state religion, were daughters of patricians who had been married by *confarreatio*; they were paragons of chastity who retained their virginity through their reproductive years. Finally, Stoicism, which became a powerful movement among artists, intellectuals and politicians during the Empire, extolled the ideal of monogamous family based on conjugal affection and sexual restraint for both sexes.^[492]

There were also egalitarian political trends, as the plebeians gradually achieved considerable power and opportunities for upward mobility (see Appendix to Chapter 2). These changes parallel the general finding that barriers between Indo-Europeans and the European peoples they conquered gradually disappeared, and upward mobility was possible for males who had military talent (see Chapter 2). Indeed, it should be recalled that Indo-European culture should not be thought of as aristocratic *simpliciter*. As Ricardo Duchesne emphasizes,^[493] Indo-European culture is best thought of as aristocratic-egalitarian—as hierarchical but with egalitarianism among aristocratic peers. Ending the practice of bridewealth and delegitimizing offspring outside of monogamous marriage, as occurred in Republican Rome,

may then be considered an extreme version of aristocratic individualism.

Thus, although there is no question that Rome had strong features of an aristocratic society, as maintained by Siedentop, these features were by no means absolute, and elements of egalitarianism can be traced from the very earliest history of Rome. Christianity, then, appearing during the Empire after the huge influx of peoples to Rome, should be seen as accentuating and elaborating tendencies that were already apparent in Roman culture. From an evolutionary perspective, these new peoples were unrelated to the founding aristocratic stock and had an interest in deposing the aristocratic system. Christianity articulated their interests in doing so. The egalitarian forces that fueled the rise of the plebeians in the Republic had expanded to include the multiethnic masses of the Empire (all free men in the Empire were given Roman citizenship in AD 212 by Emperor Caracalla), accompanied by a powerful religious ideology of moral egalitarianism.

There are other grounds for emphasizing the underlying ethnic component of Western individualism and egalitarianism. For instance, there were important differences between Western and Eastern Christendom, and within Western Christendom itself. Regarding the latter, from the early Middle Ages, the Western family pattern was confined to northwest Europe, particularly the area encompassed by the Frankish Empire, Britain, and Scandinavia, but not, as emphasized in Chapter 4, the region to the south of the Loire in what is now France, and excluding much of Europe outside the Hajnal line despite being part of the Western Christendom (e.g., southern Italy, Ireland, the southern Iberian peninsula, Croatia and parts of eastern Europe).^[494] Individualist family structure, which many scholars point to as critical for understanding the rise of the West, thus fails to include significant parts of Western Christendom.

One might argue that differences in family structure between Eastern and Western Europe are explainable by the later introduction of Christianity in Eastern Europe. Poland, for example, was Christianized relatively late (beginning in the tenth century) compared to the Frankish Empire (beginning with the conversion of Clovis I in 496). However, Scandinavian societies, which have the most individualist family structure in Europe (see Chapter 4), also converted quite late. For example, Denmark, the first Christian Scandinavian country, became Christianized only after the conversion of Harold Bluetooth in 972.^[495] Sweden followed much later, first establishing an archdiocese in 1264, and even then, the eradication of pagan practices and

beliefs took another 150–200 years.^[496] Ethnic differences are a far more parsimonious explanation.

Outside of Western Christendom, a basic problem with supposing Christianity per se was the cause of European family practices is that lineage, joint families (where brothers would set up households together), and patrilineal patterns retained importance in Eastern Orthodox areas: southeastern Europe and Russia. Moreover, Christian groups in the Middle East generally remained tribal, thereby reflecting the culture of the area.^[497] Given that many scholars attribute Western uniqueness to the unique family patterns of northwest Europe (see Chapter 4), Christianity or the Western Church cannot be its sole source.^[498]

Parenthetically, it is worth noting that other religions, such as Islam, are universalist and desire all humans to be members. However, no other religion worked so energetically to achieve temporal power and use that power to overcome tribal, clan-type structures, as Christianity did during the early Middle Ages. Islam is universal, but it never tried to undermine the tribal nature of society based on extended kinship relations; Islamic societies throughout the Middle East remain tribal into contemporary times—a major difficulty for the nation-building programs that have been such a prominent feature of Western foreign policy in recent times.

Nevertheless, the power of the Church does seem important to include in any complete analysis. The Church is without doubt unique among the cultures of the world as a religious institution that was able to bend the wider culture toward its own interests in maximizing its power over the aristocracy and over extended kinship groups.^[499] As noted above, a central aspect of the Church's power during the High Middle Ages was the public perception of being reproductively altruistic. During the height of its power from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, the Church had successfully carved out a moral sphere as distinct from power politics, violence, warfare, etc.—of spiritual versus temporal power—even as it engaged in considerable power politics of its own. Nevertheless, as Siedentop notes, there is ample evidence that the Church often used its spiritual power to achieve temporal power (by, for example, excommunicating kings who attempted to divorce their wives or have their illegitimate offspring inherit). “The Church persisted in its moral enterprise, which was, after all, its *raison d'être*.”^[500]

This concern with temporal power was apparent in the fourth century, when the Church exerted its power, not to regulate the sex life of aristocrats,

but to combat Jewish power.^[501] Indeed, Christian theology as it developed during this period was at its core anti-Jewish, and the rise of the Church to official status coincided with a decline in Jewish power and the enactment of laws against Jews owning Christian slaves. Moreover, although far from consistent, the Church continued to reign in Jewish power as, for example, with the Lateran Council of 1215 that mandated the wearing of distinctive clothing for Jews. And although the mendicant friars were models of reproductive altruism, they also spearheaded the anti-Jewish attitudes of the period; this was also an important part of why Christianity was so compelling during this period.^[502]

This ideological shift (in which Jews were “portrayed in a more malevolent light”) coincided with an active campaign against Judaism. “The friars encroached upon the actual practice of Jewish life, forcibly entering synagogues and subjecting Jews to offensive harangues, participation in debates whose outcomes were predetermined, and the violence of the mob. The intent of the friars was obvious: to eliminate the Jewish presence in Christendom—both by inducing the Jews to convert and by destroying all remnants of Judaism even after no Jews remained.”^[503] ... A contemporary Jewish writer stated that the Franciscans and Dominicans “are everywhere oppressing Israel... . [T]hey are more wretched than all mankind.”^{[504], [505]}

Devout kings, such as Louis IX of France, were instrumental in preventing Jewish exploitation of non-Jews. A contemporary biographer of Louis, William of Chartres, quotes him as determined “that [the Jews] may not oppress Christians through usury and that they not be permitted, under the shelter of my protection, to engage in such pursuits and to infect my land with their poison.”^[506]

During the medieval period, the Church therefore carved out the moral realm as an area of influence. The effectiveness of this policy depended ultimately on the reality that so many people had fervently held religious beliefs—kings and aristocrats feared excommunication because they would lose the support of their people. One might ask, what else could a non-military organization do to attain power over the aristocracy, kings, etc.? From a strategic perspective, the Church chose areas that were *prima facie* moral and therefore came under religious purview.

In conclusion, the Church promoted policies that tended toward individualism—policies that were consistent with its own interests in becoming a powerful, hegemonic institution and that built on pre-existing tendencies toward individualism in Indo-European and northern hunter-gatherer cultures. Individualism was and remains strongest in northwest Europe because these evolutionarily based tendencies are stronger there. In the end, individualism militated against the Church as an authoritarian, collectivist institution with the result that Protestantism flourished throughout most of northwest Europe, with the radical individualism of the Enlightenment soon to follow.

It is noteworthy in this regard that an important factor motivating the Protestant Reformation was perceived corruption in the Church—e.g., the practice of selling indulgences (Luther) as well as the wealth of many monasteries, the idleness of many monks, and profit from the veneration of religious relics (Erasmus).^[507] As on the eve of the Papal Revolution, the Church had lost its moral stature, rendering it vulnerable.

PURITANISM: THE RISE OF EGALITARIAN INDIVIDUALISM AND MORALISTIC UTOPIANISM

The previous chapter concluded that the medieval Church set the stage for the demise of its hegemony partly by promoting the primacy of conscience in religious belief, eventually leading to the theological basis of the Protestant Reformation. In this chapter I aim to discuss Puritanism as a particularly important Protestant movement, not only in British history but also for the United States, where a Puritan-descended elite dominated intellectual discourse and the Ivy League universities, as well as the legal, political, and commercial establishment until the rise of a new elite. This new elite was influential even in the early decades of the twentieth century, but its influence expanded considerably in the post-World War II era and accelerated dramatically after 1965.

The English Civil War of the mid-seventeenth century, which established the influence of Puritan culture in both Britain and the United States, should therefore be seen as a turning point in the history of the West, a watershed event that eventually ended the domination of the fundamentally Indo-European-derived social structures that had held sway over the Western European political landscape from time immemorial.

However, despite Protestantism being ultimately enabled by Western individualism, Puritanism itself, in theory and for a considerable time in practice, was strongly collectivist. Ingroup-outgroup distinctions were highly salient and within the group there were powerful controls on thought and behavior. In other words, at its origins, Puritanism was a group evolutionary strategy.

PURITANISM AS A GROUP EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

Puritanism originated in East Anglia, which was settled mainly by Angles during the early medieval period.^[508] They produced “a civic culture of high literacy, town meetings, and a tradition of freedom,” distinguished from other British groups by their “comparatively large ratios of freemen and small numbers of *servi* and *villani*.”^[509] As noted in Chapter 4, this area, unlike

central England, was not manorialized but rather consisted of small holdings with joint family structure centered around male siblings. As a result, East Anglians did not owe services to a lord and had relatively greater individual freedom. One might suppose that this resulted in East Anglians having a tendency toward “insurrections against arbitrary power”—the risings and rebellions of 1381 led by Jack Straw, Wat Tyler, and John Ball, Clarence’s rebellion in 1477, and Robert Kett’s rebellion of 1548, all of which predated the rise of Puritanism. President John Adams, cherished the East Anglian heritage of “self-determination, free male suffrage, and a consensual social contract.”^[510]

This emphasis on relative egalitarianism and consensual, democratic government are tendencies characteristic of Northwest European peoples.^[511] At the same time, there was a high degree of cohesion within the group made possible by a powerful emphasis on cultural conformity (e.g., punishment of religious heresy) and public regulation of personal behavior via social controls related to sex, lack of religious piety, public drunkenness, etc. These anti-individualist tendencies would be expected to strengthen not only the cohesion of the community but also tendencies for cooperation and high-investment parenting within the community, without compromising the tendencies toward political and a large (albeit limited) measure of economic individualism. One might say that Puritanism was an individualistic group strategy—individualistic in economic tendencies and political tendencies, but collectivist in the areas of religion and sexual behavior.

Indeed, the intensity of public violence directed at defectors may be an example of altruistic punishment (i.e., punishment of others at cost to oneself) discussed in Chapters 3 and 8. One would expect a cooperative culture of individualists attempting to create an effective group to employ high levels of punishment—even altruistic punishment—directed at free-riders and other forms of rule-violation.

John Calvin’s Group Strategy

Calvinism was conceived and developed by John Calvin, a sixteenth-century religious reformer based in Geneva. David Sloan Wilson notes that Calvin was not only conversant in Christian writings, but also impressed people with his ability to discuss these writings from memory as well as with his skills as a writer.^[512] These traits indicate high general intelligence, a set of mechanisms critical for adapting to novel, complex environments.^[513] In other

words, Calvin, like Moses and the Jewish priests who invented Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy, was an intelligent person attempting to design a strategy for living in a complicated world, but one embedded in a theological context typical of his age. Calvin and his colleagues talked a great deal among themselves about how to hold a community together. They developed a belief system that was “user-friendly” in the sense that it appealed to a wide range of people, not just the well-educated or highly intelligent. Of course, belief systems need not be true to motivate adaptive behavior, witness a belief that in the Book of Genesis God enjoins the Israelites to reproduce and multiply.

Calvin compared his church to an organism with many parts working together for the good of the whole:

All God’s elect are so united and conjoined together in Christ that as they are dependent on one Head, they also grow together into one body, being joined and knit together as are the limbs of one body. ... Just as the members of one body share among themselves by some sort of community, each nonetheless has his special gift and distinct ministry.^[514]

Every person has a role to play in the group; therefore, all occupations from farmer to minister are worthy and sanctified.

The free-rider problem and other problems caused by cheating are a central issue for any group evolutionary strategy. Punishment is always an effective mechanism and is undoubtedly critical to the long-term success of any group strategy. However, there are obvious benefits to a group strategy if rule-abiding behavior is internally motivated, and Calvinist theology is designed to do just that. The internal motivation for not violating group norms is that violators have offended God and must seek his forgiveness. They must repent for their sins. Forgiveness and repentance are basic to all human relationships—part of our evolved psychology. However, believing that one’s actions have not just wronged another human but have wronged a powerful and just God capable of the severe punishment of eternal damnation produces a powerful motivation to abide by the rules of the group. This is another example of how Christian religious ideology is able to motivate behavior.^[515]

A great deal of attention was paid to making sure that pastors were paragons of moral rectitude and not prone to ideological deviation which would lead to schism and a breakdown of the organic, collectivist spirit of the

group —reminiscent of the medieval Papal Reform movement that was so effective in motivating Christian commitment during the High Middle Ages (see Chapter 5). Indeed, an important factor motivating the Protestant Reformation was perceived corruption in the Church—e.g., the practice of selling indulgences (a particular focus of Martin Luther) and the wealth and idleness of many monasteries profiting from the veneration of religious relics (commented on by Erasmus, among others).^[516] This is another indication that the power of the Church and other Christian religious sects has depended on the perception that clergy were paragons of morality and even altruism.

Calvinist pastors were to “admonish amicably those whom they see to be erring or to be living a disordered life.”^[517] Those who violated the religious norms were subjected to an escalating set of penalties ranging from a private “brotherly admonition” from the pastor, to public forms of shaming, and finally to excommunication which would mean expulsion from the city.

A high level of commitment was required of group members—indeed, a very high of commitment, since the original Calvinist congregation was the entire city of Geneva rather than a self-selected group of people who voluntarily joined as converts. Church attendance was required, and each family was visited once a year in order to assess the state of their spiritual commitment. In order to maintain the organic nature of the group, punishment was directed at rich and poor alike. Many of Calvin’s greatest battles centered around enforcing the puritanical moral code on the wealthy and powerful who, as expected on the basis of evolutionary theory, are more likely than the less prosperous to be able to translate their wealth and power into sexual liaisons and reproductive success.

Calvinism was a success in Geneva and spread rapidly elsewhere in Europe. Geneva had been politically fractionated and in constant danger in its conflict with the Duchy of Savoy. Notwithstanding the repressive discipline, harsh laws, and paternalistic controls (which made Puritanism unpopular in England after the Puritan victory in the English Civil War), the positive and constructive elements of Calvin’s system became increasingly effective. The people of Geneva listened to preaching several times weekly. They were trained in Calvin’s Sunday School, instructed by his sermons, able to recite his catechism, to sing the Psalter, and to read the Bible with understanding. This was a high level of discipline and indoctrination indeed.^[518]

Calvin had taken a city wracked with dissension and molded it into a power far out of proportion to its economic importance. The same can be said

for an offshoot of Calvinism, the Puritans of England and the United States.

Puritanism in New England

Puritans wished to “purify” the established Church of England from any remnants of Catholicism. Puritanism originated in East Anglia in England, spread to New England, and became the most important cultural influence in the United States from the eighteenth century down to the mid-twentieth century.

Puritan Families. The great majority of the Puritan founders of Massachusetts arrived with their families.^[519] By comparison with other colonies, “households throughout Massachusetts and Connecticut included large numbers of children, small numbers of servants and high proportions of intact marital unions. In Waltham, Massachusetts, for example, completed marriages formed in the 1730s produced 9.7 children on the average. These Waltham families were the largest that demographic historians have found anywhere in the Western world, except for a few Christian communes which regarded reproduction as a form of worship.”^[520]

The high percentage of intact families in the Puritan migration to America meant that they engaged in a much lower incidence of exogamy with the Amerindian population (as occurred in the Spanish and especially the Portuguese colonies in the Americas), or with Black slaves (as in the Southern states), or even with other European ethnic and religious groups (as in the Mid-Atlantic states).

The English Puritans preserved Calvin’s original emphasis on moral rectitude and internally motivated adherence to group norms, many of which supported family life. Puritan ideology deplored “drunkenness, indolence, debauchery, and revels.” Puritans “worried constantly about losing God’s favor through some shortcoming, especially failure to promote moral reformation”; they “looked to the Bible for daily guidance, which made sermons and the interpretative abilities of ministers all-important.”^[521]

These social supports for family life were remarkably adaptive in an evolutionary sense. East Anglian Puritans “became the breeding stock for America’s Yankee population” and “multiplied at a rapid rate, doubling every generation for two centuries. Their numbers increased to 100,000 by 1700, to at least one million by 1800, six million by 1900, and more than sixteen million by 1988—all descended from 21,000 English emigrants who came to Massachusetts in the period from 1629 to 1640.”^[522]

Child-rearing Practices. Puritan child rearing practices were strict and involved rigorous supervision, yet emphasized maintaining warm family bonds throughout life. The importance of a well-ordered family life was surely not unique to Puritans in colonial America, but the Puritans continuously and vigorously “harped on the subject in sermons, pamphlets, laws, and governmental pronouncements.”^[523] While mothers cared for infants, fathers played a major role in rearing both sons and daughters, often teaching them to read and write, instructing them in religion, and even in adulthood advising them in their decisions about work and marriage.

Puritan sexual mores emphasized sexual love within marriage but strongly forbade fornication and adultery. Courtship occurred under family supervision. An illustrative custom was the use of the “courting stick,” “a hollow pole six or eight feet long, with an earpiece at one end and a mouthpiece at the other. The courting couple whispered quietly to one another through this tube, while members of the family remained in the room nearby.” The stick had a dual purpose—“to combine close supervision by elders with free choice by the young.”^[524] The courting stick illustrates the community’s commitment to high-investment parenting: Courtship was aimed at the possibility of marriage, not sexual experimentation.

Intelligence and Emphasis on Education. Havelock Ellis’s *A Study of British Genius* found East Anglia to have the highest average intelligence in Britain: “a larger proportion of scholars, scientists, and artists came from East Anglia than from any other part of England.”^[525] Two Puritan East Anglian counties had the highest rates of literacy in England during the seventeenth century—around 50 percent. Puritans were especially prominent in law and commerce. East Anglian historian R. W. Cretton-Cremer described them as “dour, stubborn, fond of argument and litigation.”^[526]

Reflecting this profile of high intelligence, most Puritan settlers in Massachusetts were middle-class or above, with only a few true aristocrats. Even fewer were poor: “Less than five percent were identified as laborers—a smaller proportion than in other colonies. Only a small minority came as servants—less than 25 percent, compared with 75 percent for Virginia,” and “nearly three-quarters of Massachusetts immigrants paid their own passage—no small sum in 1630.”^[527] As indicated by family names, there were a disproportionate number of tradesmen and craftsmen—names such as “Chandler, Cooper, Courier, Cutler, Draper, Fletcher, Gardiner, Glover, Mason, Mercer, Miller, Sawyer, Saddler, Sherman, Thatcher, Tinker, Turner,

Waterman, Webster, and Wheelwright.”^[528]

It’s thus no surprise that the Puritans in Massachusetts distinguished themselves by their strong support of public libraries and public schools.^[529] Massachusetts law required every town of 50 families to hire a schoolmaster and every town of 100 to maintain a grammar school that taught Latin and Greek.^[530] Even illiterate New England farmers voluntarily contributed some of their harvest to support university faculty and students.

Educational institutions developed by Puritans were much more widespread and sophisticated than in the other colonies during the same period.^[531] At least 130 of the original settlers had attended universities in Europe. Harvard University was established within six years of the founding of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Those admitted to Harvard were required to be able to read and speak classical Latin and know the declensions of Greek nouns and verbs. These requirements were framed in a religious context: “Everyone shall consider the main end of his life and studies to know God and Jesus Christ which is Eternal Life.”^[532]

Puritan Names as Ingroup Markers. The distinctive names given to Puritan children not only reinforced group values, but also served as ingroup markers. While many Puritans gave their children Biblical names from the New and especially the Old Testament, they avoided names such as Emmanuel, Jesus, Angel, Gabriel, Michael, or Christopher commonly used by Catholics. Most indicative of the values Puritans instilled in their children are their hortatory naming practices—Be-Courteous Cole, Fight-the-Good-fight-of-Faith White, Kill-Sin Pemble, and Mortifie Hicks. In some areas, almost half the children received such names, including “an unfortunate young woman named Fly-Fornication Bull ... who was made pregnant in the shop of a yeoman improbably named Goodman Goodman.”^[533] Another distinguishing mark were the “sadd colors,” a drab way of dressing that set Puritans off from others during the colonial period.

Puritan naming practices reflected the reality that being a member required them to transform their entire lives—to see all things great and small through the lens of religious ideology. “Puritanism asked them to look with new eyes at the nature and structure of government, at the role of communities, at the obligations of families; to have new attitudes toward work, toward leisure, toward witches and the wonders of the world.”^[534]

Community Control of Individual Behavior: Puritan Collectivism. As with Calvin’s original doctrine, there was a great deal of supervision of

individual behavior. Thomas Tombs notes that the radical leveling ideas that sprang up in the wake of the English Civil War “tended not toward democratic freedom, but toward godly authoritarianism resting on armed force.”^[535] David Hackett Fischer describes Puritan New England’s ideology of ‘Ordered Liberty’ as “the freedom to order one’s acts in a godly way—but not in any other.”^[536]

As in the Old Testament, God’s wrath would be leveled at entire communities, not only individuals. Each member was therefore responsible for the purity of the whole, since transgressions of others would result in God’s wrath being leveled at the entire community.^[537] Puritans were therefore highly motivated to control the behavior of others that they thought might offend God.

This “freedom as public obligation” implied strong social control of morals, famously including sexual relationships. Puritans forbade the celebration of Christmas, both in England and Massachusetts, and whipped, burned, and exiled those they found to be heretics, all the while believing themselves to be the beleaguered defenders of liberty.

Puritan collectivist ideology can be seen by the analogy of a Christian community to a body, as in Calvin’s original formulation (see above) and in this comment by John Winthrop, written in 1630 immediately prior to establishing the Massachusetts Bay Colony:

All true Christians are of one body in Christ. ... All parts of this body being thus united are made so contiguous in a special relation as they must needs partake of each other’s strength and infirmity, joy, sorrow, weal and woe. 1 Corinthians 12:26 *If one member suffers, all suffer with it; if one be in honor, all rejoice with it.* ... For the work we have in hand, it is by a mutual consent through a special overruling providence, and a more than ordinary approbation of the churches of Christ, to seek out a place of cohabitation and consortship under a due form of government both civil and ecclesiastical. In such cases as this the care of the public must oversway all private respects, by which not only conscience, but mere civil policy doth bind us; for it is a true rule that particular estates cannot subsist in the ruin of the public.^[538]

Economic behavior also came under community control. As with traditional Jewish groups, economic relationships were predicated on fairness

within the group and the good of the group as a whole, not maximizing individual profit. There were elaborate rules on what merchants could charge: “Some false principles are these: 1. That a man might sell as dear as he can, and buy as cheap as he can. 2. If a man lose by casualty of sea, etc., in some of his commodities, he may raise the price of the rest. 3. That he may sell as he bought, though he paid too dear, etc., and though the commodity be fallen, etc., 4. That, as a man may take the advantage of his own skill or ability, so he may of another’s ignorance or necessity.”^[539]

These principles are collectivist, and they violate individualist economic logic, putting the risk much more heavily on the merchant. However, they indicate the extent to which group rather than individual interests were the critical consideration.

Was Puritanism a Closed Group Evolutionary Strategy? We have seen that a general characteristic of Western groups is permeability—barriers, if they exist at all, do not survive for long. This generalization holds for the Puritans, although there certainly were attempts to close off the group to others.

In England, Puritanism never really developed into a group evolutionary strategy. Rather, since Puritans did not control a specific territory, it remained a loosely bordered faction among other Protestant sects. In New England, however, it began as a hegemonic religious and political movement in control of a particular territory. Membership in the church required a vote of the congregation. “The principal criterion, besides an upright behavior, was evidence that God had chosen the candidate for eternal salvation, that he was a regenerate spirit rather than merely a man or woman who wanted to be picked for salvation.”^[540]

Attesting to a considerable amount of endogamy and hence ingroup attraction, the leading Puritan families of East Anglia “intermarried with such frequency” that one historian dubbed them “a prosopographer’s dream.”^[541] There are also examples of individuals who exhibited something close to racist thinking. In the late eighteenth century, anti-Federalist James Winthrop, a Harvard professor and patriot during the Revolutionary War, urged his fellow New Englanders not to ratify the Constitution, instead exhorting them to “keep their blood pure” as it was only “by keeping separate from the foreign mixtures” that they had “acquired their present greatness ... [and] preserved their religion and morals.”^[542] Puritans thought of themselves as “a Chosen People,” presumably a product of their immersion in the Old

Testament.

Nevertheless, Puritans sought to convert others to their ways, so that, theoretically at least, Puritanism was not a genetically closed strategy. Puritans in Massachusetts thought that the heathens living among them, including the Native Americans, “must be converted to Reformed Protestantism; they must also take on the social and political habits of the true Christian. ... The conversion of the Indian neighbors was a cherished Puritan project, and one that reveals much about the objectives and outlook of Puritan society.”^[543] In comments on Africans who were held mainly as bond servants in the Massachusetts colony, Cotton Mather wrote, “the considerations that would move you to teach your Negroes the truths of the glorious gospel as far as you can, and bring them, if it may be, to live according to those truths a sober, and a righteous, and a godly life; they are innumerable.”^[544]

Nevertheless, very few Blacks or Indians joined Puritan churches, and Alden Vaughn comments that while a few Puritans like Mather attempted to convert Indians and Blacks, “their fellow New Englanders increasingly turned Puritanism into a tribalistic ritual for the descendants of the founding fathers.”^[545]

From its founding in 1630, Puritans created a tribalistic, insular society in New England that regularly excluded non-Puritans and retained strong control over group boundaries. An early regulation from Springfield required that sale of property be only to those approved by town magistrates—an attempt to prevent the “sundry evils that may befall this township through ill-disposed persons that may thrust themselves in amongst us against the liking and consent of the generality of the inhabitants, or select townsmen by purchasing a lot or place of habitation, etc.”^[546] As John Winthrop noted in 1637, “If we heere be a corporation established by free consent, if the place of our co-habitation be our owne, then no man hath a right to come into us ... without our consent.”^[547]

Puritan theoretical openness to conversion was consistent with excluding those of a different faith, and at its origins, it did so quite energetically. Anabaptists and Quakers were particularly singled out for exclusion and even executed if they returned to New England after being banished. Four Quakers were executed in 1659–1661 when they returned after being banished from the colony, but within a generation even these dissenting religions were tolerated in Boston.

Decline of Puritan Group Boundaries. The Puritan colony retained a

great deal of independence from England: “Neither foreign powers nor the English crown had much influence on the small cluster of colonies.”^[548] However, after the Restoration of 1660 and the decline of Puritan political power in England, the ability of Puritans to retain control over their territory began to decline, resulting in a more religiously diverse, materialistic, and cosmopolitan society. Puritans ceased being a religious group with a common ethnic origin and clear boundaries between themselves and the outside world. As German historian Theodor Mommsen said of the Romans, they were no longer a people, but a population.^[549]

The main source of Puritan decline was that the British government denied them the right to police their borders and expel heretics. In 1664 the British government ruled that an Englishman need not be a member of the Congregationalist Church to qualify as a freeman in Massachusetts. The Charter of 1691 prescribed freedom of Christian religious conscience (except to Papists!); it also ended the colony’s right to select its own governor, its practice of limiting voting to church members, and its ability to expel heretics. And as political control waned, it became increasingly difficult to impose Puritan religious and moral orthodoxy on the inhabitants of New England.

The colony was thus opened up to immigration and soon became inundated by waves of people who were not committed to the Puritan way of life but attracted by its vibrant economy. Moreover, the colony itself became more inclined to commercialism and materialism—individualism had resurfaced from the chains of Puritan collectivism.^[550] There was also a diminution of Puritan religious militancy, perhaps because of its extraordinary demands for conformity, emotional intensity, and self-denial. For all practical purposes, the dream (i.e., the group evolutionary strategy) had ended within 70 years after its beginning.

More significant perhaps than the gradual erosion of political monopoly and the growth of materialism was the feeling that after the Restoration, New Englanders were less determined than their predecessors to fashion a Zion in the wilderness, to make of their society a vigorous example of piety and right-walking. ... To their credit, the men and women of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries may have been more tolerant, more practical, more humane ... than their predecessors, but with the exception of the Mathers and a few other clergymen, they were

certainly less militant in their attachment to Puritan principles.^[551]

As in the Old Testament, harbingers of decline were greeted by claims that Puritans had strayed from the path of righteousness and would be destroyed by the wrath of God. After 1660 preachers wrote Jeremiads with the message that New England must repent for having strayed from God's path and from the high achievements of the founding fathers. God will not long tolerate so profligate a people. "What shall I do with such a stiff-necked race?"

THE PURITAN REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND

The first clash took place in England. ... The effort to abolish absolute power in the temporal sphere and in the intellectual sphere, that is the meaning of the English revolution, that is its role in the development of our civilization.

François Guizot^[552]

The Tudor period and the creation of the Church of England eclipsed the power of the Church, but the events unleashed by this upheaval resulted in a far more radical revolution in English political culture in the seventeenth century: the rise of the Puritans and the eventual eclipse of the aristocracy. Thomas Tombs labels the period from 1500–1700 encompassing the Reformation, the English Civil War, and the Glorious Revolution as "the Great Divide"—a watershed in English history.^[553] Likewise, Andrew Fraser perceives the Puritan revolution as a fundamental break in English history. It resulted in "a radically new social character" that resulted in the "*embourgeoisement* of English elites."^[554]

The radicalism of the Puritan Revolution was that it eventually destroyed the old tri-partite Indo-European order based on domination of a military elite. This revolution was far more radical than that whereby Christianity destroyed the pagan gods of Old Europe because it "flattened the foundational myths of the trifunctional social order characteristic of all Indo-European peoples."^[555] The Puritan Revolution and its aftermath eventually ended the Indo-European world and its Christian version: the king and aristocracy ("those who fought *bellatores*"), the Church ("those who prayed, *oratores*"), and the commoners ("those who worked, *laboratores*").^[556]

It was thus the quintessential modern revolution, and because of the rise of Britain into a dominant world power, it was a fundamental break in the

history of the West. It marked the beginning of the end of aristocratic individualism with its strong emphasis on hierarchy between social categories and the beginning of the rise of egalitarian individualism with its ideology of social leveling and parliamentary democracy—blended with capitalism and wealth accumulation.

For the Puritans, the Civil War was framed in religious terms with a strong dose of millenarianism—the first of many Puritan-inspired holy wars aimed at achieving the millennium of peace and virtue. Flags for the parliamentary side had “aggressively religious themes,” with “anti-papist designs and Old Testament mottos such as ‘Aflame with love for Sion’ or ‘Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron.’”^[557] After achieving power, Oliver Cromwell attacked Spain, “the perfect target for a holy war, the enemy of ‘whatsoever is of God’, involving ‘all the wicked people of the world, whether abroad or at home.’”^[558]

The revolution, although begun in England, was slow to reach its completion there, whereas in the United States, “as a consequence of the Civil War, the absolute hegemony of the leveling, acquisitive and utilitarian society pioneered by the Puritan Revolution was firmly entrenched.”^[559] The new order was far more egalitarian than the older order. Congregations elected their ministers, who served at their pleasure. Whereas war had been the province of the nobility, Cromwell’s New Model Army was based on citizen participation.

It was also profoundly spiritual and created enormous energy—energy that was eventually characterized far more by capitalist financial concerns than religious spirituality. “Possessive individualism” and “tasteful consumption” eventually came to define the highest expression of Anglo-Saxon character and culture. The government of England and other Anglo-Saxon areas became dominated by commercial and financial interests.

However, from the point of view of the new order, the revolution had succeeded in overthrowing an oppressive system. When the intellectuals of the new order looked at the English past, they did not see a social order of liberty and reciprocity. Rather, Whig historians saw the Middle Ages as oppressive, that people had no share in the government and the vast majority were the villeins, vassals, or bondsmen of their lords.^[560]

THE PURITAN REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States, the Puritan revolution was carried to its extreme, and

again we see strong millenarian tendencies. Freed of the hereditary aristocracy and religion of England, during the Jacksonian era “the few remaining conservative influences in religion, politics, and law” were swept aside.^[561] The result was an exultant radical individualism in which every person was to have direct, unmediated access to God. This radical individualism distrusted all manifestations of corporate power, including chartered private corporations. However, the corporations established by the heirs of Puritanism, referred to as WASPs (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) in the following, eventually metastasized into monsters “incapable of preserving either the class boundaries of the bourgeoisie or the ethnic character of the Anglo-American nation as a whole.”^[562] In the hands of recent and contemporary Anglo-Saxons, the modern business corporation is analogous to the “proposition nation” concept: merely a concatenation of contracts, with no ethnic character, although Fraser is quick to note that corporations dominated by other groups do not lose their ethnic character. As noted in Chapter 2, oath-bound contracts were a central feature of Indo-European culture.

The Puritan-energized egalitarian tendencies eventually ended the aristocratic, Indo-European-derived social order of the Old South. The triumph of the North in the Civil War meant that the U.S. was even further removed from its Indo-European roots than before.

The result of Lincoln’s victory was that limits on federal power “were swept aside by executive decree and military might. By crushing the southern states, Lincoln fatally weakened the federal principle; his arbitrary exercise of emergency powers laid the foundations for executive dictatorship whenever exceptional circumstances justify the suspension of constitutional liberties.”^[563]

NINETEENTH-CENTURY PURITAN-INSPIRED

INTELLECTUAL TRENDS: SECULAR VERSIONS OF MORAL UTOPIANISM

An interesting feature of Puritanism is the tendency to pursue utopian causes framed as moral issues—their susceptibility to utopian appeals to a “higher law” and the belief that the principal purpose of government is moral (see Chapter 7 for a psychological analysis of moral idealism). New England was the most fertile ground for “the perfectability of man creed,” and the “father of a dozen ‘isms.’”^[564] There was a tendency to paint political alternatives as starkly contrasting moral imperatives, with one side portrayed

as evil incarnate—inspired by the devil. Puritan moral intensity can also be seen in their “profound personal piety”^[565]—their intensity of commitment to live not only a holy life, but also a sober and industrious life.

Whereas in the Puritan settlements of Massachusetts the moral fervor was directed at keeping fellow Puritans in line, in the nineteenth century it was secularized and directed at the entire country. The moral fervor that had inspired Puritan preachers and magistrates to rigidly enforce laws on fornication, adultery, sleeping in church, or criticizing preachers was universalized and aimed at correcting the perceived ills of capitalism and slavery.

Puritans waged holy war on behalf of moral righteousness even against their own cousins—quite possibly a form of altruistic punishment given the sacrifices of closely related peoples on both sides of the Civil War. Whatever the political and economic complexities that led to the Civil War, it was the Yankee moral condemnation of slavery that inspired and justified the massive carnage of closely related Anglo-Americans on behalf of slaves from Africa. Militarily, the war with the Confederacy was the greatest sacrifice in lives and property ever made by Americans.^[566] Puritan moral fervor and punitiveness are also evident in the call of the Congregationalist minister at Henry Ward Beecher’s Old Plymouth Church in New York during World War II for “exterminating the German people ... the sterilization of 10,000,000 German soldiers and the segregation of the woman.”^[567]

Ernest Tuveson notes that the moralistic, idealistic strand of American thought tends to come to the fore in times of crisis—“the expansionist period, the Civil War, the First World War.”^[568] After the evil has been vanquished, the rhetoric dies down, and disillusionment may occur as people realize that evil has not, after all, been extirpated.^[569] However, it lurks in the background and may revive in times of crisis. “Yet, despite post-Civil War disillusionment, the myth of the Redeemer Nation kept a hold on the deepest feelings of the country, and in critical moments asserted itself,”^[570] citing several speeches of Woodrow Wilson: “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.”^[571]

Transcendentalism as a Movement of Puritan-Descended Intellectuals

Philip Gura’s *American Transcendentalism* provides a valuable account of the Transcendentalists as a nineteenth-century intellectual elite in the United

States whose characteristics can be traced to their Puritan origins; they created what we would recognize today as a culture of the left—utopian, idealistic, and moralistic.^[572] This is of considerable interest because Transcendentalism was a movement entirely untouched by the predominantly Jewish milieu of the twentieth-century left in America.^[573] Rather, it was homegrown, and its story tells us much about the sensibility of an important group of White intellectuals and perhaps gives us hints about why in the twentieth-century the WASP establishment so easily became replaced by a new Jewish elite.

Based in New England, Transcendentalism was closely associated with Harvard and Boston—the very heart of Puritan New England. It was also closely associated with Unitarianism which was an offshoot of the original Puritan Congregationalists and which had become the most common religious affiliation for Boston’s elite. Many Transcendentalists were Unitarian clergymen, including Ralph Waldo Emerson, the person whose name is most closely associated with the movement in the public mind.

These were very intelligent people living in an age when religious beliefs required an intellectual defense rather than blind obedience. Their backgrounds were typical of New England Christians of the day. But as their intellectual world expanded (often at the Harvard Divinity School), they became aware of the “higher criticism” of the Bible that originated with German scholars. This scholarship showed that there were several different authors of Genesis and that Moses did not write the first five books of the Old Testament. They also became aware of other religions, such as Buddhism and Hinduism which made it unlikely that Christianity had a monopoly on religious truth. If the higher criticism implied that the foundations of religious belief were shaky, and if God was unlikely to have endowed Christianity with unique religious truths, the Transcendentalists would build new foundations emphasizing the subjectivity of religious experience.

In their search for an intellectual grounding of religion, they rejected the empiricism of John Locke which conceptualized the human mind as passively reacting to environmental events, turning instead to the idealism of Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schelling, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, based on the idea of an active, creative mind able to envision ideal worlds and pursue them into reality. As the writer and political activist Orestes Brownson summed it up in 1840, Transcendentalism defended man’s “capacity of knowing truth intuitively [and] attaining scientific knowledge of an order of

existence transcending the reach of the senses [the program of the empiricists], and of which we can have no sensible experience.”^[574] Everyone, from birth, possesses a divine element, and the mind has “innate principles, including the religious sentiment.”^[575]

The intuitions of the Transcendentalists were decidedly egalitarian and universalist. “Universal divine inspiration—grace as the birthright of all—was the bedrock of the Transcendentalist movement.”^[576] Ideas of God, morality, and immortality are part of human nature and do not have to be learned. This is the spiritual equivalent of the democratic ideal that all men (and women) are created equal.

Intuitions are by their very nature slippery things. One could just as plausibly (or, in my view, more plausibly) propose that humans have intuitions of greed, lust, power, and ethnocentrism—precisely the view of the Darwinians who came along later in the century and rose to predominance in the early twentieth century. In the context of the philosophical milieu of Transcendentalism, their intuitions were not intended to be open to empirical investigation. Their truth was obvious and compelling—a fact that tells us much about the religious milieu of the movement.

Besides rejecting empiricism as the basis of knowledge, the Transcendentalists rejected materialism with its emphasis on “facts, history, the force of circumstance and the animal wants of man.”^[577] Fundamentally, they did not want to explain human history or society, and they certainly would have been unimpressed by a Darwinian view of human nature that emphasizes such nasty realities as competition for power and resources and how these play out given the exigencies of history. Rather, they adopted a utopian vision of humans as able to transcend all that by means of the God-given spiritual powers of the human mind.

Not surprisingly, this philosophy led many Transcendentalists to become deeply involved in social activism on behalf of the lower echelons of society—the poor, prisoners, the insane, the developmentally disabled, and—most critically—slaves in the South.

Prominent Transcendentalists

The following examples give a flavor of some of the central attitudes and typical social activism of important Transcendentalists.

Orestes Brownson (1803–1876). Brownson admired the Universalists’ belief in the inherent dignity of all people and the promise of eventual

universal salvation for all believers. He argued “for the unity of races and the inherent dignity of each person, and he lambasted Southerners for trying to enlarge their political base.”^[578] Like many New Englanders, he was outraged by the Supreme Court decision in the Dred Scott case that required authorities in the North to return fugitive slaves to their owners in the South. For Brownson the Civil War was a moral crusade waged not only to preserve the union, but to emancipate the slaves. Writing in 1840, Brownson claimed that we should “realize in our social arrangements and in the actual conditions of all men that equality of man and man” that God had established but which had been destroyed by capitalism.^[579] According to Brownson, Christians had

to bring down the high, and bring up the low; to break the fetters of the bound and set the captive free; to destroy all oppression, establish the reign of justice, which is the reign of equality, between man and man; to introduce new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness, wherein all shall be as brothers, loving one another, and no one possessing what another lacketh.^[580]

George Ripley (1802–1880). Ripley founded the utopian community of Brook Farm and was an important literary critic, “preach[ing] in earnest Unitarianism’s central message, a belief in universal, internal religious principle that validated faith and united all men and women.”^[581] He wrote that Transcendentalists “believe in an order of truths which transcends the sphere of the external senses. Their leading idea is the supremacy of mind over matter.” Religious truth does not depend on facts or tradition but inheres in every human—clearly a universalist vision.

[Religious truth] has an unerring witness in the soul. There is a light, they believe, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world; there is a faculty in all, the most degraded, the most ignorant, the most obscure, to perceive spiritual truth, when distinctly represented; and the ultimate appeal, on all moral questions, is not to a jury of scholars, a hierarchy of divines, or the prescriptions of a creed, but to the common sense of the race.^[582]

Ripley founded the ill-fated Brook Farm on the principle of substituting

“brotherly cooperation” for “selfish competition.”^[583] His creation was a paradigmatic transcendentalist project—developing a utopian society on the basis of reason and moral intuitions. He questioned the economic and moral basis of capitalism, and held that if people did the work they desired, and for which they had a talent, the result would be a non-competitive, classless society where each person would achieve personal fulfillment.

Amos Bronson Alcott (1799–1888). Alcott was an educator who “believed in the innate goodness of each child whom he taught.”^[584] He “realized how Unitarianism’s positive and inclusive vision of humanity accorded with his own.”^[585] He advocated strong social controls in order to socialize children: infractions were reported to the entire group of students, and the entire group was punished for the bad behavior of a single student—a remnant, perhaps, of Puritan collectivism. His students were the children of the intellectual elite of Boston, but his methods eventually proved unpopular. The school closed after most of the parents withdrew their children when Alcott insisted upon admitting a Black child, indicating that although the transcendentalists formed an antislavery intellectual elite, their ideas were not necessarily popular with the public. Alcott supported William Garrison’s radical abolitionism, and he was a financial supporter of John Brown and his violent attempts to overthrow slavery.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882). The most widely known intellectual of the period, Emerson began his career by stirring up a great deal of controversy in an 1832 address to the Harvard Divinity School in which he reinterpreted Christ’s claim to be divine as implying that all people:

One man was true to what is in you and me. He saw that God incarnates himself in man, and evermore goes forth to take possession of his world. He said, in this jubilee of sublime emotion, “I am divine. Through me, God acts; through me, he speaks. Would you see God, see me; or, see thee, when thou also thinkest as I now think.”^[586]

Although relatively individualistic by the standards of Transcendentalism, Emerson proposed that by believing in their own divine purpose, people would have the courage to stand up for social justice. The divinely powered individual was thus linked to disrupting the social order.

Theodore Parker (1810–1860). Parker was a Unitarian minister, writer, public intellectual, and model for religiously motivated liberal activism.

Similar to Emerson, he wrote that “God is alive and in every person.”^[587] He was also a social activist, concerned about crime and poverty, and he was deeply opposed to the Mexican war and to slavery. He blamed social conditions for crime and poverty, and condemned merchants in terms of moral universalism: “We are all brothers, rich and poor, American and foreign, put here by the same God, for the same end, and journeying towards the same heaven, and owing mutual help.”^[588] In Parker’s view, slavery is “the blight of this nation” and was the real reason for the Mexican war, because it was aimed at expanding the slave states. Parker was far more socially active than Emerson, becoming one of the most prominent abolitionists and a secret financial supporter of John Brown.

When Parker looked back on the history of the Puritans, he saw them as standing for moral principles. He approved of John Eliot in particular because he preached to the Indians and attempted to convert them to Christianity.

Nevertheless, Parker is a bit of an enigma because, despite being a prominent abolitionist and favoring racial integration of schools and churches, he was also prone to making condescending and disparaging comments about the potential of Africans for progress, while claiming that the Anglo-Saxon race was “more progressive” than all others,^[589] He listed five racial traits, including a talent for administration, “intense materialism,” “love of individual liberty,” practicality (i.e., “unideal, unpoetic character”), and (surprisingly) “hostility to other tribes of men.”^[590]

William Henry Channing (1810–1884). Channing was a Transcendentalist writer and Christian socialist. He wrote that “Christian love, and labor in its spirit, would initiate a more egalitarian society,”^[591] including for immigrants, the poor, slaves, prisoners, and the mentally ill. He worked tirelessly on behalf of the cause of emancipation and on behalf of the Freedman’s Bureau which was designed to provide social services for former slaves.

Transcendentalist Activism on Behalf of Social Justice

In the 1840s there was division between relatively individualist Transcendentalists like Emerson who “valued individual spiritual growth and self-expression,” and “social reformers like Brownson, Ripley, and increasingly, Parker.”^[592] In 1844 Emerson joined a group of speakers that included abolitionists, but many Transcendentalists questioned his emphasis on self-reliance given the Mexican war, upheaval in Europe, and slavery.

They saw self-reliance as ineffectual in combating the huge aggregation of interests these represented. Elizabeth Peabody lamented Emerson's insistence that a Transcendentalist should not labor "for small objects, such as Abolition, Temperance, Political Reforms, &c."^[593] (She herself was an advocate of the movement to add Kindergarten to school systems as well as Native American causes.)

But Emerson did oppose slavery. An 1844 speech praised Caribbean Blacks for rising to high occupations after slavery: "This was not the case in the United States, where descendants of Africans were precluded any opportunity to be a white person's equal. This only reflected on the moral bankruptcy of American white society, however, for 'the civility of no race can be perfect whilst another race is degraded.'"^[594]

Emerson and other Transcendentalists were outraged by the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Gura notes that for Emerson, "the very landscape seemed robbed of its beauty, and he even had trouble breathing because of the 'infamy' in the air."^[595] After the John Brown debacle, Emerson was "glad to see that the terror at disunion and anarchy is disappearing," for the price of slaves' freedom might demand it.^[596] Both Emerson and Henry David Thoreau commented on Brown's New England Puritan heritage. Emerson lobbied Abraham Lincoln on slavery, and when Lincoln emancipated the slaves, he wrote "Our hurts are healed; the health of the nation is repaired."^[597] The war was worth fighting because of it.

It is worth noting here that Lincoln was of New England stock and is a good example of the millenarian spirit that pervaded nineteenth-century thought. Central to Transcendentalism was the idea that the creative powers of the human mind would be able to create the ideal society. Conservative theorist M. E. Bradford emphasizes this aspect of Lincoln's thought, describing Lincoln's "secular Puritanism" that "must replace Church with State."^[598] Millennialism is thus not entirely individualistic: "God must operate through cohesive bodies of men; there must be children of light and children of darkness geographically."^[599] In the event, this cohesive body of men was the Union army marching to the strains of "The Battle Hymn of the Republic."

This emphasis on reforming and seizing power in a state marks a departure from the early Transcendentalists' concern with shoring up the intellectual basis of religion. However, it continues to mirror these early transcendentalists' moral and egalitarian intuitions in their efforts to create a

utopian society on the basis of reason. Because of this moral imperative, even apocalyptic force should be used to attain it in a Manichean struggle between good and evil. Bradford comments on Lincoln rejecting compromise in his Peoria speech of October 16, 1854 in wording that is strikingly similar to political rhetoric in our own times.

The great difficulty with Lincoln's Peoria presentation is that it finally refuses accommodation, the sacrosanct principle of Clay and of the Founders, and in its place threatens apocalypse if the alternate principle of exclusion is not applied to all Western territories of the Republic [i.e., that slavery could be excluded from new states by federal mandate as opposed to popular attitudes, as required by the Missouri Compromise of 1820 but repealed by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854]. To accept the notion that there is any policy superior to these alternatives is called both "monstrous" and "worthy of hate." We are now returned to the false dilemma. Ordinary persuasion is forsworn. A new political religion is implied. And though Lincoln still pretends civility and claims not "to question the patriotism or to assail the motives of any man, or class of men," we are well on our way to a full-fledged Puritan rhetoric of perpetual war against the "powers of darkness": "to universal armed camps, engaged in a death struggle against each other."^[600]

Note particularly Lincoln's claim that rejecting the ability of the federal government to exclude slavery from new states is "monstrous" and "worthy of hate"—phrases that are common among the contemporary left in the United States in condemning policy proposals of the right, especially those related to race.

Ultimately, it is a moral struggle, as Lincoln stated in his 1858 debate with Stephen Douglas:

It is the eternal struggle between these two principles—right and wrong—throughout the world. They are two principles that have stood face to face from the beginning of time; and will ever continue to struggle.^[601]

Lincoln fit into the millenarian trends of the nineteenth century, combining a belief in inevitable progress heading toward a utopian society of the future but wrapped in a religious framework. These trends are described by Ernest

Lee Tuveson in his *Redeemer Nation*: “it is startling to realize how widespread was this religious version of the belief in progress. Especially in the United States, the millennialist interpretation of God’s Word did much to shape attitudes toward contemporary problems.”^[602] And because of the religious overlay, these ideas were highly influential with relatively uneducated people who would never have read the Transcendentalists or Herbert Spencer.

These ideas were widely disseminated in the mass culture of the period. A good example is Julia Ward Howe, whose “The Battle Hymn of the Republic” was published in 1862. She was a Bostonian and a parishioner of Theodore Parker, and she and her husband were friends of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Her hymn epitomizes the messianic idea of the cosmic struggle between good and evil, replete with images of the Apocalypse from the Book of Revelations: “As he died to make men holy, let us die to make men free, While God is marching on.”

Transcendentalism: A Summing Up

It is easy to sympathize with the optimism and belief in progress that was so characteristic of the nineteenth-century intellectuals and religious writers. Material progress was obvious, and the century saw great strides in science and technology—the railroads, sewing machines, telegraph, rubber vulcanization, the internal combustion engine, photography, the phonograph, telephone, and many more. As noted by many millennialist writers, life was getting better, standards of living were improving. In 1814 a religious writer, Joel Barlow, anticipated a world of “longer lifespan in the holy utopia, population will be increased, millions of acres now barren will be fruitful.”^[603] A cousin of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Joseph Emerson, a minister and theologian writing in 1818, anticipated a world of easier travel and accelerated accretion of knowledge.^[604]

These improvements in the secular world were then combined by the religious descendants of Puritans into a world view that saw progress not just in the material world but also in the spiritual world, the “holy utopia.” Humanity was thus heading toward a spiritual and material utopia—a golden age of peace, harmony, righteous behavior and material comfort—ideas that were often combined with the idea that this golden age would follow upon an apocalyptic battle between good and evil. Such thinking may well have been the lens through which many in the North saw the Civil War; as indicated

above, it appears to characterize how Lincoln saw his role as an agent of God fighting an apocalyptic battle against evil.

Indeed, many of these thinkers believed that the utopia could only come about as a result of a military campaign. Thus Joseph Bellamy, a prominent late nineteenth-century Congregationalist preacher and theologian, identified “the whole process of redemption with a long military operation in which, eventually, superior generalship will prevail.” Bellamy wrote that “the time of the last general battle draws on, when a glorious victory is to be won.”

Similarly, in the nineteenth century it was entirely reasonable for Europeans, and especially northwest Europeans, to think that they were a special people given that they had essentially conquered the world, and Americans in particular had carved out a huge continental land mass for themselves. Moreover, all of those inventions and all the progress in science was coming from Europeans. It was quite natural, then to think that there was something special and unique about Europeans and their culture—as indeed there is.

Early on, these ideas of peoplehood were not based on sophisticated theories of race, and they were typically bound up with various religious ideas (see following section). But as the century wore on, and particularly after Darwin’s naturalistic, empirically based perspective became influential, racial conceptions of Anglo-Saxons, the Germanic peoples, and Europeans generally were shorn of their theological overtones by more secular-minded intellectuals who ultimately came to dominate the high culture of the United States. These latter racial ideas then became the basis for creating the intellectual milieu in which the ethnically defensive 1924 immigration law was enacted.

After the Civil War, the idealism of the Transcendentalists lost its preeminence, and American intellectuals increasingly embraced materialism and science. Whereas Locke had been the main inspiration for materialism earlier in the century, it was now exemplified by Charles Darwin, Auguste Comte, and William Graham Sumner. After the Civil War, the Transcendentalists’ contributions to American intellectual discourse “remained vital, if less remarked, particularly among those who kept alive a dream of a common humanity based in the irreducible equality of all souls,”^[605] a comment that illustrates the profound egalitarian universalism—the dream of a common humanity—at the heart of transcendentalism. One of the last Transcendentalists, Octavius Brooks Frothingham, wrote that

Transcendentalism was being “suppressed by the philosophy of experience, which, under different names” was taking possession of the speculative world.”^[606] He described the enemies of Transcendentalism as “positivists.”^[607] After Emerson’s death, George Santayana commented that he “was a cheery, child-like soul, impervious to the evidence of evil.”^[608]

By the early twentieth century, then, Transcendentalism was a distant memory and the new materialists had won the day. The early part of the twentieth century was the high-water mark of Darwinism in the social sciences. It was common at that time to think there were important differences between the races in both intelligence and moral qualities. Not only did races differ, they were in competition with each other for supremacy. For example, Sumner, a social Darwinist, thought that social class and racial divisions as well as competition were part of the natural order of things. Writing in 1903, he noted that “the two races live more independently of each other now than they did” during the slave era.^[609] Racist ideas had become part of the furniture of intellectual life—commonplace among intellectuals of all stripes, including a significant number of Jewish racial nationalists concerned about the racial purity and political power of the Jewish people. Many of them were Zionists.^[610]

THE UNEASY ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ANGLO-SAXON INDIVIDUALISM AND ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

“Surely, to be a Christian and an Anglo-Saxon, and an American in this generation is to stand on the very mountain-top of privilege.”
Josiah Strong, 1893^[611]

Americans like myself who are distressed at the decline and displacement of Whites, the rise of multiculturalism, and massive non-White immigration must acknowledge the strong strands of American culture that have facilitated these phenomena. On one hand, individualism and its cluster of related traits (moral universalism, science, the Faustian spirit of exploration and conquest) are the basic features of Western modernization—the features that have allowed Western cultures to dominate the world and to colonize areas far away from their European homelands.

On the other hand, because of its relative lack of ethnocentrism and its tendencies toward assimilation rather than erecting ingroup/outgroup barriers,

an important strand of American individualism has been to develop wildly optimistic and idealistic theories of the American future. Liberal theorists of the nineteenth century saw a future America as dominated by people who looked and thought like themselves: Even people from different races would ultimately become White Anglo-Saxon and Protestant no matter what their racial background.

However, despite their Enlightenment values (which at their heart are individualist), it was common among the U.S. Founding Fathers to think of themselves in ethnic terms. In his *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, Eric Kaufmann shows that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Anglo-Americans had a strong sense that they were the biological descendants of freedom-loving Anglo-Saxon tribes: “The New England town meeting was likened to the Anglo-Saxon tribal council, and the [statements of Tacitus](#) regarding the free, egalitarian qualities of the Anglo-Saxons were given an American interpretation.” For example, Tacitus: “The king or the chief, according to age, birth, distinction in war, or eloquence, is heard, more because he has influence to persuade than because he has power to command. If his sentiments displease them, they reject them with murmurs; if they are satisfied, they brandish their spears.”^[612]

The “Yeoman farmer” was considered the ethnic prototype. After drafting the Constitution, Thomas Jefferson stated that Americans are “the children of Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night; and on the other side, [Hengist and Horsa](#), the *Saxon chiefs from whom we claim the honour of being descended, and whose political principles and form of government we have assumed.*”^[613] An early version of the Declaration of Independence referred to affronts to the “common blood.”^[614]

Similar statements of ethnic confidence were common among intellectuals and politicians in the period preceding the Mexican-American war. For example, in 1846 Walt Whitman [wrote](#), “What has miserable, inefficient Mexico ... to do ... with the mission of peopling the New World with a noble race?”^[615] This was the period when Samuel George Morton published his data on the cranial capacity of different races, showing that Europeans had larger cranial capacity than other racial groups, with Africans having the lowest average capacity.^[616]

Later in the century, Protestant writer Josiah Strong noted:

[Revelation teaches us] that the world is evidently about to enter a new

era, that in this new era mankind is to come more and more under Anglo-Saxon influence, and that Anglo-Saxon civilization is more favorable to the spread of those principles whose universal triumph is necessary to that perfection of the race to which it is destined; the entire realization of which will be the kingdom of heaven fully come on earth.

[\[617\]](#)

Indeed, this conviction that Englishmen as a race held a special place in God's favor "was by no means limited to the Puritan factions, nor did it end with the Civil Wars. There is ample evidence that it continued as a presiding idea in English-speaking countries down into the twentieth century."[\[618\]](#)

As developed in previous chapters, Jefferson was correct to view the Anglo-Saxon tendencies toward individualism and representative government as ethnic traits. This view was emphatically stated in this previously quoted passage from the mid-nineteenth century by Whig historian Thomas Macaulay emphasizing the special characteristics of the "German race":

The Reformation had been a national as well as a moral revolt. It had been not only an insurrection of the laity against the clergy, but also an insurrection of all the branches of the great German race against an alien domination. It is a most significant circumstance, that no large society of which the tongue is not Teutonic has ever turned Protestant, and that, wherever a language derived from that of ancient Rome is spoken, the religion of modern Rome to this day prevails.[\[619\]](#)

Ernest Tuveson comments: "This notion had begun as early as the seventeenth century. The Germanic peoples in general, it came to be assumed, had throughout their history exhibited qualities of courage, intelligence, and love of liberty that peculiarly fitted them to be the defenders of the 'Christian liberty' promised in the New Testament, and to advance the cause of religion and civilization."[\[620\]](#)

A critical feature of individualism is that group boundaries are relatively permeable, and assimilation is the norm. As Kaufmann notes, even in the nineteenth century, individualism resulted in assimilation rather than maintaining impermeable boundaries with other European groups: "Interethnic relations followed a pattern of Anglo-conformity. ... Immigrants were to be made into American WASPs by absorbing American English,

American Liberty, and American Protestantism and, ultimately, by intermarrying with Americans.”^[621]

For example, in the late eighteenth century, the response to large-scale German settlements in Pennsylvania was to reject German-American separatism and a multicultural model of America. Attempts to make German an official language and have laws written in German were rebuffed. German-Americans began Anglicizing their names to better fit into the American milieu.

There was an assumption, even among many liberals, that these ethnic others would look and act like Anglo-Americans. In the nineteenth century, liberals typically had “an optimistic, expansionist Anglo-conformism that accepted the immigrants, provided they looked like Anglo-Protestants and assimilated to the WASP mytho-symbolic corpus.”^[622]

This optimistic ideology was fueled by deeply muddled thinking about race. Nineteenth-century American intellectuals tended to have what Ralph Waldo Emerson called a “double consciousness”—a tendency to think of America as committed to a non-racial liberal cosmopolitanism as well as a tendency to identify strongly with their Anglo-Saxon ethnicity. This fits with individualism because the ethnic tendency is to assimilate others rather than to erect strong ethnic boundaries. However, the result was an intellectual cul-de-sac in which intellectuals were forced into attempts to reconcile identification with Anglo-Saxon ethnicity with statements of universalism.

Emerson himself was an example of double consciousness. He wrote that America was “the asylum of all nations. ... The energy of Irish, Germans, Swedes, Poles and Cossacks, and all the European tribes, of the Africans and Polynesians, will construct a new race ... as vigorous as the new Europe which came out of the smelting pot of the Dark Ages.” This very clear statement of universalism co-existed with the following statement from around the same time: “It cannot be maintained by any candid person that the African race have ever occupied or do promise ever to occupy any very high place in the human family. ... The Irish cannot; the American Indian cannot; the Chinese cannot. Before the energy of the Caucasian race all other races have quailed and done obeisance.”^[623]

These ideas are not contradictory—the idea that there are differences between the races is compatible with the idea that eventually the races will look and act like good Anglo-Saxons. In his book *English Traits*, Emerson acknowledges racial differences: “Race is a controlling influence in the Jew

who, for two millennia, under every climate, has preserved the same character and employments. Race in the negro is of appalling importance.”^[624] However, he maintains that racial boundaries are weak and that “the best nations are those the most widely related; and navigation, as effecting a worldwide mixture, is the most potent advancer of nations.”^[625]

What is odd is Emerson’s belief that the English race could remain the English race even after absorbing other races. Emerson thought that immigrants to America would literally be assimilated to the English race: The “foreign element [in America], however considerable, is rapidly assimilated,” resulting in a population of “English *descent* and language” (my emphasis).^[626] This is an example of the muddled thinking on race that was characteristic of many intellectuals during the nineteenth century.

The basic problem was that these thinkers were [Lamarckians](#)—that is, they believed that people could inherit traits that their ancestors had acquired during their lifetimes. With Jean-Baptiste Lamarck rather than Darwin as inspiration, race and culture were conflated. Liberal intellectuals thought that Blacks would become White with more education, like “the running of a dirty stream into a pellucid lake which eventually clears leaving no trace of mud.”^[627]

Lamarck’s theory has always been a darling of the left because it holds the promise that inherited traits can easily be changed simply by changing the environment. It is no accident that Lamarckism became official ideology in the Soviet Union precisely because it implied that it would be quite easy to mold the new Soviet man—or, as Trofim [Lysenko](#), the director of the Institute of Genetics of the USSR thought, to develop crops that could flourish in cold climates.

In the hands of the Anglo-Saxon assimilationists, Lamarckism was part of the optimistic spirit of elite nineteenth-century liberal intellectuals who envisioned a future America to be people just like themselves, no matter what their origins.

SELF-INTEREST AND LIBERAL IDEOLOGY

An ethnic tendency toward individualism makes people less likely to erect barriers to other groups. But individualists are certainly capable of developing a sense of ethnic identity. In fact, we have seen that it was quite common for Anglo-Saxons to think of individualism as resulting from their ethnic heritage. However, individualists are relatively less ethnocentric, and

as a result it is relatively easy for other motivations to predominate. These motivations can range from libertarian self-actualization to self-interested business practices that, for example, promote non-White immigration if there are economic benefits to self whatever their effects on other groups in the society or the society as a whole.

Kaufmann points to a general tendency—[still apparent today](#)—in which elite Protestants made alliances with immigrant groups (including non-White immigrants such as Chinese on the West Coast in the 1870s) to encourage immigration. These elites were in opposition to the middle- and working-class Anglo-Protestants of both parties and their blue-blood, Darwin-influenced intellectual defenders based on the East Coast.^[628] “To quell dissent within their party, Republican elites accused their populist wing of racism and ethnic bigotry”^[629]—a trend that remains quite common today.

As is also the case today, people with the most liberal attitudes were not personally threatened by upholding liberal attitudes (e.g., favoring Chinese immigration in areas where there were no Chinese). Or liberals imagined that “divine providence ... would keep Chinese numbers in the United States to a minimum.”^[630] Again, there is quite a bit of muddlement: prominent Republicans like William Seward (Secretary of State, 1861–1869), simultaneously “backed equal rights for blacks and favored Chinese immigration, [but also] fervently believed in the separation of the races and in the homogeneity of the nation.”^[631]

OTHER LIBERAL NINETEENTH-CENTURY INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS

Eric Kaufmann points to four different liberal intellectual traditions, all of which had their origin in the nineteenth century and are still present today.^[632] Each of them may be seen as a different expression of individualism. None were majority views and none were decisive for creating the watershed countercultural revolution of the 1960s. But all point to a robust tendency in the direction of deracinated cosmopolitanism in the thinking of secular and religious intellectual elites of a New England Puritan background. And because these movements were staffed by people in positions of authority and cultural influence, they likely provided a climate that was receptive to or at least unwilling to vigorously oppose the more radical movements that came to the fore with the rise of a new elite—movements that ultimately proved the downfall of the Puritan legacy in America. Essentially they had

paved the way for their own displacement.

Libertarian Anarchism

One strain of New England liberalism is represented by the libertarian anarchists, typified by [Benjamin Tucker](#), a believer in unfettered individualism and opposed to prohibitions on non-invasive behavior (“free love”, etc.). But even these libertarians were conscious that their attitudes sprang from their ethnic heritage: “The radical tradition [of anarchic individualism] did not necessarily point in a cosmopolitan direction, but, as with radical figures such as Thomas Jefferson, Horace Greeley, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Walt Whitman, often reinforced ethnonational pride. ... Anarchist logic did not wipe clear all traces of white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant attachment.”^[633]

A large part of the vision of what Kaufmann calls the “expressive pathfinders” in the early twentieth century was a rebellion against small-town Protestant America, its sexual repression and its other mores which resulted in exclusion of some (e.g., homosexuals). It was a radical individualism freed from the social controls championed by the Puritan tradition. Indeed, as indicated above, Puritanism should be seen as having inherent tensions between individualism and powerful social controls—rules governing everything from church attendance to sexual behavior. When individual Puritan-descended individuals left these tightly controlled groups, they were free to develop radically individualist ideas in the manner of Benjamin Tucker.

Centered in New York, this expressive individualist *avant-garde* culture was not significant in the nineteenth century, being overshadowed by the genteel radicalism emanating from the New England transcendentalist tradition. The new Bohemians in Greenwich Village (ca. 1910–1917) were led by [Max Eastman](#) (1883–1969) and defined themselves by cultural liberation, which they understood as freedom from constraints. It was an early precursor of 1960s’ hippiedom, celebrating self-discovery, emotion over logic, intuition, rebellion, free love, Black jazz, and leftist politics. They developed an ingroup ideology that functioned like a pseudo-ethnic identity in which shared attitudes served as boundary markers. They had founding myths, iconic figures, and a utopian vision of an expressive, egalitarian future.

In short, it was a moral community of shared values and outlook of the

kind so typical of Western groups (as opposed to shared ethnicity or kinship-based identity). Another important figure in this mold was [H. L. Mencken](#) (1880–1956) who opposed Puritanism as “moralistic, aesthetically barren and an impediment to American intellectual development.”^[634]

Many were in open rebellion against the Christian, small-town culture they had grown up in. Rebels like [Hutchins Hapgood](#) were attracted to Jews because they were the “other”: “I was led to spend much time in poor resorts of Yiddish New York, through motives neither philanthropic nor sociological, but simply by virtue of the charm I felt in men and things there.” Horace Kallen, the Jewish philosopher of cultural pluralism (and someone who retained his own ethnic commitments^[635]) commented in 1915 on the effects of the individualism of American intellectuals of the period:

The older America, whose voice and spirit were New England, has ... gone beyond recall. Americans of British stock still are prevailingly the artists and thinkers of the land, but they work, each for himself, without common vision or ideals. They have no *ethos*, any more. The older tradition has passed from a life into a memory.^[636]

Expressive individualism remained a marginal phenomenon until it became an integral part of the counterculture of the 1960s. At that point, it became ingrained in American mass culture as a component of the culture of the left.

Parenthetically, there were really two streams of the 1960s counterculture of the left, a hippie version of expressive individualism and a politically radical version. These two strands interacted and overlapped but also had important differences—the hippies less politically involved and more involved in artistic expression and experimenting with drugs, while radicals often condemned the lack of political involvement of the hippies. Radicals were not flower children.^[637]

The movement of expressive individualism to the center of American culture therefore followed rather than preceded the major cultural changes brought about by the success of the New York Intellectuals and other Jewish-dominated intellectual movements discussed in *The Culture of Critique* as these came to dominate intellectual discourse after World War II and especially in the 1960s and thereafter.^[638] The success of expressive individualism, therefore, was not the cause the eclipse of Anglo-America,

but rather a consequence of the rise of a new intellectual elite which promoted it as part of the new culture of the left.

Finally, the fact that some Puritan-descended people promoted expressive individualism is likely best explained by proposing that their inherent individualism was free to express itself after the decline of the strong social controls of Puritanism as a tightly controlled group strategy. It's said that forging individualists into a cohesive group is like herding cats. Doing so requires strong controls at the group level and an ideology that rationalizes the controls—exactly what traditional Puritanism provided.

Liberal Protestantism

Kaufmann notes several strains of liberal Protestantism in nineteenth-century thought. The Free Religious Association (FRA; founded in 1867) was a more liberal offshoot of the Unitarians—the most liberal strain of American religion and itself a religious offshoot of Puritanism. But again, the members of the FRA thought of their liberal attitudes as stemming from their ethnic heritage. After stating that his religious movement intended to humanize (not Christianize) the entire world, Francis E. Abbot, founder of the FRA, stated “The rest I need comes no longer from spiritual servitude, but must be sought and found in the manly exercise of freedom. It is to those who feel this *Anglo-Saxon instinct of liberty* stirring in their hearts that my words are addressed—not to those who feel no galling pressure from the easy yoke.”^[639]

[Merrill Gates](#) (1848–1922), President of Rutgers College and a Congregationalist preacher, also combined his religious commitments with a belief that his political attitudes stemmed from his ethnic heritage: “There is no other ‘manifest destiny’ for any man [than Liberty]. ... To this we [liberals] are committed, by all the logic of two thousand years of Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon history, since [Arminius](#) ... made a stand for liberty against the legions of Rome.”^[640]

Many nineteenth-century Protestants believed that all Americans would eventually voluntarily become Protestants. Religious leaders, particularly Methodists and Baptists, rejected the idea of writing Christianity into the U.S. Constitution, but they retained the belief that the U.S. government was Christian. “Anglo Protestants wanted their tradition to be supreme, but their universalist liberal commitments would not countenance boundary-defining measures of legislative origin.”^[641] Christianity would retain its special place by persuasion, not coercion.

Parenthetically, the liberal cosmopolitanism of the late twentieth century has taken the opposite strategy: Once it achieved power, it developed strong overtones of coercion, including attempts to limit freedom of speech and remove people from their jobs for beliefs and attitudes that conflict with the cosmopolitan zeitgeist—an indication that liberal cosmopolitanism of the late twentieth century is far more in the Puritan tradition of combining individualist tendencies with strong social controls than with anything approaching libertarian anarchism.

Moreover, even though they did not approve of Catholicism, Protestant religious leaders in the 1840s did not oppose Catholic immigration, believing that they could convert immigrants to “the ‘American’ faith”^[642] and absorb them into the Anglo-Saxon race. Indeed, all races would immigrate to America for the new millennium: In the words of a prominent Baptist, “In the gathering of all nations and races upon our shores, do we not witness the providential preparation for a second Pentecost that shall usher in the millennial glory?”^[643] All races would be absorbed into the Anglo-Saxon race, their better qualities absorbed, “yet [the Anglo-Saxon race] remaining essentially unchanged.”^[644]

This is a good example of the optimism so common among American intellectuals in the nineteenth century. It is also an extreme form of egocentrism. What the good minister is saying is that all peoples will eventually assimilate in race and religion to look and behave pretty much like he does. Even in the seventeenth century, Oliver Cromwell had a purely religious, very Puritan perspective on tolerance: “he favored freedom of conscience for the godly—‘Scots, English, Jews, Gentiles, Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists and all’—as a route to eventual truth, unity and the Millennium.”^[645] Millenarianism is nothing if not optimistic.

The period from 1900–1910 also saw the beginnings of a liberal Protestant elite willing to sacrifice the dream of conversion for universalist, humanitarian ethics. The idea that Anglo-Saxons would convert the world to Protestant Christianity—common in the late nineteenth century—faded after 1910. This elite was more open to religious relativism and criticized the implicit Whiteness of Christian missionaries. The Federal Council of Churches (FCC; established in 1908) became a key organizing body for liberal Protestantism. In 1924, at the time when the U.S. Congress was overwhelmingly passing an immigration restriction bill favoring immigration from Northwestern Europe, the FCC resolved that

the assumption of inherent racial superiority by dominant groups around the world is neither supported by science nor justified by ethics. The effort to adjust race relations on that basis and by the use of force is a denial of Christian principles of the inherent superiority of ethical values and the supreme worth of personality. As it applies to the white and Negro people in America, it is a philosophy that leads only to suffering and despair.^[646]

The FCC quoted universalist passages from the New Testament rather than passages reflecting Jewish ethnocentrism that predominate in the Old Testament. This was an elite viewpoint, and there was a major gap with popular attitudes. The 1920s saw the Protestant masses devoted to immigration restriction and fearful of Communism and other forms of political radicalism associated with immigrants, with many sympathetic to the Ku Klux Klan. Despite these popular sentiments, the Protestant media and ministers in the North and the South attacked the KKK throughout the 1920s. Some liberal ministers were forced to leave their congregations because of popular attitudes.

This liberal Protestant elite established itself at the highest levels of the culture well before the final fall of Anglo-America: “From 1918 to 1955, the concept of national identity held by Anglo-Protestant university administrators, intellectuals, federal bureaucrats and the federal executive underwent a shift from a WASP conception to a more pluralist construct.”^[647] This elite attitude embraced pluralism rather than assimilation.

But this brand of Christian liberal progressivism was not characteristic of the great mass of American Whites: They “soon found themselves marginal not only to American society, but to the Progressive mainstream as well.”^[648] During the 1920s there was a rise of fundamentalist, non-elite Protestantism typified by figures like [Billy Sunday](#) and [Carl McIntire](#) in opposition to the liberal elite establishment. The masses of Protestants, even in liberal denominations, did not buy into the cosmopolitanism of the elites. The FCC and the religious media opposed the Reed-Johnson immigration restriction act of 1924—very much a minority point of view. During the 1930s and the early stages of World War II, the only successful attempt to get Protestant politicians to respond positively to refugees was when they were British. Jewish refugees were harder to place, and the response was not enthusiastic.

The FCC had no success in lobbying for the Wagner-Rogers Bill that called for 20,000 German Jewish children to be admitted outside the quotas.^[649]

The FCC entered the mainstream when it condemned communism after World War II. But the leadership of the FCC (now called the National Council of Churches) remained well to the left of its constituents throughout. A study in the late 1960s showed that 33 percent of the laity advocated civil rights activism versus 64 percent of clergy; 89 percent of the laity felt Black problems were their own fault, versus 35 percent of clergy; 42 percent of laity backed the national origins provisions biasing immigration to Western Europe versus only 23 percent of clergy. Clearly, Protestant religious elites had little effect on the attitudes of the laity.

The liberal progressives and ecumenical Protestants were an elite of university-educated people who self-consciously thought of themselves as a “better element”—that is, they had a sense of moral and intellectual superiority so common on the left today. But Kaufmann acknowledges that this “genteel liberal progressive vision was limited” and by itself probably would not have resulted in profound cultural change.^[650] In general, the liberal Protestant elite moved in step with their secular liberal brethren, i.e., following secular trends rather than leading them, and as a result they are ultimately of little importance for understanding the fall of Anglo-Saxon America.

Academic Cultural Determinism and Anti-Darwinism

In academic history in the late nineteenth century, Frederick Jackson Turner thought of America as a melting pot in which the frontier environment fused immigrants into an American race. The new race would not be Anglo-Saxon or English but distinctively American. Turner was therefore a Lamarckian—a believer in the idea that acquired traits could be inherited: The American frontier environment shaped the characteristics of the new race which were then passed down as genetic traits.

Nevertheless, Turner was not sympathetic to the new immigrants. “Evidently, Turner had merely emphasized one part of his inherited American ethnic mythology (frontier, liberty, agrarianism) without jettisoning the other symbols (Protestantism, Nordic whiteness).”^[651] But it was a short step from Turner’s ideas to more radical forms of liberal cosmopolitanism. His general perspective was assimilationist—distrust of

new immigrants combined with hope that they would become culturally assimilated to Anglo-Saxon culture and a common racial identity.

Ultimately, however, this tepid form of WASP academic liberalism had little importance. By 1915, Franz Boas and his students dominated the American Anthropology Association and began to have a wide influence in other academic disciplines. Boasian anthropology is the premier cultural determinism theory of the twentieth century and may be considered a [Jewish intellectual movement](#).^[652] Kaufmann almost completely ignores Boas's influence, but, as discussed below, the Boasians were critical to the demise of Darwinism in the social sciences, and the demise of Darwinism was a critical linchpin underlying any viable intellectual basis for Anglo-Saxon ethnic defense. Without a Darwinian theory, the way was open to the erection of a blank-slate theory of culture which ultimately resulted in an intellectual establishment that would view the eclipse of Anglo-America as a moral imperative.

The Secular Left

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, WASP intellectuals began interacting and making alliances with first- and second-generation immigrant Jewish intellectuals who were quite favorable to the lack of ethnic identity they found in their WASP cohorts. Ultimately, the leftist intellectual scene, which had never percolated through to the great mass of Americans, became dominated by Jewish intellectuals, with vast ramifications for the direction of American culture in the late twentieth century and beyond. Unlike their liberal WASP forebears, the Jewish left was eventually able to have a transformative effect on American popular culture and attitudes in the direction of cosmopolitanism.

Kaufmann credits two Jews, [Felix Adler](#) (1851–1933) and [Israel Zangwill](#) (1864–1926), with promoting nineteenth-century American universalist tendencies to the point of completely rejecting ethnicity altogether. Adler founded the New York Society for Ethical Culture in 1876 and became president of the Free Religious Association (see above) in 1878. Kaufmann quotes Adler as advocating the dissolution of Judaism via assimilation and eventually withering away: “Individual members of the Jewish race [will] look about them and perceive that there is as great and perhaps greater liberty in religion beyond the pale of their race and will lose their peculiar idiosyncrasies, and their distinctiveness will fade. And eventually, the Jewish

race will die.”^[653]

However, Adler believed that Jews should only “universalize themselves out of existence when the task [of ethnic dissolution of non-Jews] was complete,”^[654] indicating that he disapproved and feared ethnic identity among non-Jews. Indeed, Adler declared that “So long as there shall be a reason of existence for Judaism, so long the individual Jews will keep apart and will do well to do so.”^[655]

According to Adler, then, the “reason for the existence” of Judaism was to evangelize his new universalist religion of ethical culture until the whole world was converted. Kaufmann observes that under Adler’s influence “Anglo-Protestant thinkers would call for [Anglo-Protestantism’s] termination as forthrightly as Adler did for the Jews.”^[656] In the event, the Anglos applied Adler’s doctrine to themselves, but without waiting for non-Anglos like Adler to shed their ethnic identities and sense of group interests.

Indeed, Adler’s ideas are remarkably congruent with the ideas of prominent Reform Judaism rabbis of the period. [Kaufmann Kohler](#) (1843–1926) is an important example of the Reform tendency (also seen, e.g., in Kohler’s mentor, [David Einhorn](#) (1809–1879), and [Samuel Hirsch](#) (1815–1889)) to assert that Jewish ethics is universalistic while at the same time maintaining that Israel must remain separate in order to present a moral beacon to the rest of humanity—a beacon of universalism and ethnic dissolution of non-Jews. “One cannot underestimate the importance of the fact that the central pose of post-Enlightenment Jewish intellectuals is a sense that Judaism represents a moral beacon to the rest of humanity.”^[657]

This suggests that Adler retained a Jewish identity. He was married to a Jewish woman and maintained Jewish associates—for example, a close friendship with [Louis Brandeis](#), an influential Supreme Court justice and an important Zionist activist of the period; Brandeis was married to a sister of Adler’s wife.

Adler was thus the prototype of the twentieth-century secular Jewish political activist of the left—opposing Anglo-Saxon ethnic hegemony and making alliances with non-Jews with similar political sympathies while retaining a Jewish identity. Indeed, in 1901 Adler was presented with an award from the above-mentioned Rabbi Kohler, who noted that Adler had embraced Jewish nationalism instead of cosmopolitanism.

A senior Reform rabbi and former critic, Dr. Kaufmann Kohler, stated

.... with Adler in attendance, that although the Society for Ethical Culture was initially seen as a breakaway from Judaism, it had come back to its roots. The Society was a product of Jewish religion and race, Kaufmann Kohler stated, adding that Adler himself had declared to East Side Jews in 1900 that “he was in heart and sentiment one with them.” ... Adler’s initial criticism of Judaism had mellowed to friendliness, Kohler stated. “Nationalism took the place of cosmopolitanism.” ... “If the society becomes a permanent historic force it will be regarded as a stream of Jewish origin and character.” ... “The great and noble achievements of Dr. Adler redound to the credit of the race and the religion that nurtured them. The lofty idealism and purity of character of the men and women of this society emanate from the same source from which Jew and Christian derive strength and inspiration.”^[658]

[My review](#) of Jewish secular leftists shows that they typically retained a strong sense of Jewish identification—often not explicitly or religiously, but rather in their friends, associates, spouses and attitudes toward Jewish issues, especially anti-Semitism.^[659] Many Jewish leftists who denied having Jewish identities found that they had a profound commitment to Judaism with the rise of National Socialism in Germany and to Israel during the Six-Day War of 1967. In general, the Jewish identification of non-religious Jews is complex, with Jewish identity more likely to surface during perceived threats to Jews.

Israel Zangwill, the other Jewish advocate of ethnic dissolution highlighted by Kaufmann, had a strong Jewish identity. Despite marrying a non-Jew and advocating the dissolution of all ethnic groups, [Zangwill](#) was a prominent advocate of a Jewish homeland and was active in Jewish politics throughout his life.

Indeed, Zangwill was [well aware](#) that Anglo-Saxon ideals of individualism and universalism could be used in the battle against immigration restriction. During the debate on the 1924 immigration law, the House Majority Report emphasized the Jewish role in defining the intellectual battle in terms of Nordic superiority versus “American ideals,” highlighting Zangwill’s role in particular, while the committee favored an ethnic status quo which was eventually enacted into law:

The cry of discrimination is, the committee believes, manufactured and

built up by special representatives of racial groups, aided by aliens actually living abroad. Members of the committee have taken notice of a report in the *Jewish Tribune* (New York) February 8, 1924, of a farewell dinner to Mr. Israel Zangwill which says:

Mr. Zangwill spoke chiefly on the immigration question, declaring that if Jews persisted in a strenuous opposition to the restricted immigration there would be no restriction. "If you create enough fuss against this Nordic nonsense," he said, "you will defeat this legislation. You must make a fight against this bill; tell them they are destroying American ideals. Most fortifications are of cardboard, and if you press against them, they give way."^[660]

Although Kaufmann represents Zangwill as advocating the melting together of all racial groups, the reality is a bit subtler. Despite his own marriage, Zangwill's views on Jewish-gentile intermarriage were ambiguous at best and he detested Christian proselytism to Jews. Zangwill was an ardent Zionist and an admirer of his father's religious orthodoxy as a model for the preservation of Judaism. He believed Jews were a morally superior race whose moral vision had shaped Christian and Muslim societies and would eventually shape the world, although Christianity remained morally inferior to Judaism. Jews would retain their racial purity if they continued to practice their religion: "So long as Judaism flourishes among Jews there is no need to talk of safeguarding race or nationality; both are automatically preserved by the religion"^[661]—a view that certainly accords with an evolutionary perspective on Jewish religious writing and practice.^[662]

Although the country as a whole had moved toward ethnic defense, often with an explicitly Darwinian rationale, Adler was part of a network of leftists who worked to undermine its cultural and ethnic homogeneity. An important node in this network was the Settlement House movement of the late nineteenth–early twentieth century. The settlements were an Anglo-Saxon undertaking that exhibited a *noblesse oblige* still apparent in White leftist circles today. They were "residences occupied by upper-middle-class 'workers' whose profile was that of an idealistic Anglo-Saxon, university-educated young suburbanite (male or female) in his or her mid-twenties."^[663] The movement explicitly rejected the idea that immigrants ought to give up their culture and assimilate to America: "To put the immigrants (as individuals) on an equal symbolic footing with the natives, a concept of the

nation was required that would not violate the human dignity of the immigrants by denigrating their culture.”^[664] Cultural pluralism was encouraged: “The nation would be implored to shed its Anglo-Saxon ethnic core and develop a culture of cosmopolitan humanism, a harbinger of impending global solidarity.”^[665]

The leader of the Settlement House movement, [Jane Addams](#), advocated that America shed all allegiance to an Anglo-Saxon identity. Addams came from a liberal Quaker background—another liberal strand of Protestant culture that, like the Puritans, stemmed from a [distinctive British sub-culture](#).^[666] In general, the Quakers have been less influential than the Puritans in the United States (although they had a critical role in the British antislavery movement discussed in the following chapter), but their attitudes have been even more consistently liberal than the Puritan-descended intellectuals who became a [dominant intellectual liberal elite](#) in the nineteenth century.^[667] For example, [John Woolman](#), the “[Quintessential Quaker](#),” was an eighteenth-century figure who opposed slavery, lived humbly, and, most tellingly for the concept of ethnic defense, [felt guilty](#) about preferring his own children to children on the other side of the world.^[668]

A connection between Jane Addams and the Puritan intellectual tradition was that Harvard philosopher William James influenced Addams and approved her ideas. James was a member of Felix Adler’s Ethical Culture Society, which Kaufmann terms “the fount of Jewish cosmopolitanism,”^[669] and one of his students was [Horace Kallen](#), the premier theorist of a multicultural America—and an ardent Zionist.^[670] James was a moral universalist: “Moral progress is a value that outweighed group survival,” a point of view that “reaffirmed Felix Adler’s cardinal dictum that particular ethnic groups had a duty to sacrifice their existence for the progress of humankind. ... The dominant Anglo-Saxon group had no case for its preservation but instead needed to devote itself to bring about the new cosmopolitan humanity.”^[671] This was a rarified phenomenon of a small but elite minority: even many settlement workers believed in an Anglo-Saxon America and favored immigration restriction.

Randolph Bourne’s 1916 [Atlantic Monthly](#) article is a classic statement by a prominently placed Anglo intellectual advocating a multicultural ideal for America.^[672] Bourne (who, as Kaufmann notes, was a disciple of Horace Kallen) acknowledged the concern that different nationalities hadn’t blended, but he advocated that America become the first “international nation”—a

“cosmopolitan federation of national colonies.” All other ethnic groups would be allowed to retain their identity and cohesion; only the Anglo-Saxon is implored to be cosmopolitan. In particular, Bourne wrote that “it is not the Jew who sticks proudly to the faith of his fathers and boasts of that venerable culture of his who is dangerous to America, but the Jew who has lost the Jewish fire and become a mere elementary, grasping animal.”

People like Bourne, H. L. Mencken, and Sinclair Lewis had a strong sense of intellectual elitism and rebellion against Protestant, small-town America—individualist rebellion against conformity to cultural norms much like that seen among the libertarian anarchists discussed above. A character in Sinclair Lewis’s *Main Street* complains that the townspeople have a “standardized background ... scornful of the living. ... A savourless people, gulping tasteless food ... and viewing themselves as the greatest race in the world.”^[673] The character was mildly excited by Scandinavian immigrants but deplored the fact that they were absorbed without a trace into the mainstream Protestant culture of America.

These attitudes could also be found among Jewish intellectuals. Walter Lippmann called America “a nation of villagers”^[674]—a harbinger of the hostility of Hollywood to small-town America.^[675]

THE PERIOD OF ETHNIC DEFENSE: 1880–1965

We have seen that the view among elite liberal intellectuals in the nineteenth century that America was the product of Anglo-Saxon ethnicity coincided with optimistic ideas about an Anglo-Saxon future. Towards the end of the century, however, as American intellectuals were coming to grips with large-scale immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, such optimistic views of an Anglo-Saxon future were more and more difficult to defend, especially because a large number of the immigrants were (correctly) seen as politically radical and unassimilable. The decades leading up to the passage of the 1924 immigration law and thereafter were a period of ethnic defense. Optimistic, liberal views on immigration persisted among a small group of intellectuals, but they were politically powerless. Among many pro-restrictionist intellectuals, Darwinism displaced Lamarckism.

The result was an effective alliance between elite intellectuals of Ivy League-educated, Puritan-descended extraction with rural Whites in the south and west to prevent America’s being overwhelmed by immigration. “Whenever the northeastern ‘WASP’ elite make common cause with their

less prestigious but more numerous provincial kin, Anglo-Protestant ethnic nationalism revives.”^[676] This alliance, lasting until the passage of the 1965 immigration law which opened up immigration to all peoples, indicates that despite the liberal strands of WASP culture, change may occur if liberal, cosmopolitan views are seen as resulting in negative consequences—if the nineteenth-century optimism of immigrants being “just like us” is proven to be unwarranted. Similarly in the present era, American Whites are coalescing in the Republican Party, not on the traditional basis of social class, but as a result of a common racial/ethnic identity and increasing skepticism about the benefits of immigration.

The increased pessimism over cosmopolitan views can be seen in the comments of a Congregationalist minister who noted in 1885 that

Political optimism is one of the vices of the America people. ... We deem ourselves a chosen people, and incline to the belief that the Almighty stands pledged to our prosperity. Until within a few years probably not one in a hundred of our population has ever questioned the security of our future. Such optimism is as senseless as pessimism is faithless.^[677]

Optimistic, laissez-faire attitudes diminished, and Protestant thinkers started to take the side of labor rather than capital because of a felt need for social cohesion. By the 1890s the need for immigration restriction was “universally accepted”^[678] among Baptists, and similar trends were apparent in other Protestant sects, even including the elite and liberal-tending Congregationalists. True to their universalist proclivities, Protestants did not oppose immigration until they realized that the new immigrants were not susceptible to conversion.

Kaufmann notes that business interests remained opposed to immigration restriction, but he fails to mention the very strong role that Jewish organizations [played](#) in delaying immigration restriction until the 1920s—long after popular opinion favored for it.^[679] Of all the groups affected by the immigration legislation of 1907, Jews had the least to gain in terms of numbers of possible immigrants, but they played by far the largest role in shaping the legislation.^[680] In the subsequent period leading up to the relatively ineffective restrictionist legislation of 1917, when restrictionists again mounted an effort in Congress, “only the Jewish segment was aroused.”^[681]

Writing in 1914, sociologist [Edward A. Ross](#) believed that liberal immigration policy was exclusively a Jewish issue:

Although theirs is but a seventh of our net immigration, they led the fight on the Immigration Commission's bill. The power of the million Jews in the Metropolis lined up the Congressional delegation from New York in solid opposition to the literacy test. The systematic campaign in newspapers and magazines to break down all arguments for restriction and to calm nativist fears is waged by and for one race. Hebrew money is behind the National Liberal Immigration League and its numerous publications. From the paper before the commercial body or the scientific association to the heavy treatise produced with the aid of the Baron de Hirsch Fund, the literature that proves the blessings of immigration to all classes in America emanates from subtle Hebrew brains.^[682]

Largely as a result of this activism, including access to the media and a well-funded pro-immigration infrastructure, an effective immigration restriction bill was only enacted in 1924, even though by 1890 there was popular support for such a measure. During this interval, 20 million immigrants arrived in the United States,^[683] including around 2 million Jews from Eastern Europe.

Kaufmann attributes the rise in restrictionist sentiment to Social Gospel concerns among religious people: The Social Gospel movement

galvanized the process of ethnic closure by concentrating Protestant minds on this-worldly social factors such as the rise of the industrial city, capital-labor conflict and the need for legislation—forces they had traditionally been loath to consider.”^[684]

But he also attributes it to the realization that the new immigrants would not convert to Protestantism and to the rise of race theories, although he doesn't really discuss the latter.

The lack of emphasis on race theories is a major omission because these theories had widespread acceptance among well-educated Americans with positions in academia and the media. Beginning around 1900 racial theories based on Darwinism rather than religion held the academic high ground.

When [Franz] Boas began his work in America, evolutionism was the dominant (even “hegemonic”) paradigm in anthropology, sociology, and political economy. Intellectuals of the political left were as invested in evolutionism as were those on the right In addition to evolutionism, racial determinism and Social Darwinism were also in the ascendance ... and these touched the emotions and socioeconomic interests of American and European elites even more. This was the era of the passage of Jim Crow laws, racial segregation, and anti-black and antiforeigner agitation. Despite their entrenched status in American and European intellectual and political life, however, Boas, a new immigrant, virtually alone, started to combat all of these from the very beginning of his career, drawing upon his view of humanity and on his science. Were these not political acts?^[685]

Indeed they were political acts, and their influence has had a profound effect on academic theories of race and culture and hence on the decline of White America.^[686]

The prominence of Darwinian theories of race was not confined to the United States. Such theories were influential among [intellectuals in Europe](#) as well, including [Benjamin Disraeli](#), [Arthur de Gobineau](#), [Houston Stewart Chamberlain](#), [Gustave Le Bon](#), Herbert Spencer and a large number of Jewish racist theorists mostly associated with Zionism.^[687]

This Darwinian intellectual framework became the target of an ascendant Jewish intellectual elite beginning with Boas’s pioneering work. The following is a comment on the intellectual milieu of U.S. military officers in the early twentieth century:

Christianity was a deeply embedded aspect of the culture of the Northern Europeans, but it played a remarkably small role in the battles with the emerging Jewish elite. Far more important for framing these battles were Darwinian theories of race. The early part of the twentieth century was the high-water mark of Darwinism in the social sciences. It was common at that time to think that there were important differences between the races—that races differed in intelligence and in moral qualities. Not only did races differ, but they were in competition with each other for supremacy. Schooled in the theories of Madison Grant,

Lothrop Stoddard, Henry Pratt Fairchild, William Ripley, Gustav Le Bon, Charles Davenport, and William McDougall, this generation of U.S. military officers [and other American elites] viewed themselves as members of a particular race and believed that racial homogeneity was the *sine qua non* of every stable nation state. They regarded their racial group as uniquely talented and possessed of a high moral sense. But, more importantly, whatever the talents and vulnerabilities of their race, they held it in the highest importance to retain control over the lands they had inherited as a result of the exploits of their ancestors who had conquered the continent and tamed the wilderness. And despite the power that their race held at the present, there was dark foreboding about the future, reflected in the titles of some of the classic works of the period: Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race* and Stoddard's *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy* and *The Revolt Against Civilization: The Menace of the Under-Man*.^[688]

Bluebloods like [Henry Cabot Lodge](#) and [Madison Grant](#) who descended from the Puritans were extolling the virtues of Northern Europeans and funding the movement to end immigration—a battle that ended with the ethnically defensive immigration law of 1924 which was based on an ethnic status quo as of 1890. [A. Lawrence Lowell](#), President of Harvard, Vice President of the Immigration Restriction League and descendant of Puritans, opposed the nomination of Louis Brandeis as a Supreme Court Justice because of Brandeis' ardent Zionism; he also supported quotas on Jewish students (15 percent—generous given that Jews comprised 5 percent of the population); he also supported racial segregation, and he opposed homosexuality.

Ideas of eugenics, racially motivated pacifism, and belief in the power of international financiers were entirely respectable at the time. In his biography of Henry Ford, Neil Baldwin recounts Ford's journey to the West Coast in 1915 to attend a "Race-Betterment Conference" in San Francisco.^[689] The event attracted the economic and intellectual elite of the day. Speakers included Luther Burbank, the renowned plant breeder, David Starr Jordan, first president of Stanford and a prolific writer on cultural issues, and Charles Eliot, president of Harvard. Attendees included renowned inventor Thomas Edison, and millionaires such as John Harvey Kellogg (founder of the eponymously named cereal company) and Harvey Firestone (founder of the

eponymously named tire company).

Anti-Jewish attitudes were common among this elite. Ford financed *The International Jew* (discussed below), a series of essays originally published from 1920–1922 which focused on describing Jewish behavior and documenting Jewish influence. Ford became a leader of the peace movement during World War I, stating to another peace activist that “German-Jewish bankers caused the war.”^[690] Jordan was a eugenicist who advocated peace for racist reasons—that war decimated strong people from the gene pool. Jordan, writing in 1912, also developed the view that financial manipulators, mainly Jews, were driving Europeans to war. He described an “unseen empire” of international finance, largely composed of Jewish banking firms originating with the Rothschilds. Behind these firms were Jewish families “allied to one another by so many close ties of blood, marriage, and business” including Bischoffheim (France), Bleichröder (Germany), Camondo (Italy), Goldschmid and Stern (England, Portugal), Günzberg (Russia), Hirsch and Wertheimer (Austria), Cassell (Europe, Egypt), Sassoon (“Rothschilds of the Orient), Mendelssohn and Montefiore (Australia).^[691]

Kaufmann’s lack of discussion of the eclipse of racial Darwinism is a major omission because the defeat of racial Darwinism was a [major thrust](#) of Jewish intellectual and political movements, particularly Boasian anthropology:

[The defeat of the Darwinians] had not happened without considerable exhortation of ‘every mother’s son’ standing for the ‘Right.’ Nor had it been accomplished without some rather strong pressure applied both to staunch friends and to the ‘weaker brethren’—often by the sheer force of Boas’s personality.^[692]

By 1915 the Boasians controlled the American Anthropological Association and held a two-thirds majority on its Executive Board. By 1926 every major department of anthropology was headed by Boas’s students, the majority of whom were Jewish. Based on Boas’s views of cultural relativism (which eventually morphed into the view that race was nothing more than a social construct with no biological basis), these theorists promoted cultural pluralism in academia. As Gelya Frank noted, cultural pluralism as a model for Western societies, has been the “invisible subject” of American anthropology—invisible because the ethnic identifications and ethnic

interests of its advocates have been masked by a language of science in which such identifications and interests were publicly illegitimate.^[693]

Ford's *The International Jew* contains interesting material on the rise of Jewish influence which I find credible.^[694] Public criticism of Jewish influence was becoming off-limits:

There is a vague feeling that even to openly use the word 'Jew,' or to expose it nakedly to print, is somehow improper There is extreme sensitiveness about the public discussion of the Jewish Question on the part of Gentiles. They would prefer to keep it in the hazy borderlands of their thought, shrouded in silence The principal public Gentile pronouncements upon the Jewish Question are in the manner of the truckling politician or the pleasant after-dinner speaker; the great Jewish names in philosophy, medicine, literature, music and finance are named over, the energy, ability and thrift of the race are dwelt upon, and everyone goes home feeling that a difficult place has been rather neatly negotiated.^[695]

Anyone who essays to discuss the Jewish Question in the United States or anywhere else must be fully prepared to be regarded as an Anti-Semite, in high-brow language, or in low-brow-language, a Jew-baiter The press in general is open at this time to fulsome editorials in favor of everything Jewish ... while the Jewish press, which is fairly numerous in the United States, takes care of the vituperative end.^[696]

Joseph Bendersky's *The 'Jewish Threat': Anti-Semitic Politics of the U.S. Army* includes valuable information on the decline of racist ideas. The tide against the intellectual basis of ethnic defense turned in the 1930s. "Nazi racial ideology was under attack in the press as pseudo-science and fanatical bigotry."^[697] By this time, Jews had a powerful position in the media, including ownership of several large, influential newspapers (*New York Times*, *New York Post*, *New York World*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, *Washington Post*, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *Philadelphia Record* and *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*), radio networks (CBS, the dominant radio network, and NBC), and all of the major Hollywood movie studios.^[698]

It is remarkable that the word 'Nordic' disappeared by the 1930s although the restrictionists still had racist views of Jews and themselves.^[699] By 1938 eugenics— a commonly held perspective among all political persuasions

earlier in the century—was “shunned in public discourse of the day”^[700] because of its associations with National Socialism.

The racist views that were common in the 1920s persisted among American military officers well into the 1930s. A 1938 talk by General George van Horn Moseley’s on eugenics and its implications for immigration policy caused a furor when it was reported in the newspapers. Moseley was charged with anti-Semitism, although he denied referring to Jews in his talk. The incident blew over, but “henceforth, the military determined to protect itself against charges of anti-Semitism that might sully its reputation or cause it political problems The army projected itself as an institution that would tolerate neither racism nor anti-Semitism.”^[701]

Moseley himself continued to attack the New Deal, saying it was manipulated by “the alien element in our midst”^[702]—obviously a coded reference to Jews. This time he was severely reprimanded, and the press wouldn’t let it die. By early 1939, Moseley, who had retired from the army, became explicitly anti-Jewish, asserting that Jews wanted the U.S. to enter a possible war with Germany and that the war would be waged for Jewish hegemony. He accused Jews of controlling the media and having a deep influence on the government. In 1939, he testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee on Jewish complicity in communism and praised the Germans for dealing with the Jews properly.^[703]

But his testimony was beyond the pale by this time. As Bendersky notes, Moseley had only articulated the common Darwinian worldview of the earlier generation, and he had asserted the common belief of an association of Jews with communism. These views remained common in the army and elsewhere on the political right, but they were simply not stated publicly. And if they were, heads rolled and careers were ended.

The new climate can also be seen in the fact that Lothrop Stoddard stopped referring to Jews completely in his lectures to the Army War College in the late 1930s but continued to advocate eugenics and was sympathetic to National Socialism because it took the race notion seriously. By 1940, the tables had turned. Anti-Jewish attitudes came to be seen as subversive by the government, and the FBI alerted military intelligence that Lothrop Stoddard should be investigated as a security risk in the event of war.^[704]

From Bendersky’s perspective, these changes are due largely to the triumph of science: “Not only was Stoddard’s racial science erroneous, it was—despite his assertions to the contrary—out of step with the major trends in

science and scholarship.”^[705] What Bendersky does not note is that the “scientific” refutation of the ideas of Stoddard and the other Darwinian theorists was entirely due to a political campaign waged in academic social science departments by Franz Boas and his students and sympathizers. The political nature of this shift in intellectual stance and its linkage to Jewish academic ethnic activists has long been apparent to scholars.^[706]

This is an excellent example of how academia is a major power center. Boas’s activism resulted in anti-Darwinian ideas being promulgated as scientifically sound by the elite media and disseminated to educated people in universities. As John Higham [noted](#), by the time of the final victory in 1965, which removed national origins and racial ancestry from immigration policy and opened up immigration to all human groups, the Boasian perspective of cultural determinism and anti-biologism had become standard academic wisdom. The result was that “it became intellectually fashionable to discount the very existence of persistent ethnic differences. The whole reaction deprived popular race feelings of a powerful ideological weapon.”^[707]

The demise of Darwinism had major implications because it removed the only intellectually viable source of opposition to cosmopolitan ideology and a cultural pluralist model of America. In the absence of an intellectually respectable defense, ethnic defense was left to conservative religion and the popular attitudes of the less educated. These were no match for the cosmopolitan intellectuals who quickly became ensconced in all the elite institutions of the US—especially the media and the academic world.

The rise to preeminence of what was now a Jewish-dominated intellectual scene sealed the fate of the Puritan-descended intellectuals reviewed here. This Puritan-descended intellectual tradition was victorious against the aristocratic tradition of the Old South but proved no match for the rising Jewish elite which, even by the 1930s, had become very influential. By the 1960s this new elite had become dominant in critical sectors of American life, particularly the media, the social sciences, the legal profession, and as financial contributors to political campaigns and causes. High on the agenda of this new elite was replacement-level immigration. In 1965, America was opened up to all the peoples of the world. In the ensuing decades this cultural shift resulted in the ever-decreasing power and influence of the European-derived peoples and cultures of America.

CONCLUSION

The Puritan legacy in American culture is indeed pernicious because, once the Puritan-descended intellectual and financial elite had been displaced, their moral idealism and their proneness to altruistic punishment was vulnerable to hijacking by intellectual and political movements aimed at replacing the traditional peoples of the United States. The current intellectual and political left (which is a product of the post-1965 countercultural revolution) is fundamentally based on a moral critique of traditional American society that aims to eradicate the power of its European-derived majority and relegate them to a relatively powerless demographic minority. As of this writing, any group identification of Whites has been pathologized—a legacy of the Boasians, the Frankfurt School and their offshoots which have become the intellectual basis of the new elite.^[708]

As someone with considerable experience in the academic world, I can attest to feeling like a wayward heretic back in seventeenth-century Massachusetts when confronted, as I have often been, by academic thought police. It's the moral fervor of these people that stands out. The academic world has become a Puritan congregation of stifling thought control, enforced by moralistic condemnations that a Puritan minister could scarcely surpass. In my experience, this thought control is far worse in the elite colleges and universities founded by the Puritans than elsewhere in academia—a fitting reminder of the continuing influence of Puritanism in American life.

The problem with the Transcendentalists and the other nineteenth-century idealists and moral perfectionists is that they came along before their intuitions could be examined in the cold light of modern evolutionary science. Lacking any firm foundation in science, they embraced a moral universalism that is proving ultimately ruinous to people like themselves: as a consequence of the rise of Jewish intellectual movements and political and cultural influence in the twentieth century, the continuing legacy of Puritan moral universalism in the context of replacement-level multiethnic immigration has been used against the contemporary White population of America.

And because the loss of demographic and cultural hegemony being experienced by the European-derived population is so contrary to human evolved predispositions, their moral universalism needs constant buttressing with all the power of the media, the educational system, and ultimately the state—much as the rigorous rules of the Puritans of old required constant surveillance by the authorities. Indeed, as the universalistic, anti-White left

assumes ever greater control, we see censorship of heterodox thought in the universities and the proliferation of police-state coercion to ensure conformity of thought and deed—highly reminiscent of Puritan Massachusetts.

Of course, the Transcendentalists would have rejected such a “positivist” analysis. One might note that modern psychology is on the side of the Transcendentalists in agreeing that explicitly held ideologies are able to exert control over the more ancient parts of the brain, including those responsible for ethnocentrism.^[709] The Transcendentalist belief that the mind is creative and does not merely respond to external facts is quite accurate in light of modern psychological research. In modern terms, the Transcendentalists were essentially arguing that whatever “the animal wants of man” (to quote Emerson), humans are able to imagine an ideal world and exert considerable psychological control over their ethnocentrism and other evolved desires.^[710]

Like their Puritan forebears, the Transcendentalists would have doubtlessly acknowledged that some people have difficulty controlling these tendencies. But this is not really a problem, because these people can be coerced to conform. The New Jerusalem can become a reality if people are willing to use the state to enforce group norms of thought and behavior. Indeed, the multicultural New Jerusalem cannot become a reality without suppressing the natural desires of a great many Whites for control of their own destiny.

The main difference between the Puritan New Jerusalem and the present multicultural one is that the latter will lead to the demise of the very White people who are the mainstays of the current multicultural *Zeitgeist*. Unlike the Puritan New Jerusalem, the multicultural version will not be controlled by people like themselves. In the long run they will become a tiny, relatively powerless minority.

The ultimate irony is that without altruistic Whites willing to be morally outraged by violations of multicultural ideals, the multicultural New Jerusalem is likely to revert to a Darwinian struggle for survival among the remnants. But the high-minded descendants of the Puritans won’t be around to witness it.

MORAL IDEALISM IN THE BRITISH ANTISLAVERY MOVEMENT AND THE “SECOND BRITISH EMPIRE”^[711]

There is no more central question in evolutionary biology than that of altruism. Altruists perform actions that benefit others without receiving anything tangible in return. In the absence of certain conditions, altruistic behavior is an evolutionary dead end. For example, research on altruistic cooperation has shown that it can evolve if altruists assort with each other^[712] and exclude non-altruists on the basis of reputation^[713] or if they are willing to punish non-altruists, as might occur in a military unit.^[714]

This chapter discusses the affective revolution that occurred in England in the eighteenth century by focusing on the movement to abolish the slave trade (1807) and slavery (1833). As discussed below, this revolution extended to many other areas of British society. Its consequences are apparent in David Hackett Fischer’s *Fairness and Freedom*, discussed below, which contrasts the British Empire of the nineteenth century with that of the eighteenth century, during the formative period of the American colonies.^[715] By the 1840s, when New Zealand was populated with immigrants from Britain, there were powerful currents of moral universalism, empathic concern, and fairness in the British Empire.

This affective revolution, labeled by Hannah More the “Age of Benevolence,”^[716] began in the eighteenth century. I suggest that ultimately this revolution was a long-term consequence of the egalitarian tendencies of the Puritans and their program of establishing moral communities as the basis of social cohesion—a phenomenon that was ultimately applied to the wider society, as noted in Chapter 6. By the 1780s, “the moral character of imperial authority, the ethics of British conduct outside the British Isles, started to figure in public discussions of empire with increasing frequency.”^[717] In the following I will concentrate on the movement to abolish the slave trade and slavery as illustrative of this upsurge in empathic concern and fairness. The purpose is not to describe the political processes that finally resulted in abolition or even to explain why the movement happened exactly when it did,

but to explore the psychology of some of the principle activists of the movement and the methods they used to make others resonate with their disgust at slavery. These activists and writers were highly principled and deeply Christian, with a powerful sense of fairness and egalitarianism. And although there was a strong background influence of the Puritan ethos described in the previous chapter—an ethos that was central to the abolitionist movement in the United States, the major activists were Quakers, joined later by other dissenting religious groups and finally the Church of England which drew its membership much more from British elites.

On the face of it, these movements involved altruism. In the words of Adam Hochschild, the movements to end the slave trade and slavery itself were

the first time a large number of people became outraged, and stayed outraged for many years, over someone *else's* rights. ... For fifty years, activists in England worked to end slavery in the British Empire. None of them gained a penny by doing so, and their eventual success meant a huge loss to the imperial economy. Scholars estimate that abolishing the slave trade and then slavery cost the British people 1.8 percent of their annual national income over more than half a century.^[718]

This movement occurred at a time when slavery was the norm in Africa, the Arab world, India, the Ottoman Empire, and, in effect, China. As Seymour Drescher notes, “freedom, not slavery, was the peculiar institution.”^[719]

It should be noted that an explanation in terms of altruism is not uncontroversial. To be sure, as with any mass movement, there were doubtless a wide range of motivations, including selfish careerists who would use a movement like abolitionism to further their own fame and fortune.^[720] Nevertheless, selfish motives for action do not imply that the empathy felt for enslaved Africans was not real and a spur to action for many. More importantly, at the indispensable core of the movement were Quakers for whom, as will be discussed below, imputations of selfish motives are difficult at best to support. And finally, even if elites achieved moral capital by abolishing slavery, one must ask how and why moral capital had psychological resonance—why is it that elites beginning in the eighteenth century justified themselves by drawing attention to the moral character of

their policies rather than, say, relying simply on raw power or religious authority.

The point here is a narrow one—that moral idealism and unselfish motives characterized an important core of abolitionists, not that all abolitionists could be characterized in this way. To be sure, there continues to be substantial debate on the motives of those involved in the movement.^[721] Even in the nineteenth century it was proposed that the campaign to end slavery avoided dealing with the exploitation of labor within England and resulted in moral capital that rationalized a far-from-perfect Empire. “By the 1970s, few academic historians cared to write about ‘selfless’ men engaged in a ‘virtuous crusade.’”^[722]

THE WIDER CONTEXT OF THE AGE OF BENEVOLENCE

The two political parties in eighteenth-century England were the Whigs and the Tories, “descended from the two sides in the Civil War,”^[723] the Puritan-based Roundheads and the Cavaliers respectively. England was prosperous and comparatively wealthy, with both rural and urban populations “visibly better off” than in Continental Europe.^[724] The system was oligarchical and there were “rotten boroughs” controlled by wealthy landowners, but it was far more democratic than Continental Europe: “most constituencies had genuine electorates.”^[725]

Eighteenth-century England was also far more egalitarian than the Continent:

This was a golden age for the aristocracy, yet it had no privileged legal status, unlike on most of the Continent, where feudal lordship and serfdom were the norm. Local power relationships depended on ‘deference’; but deference had to some extent to be earned, and could be withheld. ... Even the poorest had legal rights, including economic assistance under the Poor Law of 1601. This gave ordinary men and women, taking turns in their parish as Overseers of the Poor, the responsibility for assisting their needy neighbors who applied to them, the cost being met by a ‘poor rate’ on the wealthiest members. By the late eighteenth century, it was unique in the world.^[726]

In 1780 a German observer noted that Londoners “from the highest to the lowest ranks, [were] almost all well looking people and cleanly and neatly

dressed [with] not near so great a distinction between high and low, as there is in Germany.”^[727]

Relative egalitarianism was thus linked to a relatively peaceful and economically prosperous society, a society where even poor people were seen as having claims on the system. The following discusses how these phenomena were linked to an affective revolution as well, making England a kinder and gentler place and paving the way for the success of the abolitionist movement and a transformed British Empire.

Although the focus here is on abolitionism, the Age of Benevolence was not restricted to the disapproval of slavery.

Between 1720 and 1750, five great London hospitals and nine in the country were founded, and the following half century saw the establishment of dispensaries, clinics, and specialized hospitals (maternity, infectious diseases, insane asylums). An act providing nursing care in the country for the infants of paupers, and such other measures as the paving and draining of many London streets and the clearing of some of its worst slums, resulted in a dramatic reduction of the death rates, for children especially.^[728]

The education of the poor became accepted as part of the new *Zeitgeist*:

The movement for the education of the poor thus reflected the same sensibility and ethos that inspired such other philanthropic and reform movements as the campaign against cruelty to animals, for the abolition of slavery, for prison and legal reforms, and for the establishment of a multitude of societies that undertook to alleviate a variety of social ills.^[729]

It was also the period when, as seen in the work of historian Lawrence Stone, close relationships based on affection and love became universally seen as the appropriate basis for marriage in all social classes, including landed aristocrats.^[730] Stone describes “a new ideal type, namely the Man of Sentiment, or the Man of Feeling, the prototype of the late eighteenth-century Romantic.”^[731] Novels emphasized morality—“the sentimental novel,” such as Samuel Richardson’s *Pamela*.

The new ethic transcended social class, political party, and religious

divisions.^[732]

[The Methodists] regenerated the Church of England. ... They even had an effect on free thinkers, who subsequently refrained from criticizing Christian doctrine in order to devote themselves to political economy and philanthropy. Utilitarians and evangelicals agreed to work together for commercial freedom, the abolition of slavery, and the reform of criminal law and prison organizations.^[733]

Freethinkers in association with the philanthropists of the evangelical movement would work for the material and moral betterment of the poor. In the interval, they were ‘converted’ to philanthropy through the influence of Methodist preachers.”^[734]

This is not to say that the result was an ideal society. “By later standards, of course, the reforms, societies, and institutions reflecting this ethic seem woefully inadequate ‘The Age of Benevolence’ obviously had its underside. If it produced a generation of reformers and humanitarians, it was partly because there was so much to reform and even more to offend the sensibilities of a humane person.”^[735]

By today’s standards, eighteenth-century Britain was indeed rather brutal, with executions for even minor offenses, although the actual number of executions declined by half since the 1590s. However, in general, crime rates were quite low despite the lack of organized law enforcement, and homicide rates had fallen off sharply since the late sixteenth century to rates approaching modern levels. Social welfare organizations aimed at better treatment of criminals, although social ills such as drunkenness proliferated—the latter perhaps an indication that traditional social controls in rural communities were unraveling as people sought work in urban areas.

The emphasis on reforming society went along with utopian idealism—explicit ideologies on how to construct society for the purposes of moral benefit and noted in Chapter 6 as highly characteristic of Puritan-descended intellectuals in nineteenth-century America. British abolitionists developed ideas of model communities of freed slaves. For example, Granville Sharp envisioned a utopian society in which freed slaves and Whites would be settled in Sierra Leone.^[736] The community would be governed by the freed slaves with the consent of native Africans. “All this was far more idealistic

than many later Utopian communities: Brook Farm in Massachusetts, for instance, never invited American Indians to join.” The actual community had a flag depicting clasped Black and White hands; at least half of juries were mandated to be of the same race as the defendant; employing both Blacks and Whites. It did not end well,^[737] and Sierra Leone eventually became a British colony.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ALTRUISM AND MORAL UNIVERSALISM

There are indeed strong intellectual currents opposed to the possibility of altruism, including not only what one might term traditional evolutionary thinking centered around self-interest and encapsulated above, but also Marxist ideology which has often informed discussion in recent decades. Marxism implies self-interest on the part of all social classes and sees ideology as nothing more than a reflection of class interests. Marxists are naturally skeptical that there could possibly be a movement spearheaded by people who had nothing to gain personally and, if these efforts were successful, would result in a cost to the society as a whole. For example, Eric Williams’ *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944) proposed a Marxist explanation, claiming that the campaign to end slavery occurred when it was economically advantageous because the colonies had lost their value.^[738] This interpretation has been rejected by recent findings that in fact the colonies retained their value well into the nineteenth century.^[739]

Given that contemporary academia is decidedly on the left and is highly critical of the Empire and traditional British culture, it is therefore not surprising that the humanitarian basis of the movement is “increasingly neglected and long discredited.”^[740] Nevertheless, a contemporary evolutionary psychologist need not be wedded to a psychology of inevitable self-interest. As Christopher Leslie Brown notes,

warnings [about the inscrutability of motivations] have their place, but honored in practice they tend to close off investigation precisely where it needs to begin. When we ask why abolitionism, why did individuals and groups organize against the slave trade, we are asking not only about macrohistorical processes and contexts. We are asking also about motivations, about decisions to act. This problem cannot be dodged. If the answer to questions about motivation must be incomplete, as it must,

dodging the problem encourages, as it has in most published work on the abolitionists, implied or perfunctory explanations of individual and collective behavior that merely assume or assert the noble (or contemptible) motivations of the figures in question. ... To get at the problem of motivation, we need to revisit the Evangelicals' intentions.^[741]

This is not to claim that those involved in the antislavery movement were motivated only by altruism and empathy. As the antislavery movement gained traction, it became possible to make a career in antislavery activism, and once the view became widespread that slavery was evil, people could signal their virtue and enhance their reputation by loudly opposing it.

Moreover, as noted below, while there can be little doubt that Rev. Thomas Clarkson, the most effective and well-known abolitionist activist, had genuine empathy for the slaves, he also had a heroic sense of ambition that was foreign to the Quakers he worked among, writing "Grand in ambition, visionary in aim, demanding in execution, and nearly impossible to achieve, yet principled in purpose, altruistic in spirit, and a pleasure to contemplate—what could be more heroic than a life devoted to the abolition of the slave trade and an end to slavery?"^[742]

Brown describes several antislavery figures who had a similar heroic sense of ambition utilized in the cause of moral righteousness.^[743] Such motivations recall Ricardo Duchesne's description of Indo-European warrior ethos with its emphasis on heroic action and lasting fame as fundamental to the Western spirit: "It is my contention that the aristocratic culture of Indo-Europeans was dominated by men whose souls were 'too high-spirited, too intrepid, too indifferent about fortune.'"^[744] "The expansionist aggression of the West is an inescapable expression of its roots in aristocratic men who are free and therefore headstrong and ambitious, sure of themselves, easily offended, and unwilling to accept quiet subservience."^[745]

The following describes psychological mechanisms that could give rise to altruistic attitudes and behavior, especially in people so disposed—mechanisms that go some way to explain the moral idealism and moral outrage exhibited by an important subset of the opponents of slavery. Two mechanisms will be discussed: the emotion of empathy and the explicit processing that enables moral idealism and the possibility of purposeful altruistic behavior in conformity with an ideology—in this case the ideology of moral universalism embedded in the Christian religiosity of the period.

Evidence is then provided that empathy and an ideology of moral universalism were indeed important to abolitionism.

The Personality System of Empathy

Empathy is a social emotion that motivates helping behavior. Empathic individuals are strongly moved by the suffering of others; indeed, at the extreme, empathic individuals are prone to “pathological altruism” in which they engage in maladaptive, personally injurious or self-destructive behavior on behalf of others.^[746] Pathologically altruistic persons are prone to Dependent Personality Disorder characterized by self-sacrificing behavior on behalf of others motivated by empathy as well as fear of losing close relationships. “They may make extraordinary self-sacrifices or tolerate verbal, physical, or sexual abuse.”^[747]

Individual differences in empathy are most closely linked to the personality trait of Agreeableness in most versions of the Five Factor Model of personality.^[748] Within an evolutionarily informed factor rotation emphasizing evolutionarily expected sex differences in psychological adaptations, empathy lines up with Love/Nurturance, the personality system underlying close relationships of intimacy and trust that evolved in order to cement close family relationships.^[749] People at the high end of the distribution in this trait are prone to love and intimacy, while those at the low end are prone to sociopathy, a trait that predisposes to coldness toward others, exploitative relationships, and lack of guilt or remorse when harming others. Whereas sociopathic traits are higher in men, empathy and wanting to be loved are higher in women: On average, women are more altruistic and empathic than men, and they place more value on close relationships. In the following, it will be shown that abolitionists appealed to the empathic tendencies of their audience by graphically depicting the suffering of slaves and that, although both sexes were responsive to these messages, women were more responsive than men.

Nevertheless, there is evidence that empathy by itself may not motivate altruistic behavior if the prospective recipient of the altruism is seen as a member of an outgroup. There is substantial research linking empathy to levels of the hormone oxytocin. However, oxytocin operates to make people more altruistic and defensive toward their ingroup—what Carsten DeDreu et al. label “parochial altruism.”^[750] Since the ingroups in such studies are not based on ethnic homogeneity, these results may be interpreted as supporting

the proposal that altruism-prone individuals would be likely to support and defend culturally created ingroups (i.e., moral communities) at cost to self.

This research suggests that a good strategy for abolitionists would be to frame the African slaves as members of a common humanity—as members of an ingroup rather than an outgroup. In the following, evidence will be adduced indicating that the abolitionist activists did indeed appeal to the common humanity of the African slaves. For Rev. James Ramsey, the leading intellectual light of the Evangelical Anglicans, the point of opposition to slavery was to “gain to society, to reason, to religion, half a million of our kind, equally with us adapted for advancing themselves in every art and science that can distinguish man from man, equally with us capable of looking forward to and enjoying futurity.”^[751] Similarly, the above-mentioned Rev. Thomas Clarkson referred to slaves as “oppressed brothers.”^[752]

Moral Idealism and the Ideology of Moral Universalism

Other mechanisms relevant to the human psychology of altruism are those that allow for the moral idealism which played such an important role in Puritanism as discussed in Chapter 6. This analysis depends on psychological research reviewed in Chapter 5 indicating two very different types of psychological processing: implicit and explicit processing. Explicit processing is involved in the regulation of emotions and is fundamental to general intelligence.^[753]

Moral idealism is possible because of the ability of explicit representations of moral ideals to control the modular psychology of moral reasoning and behavior (i.e., emotional states and action tendencies mediated by evolved implicit processing centered in the lower brain).^[754] For example, people are able to effortfully suppress ethnocentric tendencies originating in the lower, modular parts of the brain.^[755] Thus, under experimental conditions, White subjects presented with photos of Blacks had less of a negative response when the photos were presented long enough for explicit processing to take place.^[756] Other research indicates that people may suppress moral emotions like moral outrage, empathy and guilt. For example, Alan Sanfey et al. showed that prefrontal rational choice mechanisms could suppress moral outrage at people who make unfair offers in a one-shot ultimatum game (presumably a modular mechanism promoting self-interest by producing anger directed at people who behave unfairly).^[757] Further, moral emotions

such as empathy may be overridden by utilitarian concerns: subjects will make decisions that override concern for a particular victim if more people will benefit.^[758]

Given the general findings that explicitly represented ideas may suppress emotions of moral outrage and empathy, it is a short step to suppose that a moral ideal could also motivate people to control sub-cortical egoistically inclined modular systems independent of self-interest or utilitarian considerations.^[759]

The psychological literature thus supports the proposal that moral idealism is possible. Such a framework may be found in the abolitionist literature. For example, the seminal abolitionist writer Anthony Benezet, a Quaker, emphasized the need to suppress human pride and desire for worldly success by engaging in charitable works.^[760] Like other Quakers, Benezet did not see opposition to slavery in terms of personal ambition: “Like most Quakers, Anthony Benezet showed little interest in self-promotion. Unprepossessing and lacking in charisma, he had a greater interest in charity than in burnishing his reputation.”^[761]

This implies that altruistic behavior is possible because of the power of explicit processing over implicit processing—the worldly temptations implied by slavery (greed, controlling others) may be suppressed, just as it is possible to suppress reward-oriented behavior, aggression, and ethnocentrism.^[762] Explicit processing is able to control egoistic moral emotions in the service of a moral ideal, even an altruistic moral ideal. In the following, evidence from the historical record will be discussed indicating that moral idealism was part of the self-conception of abolitionists.

Ideologies are a particularly important form of explicit processing that may result in top-down control over behavior. That is, explicit construals of the world—for example, costs and benefits mediated by human language and the human ability to create explicit representations of events—may motivate behavior. This is implied, for example, by the Sanfey et al. study mentioned above: people can rationally decide to act in opposition to their emotional proclivities. Ideologies are coherent, explicitly held beliefs associated with the prefrontal cortex which can control behavior and evolved predispositions that in the absence of prefrontal control, are involuntary outputs of the lower-brain.^[763] They are not necessarily adaptive.^[764] Ideologies often characterize voluntary subgroups within a society (e.g., churches, political parties, the abolitionist movement in the United States or Britain). And finally,

ideologies often rationalize social controls (e.g., Marxist rationalizations for advocating a “dictatorship of the proletariat” that would forcefully eradicate dissent from political orthodoxy); in turn the social acceptance of ideologies may be strengthened by such controls (enforcing the teaching of Marxism in the educational system).

In the following I will describe the ideologies of the abolitionists, particularly religious ideologies, that conceptualized all humans as created by God, as having equal natural abilities, and as candidates for eternal salvation. Quite clearly, the point of the abolitionist movement was to enact social controls in opposition to the slave trade and to slavery. The ideologies of the abolitionist movement rationalized such controls.

Putting the comments in this section together with the previous comments on the personality basis of empathy, we would expect that people prone to empathy (high on the trait of Love/Nurturance) would also be prone to moral idealism promoting behavior that relieves others’ suffering. However, a morally idealistic ideology may play an independent role and facilitate positive behavior toward others even in the absence of strong tendencies toward empathy, and of course the reverse is true: people inclined to empathy may attempt to relieve others suffering even without subscribing to an explicit ideology that they should do so.

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS

One advantage that the abolitionists had was that they could cite the authority of influential, well-known philosophers who collectively had altered elite opinion in the direction of prizing empathy. Gertrude Himmelfarb’s *Roads to Modernity: The British, French, and American Enlightenments*, describes the British Enlightenment as a “sociology of virtue” that contrasted with what she characterizes as the French Enlightenment’s “ideology of reason.”^[765] The central feature of the British Enlightenment was acceptance of an ethic that “derives from a moral sense that inspired sympathy, benevolence, and compassion for others.”^[766] “The British moral philosophy ... was reformist rather than subversive, respectful of the past and present even while looking forward to a more enlightened future. It was also optimistic and, in this respect at least, egalitarian, the moral sense and common sense being shared by all men, not merely the educated and the well-born.”^[767]

The “moral sense” or “moral sentiment,” the “social virtues” or “social affections,” the ideas of “benevolence,” “sympathy,” “compassion,” “fellow-feeling,”—these were the defining terms of the moral philosophy that was at the heart of the British Enlightenment. ... It was that ethos that found practical expression in the reform movements and philanthropic enterprises that flourished during the century, culminating in what the Evangelical writer Hannah More described (not entirely in praise) as “the Age of Benevolence,” and what a later historian called “the new humanitarianism.”^[768]

Hannah More (~1746–1833) was a playwright who also wrote on moral and religious topics; she was also an abolitionist and a member of the Evangelical Anglicans discussed below as having a major role in abolitionism. The “later historian” mentioned by Himmelfarb is Mary Gwladys Jones whose 1938 book, *The Charity School Movement: A Study of Eighteenth-Century Puritanism in Action*, describes the Puritan roots of the Age of Benevolence and is discussed below.^[769]

Indeed, abolitionists commonly cited philosophers such as Montesquieu, David Hume, and Adam Smith.^[770] Hume proposed a moral sense common to all humans. At the root of the moral sense was sympathy, the “chief source of moral distinctions,” and the source of “the public good”^[771] and “the good of mankind.”^[772] In *A Treatise on Human Nature* (1738), Hume claimed that all humans resonated to positive emotions and that these emotions result in similar emotions among others—what psychologists term emotional contagion:

The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations; nor can any one be actuated by any affection of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature.^[773]

In *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Hume emphasized “general benevolence” or “disinterested benevolence”—benevolence without concern for personal interest.

It appears that a tendency to public good, and to the promoting of peace, harmony, and order in society does, always, by affecting the benevolent principles of our frame, engage us on the side of the social virtues.^[774]

There is some benevolence, however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of friendship for human kind; some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wolf and serpent.^[775]

Adam Smith's well-known and highly regarded *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) emphasized emotional contagion as well, but also mentions feelings of pleasure at others' happiness, empathy for suffering others, the human ability to control selfishness, and the desire to achieve a reputation as a morally upstanding person:

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others and render their happiness necessary to him, although he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others when we either see it or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner [e.g., by the graphic depictions of the suffering of slaves employed by abolitionists]. ... By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation ... we enter, as it were, into his body and become in some measure the same person with him.^[776]

Hence it is, too, that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfish [i.e., via effortful control as described above^[777]] and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature.^[778]

Man naturally desires not only to be loved but to be lovely. ... He naturally dreads not only to be hated but to be hateful. ... He desires not only praise but praiseworthiness.^[779]

Smith thus emphasized the moral emotions rather than abstract rules of justice based on reason. Moreover, theories of moral emotions were divorced from religion and thus appealed to the more secularly minded elites that

looked down on the religious enthusiasm of the Evangelical Anglicans and Methodists^[780]—not to mention the Quakers. Smith was an ardent opponent of slavery, stating in 1759 that colonial slaveholders were “the refuse of the jails of Europe.” Calling them “wretches,” he wrote: “fortune never exerted more cruelly her empire over mankind, than when she subjected those nations of heroes” [Africans] “to the levity, brutality, and baseness” of British Americans.^[781]

Because this intellectual framework dominated the most elite intellectual circles of British society, it was easy for abolitionists to make a credible moral argument. Opposition to slavery could easily be seen as an example of Hume’s disinterested benevolence and Smith’s universal compassion for the suffering of others. Further, it was difficult to defend slavery when “the luminaries of the Enlightenment [e.g., Montesquieu’s *Spirit of the Laws* and *Encyclopédie*] increasingly subjected human bondage to a sustained critique. It would be difficult ... to find many in the British Isles willing to describe colonial slavery and the Atlantic trade as an emblem of social, cultural, or moral progress during the mid-eighteenth century.”^[782] “It became more common to doubt the morality of the slave system because certain intellectuals did too, because prominent theologians, philosophers, and historians raised troubling questions about the moral and legal foundations on which the system stood.”^[783]

EMPATHY AND ABOLITIONISM

The abolitionist movement clearly involved calling attention to the suffering of slaves. “In Britain, the campaign to abolish slavery, like the other reform movements, was motivated not by ‘rational will’ but by humanitarian zeal, by compassion rather than reason.”^[784] The movement realized that “the way to stir men and women to action is not by biblical argument, but through the vivid, unforgettable description of acts of great injustice done to their fellow human beings [i.e., in a “very lively manner” as Adam Smith noted (see above)]. The abolitionists placed their hope not in sacred texts, but in human empathy.”^[785] Although practical arguments were also made (e.g., that slave owners would benefit from the abolition of the slave trade), empathy elicited by depictions of the suffering of slaves was not only the main way that the abolitionists appealed to the masses, it was also apparent in the key figures of the movement. While doing research for his prize-winning essay at Oxford University in 1785, Rev. Thomas Clarkson “found himself

overwhelmed with horror”^[786]; his essay exhibits “heartfelt outrage about slavery.”^[787]

This empathy in activists like Clarkson was apparent to observers. The poet and philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge wrote of Clarkson, “Nothing can surpass the moral beauty of the manner in which he ... relates his own [part] in that Immortal War. ... [Clarkson is] a moral steam engine.”^[788]

Clearly Clarkson’s emotions were not religious, but empathic. He spent much time traveling around England in an effort to find examples of cruelty and witnesses to cruelty, not only to slaves, but also to the sailors on slave ships. Their appeals to mass audiences also emphasized the universalist ideology aimed at combatting the idea that slaves were an outgroup rather than members of a common humanity. A famous medallion with a kneeling slave was inscribed “Am I not a man and a brother?” “Reproduced everywhere from books and leaflets to snuffboxes and cufflinks, the image was an instant hit.”^[789]

Another very effective empathy-inducing illustration was a drawing of a slave ship, the H. M. S. Brookes, showing the very cramped quarters of slaves on their journey to the West Indies. This image was used in parliamentary debates over slavery and was included in Clarkson’s *Abstract of the Evidence delivered before a select committee of the House of Commons in the years 1790 and 1791, on the part of the petitioners for the Abolition of the slave trade* which sold several hundred thousand copies. Rather than religious sentiments, the abstract is completely devoted to detailing the suffering of slaves “in gory detail.”^[790] The appeal was to the empathy of his readers.

It was common among activists to assert that if people knew what really went on with the slave trade, they would be sympathetic to abolitionism. Another important activist, Granville Sharp, noted “We are clearly of the opinion that the nature of the slave-trade needs only to be known to be detested”^[791]—a comment that assumes the empathic capability of his audience. Clarkson wrote of this “enormous evil” that he “was sure that it was only necessary for the inhabitants of this favoured island to know it, to feel a just indignation against it.”^[792]

As a result of these efforts, abolition of the slave trade was popular with the public long before it became law in 1807. Indeed, even in 1787–1788, “if the question could have been decided by public opinion, the slave trade would have been abolished at once.”^[793] A contemporary estimated 300,000

British gave up sugar because of its moral taint; another claimed 400,000. Olaudah Equiano, a former slave, wrote an autobiography depicting the cruelty of slavery and the slave trade that became a best-seller. In 1788, Joseph Wool, a merchant and Quaker abolitionist, wrote that “the British people were like ‘Tinder which has immediately caught fire from the spark of information which has been struck upon it.’”^[794] In April, 1788, a touring actor wrote that “the many British cities he had passed through had ‘caught fire’ over slavery.”^[795] When the slave trade was finally abolished, it was not the government that was the moving force; an article in the *Edinburgh Review* claimed “the sense of the nation had pressed abolition upon our rulers.”^[796]

EMPATHY AND IDEOLOGY IN OPPOSITION TO SLAVERY: QUAKERS, EVANGELICAL ANGLICANS, AND METHODISTS

Antislavery sentiments were often expressed quite early in the eighteenth century, and indeed appear to have been rather common, waiting only for an organized movement and greater democratization of political institutions to have an effect on public policy.

Slave traders in Britain encountered public disapproval early in the eighteenth century, decades before the emergence of those cultural movements often credited for engendering antislavery sentiment, decades before the height of the Evangelical revival or the apex of the European Enlightenment, or the emergence of a cult of sensibility ... [In 1746] a propagandist for the Royal Africa Company observed that ‘many are prepossessed against the Trade, thinking it *a barbarous, unhuman, and unlawful traffic for a Christian Country to Trade in Blacks.*’”^[797]

Remarks in opposition to slavery were made in an “offhand manner” which shows that the author assumed widespread antislavery sentiment. Further, “a culture of sympathy made it increasingly fashionable by the middle of the eighteenth century to romanticize enslaved Africans as exemplars of wounded innocence.”^[798] During the American Revolutionary War, apologists for Britain emphasized the hypocrisy of the American rhetoric of liberty in the context of slavery. Americans countered that the British were hardly free from the practice, and indeed were ultimately responsible for slavery in America. Antislavery elements in America (notably

the Quakers and descendants of the New England Puritan heritage) emphasized that slavery was indeed incompatible with American ideals.^[799]

Nevertheless, there was no effective movement until the 1780s. By that time, it was possible to envision a career as an antislavery activist:

To condemn slavery in principle and colonial institutions in practice had become by the 1780s the mark of an enlightened, humane Christian. Since the midcentury, novelists like Sarah Scott and Laurence Sterne had presented the man and woman of feeling, with their characteristic sympathy for the African, as the exemplar of moral virtue. It required only a small step to see that active opposition to slavery could be used as a way to demonstrate individual moral worth [i.e., virtue signaling], once such aims lost their association with hopeless idealism.^[800]

Although antislavery attitudes were much affected by empathy for suffering others and were not necessarily tied to strong religious beliefs, the key activists and organizations, doubtless reflecting the general religiosity of the period, were all associated with religious groups: the Quakers, the Evangelical Anglicans, and the Methodists. An exception perhaps is Granville Sharp, a high Anglican and early activist against slavery. As were Evangelical Anglicans such as James Ramsey, Sharp was motivated by moral fervor mixed with concern about the effects of slavery on the afterlife. “When he believed that something was evil, he confidently marched off to confront the evildoer in person.”^[801] The slave trade and colonial slavery brought Britain “indelible disgrace,” a “notorious wickedness”^[802]; “*to be in power* and to neglect (as life is very uncertain) even a day in endeavouring to put a stop to such monstrous injustice and abandoned wickedness, must necessarily endanger a man’s *eternal* welfare.”^[803] For Sharp, opposition to slavery was a moral duty, deeply embedded in his religious worldview; “he could never regard human bondage in anything other than moral terms.”^[804] Brown situates Sharp in the context of New England Calvinism.^[805] As discussed below and in Chapter 6, in the U.S., the Puritan heritage of New England provided the most powerful opposition to slavery in the period leading up to the Civil War. Like the Quakers and Evangelical Anglican women, Sharp seems to have been uninterested in self-promotion and typically avoided the limelight.^[806]

Quakers

Quakers in Philadelphia early developed an antipathy toward slavery, coming out against it in 1754^[807] and expelling slaveholders in the 1760s and 1770s.^[808] Quakers in the U.S. freed their slaves and some paid compensation. The American Quakers pressured their British brethren/coreligionists to be more actively involved in abolitionism.^[809]

In Britain, Quaker networks and money were “of critical importance” in the early campaigns of 1787–1788; they were “the foremost champions of liberty for enslaved Africans.”^[810] In 1783 Quakers, with around 20,000 members, started an energetic campaign against slavery, responsible for the first petition to the House of Commons in 1783, the first antislavery committees (beginning in 1783 but including the very influential Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade established in 1787), and the printing and distribution of antislavery literature. Quakers did the vast majority of the practical, day-to-day work of the Society and were a major source of its funding.

“Quaker propagandists shaped the information available to the reading public after 1783.”^[811] They also aggressively distributed their literature among the elite (e.g., political figures) and non-elite alike (e.g., articles in provincial newspapers without attribution to Quaker sources, an approach that “allowed them to disguise the extent to which the sudden appearance of antislavery sentiment in the press reflected Quaker initiative.”^[812] “Dozens of Quakers across England devoted countless hours in 1784 and 1785 to placing antislavery literature in the proper hands.”^[813] Beginning in the 1780s all antislavery literature was printed by the Quaker James Phillips, typically with the financial support of other Quakers. The works of Philadelphia Quaker Anthony Benezet were of seminal importance and often cited by other writers; Maurice Jackson subtitles his biography of Benezet “the Father of Atlantic Abolitionism.”^[814] Benezet wrote that slavery and the slave trade were “prodigious wickedness,” “prodigious iniquity.”^[815]

Quakers were a fringe group in British society: “They were marginalized because they could not hold office because only [Church of England] members could. Often mocked, ‘laughed off as powerless oddballs.’”^[816] Brown argues that Quakers used the public consensus against slavery that had developed by the 1780s as a way of obtaining greater acceptance.^[817] They were, indeed, widely praised for introducing an antislavery petition to the House of Commons: “These tributes encouraged Friends to picture themselves as moral campaigners, to assume the mantle of crusaders for

justice and virtue”^[818] Opposition to slavery came to be a central aspect of Quaker identity: “Laboring against ‘the avarice of unrighteous men’ reinforced the religious fellowship and instilled a collective sense of purpose.”^[819]

Elizabeth Hayrick, a convert to Quakerism, was an effective advocate for abolition. In general abolitionism was very popular among women, and many were engaged in street-level activism, distributing literature, etc. Women’s societies were “almost always bolder than men’s.”^[820] Women kept the movement alive when it had lost steam in the 1820s and early 1830s.

Quaker religious ideology is the *nec plus ultra* of moral universalism; they “believed that the ‘Inner Light’ of God’s revelation shone equally on human beings of any race or class.”^[821] For Benezet, human equality “was an ontological fact rather than a philosophical doctrine or maxim”;^[822] in addition to his concern for African slaves, he extended his interest to the welfare of Native Americans and the poor in Philadelphia. A statement by a Quaker subcommittee submitted to Parliament was titled *The Case of Our Fellow-Creatures, the Oppressed Africans*.^[823]

Quakers were also highly egalitarian: they were “democratic and nonhierarchical”;^[824] there were no bishops or ordained ministers, and any person (including women) could speak. As is typical of egalitarian groups (see Chapter 3), policy was passed by consensus of the entire meeting. In general, Quakers were economically successful, a merchant class capable of devoting substantial resources to the cause of antislavery activism.^[825] While beginning as a fringe group widely derided for their customs (early Quakers in the mid-seventeenth century at times appeared naked in public^[826]), they eventually became a religion (along with Puritan-derived Unitarianism) of urban and business elites, with “some of the most famous names in British business and finance.”^[827]

Even early in the eighteenth century, Quaker concerns went beyond utilitarian reasons (e.g., the dangers of slaveholding):

Quaker moralists from William Edmundson to John Woolman insisted on a conflict between slavery and the fundamental principles of justice, morality, and righteousness. This attitude reflected, in part, the peculiar cast of the Quaker faith. More than other sects, Quakers attempted to realize in practice the egalitarian principles implicit in the radical wing of the Protestant Reformation. Friends knew that Christ had enjoined

compassion for the weak. And they knew that the violence required to institute and sustain slavery conflicted with their unique commitment to pacifism They placed particular emphasis on renouncing worldly luxuries, on demonstrating through everyday life the disavowal of greed and self-interest.^[828]

As noted above, Woolman, known as the “Quintessential Quaker,” felt guilty about preferring his own children to children on the other side of the world.^[829]

Evangelical Anglicans

Evangelical Anglicans were motivated by moral outrage at slavery combined with strong ideological overtones based on a religious worldview. Unlike the Quakers or Methodists, they “enjoyed prominence and social standing,”^[830] and were thus in a better position to alter the attitudes and behavior of elites. The principle figures are Rev. Thomas Clarkson (the principle activist, an effective writer, and a bridge between the Evangelical Anglicans and the Quakers), Rev. James Ramsey (the preeminent writer and pamphleteer), William Wilberforce (the leader of abolitionist forces in Parliament), Hannah More (the writer and philanthropist who, as noted above, first used the phrase “Age of Benevolence”), Beilby Porteus (an influential Anglican bishop), Elizabeth Bouverie (a wealthy benefactress), and Admiral Charles and Margaret Middleton (the latter a wealthy, pious benefactress who “insisted that Barham Court [Middleton’s estate in Teston] serve as a space for conversations about slavery”^[831]); she is regarded as a formative force among the Evangelical Anglicans.

While empathy for the slaves is quite apparent in their writings and comments, there was also a strong religious emphasis—a universalist ideology in which all humans were created by God and candidates for eternal salvation.^[832] “The Evangelical revivalists sometimes overlooked racial and ethnic difference more readily. There were important differences in theology and in practice among the Evangelical sects. Yet they possessed a shared tendency to assume the spiritual equality of black men and women.”^[833]

Indeed, in his book, *An Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the British Sugar Colonies* (1784), Rev. James Ramsey emphasized the intellectual and moral equality of the African slaves: “I shall assert the claim of Negroes to attention from us, by explaining their natural capacity, and proving them to be on a footing of equality in respect of the reception of

mental improvement, with the natives of any other country.”^[834] Ramsey’s book was influential and well-reviewed in elite publications, but provoked “paroxysms of outrage” from the West Indies interests.”^[835] By 1788 even pro-slavery tracts conceded the basic moral premise of the abolitionists, for example, noting “that slavery is an evil no man can deny” or “no man condemns, as an abstract proposition, more than I the command over the lives and properties of their fellow creatures.”^[836]

Nevertheless, with authority deriving from his experience of having lived nearly 20 years in the West Indies and as a former slaveholder himself, Ramsey provided graphic descriptions of the oppression of the slaves clearly designed to evoke empathy. Slave owners are “accustomed from their infancy to trifle with the feelings and smile at the miseries of wretches born to be the drudges of their avarice and slaves of their caprice.”^[837] He describes slaves getting “twenty lashes of a long cart whip” for minor failures in carrying out the daily task of gathering grass for domestic animals.^[838] The cart whip, “in the hands of a skillful driver, cuts out flakes of skin and flesh with every stroke; and the wretch in this mangled condition, is turned out to work in dry or wet weather, which last, now and then, brings on the cramp, and ends his slavery altogether.”^[839] There are detailed descriptions of the punishments given to slaves, often for trifling offenses. The dangers of work on the sugar plantations are also described, such as arms being cut off in the machinery, the danger made worse because overworked slaves were so exhausted from lack of sleep.

Ramsey, although contemptuous of greed, maintained that improving the lot of slaves would be good for the owners: “While the man of feeling finds every generous sentiment indulged in the prospect which it opens, the politician, the selfish, will have all their little wishes of opulence and accumulation fully realized.”^[840] He is also careful to emphasize that his involvement is altruistic—that he is not motivated by any sort of personal gain or approbation. Indeed, his behavior will be costly because he will suffer censure from others: “Profit he disclaims and willingly he would transfer all the credit that can possibly arise from it, to him who would take on him the censure.”^[841] Ramsey thus regarded himself “as a martyr, not a hero.”^[842]

Based on the ideology of moral universalism, the desirability of bringing slaves within the Christian fold was paramount. This ideology rationalized strong social controls aimed to rein in the planters. The Evangelical Anglicans proposed to achieve their aims by effecting, “in the words of

Bishop Beilby Porteus, the institution of ‘fixed laws’ and ‘police’ to restrain abusive slaveholders and for initiatives that would provide the enslaved ‘protection, security, encouragement, improvement, and conversion.’”^[843] Porteus was greatly affected by the descriptions of the treatment of slaves: “for him the treatment of British slaves had become by 1784 a measure of collective virtue.”^[844]

Reflecting the fact that antislavery attitudes had become entirely mainstream by the 1780s, Brown interprets the Evangelicals’ support as motivated by obtaining moral capital that they could use to further their wider goals of increasing piety and morally circumspect behavior in other areas.^[845] In other words, the cause of abolition had achieved a moral imperative to the point that among the public in general it “was associated with politeness, sensibility, patriotism, and a commitment to British liberty.”^[846] It could therefore be utilized as a battering ram against immorality in other areas.

Nevertheless, their attachment to abolition was not merely instrumental; there was a strong empathic motivation: “their horror at the trafficking and enslavement of human bodies was genuine”^[847]—a judgment that certainly leaps out at anyone reading Ramsey’s essay.

Methodists

The explosion of ‘New Dissent’ (especially Methodism) from the 1770s to the 1840s marked one of the most dramatic social and cultural changes in the country’s history. ... Methodism was the only denomination that positively thrived on socio-economic change—including population growth, industrialization, migration, and social mobility. So, in its various forms, it became the most powerful catalyst of cultural dissidence in England. Chapels and their Sunday schools, often staffed by self-taught artisans and miners, became a channel of revolt against squire and parson.^[848]

During this period, Methodists were Evangelicals who opposed slavery but operated outside the Church of England. Founded in 1739, Methodism was very much in tune with the emphasis on a universal moral sense: “While the philosophers were invoking the moral sense as the basis of the social affections, Methodist preachers were giving practical effect to that idea by spreading a religious gospel of good works, engaging in a variety of humanitarian causes, and welcoming the poor into their fold.”^[849]

Although the emphasis was upon the personal giving of charity and good works, the Methodists helped establish and support philanthropic enterprises and institutions of every kind: hospitals, dispensaries, orphanages, friendly societies, schools and libraries. They also played a prominent part in the movement for the abolition of the slave trade. Wesley himself was passionate on the subject of ‘that execrable villainy,’ slavery. ‘An African ... was in no respect inferior to the European’; if he seemed so, it was because the European had kept him in a condition of inferiority, depriving him of ‘all opportunities of improving either in knowledge or virtue.’ ^[850]

In a letter to William Wilberforce, the parliamentary leader of the abolitionists, Wesley wrote, “Go on, in the name of God and in the power of His might, till even American slavery (the vilest that ever saw the sun) shall vanish away before it.” ^[851] According to Wesley, if the empire required slavery, it would have to be renounced ^[852]—an excellent example of abolitionism’s lack of concern for individual or national interests.

Although they were involved in petitioning Parliament, ^[853] the Methodists were not at the center of the activist movements. Nevertheless, their position was clear. In 1774 Wesley published an antislavery tract titled *Thoughts upon Slavery* containing stark descriptions of the recruitment of slaves and their treatment during the passage to the West Indies and on sugar plantations:

And what can be more wretched than the condition they enter upon? Banished from their country, from their relations and friends forever, they are reduced to a state scarce any way preferable to that of beasts of burden. ... Their sleep is short, their labor continual and frequently above their strength: so death sets many at liberty before half their days. ... They are whipped by overseers who, if they think them dilatory, or think any thing not so well done as it should be, whip them most unmercifully, so that you may see their bodies long after wheal’d and scarred usually from the shoulders to the waist. ... As to the punishment inflicted on them, says Sir *Hans Sloan*, “they frequently geld them or chop off half a foot: after they are whipped until they are raw all over. Some put pepper and salt all over them. Some drop melted wax upon their skin. Others cut off their ears and constrain them to broil and eat

them. For Rebellion” (that is, asserting their native Liberty which they have as much right to as the Air they breathe) “they fasten them down to the ground with crooked sticks on every limb, and then applying fire by degrees, to the feet and hands, they burn them gradually upward to the head.”^[854]

Whether or not such practices occurred or were common, passages like this were clearly intended to evoke empathy and disgust in readers.

Methodism had a well-developed emphasis on altruism. Any wealth beyond the necessities to rear a family should be given to the poor and it should be done, according to Wesley, in “as secret and unostentatious way as possible.”^[855] This effectively de-emphasized personal reputation as a motive for charity. The Methodists tended to avoid organized approaches to charity in favor of individual action.

A disposition rather than an organisation for philanthropy was thus established, which explains in great part, the generous support of members of the Methodist Connection for the amelioration of human distress, whether that of poverty, or sickness, or imprisonment, or slavery; it explains too the lack of organised effort in tackling any of the leading social problems of the age.^[856]

The artistic production of Methodism emphasized moral virtue. “The Methodists published sentimental novels and poems ... , as well as sermons and tracts. And theology had at its core feelings, sentiments, and emotions that were given expression in prayers, hymns, homilies, and, not least, in personal services for the sick and needy.”^[857]

Like the Quakers and the Evangelical Anglicans, there was a strong streak of egalitarianism in Methodism. Although loyal to established hierarchy, within the church “the movement was, in spirit if not formally, democratic. ... Within the church, there were few social distinctions. ... And the organizational structure, however hierarchical, promoted a spirit of community and fraternity.”^[858] Women were often the majority in congregations, and they played a major role in leading “in prayer, counseling, and exhorting.”^[859] There were many female preachers with the same status as men. Methodism encouraged a Puritan-like ethic of thrift, diligence and hard work along with “the social obligation of charity and good works, so it made

‘self-help’ a correlative of helping others.”^[860] Methodism appealed “to the middle classes; it remained allied with Evangelicalism which “would inspire the ‘Moral Reformation’ and philanthropic movements that were so distinctive a part of the British Enlightenment.”^[861]

PURITANISM AS A PROTOTYPE OF “THE AGE OF BENEVOLENCE”

Mary Gwladys Jones’s *The Charity School Movement: A Study of Eighteenth-Century Puritanism in Action* describes the Puritan roots of the eighteenth-century “age of benevolence.”^[862] This is important for the present discussion because, although Puritans per se were not at the forefront of the movement to abolish slavery, Jones’s work clearly shows that the Puritan ethic described in Chapter 6 was at the root of what she describes as the eighteenth century’s “sustained humanitarianism and generous philanthropy.”^[863] This included concern for African slaves:

The call of the mission field abroad, the distress of religious refugees, the misery of negro slaves, foundling children and climbing boys, the brutalities of the criminal law, the hardships of the very poor, the aged and infirm, the struggle of the “second poor” [i.e., poor people not in receipt of parish relief] to keep their heads above water, the suffering of the sick and diseased, of those in prison never failed to stir the consciences and untie the purse-strings of the pious and philanthropic men and women of eighteenth-century England.^[864]

In linking these tendencies to Puritanism, Jones is implying not allegiance to any particular religious dogma, but an effort “to live their lives in punctilious conformity to Christian teaching.” Such people could be found in all the religious sects, including the Church of England. “They were united not by a specific form of Church constitution, but by a pietism, or precisianism, which aimed at promoting by an austere personal discipline the glory of God and the inner sanctification of the individual.”^[865] Their motivation was “spiritual rewards in the world to come.”^[866] The sensibility of the Evangelicals of the eighteenth century thus represented the characteristics of what she terms “classical Puritanism.”^[867] “The steady, unswerving practice of piety and charity remained their dominant characteristics.”

“THE SECOND BRITISH EMPIRE” IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A KINDER, GENTLER PLACE

The Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica and Its Supporters in England

The movement to end slavery was only a part of the overall movement toward a society with a greater role for empathy, fairness, and “high-mindedness”—characterized by strong moral principles. This high-mindedness of an important segment of British society was on display in the reaction to the Morant Bay Rebellion of Black Jamaicans carried out against Whites in 1865 in Jamaica, as discussed by Andrew Joyce.^[868]

In thinking about the context of the rebellion, the abolition of slavery in Jamaica certainly did not end racial tensions. Slavery ended in 1833 and by 1838 workers were hired at market wages with the result that poverty ensued for many amid complaints of worker indolence by the planters; sugar production dropped significantly. The situation in Jamaica had critical differences from the high-mindedness of the British settlers in New Zealand during around the same time (see below). Unlike New Zealand, Jamaica had a long history of using African slaves to work on large plantations beginning in the late seventeenth century. A race realist perspective emphasizes the low average IQ of the Africans along with poor impulse control and poor work ethic. Joyce cites Lawrence James, a well-recognized historian of the British Empire who noted that many Blacks refused to work on the plantations after a free market in labor was established on the island. The result was that planters resorted to importing workers from India and China to work on the plantations.

Unsurprisingly from a race realist perspective, the descendants of these Asian workers have become prominent in the mercantile class on the island, rising to a position that is unquestionably above the Blacks.^[869] In recent times, this has resulted in ethnic tensions, with the Chinese in particular becoming the target of hostility by poor Jamaican Blacks. Anti-Chinese riots during the 1970s resulted in large-scale emigration from the island. A revealing comment on the work ethic of Jamaican Blacks is that when Chinese entrepreneurs opened textile factories on Jamaica during the 1980s and 1990s, they brought with them laborers from China.

These tensions have not disappeared: despite continuing to dominate the economy, some Chinese are leaving Jamaica because of anti-Chinese attitudes and widespread crime.^[870] As an article on social stratification in

contemporary Jamaica notes, “the bulk of national wealth is owned by a small number of light-skinned or white families, with a significant portion controlled by individuals of Chinese and Middle Eastern heritage.”^[871] Moreover, African ancestry is “still associated with being ‘uncivilized,’ ‘ignorant,’ ‘lazy,’ and ‘untrustworthy.’” These stereotypes of Jamaican Blacks are similar to those of Blacks in other countries, and fit well with race realist research.^[872] These findings place the difficulties faced by the Jamaican authorities in 1865 in context.

The reaction of the Governor of Jamaica, John Eyre, to the rebellion did not reflect the “kinder and gentler” Second British Empire described below as applicable to New Zealand. The rebels had killed police officers and, after storming a courthouse, the White victims of the mob were killed “under circumstances of great atrocity,”^[873] such as cutting off tongues and fingers while still alive. Governor Eyre called out reinforcements from the Royal Navy which restored order after killing several hundred rebels, including the leader Paul Bogle and his brothers. George William Gordon, a wealthy mixed-race individual who was a member of the Jamaican parliament, was executed for complicity and later became the subject of glowing hagiographies devoid of historical accuracy among the critics of the government’s response to the rebellion.

However, the reaction of certain segments of British society certainly reflected the theme of a kinder and gentler British Empire. Joyce’s article shows that the sentiments that drove the antislavery movement in England were prominent and powerful in the England of the 1860s:

To the clear-thinking individual, it was a plainly criminal and unimaginably brutal series of actions, carried out for malicious reasons against a population targeted for being White. And yet, there was a liberal faction in England convinced not only that it was the Black population that were the true victims, but also that their fellow Whites were reprehensible monsters who deserved the fate which befell them. This pathological response, laden with a misplaced hyper-emotionality, would shake the Empire to its core, sapping its confidence and bequeathing a legacy which is still felt to this day.^[874]

Opinion on the Empire in the 1860s was sharply divided, with the liberal critics centering around an informal group called Exeter Hall composed of

wealthy individuals with access to the burgeoning newspaper-based media of the period. They were identified in the public mind “with what Charles Dickens described as “platform sympathy for the Black and ... platform indifference to our own countrymen.”^[875] Dickens’ comments, written in 1865, are interesting because they reflect liberal thinking in contemporary times—concern about helping poor people in far off places by promoting immigration regardless of negative effects on large segments of the native population, particularly the working class. Dickens:

The Jamaica insurrection is another hopeful piece of business. That platform sympathy with the Black—or the Native, or the Devil—afar off, and that platform indifference to our own countrymen at enormous odds in the midst of bloodshed and savagery makes me stark wild. Only the other day, there was a meeting of jawbones of asses at Manchester, to censure the Jamaica Governor [Eyre] for his manner of putting down the insurrection! So we are badgered about New Zealanders [Maoris] and Hottentots, as if they were identical with men in clean shirts at Camberwell, and were to be bound by pen and ink accordingly! So Exeter Hall holds us in perfect mortal submission to missionaries who (Livingston always excepted) are perfect nuisances, and always leave every place worse off than they found it. ... But for the blacks in Jamaica being over-impatient and before their time, the whites would have been exterminated.^[876]

Reflecting the sentiments of many proponents of the antislavery movement earlier in the century, the Exeter Hall coterie were “Christian philanthropists who believed that [the] races could be raised to standards of education and conduct which would place them alongside Europeans. Members of this group tended to be Non-Conformist, middle-class, and liberal or radical in their politics.”^[877] As Joyce notes, “Exeter Hall was largely responsible for the production and dissemination of a range of antislavery and pro-Black propaganda [replete with exaggerations, omissions, and willful rewriting of historical events] which, with its heady emotional characteristics, thrived on those under the influence of the Romantic movement.”^[878]

As with several of the nineteenth-century Transcendentalists and religious leaders discussed in Chapter 6, their views were influenced by the belief that racial characteristics were mutable, and in particular that converting Africans

would make them part of the Christian *ethnos*. As noted there, these ideas are a Christian version of the optimistic, utopian ideas based on Lamarckian ideas of the heritability of acquired characteristics. Within Lamarckian ideology, races could be changed by acquiring British or American culture, so that they would eventually become “just like us”—the conflation of race and culture.

Given the powerful role of Jewish academics in contemporary Western culture, it’s also worth noting Jewish aspects of the rebellion and how they were perceived in contemporary times. Joyce cites a first-hand account by a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society in 1871.^[879] Besides noting the inaccuracies surrounding many accounts of the rebellion and the unwillingness of Blacks to work, this individual

shed light on the activities of Jamaica’s miniscule but increasingly powerful Jewish community. Crippled further by a decrease in the price of sugar, White landowners “threw their estates into the market.” The island’s resources thus began to fall “into the hands of the Jews, who became rich and prosperous, and in conjunction with petty lawyers who had fattened on the charges for drawing legal documents, and the exorbitant interest on the loans contracted by a number of landowners anxious to save themselves from utter ruin, forced their way into the House of Assembly, where they soon became supreme, and used their power to procure jobs for themselves and their friends.”^[880]

The Jewish context of the Morant Bay Rebellion has been entirely omitted by Gad Heuman [whose writing, as Joyce notes attempts to inculcate a “post-imperial guilt complex”^[881]] and his coterie of dedicated “post-colonial” researchers. Indeed, you will find no reference to Jamaica’s Jews in any existing historical work on the Morant Bay Rebellion. This is more than curious when one considers two quite astonishing facts. The first is that Jamaica’s press was, aside from a few miniscule church bulletins, solely in the hands of the island’s tiny Jewish community. An 1895 government guide to Jamaica for intending settlers listed the island’s media outlets as being *The Colonial Standard*, operated by George Levy, and *The Gleaner*, *The Jamaica Princes Current*, and *The Tri-Weekly Gleaner*—all operated by the Jewish De Cordova brothers.^[882]

The second very crucial point is that George William Gordon was not

the only person of high influence to be arrested for sedition and treason—the others were none other than the proprietor of *The County Union*, a Mr. Sidney Levien, and a “solicitor-at-law” by the name of D. P. Nathan.^[883] The fact that this information can only be discovered by seeking out the primary documents, absent or obscured from our histories after almost 150 years and much spilled ink, is a matter of some significance.

Governor Eyre was himself convinced that much of the unrest owed its origins to “the personal, scurrilous, vindictive and disloyal writings of a licentious and unscrupulous press.”^[884] Eyre wrote to the Colonial Office in London on November 20th, 1865, with the opinion that “several persons of better position and education had been engaged in misleading the negro population by inflammatory speeches or writings, telling them that they were wronged and oppressed, and inciting them to seek redress.”^[885]

There was also substantial evidence that these inciters had been planning and anticipating the outbreak for some time. One month prior to the rebellion Levien had written to several others, in his own words promising to write editorials “to shield you and them [Blacks] from the charge of anarchy and tumult that in a short time must follow these powerful demonstrations.”^[886] Eyre also contacted Colonial Secretary Edward Cardwell with evidence that Levien, Nathan, and others were “closely associated with George William Gordon in all these proceedings,” proving that they were both well aware of the impact their propaganda was having “on the negro mind” and had “designedly pursued them to the issue they expected.”^{[887], [888]}

Joyce’s work thus illustrates several important points. The Exeter Hall phenomenon is an excellent example of nineteenth-century moral idealism and empathy for suffering others expressed at a conscious level in terms of Christian religious ideas. Further, if Charles Dickens is to be believed, Exeter Hall was quite similar to the contemporary left, which typically ignores the wage-lowering and community-destroying effects of mass non-White migration on the native working class, particularly the White working class. It also illustrates how contemporary academic historians, some likely motivated by ethnic animosity toward traditional White majorities and acting similarly to the Jewish intellectuals discussed in *Culture of Critique*, are

committed to inducing guilt over the Western past among White people.^[889] To the extent that such campaigns are successful, they depend on pre-existing tendencies toward guilt and empathy that characterize an important subset of Western Europeans—tendencies deriving from the unique evolutionary history and culture of the West, as discussed elsewhere in this volume.

David Hackett Fischer on the “Second British Empire”

David Hackett Fischer’s *Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America* has shaped the way I see American history and much else.^[890] He provides a compelling account of how the four main British-derived groups (Puritans, distressed Cavaliers, Quakers, and Scots-Irish borderers) differed, and of their struggle for dominance in America. To me as an evolutionist, a major part of the attraction is that Fischer roots these cultural differences in the distant past. Thus, the tendencies of the two main groups, Puritans based in East Anglia and the Cavaliers in Southeast England, go back to the murky period of English pre-history. These groups (Puritans inclined to egalitarian individualism; Cavaliers inclined to aristocratic individualism) displayed very strong cultural differences which were likely influenced by ethnic-genetic differences, as discussed in previous chapters.

Fischer’s *Fairness and Freedom* continues comparative approach, this time comparing two different British-derived societies, New Zealand and the United States.^[891] The basic thesis is that the political culture of New Zealand is much more infused with “an abiding concern for fairness,”^[892] while the U.S. is more focused on an ideology of individual freedom. As will be seen, this section echoes the material on the Puritans and the antislavery movement in its emphasis on fairness and empathy for suffering others that came to characterize the treatment of the British colonies in the nineteenth century. Although he places less emphasis on egalitarianism, Fischer also describes New Zealand as highly egalitarian. The “Tall Poppy Syndrome,” which is quite similar to the Jante Laws of Scandinavian culture discussed in Chapter 8, is defined by envy and resentment of people who are “conspicuously successful, exceptionally gifted, or unusually creative.”^[893] “It sometimes became a more general attitude of outright hostility to any sort of excellence, distinction, or high achievement—especially achievement that requires mental effort, sustained industry, or applied intelligence. ... The possession of extraordinary gifts is perceived as unfair by others who lack them.”^[894]

The expression ‘Tall Poppy Syndrome’ originated in Australia but seems more characteristic of New Zealand. Successful people are called ‘poppies.’ This tendency is perhaps not as strong as it used to be, but, although some successful New Zealanders are accepted, “other bright and creative New Zealanders have been treated with cruelty by compatriots who appear to feel that there is something fundamentally unfair about better brains or creative gifts, and still more about a determination to use them.”^[895] Doubtless because of the same egalitarian tendencies, the New Zealand system encourages laziness and lack of achievement—workers insist that others slow down and not work hard. “Done by lunchtime” is the motto of a great many New Zealand workers.

Perhaps reflecting egalitarianism, Fischer claims that until the mid-twentieth century—and then doubtless only because of Western influence—there are no words for fairness in languages apart from English, Danish, Norwegian, and Frisian (and notably excluding German).^[896] Moreover, the words for *fair* and *fairness* have no Greek or Latin roots, but are nevertheless traceable to an Indo-European origin. The original Indo-European word meant “to be content,” later giving rise to the Gothic *fagrs*, meaning “pleasing to behold” and often connoting blond hair and fair complexion. It eventually came to mean something that could be agreed on by most parties—e.g., a fair price.

Unlike *Albion’s Seed*, where the focus is on deep, long-lasting (dating from the earliest record keeping) and quite possibly ethnic-genetic differences in explaining cultural variation, *Fairness and Freedom* provides an entirely cultural explanation for the development of a universalist sense of ethics of fairness in the West:

In early ethical usage, [words for fairness] tended to operate within tribes of Britons and Scandinavians, where they applied to freemen in good standing. Women, slaves, and strangers from other tribes were often excluded from fair treatment, and they bitterly resented it. The tribal uses of *fair* ... were full of historical irony. These ideas flourished on the far fringes of northwestern Europe among groups of proud, strong, violent, and predatory people who lived in hard environments, fought to the death for the means to life, and sometimes preyed on their own kin. Ideas of fairness and fair play developed as a way of keeping some of these habitual troublemakers from slaughtering each other even

to the extinction of the tribe. ...

Something fundamental changed in a second stage, when the folk cultures of Britain and Scandinavia began to grow into an ethic that embraced others beyond the tribe—and people of every rank and condition. This expansive tendency had its roots in universal values such as the Christian idea of the Golden Rule. That broader conception of fairness expanded again when it met the humanist ideas of the Renaissance, the universal spirit of the Enlightenment, the ecumenical spirit of the Evangelical Movement, and democratic revolutions in America and Europe.^[897]

Thus, beginning in only a northern subset of northwest Europeans, Fischer proposes that there was a series of completely cultural shifts beginning with Christianity and culminating (as Fischer later contends) in what I would see as the rather overwrought sense of fairness that now underlies the culture of the Western. Saying that “something changed” offers no explanation, but simply points to a set of proposed historical shifts. Fischer provides no further ideas on why these changes happened.

Fischer contends that fairness is much less important in American history compared to freedom. At present, *fairness* tends to be a buzzword among Democrats, while conservative thinkers at times reject the entire concept. Still, Fischer claims that “the frequency of the word *fairness* has been increasing in American usage during the twentieth century, though far below *freedom* and *free*. Even so, few Americans think of fairness as the organizing principle of their open society.”^[898] In England, the usage of *fairness* has been increasing steadily since 1800, while the usage of *liberty* has been in steady decline from a peak around 1780.

After briefly recounting the four main British-derived American groups described at length in *Albion's Seed*, Fischer describes the very different pattern in New Zealand. The immigrants to New Zealand came from various parts of England, but without strong cultural differences. They tended to be at least of the middling rank, some with aristocratic connections; most came with assistance from organizations who were keen to select on the basis of moral character and other traits. For example, a typical program required a letter from the prospective immigrant's vicar attesting that the immigrant was “among the most respectable of his class.”^[899] The Scots who migrated to Otago on the South Island are described as “the better educated and

religiously disposed of the lower and middle classes.”^[900] Perhaps reflecting these processes, the IQ of White New Zealanders is slightly above the White average. Two large studies performed in 1989 and 1997 found that the IQ of White New Zealanders to be 101 and 102 respectively.^[901]

According to Fischer, the basic difference between the U.S. and New Zealand is that the American colonists were treated horribly by the British (“six generations of American colonists were challenged by the British to fight for their rights.”^[902] Fischer notes that the Bill of Rights is a list of specific grievances against things the British had done to the American colonists from 1760–1775. Moreover, the economic model for the American colonies was designed to benefit England rather than the colonies. All this resulted in a powerful ideology of freedom.

On the other hand, New Zealand encountered the kinder, gentler British Empire of the mid-nineteenth century and later. The “Second Empire” as it developed in New Zealand was “highly principled and deeply Christian, with an elaborately developed sense of justice and equity. ... Their acts often fell short of their ideals. But there was a constancy of striving in their lives, and they planted the seeds of an ethical system that kept growing long after they were gone.”^[903]

Unlike in the American colonies, the British encouraged self-government in New Zealand and tried to protect the Maori natives. New Zealand did not have slaves, indentured servants, or plantation economies; there was no significant number of distressed cavaliers such as those who shaped the culture of the American South. By the nineteenth century, the British Empire rejected mercantilism aimed at benefiting England in favor of free trade. But the most important characteristic of the British Empire at the time of New Zealand colonization beginning in 1840 (at a time when Americans were conquering a continent at the expense of the natives) was a greater emphasis on social justice. Colonial administrators like Captain William Hobson (“a leader of high probity ... [who] recruited able and honorable men to serve in the colony”^[904] were concerned about justice and fairness—self-consciously trying to uphold a universalist morality.

Thus, we see a strong sense of “high-mindedness”^[905] and crusading moral universalism taking hold in New Zealand. Bishop George Augustus Selwyn, who became Anglican Bishop of New Zealand in 1841, was “a high-principled idealist” with a “broad ecumenical version of Christianity which in New Zealand became linked to an idea of racial equality between Pakeha

[i.e., Whites] and Maoris”; Selwyn was “a fierce defender of Maori rights.”^[906]

The contemporary culture of White guilt and idealization of non-Whites seen throughout the West has resulted in a secular-based moralism that ignores Maori cannibalism and their culture preoccupied with intra-Maori warfare. College campuses have become hotbeds of positive attitudes toward Maoris. A military officer refers with contempt to contemporary academic “maoriolatry.”^[907] On the other hand, the Maoris themselves have realized that their culture left something to be desired. A nineteenth-century chief asked, “What did we do before the Pakeha came? We fought, we fought continuously.” In the end, a great many Maoris doubtless viewed the coming of White colonists in positive terms.

This high-mindedness and commitment to fairness can be seen in a much stronger tradition of socialist tendencies in New Zealand than in America. For example, “New Zealand after 1891 began a sustained program to redistribute its lands,”^[908] not by confiscating large estates but by government purchases when they came on the market. Fischer documents a stronger concern in New Zealand for fairness for all citizens—not without a struggle, of course, but more successfully than in the U.S. “In general, New Zealand had remarkably little in the way of hard-right, hard-core conservatism that was stronger in Britain, the United States, and Canada. ... [Even the most conservative elements] supported women’s suffrage and other Progressive measures.”^[909]

The socialist bent of New Zealand can be seen by its response to the Great Depression. Whereas the philosophy of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal is described as “helping people help themselves,”^[910] New Zealand instituted direct payments to people who were suffering from the economic collapse. These policies were intended to “put people to work and were also meant to establish a principle of fairness, equity, and social justice.”^[911] During the 1930s there was a large increase in public ownership of banking, steel, coal mining and airlines so that by 1939, 25 percent of New Zealand workers worked for the government; in the U.S., it was 8 percent. However, there was no attempt to get equality of classes. (Fischer depicts Sweden as more radically socialist than New Zealand—see Chapter 8.) Rather, the goal was “to support an ideal of individual autonomy and individual empowerment.”^[912]

In the U.S., on the other hand, Roosevelt opposed alms for the poor: “The Federal Government must and shall quit this business of relief. ... I am not willing that the vitality of our people be further sapped by the giving of cash. ... We must preserve not only the bodies of the unemployed from destitution,

but also their self-respect, their self-reliance.”^[913] The American Social Security system is the only program for old age support where funds came out of the current wages of workers. New Zealand created a national health system in 1938 that is a mix of public subsidies and private payments. As in the U.S., there was opposition from physicians’ groups, but compromise was possible. This has not been the case in the U.S. apart from the Medicare program for seniors—until the recent, extremely controversial passage of President Obama’s Affordable Care Act.

Another indication of the leftist bent of New Zealand politics has been anti-nuclear activism. In the 1980s and ‘90s, New Zealand unilaterally adopted policies opposed to nuclear weapons, much to the chagrin of the Reagan and Thatcher governments. In the 1990s, the conservatives joined in, sending a warship to the French atomic weapons test site. But New Zealand relented and moved toward collective security, realizing that a small country cannot go it alone. The Clinton administration learned to live with New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy. Fischer interprets this as an example of its “continuing attachment to ideas of justice, equity, and fairness in the world.”^[914]

On the other hand, notions of individual liberty are relatively weak in New Zealand. A Bill of Rights was finally adopted in 1990, but unlike the U.S. Bill of Rights, it incorporated “human rights” (including “natural justice” and explicit assertions of procedural and institutional fairness) rather than, as in the U.S., rights against state power that were so much on the minds of the U.S. Founding Fathers. Most New Zealanders are hardly aware of their Bill of Rights, while in the U.S., the Bill of Rights has high psychological salience to most Americans.

Free Speech in the United States and New Zealand

In the contemporary West, the U.S. is unique in having the First Amendment protecting free speech. However, only a slim majority of the Supreme Court is committed to rejecting “hate speech” laws that would curtail what can be said in public discussions of race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, and there are strong voices in the legal community and among activists clamoring for restrictions on speech.

New Zealand law protects free speech but in recent years the law has aimed at restricting speech related to immigration, race, and ethnicity. A 1993 law states that it is “unlawful for anyone to publish or distribute threatening,

abusive or insulting words likely to excite hostility or bring into contempt any group of persons who may be coming to or in New Zealand on the ground of the colour, race or ethnic origins of that group of persons.”^[915] Conviction would be a civil judgement, but it is a criminal offence with possible jail sentence if such speech can be shown to be intentionally aimed at causing “ill-will or hostility to the people targeted.”

Given this fairness-freedom divide between the U.S. and New Zealand, perhaps it’s no accident that Jeremy Waldron, a prominent proponent of restrictions on speech, was born in New Zealand and is now a law professor at New York University and an adjunct faculty appointment at Victoria University in New Zealand. Waldron argues that free speech fundamentally collides with fairness in contemporary societies, and therefore advocates ending First Amendment protections in the U.S.^[916] Waldron focuses solely on the hurt feelings of the targets of speech, arguing that some examples of racially tinged speech impinge on the ability of racial and sexual minorities to live dignified lives. Waldron would ban statements about group characteristics that I regard as well-supported by empirical data. Waldron claims that any departures from liberal orthodoxy—e.g., that all races have the same natural talents and abilities and that multiculturalism benefits everyone—are so obviously false that they can easily be banned without any loss to legitimate debate. Waldron claims that “in fact, the fundamental debate about race is over—won; finished.” Race is “no longer a live issue.” This sounds more like the pronouncements of a Chief Inquisitor than someone interested in the truth about human differences.

In fact, the debate about race is not over, although the academic world can accurately be characterized as a moral community of the left in the sense of Jonathan Haidt^[917]—a moral community that rigorously polices research conflicting with the dogmas of racial egalitarianism. Researchers, such as Arthur Jensen, Richard Lynn, and J. Philippe Rushton who attempt to publish findings on race differences find themselves socially shunned and quickly learn that there are steep barriers to publication in mainstream academic journals and no mainstream grant support for their research.

Research on racial differences is relevant to fairness because I would argue, as many have, that affirmative action policies that discriminate against Whites are inherently unfair to Whites because they limit career opportunities for Whites who cannot be blamed for the failures of other groups. Critically, advocates of such policies do not take into account real differences in ability

between the races and, without any evidence, they attribute the relative success of Whites to the murky notion of “White privilege”—even as some non-White groups (e.g., Chinese) perform better on average than Whites academically and have occupations and incomes that place them above the White average. From this perspective, banning free speech on race on the basis of fairness to some groups fails to consider unfairness to members of the White majority.

Waldron’s call to restrict speech in the name of fairness reinforces Fischer’s thesis, given that Waldron is from New Zealand and values what he thinks of as fairness far more than individual freedom. But it also illustrates the point that in some cases at least there is a very real conflict between fairness and freedom that continues to play out in the contemporary world. There is indeed a strong tradition of free speech in the U.S., but there is no reason to suppose that this will continue into the future. This is particularly obvious given the racially polarized environment that has resulted from massive non-White immigration and the fact that non-Whites are clients of the left which is now actively promoting censorship on issues related to race and immigration. And in any case, as noted above, banning utterances about race in the name of fairness is internally inconsistent given that such utterances are likely to result in policies that are unfair to Whites.

THE AFFECTIVE REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND: AN ETHNIC HYPOTHESIS

An ethnic hypothesis proposes that the eighteenth century saw the emergence of an ethos of egalitarianism that reflected the evolutionary past of important segments of the British population: the genetic heritage of primordial hunter-gatherers, and quite possibly selection after the incursions of Yamnaya-related ancestry deriving from the Pontic Steppes (reviewed in Chapter 1–3). As noted in Chapter 3, egalitarianism is a notable trait of hunter-gatherer groups around the world. Such groups have mechanisms that prevent despotism and ensure reciprocity, with punishment ranging from physical harm to shunning and ostracism.^[918] In the present chapter, the strong egalitarian trends that typified the eighteenth-century affective revolution were emphasized as well as David Hackett Fischer’s description of the strong trends toward an egalitarian ethic in New Zealand during the “Second Empire” in the nineteenth century. As noted in Chapter 3, hunter-gatherer societies are moral communities in which people are closely scrutinized to note deviations from social norms; violators are shunned, ridiculed, and

ostracized—an important characteristic of Puritan culture described in Chapter 6. Decisions, including decisions to sanction a person, are by consensus. Adult males treat each other as equals.

These features are characteristic of Quakers and other groups discussed here. The hunter-gatherer ethic implies that one's moral reputation becomes the most important aspect of ingroup status. Individuals maintain their position in society by subscribing to its moral norms and not dissenting from the group consensus. Fundamentally, the movement to end slavery operated by defining the abolitionist movement as a moral ingroup psychologically analogous to the moral communities of hunter-gatherer ingroups discussed in Chapter 3. Those who continued to advocate the slave trade and slavery were shunned as moral pariahs. The moral basis of the antislavery ingroup was firmly grounded in genuine empathic responses to the suffering of the slaves. These natural reactions to the suffering of others by a substantial percentage of the population meant that the moral ingroup was far more than an artificial or arbitrary creation; an arbitrary ingroup would not have been emotionally compelling. It is interesting in this regard that, as noted above, proponents of slavery routinely paid homage to the moral imperative of abolitionism. Unable to create a plausible moral ingroup, they opted for arguments based on necessity or the good of the Empire.

The logic connecting these tendencies to the egalitarian-individualist hunter-gather model is that like all humans in a dangerous and difficult world, hunter-gatherers (or the groups resulting from selection in northwest Europe) need to develop cohesive, cooperative ingroups. But rather than base group cohesion on known kinship relations, the prototypical egalitarian-individualist groups of northwest Europe are based on moral reputation, trust, and ingroup consensus. Egalitarian-individualists create moral-ideological communities in which those who violate public trust, ingroup consensus, and other manifestations of the moral order are shunned, ostracized, and exposed to public humiliation—a fate that would have resulted in evolutionary death during the harsh ecological period of the Ice Age.

Like the Puritans, the Quakers stem from a distinctive, ethnically based British sub-culture originating in Scandinavia.^{[\[919\]](#)} The predominant region for Quakers in England was the North Midlands colonized by Viking invaders beginning toward the end of the eighth century. They prized individual ownership of houses and fields, and were seen by others as independent and egalitarian, dressing alike and eating together. “Their houses were sparsely

furnished, and their culture made a virtue of simplicity and plain speech.^[920] They tended to be relatively poor farmers working poor, rocky soil. Historically, they were dominated by an oppressive non-resident elite; they made virtues of simplicity and hard work in a harsh environment.^[921]

The Ethnic Origins and the Decline of the Aristocratic Ethos in Britain

Finally, while an egalitarian ethic became firmly entrenched in the eighteenth century, prior to this time aristocratic elites dominated British society with elitist, hierarchical values; this system was still largely entrenched politically, with the result that popular attitudes on slavery did not result in passage of legislation ending the slave trade until 1807 and slavery itself in 1833. The decline of this social structure began in the seventeenth century with the rise of the Puritans; the purpose of this chapter has been to describe the rise of the egalitarian consciousness and morally defined ingroups in the eighteenth century.

Fischer claims that the aristocratic culture that was in the process of being displaced also appears to have its roots in the ethnic subculture of the German West Saxons reflecting the aristocratic individualist strand of European cultural influence.^[922] This group immigrated to Southwestern England in the sixth century where they became an endogamous, intermarried elite. Elites had large estates with lower-middle class *servi* and *villani*—essentially slaves, dating at least from the ninth century. They reproduced this aristocratic culture in the American South: it was characterized by “deep and pervasive inequalities, by a staple agriculture and rural settlement patterns, by powerful oligarchies of large landowners with Royalist politics and an Anglican faith.”^[923] Relationships were relatively egalitarian within the group (aristocratic individualism), but the society as a whole was highly hierarchical.

The differences between the south of England and the industrial Midlands persisted well into the nineteenth century, with “Tory England” in the south devoted to agriculture, while “Nonconformist and usually Liberal England” in the south-west and industrial Midlands was characterized by “more diverse and competitive economic conditions, non-agricultural employment, immigration (especially from the ‘Celtic fringe’), rapid population growth, and urbanization.”^[924]

While Fischer’s analysis convincingly portrays an aristocratic culture

centered in southwest England, this culture may well also have been influenced by the Norman invaders of the eleventh century given that “the Conquest annihilated England’s ruling class, physically and genetically. Some 4000–5000 thegns were eliminated by battle, exile or dispossession in the biggest transfer of property in English history. ... The last English earl, Watheof, was beheaded in 1076. ... Most simply sank in society.”^[925]

Nevertheless, the Normans, although originating in Scandinavia, clearly instituted a similar aristocratic culture in their new domains—oppressive and hierarchical, and far more centrally controlled than the culture of the Saxons. “Conquest meant wholesale national degradation.”^[926]

CONCLUSION

There is a clear continuity between the moral communities that emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the contemporary world. The logic of moral universalism based on empathic concern is now ubiquitous, rationalizing everything from wars of liberation against oppressive dictators in far off lands to alleviating the suffering of impoverished Third-World migrants and animals. Empathic concern is a lynchpin for immigration and refugee policy, ethnic relations, poverty, and much else.

Although these tendencies toward egalitarianism and moral universalism were presumably adaptive within the small societies that northwestern Europeans evolved in (what evolutionists term the “environment of evolutionary adaptedness”), they are proving to be maladaptive in the modern world where empathy and altruism can be manipulated by powerful elites to serve their own material interests.

A particular feature of the modern world bears mentioning in this regard: although the antislavery movement beginning in the late eighteenth century certainly took advantage of newspapers to spread their message, the reach and power of the mass media are far greater today. Because of the power of explicit processing, media messages can be used to frame events in a way that evokes empathy and therefore rationalizes actions that may cynically serve the interests of those who control media corporations.

For example, in the run-up to the war in Iraq which began in 2003, there were many news presentations and opinion pieces which presented Saddam Hussein as an evil villain, oppressing his own people, gassing the Kurds, engaging in bloody reprisals against the Shiites, and poised to use weapons of mass destruction on the United States. The empathy evoked by this media

promotion of suffering Iraqis and endangered Americans may have been real, but it is highly doubtful that empathy was the guiding emotion of the neoconservatives and other pro-Israel Lobbyists most responsible for promoting the war in the media and in the halls of Congress and in key parts of the national security establishment.^{[\[927\]](#)}

The manipulation of the culture of empathy to attain goals of power and money is always a real possibility. But the evidence presented here is that the antislavery movement as it developed in the late eighteenth century certainly did not in general have such ulterior motives and that the individual actors exhibited genuine altruism motivated by empathy (influenced at the level of individual differences by standing on the personality trait of Love/Nurturance), by published images of suffering slaves, and ideologies of moral universalism.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL COMMUNITIES

Human rationality consists largely of separating intellectual argument from personality attributions about moral character. Our difficulty in making this separation suggests that political, religious, and pseudo-scientific ideologies have been part of moralistic self-display for a very long time.

Geoffrey Miller, The Mating Mind^[928]

This book has emphasized that the liberal strain of Western culture stems ultimately from European individualism which in turn can be found at the very origins of the European peoples. As noted in several places, a fundamental aspect of individualism is that group cohesion is based not on kinship but on reputation—most importantly in recent centuries, a moral reputation as capable, honest, trustworthy and fair. Reputation as a military leader was central to Indo-European warrior societies where leaders' reputations were critical to being able to recruit followers (Chapter 2). And the northern hunter-gatherer groups discussed in Chapter 3 developed egalitarian, exogamous customs and a high level of social complexity in which interaction with non-relatives and strangers was the norm; again, reputation was critical to remaining in the group.

The reputation-based moral communities of the West thus have deep historical roots both in Indo-European culture and in hunter-gatherer culture. In Chapter 5 I noted that Christian Europe had become a moral community based on Christian religious beliefs rather than ethnic or national identity. Moreover, the abbots and prelates of the medieval Church, the Puritan and Quaker religious leaders of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the liberal intellectuals of the nineteenth centuries discussed in later chapters carried on the primeval tendency to create moral communities as a source of

identity. Finally, as discussed below and in Chapter 9, such moral communities have come to define the contemporary culture of the West.

These moral communities are indigenous products of the culture of the West—products of Western culture in the same way that kinship-based clans, cousin marriage, sequestering women, and the harems of elite males are products of the people of the Middle East.

My view is that the moral communities observed at the origins of Western history and surfacing recurrently in later centuries tapped into a pre-existing tendency among individualists to create such communities as a force for cohesion that does not rely on kinship relations. Particularly important since the seventeenth century have been the egalitarian moral communities based on a hunter-gatherer ethic whose evolutionary origins are discussed in Chapter 3. Beginning after World War II and accelerating greatly in the 1960s and thereafter, these moral communities have been defined by the intellectual left which is bent on dispossessing European-derived peoples from territories they have dominated for hundreds, or in the case of Europe, many thousands of years.

Moral communities are pervasive throughout the institutional structures of the West; however, because of their widespread influence, moral communities are particularly noteworthy in the media and the academic world. For example, whereas mainstream social science had been relatively free of morally based ingroup-outgroup thinking prior to World War II, such thinking has had dramatic effects on the social sciences and humanities in later decades, to the point that academic departments and scholarly associations in these areas can be accurately characterized as “tribal moral communities” in the sense of Jonathan Haidt.^[929] This is most obviously the case in areas such as social psychology, sociology, and ethnic and gender studies.

The result has been that academic research communities and the media rigorously police research and commentary that conflict with racial egalitarianism or promote the interests of European-derived peoples, and these attitudes have been internalized by a great many White people. Researchers such as Arthur Jensen, Richard Lynn, J. Philippe Rushton, and Ralph Scott who attempt to publish findings on race differences or on public policies related to race find themselves socially ostracized, and they quickly learn that there are steep barriers to publication in mainstream academic journals and no mainstream grant support for their research.

For example, when scholarly articles contravening the sacred values of the tribe are submitted to academic journals, reviewers and editors suddenly become extremely “rigorous”—demanding more experimental controls and other changes in methodology. Such “scientific skepticism” regarding research that one dislikes for deeper reasons was a major theme of *The Culture of Critique* in discussions of the work of Franz Boas, Richard C. Lewontin, Stephen Jay Gould, and the Frankfurt School, to name a few.^[930]

One result of this academic reign of terror has been that conservatives often self-select to go into other areas that are not so compromised, such as the hard sciences or computing; there is also active discrimination against conservative job candidates and Ph.D. applicants.^[931] The system is therefore self-replicating.

SOCIAL IDENTITY PROCESSES AS AN ADAPTATION FOR MORAL COMMUNITIES

In previous work I have argued for an evolved basis for social identity processes.^[932] People are prone to creating positively valued ingroups in which the outgroup is negatively valued—a human universal. The negatively evaluated outgroup need not be defined by kinship—cultural categories, such as “likes modern art” vs. “hates modern art” or if groups have different-colored uniforms (as at sporting events) are able to produce positive attitudes towards ingroup members and negative attitudes toward outgroup members. Because social identity processes are not necessarily defined by kinship, Western peoples are particularly prone to these processes.

William Graham Sumner was a Darwinian anthropologist whose work was mentioned in Chapter 6 as typical of the intellectual elite of the late nineteenth–early twentieth century that fed into the movement for ethnic defense leading to the 1924 immigration restriction law. He expressed the essentials of social identity processes as they play out in tribal societies as follows:

Loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without—all grow together, common products of the same situation. It is sanctified by connection with religion. Men of an others-group are outsiders with whose ancestors the ancestors of the we-group waged war. ... Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and

looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn.^[933]

The only difference from contemporary research into social identity is that the references to ancestors of the ingroup and the outgroup need not apply. Sumner's quote would thus not apply to the West where the important historical groups discussed here are not based on ancestry but on being a member of a moral community.

Social identity research conducted in Western societies shows that ancestry of ingroup and outgroup is not important for people having positive attitudes about their ingroup and negative attitudes about outgroups.^[934] Within the group there are higher levels of cohesiveness, positive emotional regard, and camaraderie, while relationships outside the group can be hostile and distrustful. The tendency for humans to place themselves in social categories often has powerful emotional consequences, including guilt from violating group norms, empathy for ingroup members, hatred and discrimination against the outgroup, and increased self-esteem because ingroup members see themselves as a member of a superior group. For moral communities, this implies that ingroup members see themselves as morally superior and as acting from ethically pure motives while seeing outgroup members as evil, morally depraved, lacking all human decency, etc.

Attesting to the lack of importance of kinship for creating group conflict, ingroup favoritism and discrimination against outgroups occur even in so-called "*minimal group experiments*"—i.e., experiments where groups are constructed using random labels for ingroup and outgroup. Ingroup favoritism and discrimination against outgroups thus occur even if there are no conflicts of interest between the groups or indeed any social interaction at all. Even when the experimental subjects are aware that the groups are composed randomly, subjects attempt to maximize the difference between the ingroup and the outgroup, and they do this even when such a strategy means they would not maximize their own group's rewards. The important goal seems to be to outcompete the other group. These studies attest to the power of "groupness" in the human mind—the tendency for even the most randomly constructed groups to elicit discrimination against outgroups.

My literature review concluded that social identity processes are a psychological adaptation (i.e., they are an evolved result of natural selection)

designed for between-group competition.^[935] For example, social identity processes have been found in a very wide range of societies, whether or not these societies are based on extended kinship. And they can be found very early in life—even before there is any specific knowledge about the outgroup. Moreover, cognitive processing of ingroups and outgroups is automatic—not the result of conscious reflection, but more like an innate psychological reflex akin to blinking in response to a sudden burst of intense light.

Another indication of the evolutionary origin of social identity processes is that these tendencies toward positive evaluation of the ingroup and devaluation of the outgroup are exacerbated by real conflicts of interest between groups.^[936] In other words, even though relatively mild versions of these phenomena occur in minimal groups, they are much stronger where there are real conflicts of interests. This is important because psychological adaptations typically show graded responses to environmental context. For example, most people tend to have natural, reflexive fears of things that were dangerous over evolutionary time—things such as snakes, spiders, and heights—whereas this does not tend to occur with lethal modern inventions like guns or nuclear radiation. However, reflexive fear is likely to be less extreme if the feared object is caged in a zoo or if one is a safe distance from the threat. Responses are thus graded according to the intensity of the provoking event.

Recall in Chapter 6 that millenarian attitudes, while very characteristic of American politics, tend to go into dormancy, only to be resurrected in times of presumed peril or crisis—“the expansionist period, the Civil War, the First World War.”^[937]

Like a recessive gene, in the right situation [messianic moral crusading based on constructing a morally defined ingroup] could become dominant. In the years preceding American entry into each of the great wars, there was first a period of passionate non-involvement. This reaction no doubt was perfectly natural, but there was a special moral tone to the expressions of political leaders; the wars, it seemed, were destined to catch the righteous nation in the old web. Eventually, however, the trumpets of Zion began to be heard, and a millennialist kind of enthusiasm was generated. The great wars of our history have all to a considerable extent been regarded as Armageddon—which surely

was near. After the war had been won, and evil conquered, a permanent era of peace and prosperity would begin.^[938]

In contemporary times, one thinks of the wars in Iraq and Libya, advertised in part as moral crusades to remove evil dictators, Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi respectively, and to install a democratic regime that would ensure a bright future for these countries. (In both cases, the wars have not quelled previously existing ethnic and religious conflict.) In the quote from Tuveson, notice that the political rhetoric of both the isolationist period prior to the war and the war itself is couched in moral terms and relies on creating morally defined ingroups and outgroups, as in the period prior to World War II when isolationists dominated public discussion (but not Roosevelt Administration policy) prior to Pearl Harbor.

Moreover, our contemporary political rhetoric is saturated with attributions of moral superiority, and increasingly we are seeing this rhetoric being linked to physical harassment and even violence. Because the left has attained the moral high ground in the media and in education (from elementary school through university), moral communities of the left are particularly powerful. It is not at all uncommon to see attributions of moral depravity hurled at conservatives and particularly at members of the racist right.

Despite the current regime of relatively low-level harassment and violence, if history is any guide, we are still mainly in the phase of non-violent conflict. Condemnations of harassment and physical violence are still common among establishment figures of both left and right. However, this phase will likely be followed by assertions that any and all means may be undertaken to destroy the morally depraved enemy, including violence, with the stated goal of establishing a permanent reign of peace, love, and ethnic harmony. Indeed, there have already been numerous instances of violence by self-styled antifa groups.^[939] This utopian future will be advertised in defiance of everything we know about human nature and the costs of multiculturalism, particularly the effects of multiculturalism on increasing between-group conflict.^[940]

THE ROLE OF EMPATHY IN MORAL COMMUNITIES: ALTRUISM—AND PATHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM

In a later section of this chapter on race differences in personality, I describe the personality system of Love/Nurturance and note that it is stronger in European culture than other human cultures (see also Chapter 3).

Briefly, Love/Nurturance is an evolved system linked to specific brain regions coding for positive feelings in response to being loved and nurturing others; empathy—which results in personal distress at seeing the suffering of others, especially loved ones—is a central emotion of the Love/Nurturance system. The extreme ends of individual differences in the Love/Nurturance system are linked to sociopathy at the low end (callous unconcern regarding the feelings of others, lack of remorse or guilt, cruelty) to dependency disorder (overly prone to needing social approval and love) and pathological altruism (overly prone to guilt and empathy to the point of self-sacrificing, self-harming behavior) at the high end.^[941] Because of its role in cementing family relationships and nurturing children, women are higher on the Love/Nurturance system and thus more prone to empathy than men.

Whereas sociopaths are unconcerned with receiving affection or being liked by others, people who are at least moderately high on the Love/Nurturance system value being liked by others. This tendency to want to be liked can interfere with rational judgments. The default mode of human reasoning is socially embedded in social interactions,^[942] and social predilections, such as wanting to be liked, may prevent rational assessments of costs and benefits of actions. Thus people may make rational judgments based on data or past experience that enabling more refugees to come into their city will lessen social homogeneity as well as strain social services and the school system. But they may still publicly approve a refugee program because they would be more likely to get social approval from friends and neighbors in their face-to-face world. Indeed, they may go out of their way to advertise their attitude—what is now termed “virtue signaling.”

For individualists (i.e., people who are less prone to negative attitudes toward outgroups and strangers), being on the high end of empathy can easily lead to a pathological form of altruism where high costs can be incurred with no corresponding benefit. Pathological altruism is generally defined as focusing on others’ needs to the detriment of one’s own needs.^[943] Such altruism, motivated by what one might label “hyper-empathy,” is more common among females—which fits with females generally being higher on the Love/Nurturance system.^[944] It can lead to pathological consequences for both the altruist and the intended beneficiary, as in the phenomenon of co-dependence where one person’s altruism facilitates maladaptive behaviors in another person, such as drug addiction by being overly solicitous and tolerant of another’s self-destructive behavior.

Normal levels of wanting to be liked as well as pathological altruism often involve a sense of self-righteousness, which can be translated as a sense of moral superiority that advertises one's good reputation within a community defined, as prototypical European groups are, not by kinship but by conforming or exceeding the moral standards of the community. As noted above, such expressions of moralistic self-righteousness have a long history in Western societies and are very salient in contemporary political rhetoric.

An example of how self-righteous virtue signaling works at the highest levels of government (and also illustrating the gap between elites and the rest of society on critical issues like migration), can be seen in the comments of David Goodhart, a liberal journalist based in the U.K., on migration to the U.K.:

There has been a huge gap between our ruling elite's views and those of ordinary people on the street. This was brought home to me when dining at an Oxford college and the eminent person next to me, a very senior civil servant, said: 'When I was at the Treasury, I argued for the most open door possible to immigration [because] I saw it as my job to maximise global welfare, not national welfare.' I was even more surprised when the notion was endorsed by another guest, one of the most powerful television executives in the country. He, too, felt global welfare was paramount and that he had a greater obligation to someone in Burundi than to someone in Birmingham. ... [The political class] failed to control the inflow ... in the interests of existing citizens.^[945]

An evolutionist can only marvel at the completely unhinged—pathological—altruism on display here, given that the people making these policies are presumably native White British themselves. Countries whose policies ignore the good of their own people are surely headed for disaster. Such altruism is nothing but a recipe for evolutionary extinction.

As noted in Chapter 7, this overweening concern with people of different races living in far off lands at the expense of one's own people was characteristic of many nineteenth-century English intellectuals, particularly those associated with Exeter Hall, who exhibited what Charles Dickens described as "platform sympathy for the Black and ... platform indifference to our own countrymen."^[946] In his novel *Bleak House*, serialized in 1852–53, Dickens portrayed such sentiments in the character of Mrs. Jellyby, whose

“handsome eyes had a curious habit of seeming to look a long way off. As if ... they could see nothing nearer than Africa.”^[947] Mrs. Jellyby neglected those around her, including her daughter, her thoughts directed instead towards the fictitious African possession of Borrioboola-Gha and her idealistic plans for its development.

It is well-known that massive non-White immigration has had negative effects most of all on the traditional, White working class of Western societies, while wealthier Whites can escape the problems brought about by immigration by moving to other neighborhoods—the phenomenon of White flight. They also tend to have jobs, such as in journalism, that have not been impacted by immigration, although visas for workers in technical areas are increasingly common. However, contemporary liberal-minded elites throughout the West are indifferent or even dismissive of the negative effects of immigration on the White working class in terms of lowered wages,^[948] lessened community cohesion and involvement,^[949] and deteriorating public schools. As noted, in Mrs. Jellyby’s case, this included neglecting her own children—also characteristic of contemporary liberals who typically fail to think seriously about the effects of mass non-White migration on the long-term prospects of their own children as a minority in a majority non-White society.

Such expressions of high-mindedness are attempts to fit into a moral community as defined by the media and accepted by their peers. Because the left dominates the moral high ground, expressing empathy for the native Whites, especially the White working class, makes anyone with such ideas into a moral pariah, as would advocating for their interests, with likely negative effects on career prospects. Indeed, expressions of White identity and especially having a sense of White interests have been condemned by establishment media and academic figures as illustrating the lowest form of moral depravity.

Of course, the motives involved in such cases may involve more than empathy for suffering others. While these elite Whites may feel genuine empathy for suffering others in foreign lands to the point of wanting to inundate the West with them, they are also in effect buttressing their status in the morally defined ingroup. They may even be attempting to be “more moral than thou”—competitive virtue signaling—by out-empathizing others in the group. And whether consciously or unconsciously, they may be aware of severe costs if they fail to conform to the norms of their moral community—

as well as the benefits of conforming.

As expected given the above-noted sex differences in empathy, women are more prone to pathological altruism than men—the prototype being the long-suffering wife who continues to nurture an abusive, alcoholic husband. Pathologically altruistic people respond very strongly to images of suffering refugees, immigrants, and other non-Whites. And as noted regarding empathy, there are specific brain regions that are activated when a subject feels sympathy for others. Indeed, Williams Syndrome, a genetic disorder, is characterized by being overly trusting and sympathetic.

The conviction of self-righteousness characteristic of pathologically altruistic people need not be rational:

What feels like a conscious life-affirming moral choice—*my life will have meaning if I help others*—will be greatly influenced by the strength of an unconscious and involuntary mental sensation that tells me that this decision is “correct.” It will be this same feeling that will tell you the “rightness” of giving food to starving children in Somalia, doing every medical test imaginable on a clearly terminal patient It helps to see this feeling of knowing as analogous to other bodily sensations over which we have no direct control. ^[950]

In other words, the sensations of rightness and nobility act as psychological reflexes, and they are so pleasurable that people are inclined to seek them in their own right and without regard to facts or the long-run consequences to themselves.

Talk to an insistent know-it-all who refuses to consider contrary opinions and you get a palpable sense of how the feeling of knowing can create a mental state akin to addiction. ... Imagine the profound effect of feeling certain that you have ultimate answers. ... Relinquishing such strongly felt personal beliefs would require undoing or lessening major connections with the overwhelmingly seductive pleasure-reward circuitry. Think of such a shift of opinion as producing the same type of physiological changes as withdrawing from drugs, alcohol, or cigarettes. ^[951]

Feelings of moral righteousness may thus be pleasurable and lead to

addiction. “Sanctimony, or a sense of righteous outrage, can feel so intense and delicious that many people actively seek to return to it, again and again.”^[952]

The pleasure of knowing, with subjective certainty, that you are *right* and your opponents are deeply, despicably *wrong*. Or, that your method of helping others is so purely motivated and correct that all criticism can be dismissed with a shrug, along with any contradicting evidence.^[953]

This type of sanctimoniousness is, of course, particularly common among the people labeled “Social Justice Warriors.” These are the people screaming “racist,” “misogynist,” “white supremacist,” etc. at any seeming violation of the norms of the moral communities of the left. And, because of the cultural hegemony of the left, such people can often be seen on social media (and in op-eds in the mainstream media) expressing their moral righteousness—a moral righteousness that fits with or extends the boundaries of the cultural left.

Another aspect of this is competitive altruism or competitive virtue signaling. Given that expressions of moral righteousness are typically communicated in a social setting and are aimed at solidifying or enhancing one’s reputation within a group, there may be competition for ever more extreme expressions of self-righteousness—even among people who are not biologically inclined to be high on the Love/Nurturance system. Extreme expressions of moral righteousness are not only addicting, they may also raise one’s status in a social group, just as it’s common for religious people to express “holier than thou” sentiments. Strongly religious people compete to be most virtuous in their local church. On the left, we see vegan fanatics shunning vegans who even talk to people who eat meat or eat in restaurants where meat is served—even family members. I imagine there is a dynamic within antifa groups—the shock troops of the establishment’s views on race and migration—where people who do not condone violence or are unwilling to crack heads themselves are ostracized or at least have much less status.

The result is a “feed forward” process in which the poles of political discourse move ever farther apart. For example, well-publicized attacks on Confederate statues have quickly morphed into attacks on Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and Christopher Columbus. Sympathy among liberals for granting amnesty to illegal immigrants has morphed into calls by

prominent Democrats to abolish the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE), make border crossing legal, and give them health care, driver's licenses, voting rights, and ultimately citizenship. Inviting anyone remotely associated with conservative ideas—much less the racist Right—to give a talk at a college campus has morphed from a tolerated rarity to a context for angry protests, rioting, injuries to conservatives, and damage to property.

Indeed, I suggest that this competitive virtue signaling is a major cause of the increasing polarization that we see in the United States and throughout the West in the age of social media. A Pew Research Center survey on changes in U.S. political culture from 1994–2017 found that the increasing divide between Republicans and Democrats, especially on immigration and race, was much more due to the median views of Democrats shifting left.^[954]

Nevertheless, a theoretically similar phenomenon exists on the right as, for example, when individuals condemn others for being insufficiently militant or ideologically pure. However, because the left dominates the cultural landscape, such competitive virtue signaling has had most of its effects on the left. Such competitive virtue signaling from both the left and the right is highly characteristic of the social dynamics of social media sites and journalism.

People on the right face the danger of “doxxing,” having their identity and personal information made public. Hosts of shows in the mainstream media may have to cope with losing sponsors and hence their livelihood; e.g., as of March, 2019, Fox News host Tucker Carlson had lost around 30 sponsors, mainly because of his comments on immigration.^[955] Or people may fear losing their job as a result of a phone call to their place of employment by a self-described “civil rights” organization such as the Southern Poverty Law Center or the Anti-Defamation League. This may well be why it is the left that has become more extreme in recent decades, whereas far too many on the right attempt to mollify their leftist critics by knuckling under to their moral righteousness.

The cultural domination of the left has meant that certain views are off-limits for all but the most daring. Thus, media sites like *Breitbart* and *The Daily Caller*, while definitely to the right of the mainstream media, avoid explicit advocacy of White identity and interests. Such constraints are much less apparent on the left, with the result that the left continues to get more and more extreme in their views. As I write, views on immigration noted above

and on abortion (making abortion legal up until or even shortly after birth) that used to be virtually non-existent among Democrats are increasingly being espoused by mainstream Democrat politicians and pundits.

A critical consequence of this is racial polarization. White Americans have been shifting toward the Republican Party—the last Democrat president to get a majority of White votes was Lyndon Johnson in 1964. In general, this is an expression of implicit Whiteness (discussed below), as non-White groups coalesce in the Democratic Party. The point here is that such trends are likely to increase and polarization become more severe.

CONTROLLING ETHNOCENTRISM: IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSING

As noted in Chapter 5, psychological research indicates two different types of psychological processing: implicit and explicit processing. These modes of processing may be contrasted on a number of dimensions.^[956] Implicit processing is automatic, effortless, relatively fast, and involves parallel processing (i.e., processing going on independently in different parts of the brain) of large amounts of information; it characterizes the modules described by evolutionary psychologists. Explicit processing is the opposite of implicit processing: conscious, controllable, effortful, relatively slow, and involves serial processing of relatively small amounts of information in a sequential manner (e.g., performing the steps of solving a math problem). Explicit processing is involved in the operation of the mechanisms of general intelligence^[957] as well as controlling emotional states and action tendencies (such as anger or frustration tending lead to aggression).^[958]

As noted in Chapter 5, religious beliefs are able to motivate behavior because of the ability of explicit representations of religious thoughts (e.g., the traditional Catholic teaching of eternal punishment in Hell as a result of mortal sin) to control sub-cortical modular mechanisms (e.g., sexual desire). In other words, the affective states and action tendencies mediated by evolved implicit processing are controllable by higher brain centers located in the cortex.^[959] The same goes for ethnocentrism.

Being able to control impulses of any kind taps into the personality system of Conscientiousness, often labelled “*effortful control*” because it involves explicit, conscious effort to control impulses (see discussion below). Simply put, conscientious people are relatively better able to regulate the more evolutionarily ancient parts of our brain responsible for many of our passions

and desires.

Why is this important for thinking about psychology and White ethnocentrism? Just as conscientious people can inhibit their natural tendencies toward aggression and sexual arousal, they are able to inhibit their natural ethnocentrism. The critical point in the following is that cultural information is of vital importance for enabling people to inhibit their ethnocentric tendencies. This cultural information relies on explicit processing and provides the basis for prefrontal inhibitory control of ethnocentrism.

The conclusion is that the control of ethnocentrism is a direct consequence of the control of cultural information. My book *The Culture of Critique* is an attempt to understand what happened after the highwater mark of the period of ethnic defense (~1870–1930) discussed in Chapter 6.^[960] The rise of the new elite meant that explicit messages about race (e.g., “there’s no such thing as race”) and ethnocentrism (e.g., “White ethnocentrism is a sure sign psychopathology and disturbed parent-child relationships”) were being disseminated by the media and throughout the educational system. Especially since World War II, these messages have been consistently hostile to White ethnocentrism. And that in turn has meant that Whites have been encouraged to inhibit their natural ethnocentrism.

Moreover, as emphasized throughout this book, White people tend to be more individualistic than other peoples, implying that they are less likely than other peoples to make invidious distinctions between ingroups and outgroups and are more likely to be open to strangers and people who don’t look like them. Because Whites are low in ethnocentrism and high in Conscientiousness, controlling ethnocentrism is easier for them on average. Their subcortical mechanisms responsible for ethnocentrism are weaker to start with and hence easier to control.

There is considerable research on the roles of implicit and explicit processing in ethnocentrism and its control. Implicit attitudes on race can be measured, e.g., by performing brain scans when the subjects are looking at faces of people of different races.^[961] On the other hand, explicit attitudes on race are typically assessed by filling out questionnaires which tap explicit processing. College student populations of Whites in the West typically exhibit pro-Black attitudes on tests of explicit attitudes. For example, one study found that Whites scored 1.89 on a six-point scale, with 1 meaning strongly pro-Black and 6 being strongly anti-Black.^[962]

Another way to measure explicit attitudes is by interview. A recent representative sample of 2000 households found that a surprising 74 percent of Whites thought that racial identity was very important (37 percent) or somewhat important (37 percent).^[963] In general, people become more racially conscious as they get older—only 53 percent claimed that racial identity was important while growing up. (I have noticed this also as a feature of Jewish identity.^[964]) Even more surprising is the finding that 77 percent of Whites thought that Whites had a culture that should be preserved. However, despite asserting the legitimacy of White ethnic identity, only 4 percent of Whites claimed to be a member of an organization based on racial or ethnic identity. (This presumably includes organizations for, say, Scottish or Polish identity which are politically irrelevant in the American political context.) And 75 percent of Whites state that prejudice and discrimination are important or very important to African-American disadvantage.

In general, Blacks and other minorities have much stronger explicit ethnic identities than Whites do. For example, this same survey found that 90 percent of Blacks thought that racial identity was very important (72 percent) or somewhat important (18 percent), and 91 percent felt that Black culture was worth preserving. Blacks also demonstrate a substantially larger explicit ingroup preference than Whites.^[965]

The gap between explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes is made possible by the inhibitory mechanisms of the prefrontal cortex. In one study, subjects were shown photos of Blacks and Whites while hooked up to a Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) machine that takes pictures of the brain in action.^[966] When the photos were shown for very brief periods—too short to be consciously processed, the fMRIs showed that Whites had a negative response to the photos of Blacks. This procedure therefore measures implicit negative attitudes toward Blacks.

However, when the photos of Blacks were presented for a much longer period, so that they were consciously experienced, then the difference in reaction to Black and White faces decreased. This happened because the prefrontal region was activated. In other words, people who are consciously aware that they are seeing photos of Blacks are able to inhibit the automatic negative responses from the sub-cortex. Subjects who showed the most prefrontal activation showed the lowest subcortical response. This implies that they were better able to inhibit their negative attitudes toward Blacks.

This study (and there are other studies with similar findings) shows the

importance of prefrontal inhibitory control over automatic negative attitudes of Whites toward Blacks. White ethnocentrism exists, but for most Whites, it exists only in a sort of underground world of unconscious, automatic processing: it is an ethnocentrism that dares not speak its name: As soon as the explicit, conscious processor swings into action, it acts to suppress the negative implicit attitudes coming from below so that the subject's responses align better with the cultural norms of the social environment.^[967]

Young children tend to have unabashedly explicit bias in favor of their own race. Explicit race bias emerges early, as young as age three or four, peaks in middle childhood, and then undergoes a gradual decline through adolescence, typically disappearing in adulthood.^[968] However, there is no such decline in implicit racial preferences, which remain strong into adulthood.^[969] There is also a decline in cross-racial friends and companions as children get older. White schoolchildren are much more likely to have White friends than chance would account for, and this trend increases as they get older.^[970]

This means that even as explicit racial preference in White children is declining, they become less likely to actually interact with and form friendships with children from other races. In effect, schools undergo a process of self-segregation. And among adults, Whites are significantly less likely than other racial groups to report interracial friendships and contacts.^[971]

The bottom line, then, is that as children get older, they become increasingly aware of the official explicit racial ideology, and they conform to it. Their prefrontal centers of inhibitory control are becoming stronger, so that they are better able to inhibit their implicitly generated negative thoughts about racial outgroups. At the explicit level, they are free from any negative attitudes toward non-White groups and may even be politically liberal or radical. At the same time, however, they are “voting with their feet” by choosing friends and companions of the same race.

And their parents are doing the same thing. Liberals show a greater gap between explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes and behavior than do conservatives. Moreover, while highly educated White parents tend to have liberal explicit attitudes on racial issues, including the desirability of school integration, these same highly educated Whites seek out schools that are racially segregated and are more likely to live in racially segregated neighborhoods. A 2018 article noted that for progressive parents, “more often than not, [their progressive] values lost out” when choosing a school.^[972]

Indeed, there is a positive correlation between the average education of White parents and the likelihood that they will remove their children from public schools as the percentage of Black students increases.^[973] Michael Emerson, an author of the study, is quite aware of the gap between explicit attitudes and behavior: “I do believe that White people are being sincere when they claim that racial inequality is not a good thing and that they’d like to see it eliminated. However, ... their liberal attitudes about race aren’t reflected in their behavior.”

The flip side of this is that less affluent Whites are more likely to have explicitly illiberal attitudes on racial issues that are condemned by elites. Yet they are also more likely to actually live in racially integrated areas and send their children to racially integrated schools, presumably due to financial constraints.

IMPLICIT WHITE COMMUNITIES

Children’s choice of friends and parents’ choice of schools and neighborhoods reflect the raw reality of racial hypocrisy in the United States. These children and their parents are acting on their implicit attitudes, and there is a profound gap between their implicit attitudes and their behavior (which show ingroup racial preference) versus their explicit attitudes (which express the official ideology of racial egalitarianism). In effect, they are creating implicit White communities—implicit because even though these communities are an expression of (implicit) racial preferences, they cannot speak their name: Whites behaving in an implicitly White manner do not explicitly state that their friendship choices or their choice in neighbourhood or school derives from racial preference, because that conflicts with their explicit racial attitudes and with the official racial ideology of the wider culture.

White Americans are gradually coalescing into political and cultural affiliation as Whites, and this trend will continue to strengthen in the future as America ethnic diversity is more of a reality even away from the immigration centers on the East and West coasts and the southern border. But at present, this political and cultural affiliation is not yet consciously and explicitly White, at least partly because conscious White affiliation is a cultural taboo.

In the face of overwhelming sanctions on explicit assertions of White racial identity in the post-World War II world, Whites have adopted a variety

of explicit identities which serve as the basis of White association and community. All of these identities exist under the radar of the political correctness enforced by elites in academia, politics, and the media: Republican political affiliation, NASCAR racing enthusiast, evangelical Christian, and country music fan. Each of these identities allow White people to associate with other Whites and even to form a White political base without any explicit acknowledgement that race plays a role.

Implicit White communities have become an increasingly important part of the American landscape as racial polarization increases due to the rise of identity politics—first among non-Whites (and encouraged by the left) but now clearly also among Whites as a reaction. The most important of these implicit White communities results from residential segregation due to White flight. As Kevin Kruse notes, “at the dawn of the twenty-first century, America found itself dominated by suburbs and those suburbs dominated by the politics of White flight and urban secession.”^[974] “In the past, the hostility to the federal government, the welfare state, and taxation had been driven by racial resentment, whether in the form of segregationists inside Atlanta or secessionist suburbanites outside it. In the 1990s the new generation of suburban Republicans simply took the politics of White flight to the national stage.”^[975]

As Kruse notes, race is never part of the explicit rhetoric of White flight, which tends to be expressed as opposition to the federal government, the welfare state, taxation, and perceived moral issues like abortion and homosexuality. But at the implicit level, the desire for White communities and the aversion to contributing to public goods disproportionately benefiting non-Whites are the overriding motivations.

White flight is part of the fragmented future that lies in store for the U.S. and other Western countries with high levels of non-European immigration. It is a well-established finding that the more ethnically mixed a population becomes, the greater is its resistance to redistributive policies.^[976] For example, a study of donations to the United Way of America charity found that White Americans give less when their communities are more than 10 percent non-White. Robert D. Putnam recently showed that greater racial diversity of a community is associated with a loss of trust.^[977] Putnam’s result is confirmed by studies conducted at the local community level^[978] and, given the recent surge in ethnic diversity, by recent survey data according to which 71 percent of Americans believe that trust in fellow citizens has declined in the last 20

years.^[979] Moreover, people are found to be happier living among fellow ethnics than as an ethnic minority.^[980] White people living in relatively homogeneous areas like New Hampshire or Montana are more involved with friends, the community, and politics than people in more diverse areas.^[981]

At the political level, implicit Whiteness is also reflected in Howard Dean's famous comment that the Republican Party is the party of White Christians.^[982] Non-White ethnic groups tend to vote Democrat even when they have relatively high socioeconomic status, while working class Whites tend to vote Republican—a good indication that this pattern results from identity politics rather than economics. The long-term trend is that since 1992, the Republican share of the White vote has been increasing 1½ percent every four years. Moreover,

it seems a bit touchy to assume that Republicans will max out at around 60 percent of the White vote. This might be the case, but ... it's entirely possible that as our nation becomes more diverse, our political coalitions will increasingly fracture along racial/ethnic lines rather than ideological ones.^[983]

Another implicit White community is NASCAR racing, which strongly overlaps with evangelical Christianity, country music, and small-town American culture, particularly that of the South. A famous Mike Luckovich cartoon that appeared in the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* shows a Black man and a White man talking with a Confederate flag flying in the background. "We need a flag that isn't racist ... but preserves White southern culture..." The next panel shows a NASCAR checkered flag. The implicit/explicit distinction could not be more obvious. Ninety-four percent of the NASCAR fan base is White, compared to 92 percent for another implicitly White sport, professional hockey.^[984]

A large part of the attraction of NASCAR is a desire for traditional American culture. NASCAR events are permeated with sentimental patriotism, prayers, military flyovers, and postrace fireworks. As sociologist Jim Wright notes, "just about everything ... you encounter in a day at the track drips with traditional Americana."^[985]

However, "race is the skeleton in the NASCAR Family closet. On the tracks and in the stands, stock-car racing remains a White-person's sport." The Whiteness of NASCAR races can be seen from a comment that, after

surveying the crowd at the 1999 Daytona 500, “there were probably about as many Confederate flags here as Black people”—i.e., fewer than forty out of a crowd of approximately 200,000.^[986] “The near-universal discrediting of the Stars and Bars as a politically incorrect, if not racist, symbol has obviously not yet reached every Winston Cup fan. Either that, or they just don’t care. And, as you might imagine, there was no pussyfooting or self-flagellation about the point among fans at the Southern 500, which was adorned by a profusion of Confederate flags the likes of which I had not witnessed at any other track.”^[987]

Wright stresses the link of NASCAR to traditional small town and rural American culture and its links to outdoor pursuits like hunting, fishing, camping, and guns.^[988] There is a large overlap between NASCAR fans and gun ownership. There is also a strong Christian religious atmosphere: Races begin with a benediction and a prayer. There is “a visible Christian fellowship” in NASCAR, including entire teams that identify themselves publicly as Christian teams; many of the drivers actively participate in Christian ministry.^[989] Other values in evidence are courage in the face of danger—another throwback to traditional American culture, deriving ultimately from the Scots-Irish culture of the English-Scottish border: “As we enter the third decade of women’s liberation and the second decade of the post-communist era, we’ve come to expect, even demand more sensitivity and empathy in our men than bravado or grit, and the traditional manly virtues of courage, bravery, and ‘guts’ strike many as anachronistic at best, even dangerous and moronic.”^{[990],[991]}

While NASCAR is a White sport, the NBA is widely perceived to be a Black sport. Whites, especially nonurban Whites, are a decreasing audience for the NBA, and in general Whites spend the least percentage of time watching NBA games of all U.S. racial/ethnic groups.^[992] Moreover, NBA culture is seen as African-American, and the response of the NBA has been to attempt to make the NBA look more like White America in order to restore its fan base. Sports writer Gary Peterson notes that

for decades there has been a racial divide between NBA players (mostly Black) and the paying customers (largely White). That divide has become a flashpoint over the past 15 years. ... Never before have the players seemed so unlike the fans. This divide is the top concern at the league office—even ahead of declining free throw shooting and baggy

shorts. For proof you need look no further than the league-wide dress code NBA commissioner David Stern imposed last season. It was an extraordinary step—he might as well have told the players, “Quit dressing like typical young, urban African-Americans. You’re scaring the fans.”^[993]

Besides banning ostentatious gold chains and mandating business casual attire, the NBA has also handed out draconian penalties for fighting among players. This is because fighting fits into the image of urban, African-American culture. Fines are \$50,000 for throwing a punch plus possible suspension (implying loss of pay).^[994] It’s interesting therefore that Major League Baseball does not have similar penalties for fighting and indeed, MLB tweeted about a brawl between the Yankees and the Red Sox—in effect, advertising it. The obvious explanation is that the NBA is anxious to avoid the stereotype of Black urban thugs because of its image as a Black sport (80 percent of the players are Black), while MLB has no need to do that because it is not seen as a Black sport.^[995]

The point is not that the NBA is more violent than, say, professional hockey—a largely White sport that is notorious for fighting. Rather, the NBA is conscious of racial stereotyping processes among Whites. Part of NASCAR’s attraction for Whites is that it is an implicit White community. By regulating dress and conduct, the NBA seems to be trying to make the NBA more attractive to Whites despite the racial composition of its players.

MANAGING WHITE ETHNOCENTRISM: THE PROBLEM WITH NON-EXPLICIT WHITE IDENTITY

White people are clearly coalescing into implicit White communities that reflect their ethnocentrism but “dare not speak its name.” They are often doing so because of the operation of various mechanisms that operate implicitly, below the level of conscious awareness. These White communities cannot assert explicit White identities because the explicit cultural space is deeply committed to an ideology in which any explicit assertion of White identity is anathema. Explicit culture operates in the conscious prefrontal centers able to control the subcortical regions of the brain.

This implies that the control of culture is of critical importance. The story of how this explicit cultural space came to be and whose interests it serves is the topic of my book, *The Culture of Critique*, combined with the material in

this volume on European individualism: these cultural transformations are the result of a complex interaction between pre-existing deep-rooted tendencies of Europeans (individualism, moral universalism, and science) and the rise of a new elite hostile to the traditional peoples and culture of Europe.^[996] The result has been a “culture of critique” that represents the triumph of the leftist movements that have dominated twentieth-century intellectual and political discourse in the West, especially since the 1960s. The fundamental assumptions of these leftist movements, particularly as they relate to race and ethnicity, permeate intellectual and political discourse among both liberals and mainstream conservatives and define a consensus among elites in academia, the media, business, and government.

Because implicit ethnocentrism is alive and well among Whites and affects their behavior in subtle ways (implicit Whiteness), one might suppose that Whites are in fact able to pursue their interests even against the prevailing wind of the explicit culture of powerful anti-White social controls and ideologies. The problem, however, is that White ethnic identity and interests can be managed as long as they remain only at the implicit level. In general, implicit White communities conform, outwardly at least, to the official multicultural ideology and adopt conventional attitudes and rhetoric on racial and ethnic issues. This allows them to escape the scrutiny of cultural elites that enforce conventional attitudes on racial and ethnic issues. However, it renders them powerless to promote issues that vitally affect their ethnic interests actively and explicitly.

A good example is non-White immigration. During the 2016 presidential campaign and since Donald Trump’s election, there has been much discussion of immigration stemming from Trump’s proposed policies aimed at preventing illegal immigration. His rhetoric tapped into a very large reservoir of public anger about the lack of control of our borders and, I think, the transformations that immigration in general—legal and illegal—is unleashing. Indeed, his rhetoric on immigration may well have been responsible for his election. Although it is common for proponents of illegal immigration to label their opponents “racists,” the fact that illegal immigration is, after all, illegal has made it easy for mainstream conservatives to oppose it without mentioning their racial interests.

This contrasts with the tendency within the establishment media—from far left to neoconservative, libertarian right—of presenting little or no discussion of the over one million legal immigrants who come to the U.S. every year—

no discussion of their effect on the economy, social services, crime, or competition at elite universities; no discussion of their effect on the long-term ethnic composition of the U.S. and how this will affect the political interests of Whites as they head toward minority status; no discussion of the displacement of native populations in various sectors of the economy; and no discussion of whether most Americans really want all of this. Indeed, it has been quite common for high-profile conservative opponents of illegal immigration to assert their support for legal immigration as a means of dodging the charge of “racism,” although many are also in thrall to business interests wanting cheap labor. While assertions of ethnic interests by non-Whites are a commonplace aspect of the American political and intellectual scene, mainstream explicit assertions of ethnic interests by Whites have been missing since the 1920s (see Chapter 6).

The result is that leftist ideologies of race and ethnicity have become part of conventional morality and intellectual discourse even within implicitly White communities. As a result, such communities are unable to oppose the forces changing the country in ways that oppose their long-term interest. Because there is no mainstream attempt by Whites to shape the explicit culture in ways that would legitimize White identity and the pursuit of White ethnic interests, implicit White communities become enclaves of retreating, resentful Whites rather than communities able to consciously pursue White interests.

Bottom line: The creation of an explicit culture legitimizing White identity and interests is a prerequisite to the successful pursuit of the interests of Whites as a group.

RACE DIFFERENCES IN PERSONALITY

Race differences in personality explain the unique tendency of Whites to create moral communities where reputation is paramount. The critical role for reputation implies that we evaluate the personalities of group members and potential group members. A reputation as heartless, calculating, untrustworthy or selfish is not going to help one’s status in a moral community, whereas the opposite of these traits will be welcomed. Because of the long history of moral communities in the West, it is expected that research findings will show race differences in traits conducive to membership in a moral community.

As an introduction to discussing race differences in personality, I will

briefly discuss an evolutionary theory of personality systems and how they relate to the psychiatric classification of psychopathic personality, the subject of Richard Lynn's *Race Differences in Psychopathic Personality* which is discussed below.^[997] Bear in mind that individual differences in all personality traits are heritable—approximately half of the variation between individuals in personality traits is attributable to genetic influences.^[998]

Some Basic Personality Systems

The Behavioral Approach System (BAS). One set of traits that contributes to reputation within a group as well as to psychopathic personality relates to seeking reward; collectively they are here labeled the Behavioral Approach System (BAS). Among even the most primitive mammals, there must be mechanisms designed to approach the environment to obtain resources, prototypically foraging and mate attraction systems. The BAS evolved from systems designed to motivate approach toward sources of reward (e.g., sexual gratification, dominance, control of territory) that occurred as enduring and recurrent features of the environments in which animals or humans evolved.^[999] In the contemporary world, these reward mechanisms can be triggered not only by aspects of the environment humans evolved in, such as social dominance and mating situations, but also by things like synthetic drugs designed to trigger evolved reward centers. These reward systems overlap anatomically and neurophysiologically with aggression, perhaps because aggression is a prepotent way of dealing with the frustration of expecting a reward but not getting it.^[1000]

The mechanisms underlying the BAS show sex differences in accord with the evolutionary theory of sex, which predicts that on average males will be higher than females on the BAS system because they have more to gain by social dominance, aggression and control of resources than females.^[1001] This is because successful, socially dominant males are much better able than females to translate their success into reproductive success by attracting high-quality females, extra-pair copulations, and, in the vast majority of human societies, multiple mates. Fundamentally, males benefit by being able to control females much more than the reverse, since female reproduction is constrained by the demands of pregnancy and lactation. For example, by leading successful armies, Genghis Khan and his direct descendants were able to set up harems in areas they conquered, with the result that he now has around 32 million direct descendants spread throughout Asia. No female

could do that in a similar time period given the limitations of pregnancy and lactation.

As a result, it's no surprise that among human adults, behavioral approach is also associated with aggressiveness and higher levels of sexual experiences and positive emotions (e.g., emotions one feels when achieving social dominance or attaining goals).^{[1002],[1003]}

Relevant to psychopathic personality, there are evolutionarily expected sex differences in aggression, pleasure-seeking (including sensation-seeking), and externalizing psychiatric disorders (e.g., conduct disorder, oppositional/defiant disorder), and aggression). Moreover, the social interactions of boys are more characterized by dominance interactions and forceful, demanding interpersonal styles.^[1004] On the other hand, females are more prone to depression which is associated with low levels of behavioral approach.^[1005] In fact, anhedonia (lack of ability to experience pleasure) and negative mood are primary symptoms of depression within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) classification.^[1006]

The Love/Nurturance Pair Bonding System. In Chapter 3 it was argued that Western populations are more inclined to value the traits of love/nurturance in prospective mates as an aspect of individualist mating patterns and, ultimately, because of the need to cement close family relationships and paternal investment in the harsh environments that northern hunter-gatherers evolved in. Unlike kinship-based societies, marriage is exogamous and based at least partly on personal attraction, including personality characteristics like Love/Nurturance. This trait is also important for status within moral communities. Most people would not find cold-heartedness attractive in a potential marriage partner, nor would they desire cold-hearted people to be part of their moral community because such persons would tend to be untrustworthy and selfish. The following presents a fuller account of the Love/Nurturance system.

Mammalian females give birth and suckle their young. This has led to a host of adaptations for mothering, an outgrowth of which are pair-bonding mechanisms present also in males, although to a lesser extent on average.^[1007] For species that develop pair bonds and other types of close relationships involving nurturance and empathy, one expects the evolution of a system designed to make such relationships psychologically rewarding. The adaptive space of Love/Nurturance therefore becomes elaborated into a mechanism for cementing adult relationships of love and empathy that facilitate the transfer

of resources to others, prototypically within the family.

The personality trait of Love/Nurturance is associated with relationships of intimacy and other long-term relationships, especially family relationships involving investment in children.^[1008] Individual differences in warmth and affection observable in early parent-child relationships, including secure attachments, are conceptually linked with Love/Nurturance later in life.^[1009] Secure attachments and warm, affectionate parent-child relationships have been found to be associated with a high-investment style of parenting characterized by later sexual maturation, stable pair bonding, and warm, reciprocally rewarding, non-exploitative interpersonal relationships.^[1010] The physiological basis of pair bonding involves specific brain regions underlying the ability to take pleasure in close, intimate relationships.^[1011] People who are high on this system are able to find intimate relationships psychologically rewarding and pleasurable and therefore seek them out, while psychopaths are prone to cold and callous personal relationships.

If indeed the main evolutionary impetus for the development of the human Love/Nurturance system is the need for high-investment parenting, females are expected to have a greater elaboration of mechanisms related to parental investment than males. The evolutionary theory of sex implies that females are expected to be highly discriminating mothers compared to males and more committed to long-term relationships of nurturance and affection; cues of nurturance and love in males are expected to be highly valued by females seeking paternal investment. In agreement with this theory, there are robust sex differences (higher in females) on the Love/Nurturance dimension.^[1012]

And because empathy is strongly linked to Love/Nurturance, this also implies that women will be more prone to being motivated by empathy for the suffering of others and pathological forms of altruism. In turn, this has important ramifications in the contemporary world saturated with images of suffering refugees, immigrants, and other non-Whites. Love/Nurturance involves the tendency to provide aid for those needing help, including children and people who are ill.^[1013] This trait is strongly associated with measures of femininity as well as with warm, empathic personal relationships and psychological dependence on others.

People who are low on Love/Nurturance are prone to psychopathic personality—exploitative interpersonal relationships, lack of warmth, love, and empathy, an inability to form long term pair bonds and close, confiding relationships, and lack of guilt or remorse for violating others' rights. The

finding that males in the general population are three times as likely as females to be categorized with Antisocial Personality Disorder^[1014] fits with the robust sex differences in this system. Psychopathic personality, which is characterized by lack of empathy and social bonds, is associated with having many sexual partners, an uncommitted approach to mating, sexual coercion,^[1015] many short-term sexual relationships, sexual promiscuity,^[1016] and lack of nurturance of children.^[1017]

In terms of race differences, the Love/Nurturance system is a central aspect of a slow life history strategy,^[1018] with the result that it is expected that African and African-derived populations will be less prone to affectionate pair bonding and paternal investment in children, and more prone to short-term sexual relationships. Indeed, while African mothers are sensitive and responsive to babies' needs, mother-child interactions in prototypical African cultures are devoid of the warmth and affection that are typical in European cultures.^[1019] Thus Mary Ainsworth, a pioneer in mother-infant attachment research, found that Ugandan babies were quite securely attached despite the fact that their mothers rarely showed any affection toward them—a phenomenon also noted by other researchers for a different African group.^[1020]

Prefrontal Executive Control (PEC). Having a reputation as conscientious and dependable is important for being accepted in a moral community. A relatively recent trend in evolution, especially in the Primate line, has been the evolution of a centralized control system able to integrate and coordinate lower-level adaptations. This top-down Prefrontal Executive Control (PEC) system enables coordination of specialized adaptations, including all of the mechanisms associated with the BAS.^[1021] PEC involves explicit processing of linguistic and symbolic information and the top-down control of behavior. Unlike the automatic processing typical of the BAS, it is able to evaluate complex contexts in order to generate behavior that is adaptive in contemporary human societies with their constantly changing, highly complex environments and reward-punishment contingencies.

For example, emotional states resulting from adaptations designed to react to evolutionary regularities may place people in a prepotently aggressive state energized by anger—an emotional state that is one of the subsystems of the BAS. However, whether or not aggression actually occurs may also be influenced, at least for people with sufficient levels of PEC, by explicit evaluation of the wider context, including evaluation of the possible costs and benefits of an aggressive act (e.g., penalties at law, possible retaliation).

These explicitly calculated costs and benefits are not recurrent over evolutionary time but are products of explicit processing evaluating current environments and producing mental models of possible consequences of behavior.

Individual differences in PEC are most closely associated with the personality trait of Conscientiousness.^[1022] Conscientiousness involves variation in the ability to defer gratification and pleasure (both related to the BAS) in the service of attaining long-term goals, persevering in unpleasant tasks, paying close attention to detail, and behaving in a responsible, dependable, cooperative manner. Not surprisingly, Conscientiousness is also associated with academic success;^[1023] indeed, higher Conscientiousness is likely the reason for the finding of sex differences favoring females throughout the school years, including college.

Conscientiousness refers to “*socially prescribed impulse control* that facilitates task and goal-directed behavior”^[1024] and is thus central to understanding under-controlled behaviors associated with psychopathic personality.^[1025] Specifically, variation in PEC is central to understanding the difference between controlled and uncontrolled aggression—i.e., the difference between an impulsive act of aggression carried out in anger because of an insult versus a well-planned attack of revenge carried out in cold blood. Variation in PEC is also central to controlling reward-oriented behavior (pleasure-seeking), another central component of the BAS.^[1026] Individuals with low levels of prefrontal control are prone to impulsivity, substance abuse, and have low levels of emotional control, including relative inability to control anger, a prime motivator of some types of aggression.

***Richard Lynn’s Race Differences in Personality:
Whites as More Generous and Empathic than
Other Races***

Richard Lynn’s *Race Differences in Personality* provides a welcome review of the personality literature related to race differences that fits well with the material on personality discussed above.^[1027] Studies from the United States have consistently found a rank ordering of races on behaviors related to psychopathic personality—highest in Blacks and Native Americans, followed by Hispanics, lower among Whites, and lowest among Asians, especially northeast Asians. The variables studied included conduct disorder, direct measures of psychopathic personality, measures of sexual promiscuity

(indicating less proneness to pair bonding and being high on the BAS), Conscientiousness (Blacks vs. Whites only), criminality, school suspensions, emotional intelligence (Blacks vs. Whites only), drug and substance abuse, child abuse, and self-esteem (linked to the BAS: individuals high on the BAS are prone to high self-esteem and self-confidence.) In general, as with IQ, race differences are greatest between Whites and Blacks and much attenuated between Whites and northeast Asians.

Given the data on European individualism and its effects on mating patterns (highlighting the importance of love and pair bonding in choice of marriage partner compared to more kinship-oriented societies), I suggest that the differences between northeast Asians and Whites are best explained mainly by differences in Prefrontal Executive Control. The results for Blacks clearly indicate higher levels of the BAS, lower on Love/Nurturance, and lower on PEC.

Indeed, since the uniqueness of Western individualism is central to the present analysis, it's important to note that Whites are more generous than Asians in terms of charitable donations, thus departing from the usual rank ordering of races on IQ and PEC. This is important because, as indicated above, the Love/Nurturance system is linked to altruism and empathic concern; moreover, Love/Nurturance has been of special importance for the West because of two particular aspects of individualism:

- Individual choice of marriage partner. Love Nurturance is an important criterion for both sexes but especially for men seeking a monogamous marriage with a woman high on a trait linked to nurturance of children and sexual fidelity. On the other hand, marriage in collectivist cultures is more determined by customs of marrying relatives as well by family strategizing, with parents playing a determining role.
- Reputation in a moral community. Reputation in a group of non-relatives depends partly on being seen as generous, cooperative, and unselfish. Being high on the Love/Nurturance system is linked with empathy for the suffering of others. Moreover, among individualists, because of the lack of strong group boundaries and because reputation within a moral community is so critical, empathy would be expected to be directed to others outside one's own kinship group but within one's moral community.

Congruent with this scenario, Lynn presents data showing that Whites are more willing to contribute charitable donations than all other groups, including Asians.^[1028] And again, I emphasize that this is especially noteworthy given that it departs from the usual rank ordering of racial groups based on life history differences. Empathy for suffering others was a striking aspect of the movements to abolish slavery in England and the United States (Chapters 6 and 7) and in the eighteenth-century “affective revolution” that fed into the sensibility on display in the Second British Empire (Chapter 7). Ultimately, this was an ethnic shift that brought to the fore the hunter-gatherer sensibility with its greater emphasis on egalitarianism and moral communities.

Finally, it was noted above that women are higher on Love/Nurturance and its emotion of empathy. As a result, it is not surprising that Lynn finds women are more generous than men; indeed, White women are the most generous group of all, a finding that makes sense in light of the above comments on White women being more susceptible to appeals from suffering non-Whites, refugees, immigrants, etc.

LIFE HISTORY THEORY

Nicholas Baumard has proposed a life history theory-based account of the fact that Britain was the first to develop the industrial revolution.^[1029] He points out that pre-industrial Britain was relatively wealthy compared to any other area of the world, including other parts of Europe. Although he does not attempt to explain why Britain was wealthy prior to the Industrial Revolution—usually dated as beginning around 1760, he recruits life history theory to propose that this increased wealth had a cascading effect on a number of psychological traits, including a tendency to have a longer time horizon (less time discounting), higher optimism, and higher levels of trust in others, all of which are proposed as paving the way for innovation.

The basic idea is that in a stable resource-rich environment, people are optimistic and plan for the future rather than behave impulsively; since the struggle for subsistence is less salient, they are nicer to others and are less concerned with material goods. For example, he cites a study comparing Native American children with non-Native American children before and after a casino opened on tribal land. After the Native Americans received casino payments, there were reductions in criminal behavior, drug use, and behavioral disorders associated with poverty such as depression, anxiety, and

oppositional disorders, as well as increases in the personality traits of Love/Nurturance and Conscientiousness described above.^[1030] In a similar manner, Baumard proposes that increased wealth in Britain led to an increase in these traits and that these in turn led to a flowering of innovation and technological progress.

Baumard's theory contrasts with Gregory Clark's theory in *A Farewell to Alms* which proposes natural selection for bourgeois virtues like Conscientiousness beginning in the early modern period.^[1031] While Baumard explicitly adopts a blank slate perspective, Clark's theory is compatible with pre-existing genetically based variation in traits like Conscientiousness and IQ. More intelligent, conscientious people were able to rise in the new environment of the early modern period—an environment that unleashed the economic potential of individualism—and had more children, constituting natural selection for these traits.

Another theory based on selection has been proposed by Peter Frost and Henry Harpending based on the finding that penalties against violence increased dramatically beginning in the eleventh century, with up to two percent of males in each generation being subjected to capital punishment or dying in other ways related to their crimes.^[1032] This culling of violent males would have reduced the numbers of males at the high end of aggression and at the low ends of Conscientiousness and Love/Nurturance.

I regard all three of these proposals as contributing factors in European modernization; however, by itself or in combination they are inadequate. Baumard's blank slate proposal ignores the massive data on genetic variation in personality traits and intelligence. Frost and Harpending's thesis would not explain why strong states in areas like China and Eastern and Southern Europe would not have had similar selective effects on these traits, so they cannot explain the uniqueness of northwestern Europe—its individualism, the vastly disproportionate number of discoveries and inventions, and its exploring and colonizing the planet. China's penalties for serious crimes were particularly draconian, punishing entire families of the alleged perpetrator beginning in the eighth century.^[1033]

Moreover, none of these theories discuss individualism as a necessary condition for European modernization, including the Industrial Revolution. As presented in Chapter 4, northwest Europe had a long history of individualist family structure long before the Industrial Revolution—indeed, its origins are lost in prehistory and I argue they are ethnically based.

However, the creativity, innovation, and enterprise that would be the natural product of the individualism of northwestern European peoples was throttled by a non-meritocratic aristocratic social system until the English Civil War of the mid-seventeenth century and the gradual overthrow of aristocratic culture (Chapter 6).

As noted in Chapter 4, the individualist family pattern required greater planning and self-control (Conscientiousness) prior to marriage and resulted in a greater likelihood to exhibit what psychologists label “internal locus of control” (i.e., the degree to which people believe that they have control over the outcome of events in their lives, as opposed to a fatalistic perspective resulting from external forces beyond their control.) It’s no accident that the English word *kismet* has Arabic roots.

Individualist marriage also emphasized individual choice of marriage partner based on the personal characteristics of the spouse, including intelligence, Conscientiousness, and affection (Love/Nurturance). These traits are deemphasized when marriage is embedded within extended kinship networks where marriage is typically entered into with relatives and often determined by parental choice. In individualist culture, reputation in a moral community rather than a kinship-based community was critical, resulting in trust of non-relatives.

The Protestant Reformation, which succeeded only in northwest Europe, is critical. In particular, the English Civil War of the 1640s, which saw the triumph of egalitarian individualism and the beginnings of the end of aristocratic culture based on agriculture, a rigid status hierarchy, and inherited (non-meritocratic) status with very limited opportunities for upward mobility. This upheaval ultimately resulted in relative egalitarianism, the development of a market-oriented economy, industrialization, and opportunities for upward mobility and reproductive success for the intelligent and conscientious, as described by Clark’s *A Farewell to Alms*.

Baumard supposes that increasing wealth in China and Japan (neither of which ever developed anything like European individualism) would have resulted in an industrial revolution. This is conjecture, and does not take account of greater levels of conformity and relative lack of creativity and innovation in these cultures, despite increased wealth and continuing into the present.^[1034] As discussed in Chapter 3, Westerners are WEIRD people differing in a large number of psychological characteristics from people in collectivist cultures. As with the data on the individualist family, these

findings are compatible with an ethnic interpretation of northwestern European uniqueness.

Finally, given that there has always been an affluent class in Europe and in other societies, in order to be plausible, Baumard's theory that increased affluence is critical must argue that this process is essentially the result of an increased number of people who are affluent. This is conjecture. My view is that the destruction of aristocratic culture, by allowing the inherent egalitarian individualism of northwest Europeans to come to the fore, was the critical factor.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CHALLENGES TO DEVELOPING AN EXPLICIT CULTURE OF WHITE IDENTITY AND INTERESTS

The foregoing has discussed psychological mechanisms underlying the power of human cultures to influence behavior and attitudes. Clearly, the wider culture of the West, now dominated by the anti-White left, poses a major obstacle to developing an explicit culture favorable to White identity and interests. In the absence of changes in the explicit culture on issues related to the legitimacy of White racial identity and interests, Whites will simply continue to retreat into implicit White communities.

There are obviously a great many obstacles to developing such a mainstream culture, the main one being opposition by elites in the media, academia, business, and political cultures. However, there are other mechanisms that have come into play which make it difficult to create such a culture.

Self-interest and the Anti-White Infrastructure

A large part of the problem is that these elites have created a very elaborate infrastructure so that, for the vast majority of individuals, economic and professional self-interest coincides with support for anti-White policies. Particularly egregious examples are individuals and companies that directly benefit from immigration via cheap labor, or companies, such as First Data Corporation, that benefit from remittances sent by immigrants to relatives in other countries.

Noteworthy examples are university presidents, many of whom earn seven-figure salaries. For example, Mary Sue Coleman earned over \$1,000,000/year before resigning as president of the University of Michigan

in 2014. She had been a leader in attempting to preserve racial preferences for non-Whites and in promoting the (non-existent) educational benefits of diversity.^[1035]

Similarly, when three White lacrosse players at Duke University were accused of raping a Black woman, faculty and administrators issued statements assuming their guilt.^[1036] Because the leftist political cultural of the university has become conventionalized, statements deploring the racism and sexism of the players could be counted on as good career moves, even when they turned out to be groundless. Adopting conventional views on race and ethnicity is a *sine qua non* for a career as a mainstream academic (particularly an administrator), a public intellectual, or in the political arena.

Consistent with the importance of self-interest in supporting explicitly White policies and politicians, a 2017 study found that high-income Whites were less likely to support politicians who strongly identify as White if they think the racial hierarchy is unstable. In other words, Whites who have the most to lose are most likely to be unwilling to “rock the boat” by provoking minorities if they think that the racial hierarchy could change because of demographic shifts.^[1037]

As Frank Salter has pointed out, Whites who fail to attend to the interests of their wider kinship group benefit themselves and their families at the expense of their own wider ethnic interests.^[1038] This is especially true for elite Whites—people whose intelligence, power, and wealth could make a very large difference in culture and politics. They are in effect sacrificing millions of ethnic kin—for example, by turning their backs on the White working class who are well known to suffer most from non-White immigration and the multicultural regime—for the benefit of themselves and their immediate family.

This is a disastrously wrongheaded choice by the standard measures of evolutionary success. However, because our evolved psychology is much more attuned to individual and family interests than to the interests of the ethnic group or race, Whites who benefit economically or professionally from adopting conventional views on race and ethnicity are unlikely to feel unease at the psychological level. Indeed, given that conventional views on race and ethnicity have been buttressed by the ideology that departures from these views indicate moral turpitude or psychopathology, such individuals are likely to feel morally righteous by signalling their support—virtue signalling within the moral community created by elite culture.

Social Learning Theory: The Consequences of Not Dominating the Cultural High Ground

Although changing the structure of material benefits is doubtless critical for advancing White ethnic interests, we should also pay attention to social learning, i.e., learning by imitating models. People are prone to adopting the ideas and behavior of others who have prestige and high status, and this tendency fits well with an evolutionary perspective in which seeking high social status is a universal feature of the human mind. A critical component of the success of the culture of White dispossession is that it achieved control of the most prestigious and influential institutions of the West, particularly the media and academia. Once this culture became a consensus among the elites, it became widely accepted among Whites of very different levels of education and among people of different social classes.^[1039]

For example, Leslie Fiedler, a Jewish literary scholar associated with the New York Intellectuals^[1040], described a whole generation of American Jewish writers (including Delmore Schwartz, Alfred Kazin, Karl Shapiro, Isaac Rosenfeld, Paul Goodman, Saul Bellow, and H. J. Kaplan) as “typically urban, second-generation Jews.” The works of these writers appeared regularly in *Partisan Review*, the flagship journal of the New York Intellectuals. Fiedler goes on to say that

the writer drawn to New York from the provinces feels ... the Rube, attempts to conform; and the almost parody of Jewishness achieved by the gentile writer in New York is a strange and crucial testimony of our time.^[1041]

Once Jews had achieved prestige and status in the literary world, it was only natural that non-Jews would admire and emulate them by adopting their views on race and ethnicity—views that were mainstream in the Jewish community and well to the left of most Americans.

Like other modeling influences, therefore, maladaptive memes are best promulgated by individuals and institutions with high social status. Because they have been elevated to the pantheon of elite culture, individuals such as Sigmund Freud or Stephen Jay Gould have become cultural icons—true cultural heroes. The cultural memes emanating from their thought, therefore, have a much greater opportunity to take root in the culture as a whole.

Moreover, adopting the views on race and ethnicity held by elites also confers psychological benefits because it enhances one's reputation in the contemporary moral community created by these elites. On the other hand, publicly dissenting from these views carries huge costs for most people. White elites who turn their back on their own ethnic group are likely to be massively reinforced within the contemporary explicit culture, while those who attempt to advance White interests can expect to suffer psychologically painful costs.

There are many examples of White people who have been fired from their positions in the media or other positions of influence for expressing attitudes on race and ethnicity that depart from the conventional wisdom. On the other hand, the massive social approval University of Michigan president Mary Sue Coleman received within the culture of the university for her positions on diversity issues is doubtless a positive component of her job. If she suddenly reversed position on the benefits of diversity, her career as a university president and her \$1,000,000+/year salary would have been in dire jeopardy.

Benefits and Risks of Conscientiousness

A psychological system that bears on moral reputation is Conscientiousness, discussed previously in connection with inhibiting our natural tendencies in the service of long-term payoffs. However, people who are high on Conscientiousness also tend to be deeply concerned about their reputation.

This is no accident. In fact, developing a good reputation is an important way for conscientious people to get long-term payoffs. Think of it this way. If someone cheats another person, he gets a short-term gain at the expense of developing a bad reputation when his cheating becomes known. The only way he can continue to survive is to prey on others who don't know his reputation, and that means moving on and interacting with strangers—who will be less trusting—rather than with friends and allies. On the other hand, if he cooperates, both persons benefit, and he develops a reputation as a cooperator that may last a lifetime. In the long run, therefore, he will be better off.

Conscientious people, unlike sociopaths, are cooperators, and as a result they are vitally concerned about their reputation. This is particularly critical for individualists because they tend to interact more often with strangers—their reputation is first and foremost established among non-relatives who

would be relatively quick (compared to relatives) to cease interacting with them if there are signs of untrustworthiness.

Theoretical work has shown that having access to people's reputation is likely to be a necessary condition for the evolution of cooperation.^[1042] Information on the reputation of individuals constitutes a collective memory of the past history of individuals and is made possible by language—that is, explicit representations of the past history of individuals in cooperative situations.^[1043] Without such explicit information on reputation, cooperators would be at an evolutionary disadvantage and vulnerable to a strategy of short-term exploitation rather than long-term cooperation with like-minded others. This explicit information on reputation is therefore processed by the higher brain centers located in the prefrontal cortex linked to Conscientiousness.

I suggest, therefore, that evolutionary pressure for cooperation is a critical adaptive function accounting for the evolution of Conscientiousness. Psychological research shows that people high in Conscientiousness are responsible, dependable, dutiful, and reliable. Indeed, responsibility emerges as a facet (i.e., subcategory) of Conscientiousness defined as cooperative, dependable, being of service to others, and contributing to community and group projects.^[1044] These traits are also highly correlated with honesty and morally exemplary behavior.

Thus Conscientiousness not only makes us better able to inhibit natural impulses like ethnocentrism, it also makes us more concerned about our reputation in a moral community. We want to fit into the community and we want to be known as cooperators, not cheaters. At the low end of Conscientiousness are sociopaths (also low on Love/Nurturance). They are more likely to take advantage of people for short-term gains and care nothing about developing a reputation as honest and trustworthy. After they prey on one victim, they must move on to an area where their reputation is not known.

Obviously, Conscientiousness as defined above is a pillar of human civilization and cultural life. This is especially so in the individualistic cultures of the West given its importance in achieving a good reputation in groups of strangers.

To this set of traits, Francis Fukuyama also adds trust as a critical virtue of individualist societies.^[1045] It is linked to Conscientiousness because we are more likely trust people who have a good reputation—people who have the

trust of others. Trust is really a way of emphasizing the importance of moral universalism as a trait of individualist societies. In collectivist, family-oriented societies, trust ends at the border of the family and the wider kinship group. Social organization, whether in political culture or in economic enterprise, tends to be a family affair. Morality is defined as what is good for the group—typically the kinship group (e.g., “Is it good for the Jews?”).

This lack of trust beyond the kinship group is the fundamental problem that prevents the development of civil societies in much of Asia and Africa, where divisions into opposing religious and ultimately kinship groups define the political landscape. People who have good jobs are expected to help their relatives, leading to high levels of corruption.^[1046] The movement of the West toward multiculturalism and opposing identity groups based on race and ethnicity means the end of individualist Western culture, replaced by a culture characterized by conflict between self-interested groups rather than individuals.

In individualist cultures, organizations include nonfamily members in positions of trust, and nepotism is looked on as immoral and is subject to legal sanctions. Morality is defined in terms of universal moral principles that are independent of kinship connections or group membership. Trust therefore is of critical importance to individualist society.

And fundamentally trust is about building a trustworthy reputation—for example, a reputation for honest dealing, not only with fellow kinsmen, but with others as well. It follows that European-derived people are particularly prone to being concerned with reputation. In the individualistic societies in which Westerners evolved, cooperation (and therefore success) resulted from having a good reputation, not from being able to rely on extensive kinship relations.

There are obviously great benefits to trust and the wider psychological system of Conscientiousness. The suite of traits associated with individualism is the basis of Western modernism. Relying on the good reputation of others is a key ingredient to building cooperative civil societies capable of rising above amoral familism.

The downside, however, is that conscientious people become so concerned about their reputation that they become conformists. Once the cultural and political left had won the day, a large part of its success was that it dominated the moral and intellectual high ground on issues of race and ethnicity. The culture of critique had become conventionalized and a pillar of the

intellectual establishment. People who dissented from this leftist consensus were faced with a disastrous loss of reputation—nothing less than psychological agony.

There are many examples showing the power of this mechanism. Over 75 years ago Anne Morrow Lindbergh became one of the first victims of the modern version of political correctness when her husband, Charles Lindbergh, stated that Jews were one of the forces attempting to get the United States to enter World War II. Shortly after his speech, she wrote:

The storm is beginning to blow up hard. ... I sense that this is the beginning of a fight and consequent loneliness and isolation that we have not known before. ... For I am really much more attached to the worldly things than he is, mind more giving up friends, popularity, etc., mind much more criticism and coldness and loneliness. ... Will I be able to shop in New York at all now? I am always stared at—but now to be stared at with hate, to walk through aisles of hate!^[1047]

What is striking and perhaps counterintuitive, is that the guilt and shame remain even when she is completely satisfied at an intellectual (explicit) level that what her husband said was based on good evidence, that it was morally justifiable, and that he is a man of integrity.

I cannot explain my revulsion of feeling by logic. Is it my lack of courage to face the problem? Is it my lack of vision and seeing the thing through? Or is my intuition founded on something profound and valid? I do not know and am only very disturbed, which is upsetting for him. I have the greatest faith in him as a person—in his integrity, his courage, and his essential goodness, fairness, and kindness—his nobility really. ... How then explain my profound feeling of grief about what he is doing? If what he said is the truth (and I am inclined to think it is), why was it wrong to state it?

Her reaction is involuntary and irrational—beyond the reach of logical analysis. Charles Lindbergh was exactly right in what he said, but a rational understanding of the correctness of his analysis cannot lessen the psychological trauma to his wife, who must face the hostile stares of others. The trauma is the result of the power of the Conscientiousness system in

leading to loss of reputation resulting from breaching the cultural taboo against discussing Jewish influence.

I've had similar experiences, on a much smaller scale, resulting from attacks on me at the university where I worked.^[1048] As with Anne Morrow Lindbergh's concern about going shopping in New York, the most difficult thing is dealing with loss of reputation in my face-to-face world at the university. The biggest problem is that being an academic nonconformist on race and ethnicity has huge moral overtones. If one dissents from the reigning theory of macroeconomics or the main influences on nineteenth-century French Romanticism, one may be viewed as a bit eccentric or perhaps none too smart. But one is not likely to be subjected to torrents of moral outrage.

Given that academics tend to be Conscientious types, it's not surprising that academics are generally loath to do or say things that might endanger their reputation. This is at least ironic, because it conflicts with the image of academics as fearless seekers of truth. Unlike politicians, who must continue to curry favor with the public in order to be re-elected, and unlike media figures who have no job protection, academics with tenure have no excuse for not being willing to endure labels such as "anti-Semite" or "racist" in order to pursue their perception of the truth. Part of the job—and a large part of the rationale for tenure in the first place—is that they are supposed to be willing to take unpopular positions: to forge ahead using all that brain power and expertise to chart new territories that challenge the popular wisdom.

But that image of academia is simply not based in reality. Consider, for example, an article that appeared almost two months after the publication of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt's famous essay on the Israel lobby,^[1049] appropriately titled "A Hot Paper Muzzles Academia."^[1050]

Instead of a roiling debate, most professors not only agreed to disagree but agreed to pretend publicly that there was no disagreement at all. At Harvard and other schools, the Mearsheimer-Walt paper proved simply too hot to handle—and it revealed an academia deeply split yet lamentably afraid to engage itself on one of the hottest political issues of our time. Call it the academic Cold War: distrustful factions rendered timid by the prospect of mutually assured career destruction.

Professors refused to take a stand on the paper, either in favor or against. As one Ivy League professor noted, "A lot of [my colleagues] were more

concerned about the academic politics of it, and where they should come down, in that sense.” As in 1941, discussing Jewish influence—even in a fact-based, dispassionate manner—carries huge costs.

Sadly, there is now a great deal of evidence that academics in general are careful to avoid controversy or do much of anything that will create hostility. In fact, some researchers are pointing to this fact to question whether tenure is justified. A recent survey of the attitudes of 1,004 professors at elite universities illustrates this quite clearly. Regardless of their rank, professors rated their colleagues as

reluctant to engage in activities that ran counter to the wishes of colleagues. Even tenured full professors believed [other full professors] would invoke academic freedom only “sometimes” rather than “usually” or “always”; they chose confrontational options “rarely,” albeit more often than did lower ranked colleagues. ... Their willingness to self-limit may be due to a desire for harmony and/or respect for the criticisms of colleagues whose opinions they value. Thus, the data did not support the depiction of *Professorus Americanus* as unleashed renegade. ^[1051]

Seen in this context, the reaction to the Mearsheimer and Walt paper makes a lot of sense. As one professor noted, “People might debate it if you gave everyone a get-out-of-jail-free card and promised that afterward everyone would be friends.” ^[1052] This intense desire to be accepted and liked by one’s colleagues is certainly understandable. Striving for a good reputation is part of our nature, especially for the conscientious among us.

Ostracism and moral condemnation from others in one’s face-to-face world trigger guilt feelings. These are automatic responses resulting ultimately from the importance of fitting into a group—i.e., they were developed over evolutionary time. This is especially so in the individualistic cultures of the West, where having a good reputation beyond the borders of the kinship group forms the basis of trust and civil society, and where having a poor reputation would have resulted in ostracism and evolutionary death.

Moreover, it’s interesting that in my experience, decisions by academic departments and committees are by consensus as is typical of egalitarian groups, as in Scandinavian culture as discussed below. Going against a consensus is thus likely to risk ostracism.

As shown by these examples, being able to rationally defend the ideas and

attitudes that bring moral condemnation is not sufficient to defuse the complex negative emotions brought on by this form of ostracism. One might think that just as the prefrontal control areas can inhibit ethnocentric impulses originating in the sub-cortex, we should be able to inhibit these primitive guilt feelings. After all, the guilt feelings ultimately result from absolutely normal attitudes of ethnic identity and interests that have been delegitimized as a result of the ultimate failure of the period of ethnic defense discussed in Chapter 6—failure that eventuated in the erection of the culture of critique in America and throughout the West. It should be therapeutic to understand that many of the people who created this culture retained a strong sense of their own ethnic identity and interests. And it should help assuage guilt feelings if we understand that this culture is now propped up by people seeking material advantages and psychological approval at the expense of their own legitimate long-term ethnic interests. Given the strong Jewish influence in erecting this culture,^[1053] the guilt feelings are nothing more than the end result of ethnic warfare, pursued at the level of ideology and culture instead of on the battlefield.

Getting rid of guilt and shame, however, is certainly not an easy process. Psychotherapy for White people begins with an explicit understanding of the issues that allows us to act in our interests, even if we can't entirely control the negative feelings engendered by those actions.

Evolutionary theorist Robert Trivers has proposed that the emotion of guilt is a sign to the group that a person will mend his ways and behave according to group norms in the future. Shame, on the other hand, functions as a display of submission to people higher in the dominance hierarchy.^[1054] From that perspective, a person who is incapable of shame or guilt even for obvious transgressions is literally a sociopath—someone who has no desire to fit into group norms. As noted above, sociopaths are at the low end of Conscientiousness, and there were doubtless strong selection pressures against sociopathy in the small groups that we evolved in, especially among the individualistic peoples of the West; as noted above, White subjects in fact do score higher on Conscientiousness than other groups with the exception of East Asians. The trustworthy cooperators with excellent reputations won the day.

Cognitive Dissonance as a Force of Psychological Inertia

Once the left had established cultural hegemony throughout the West, people were essentially socialized to see the world through the lens of a leftist worldview—i.e., a worldview in which Whites, especially White males, see themselves as past oppressors of the entire gamut of identity groups that make up coalition of the aggrieved: Blacks, Native Americans, Latinos, Jews, women, sexual non-conformists, etc. Once established, such a mindset of liberal-left beliefs is difficult to change.

Cognitive dissonance research has shown that people with strong beliefs, especially beliefs tied up with their personal identity, often do not change them when confronted by conflicting evidence.^[1055] Fundamentally, the brain wants to avoid conflicting ideas and often uses illogical reasoning and other mechanisms to retain a sense of psychological comfort. For example, when presented with contradictory evidence (such as data showing genetically based race differences in intelligence), people may ignore the data in order to retain a self-image as a morally righteous person. Moreover, people tend to forget evidence that conflicts with their beliefs, and they tend to accept weak arguments that fit with their world view while rejecting strong arguments and data that conflict with it. They may focus their attention not on the evidence itself but on the person presenting the evidence, impugning their motives and accepting guilt-by-association arguments. Clearly, the mind is designed to go to great lengths to avoid psychological discomfort.^[1056]

This poses a challenge in trying to convert White liberals and most White conservatives to accepting ideas such as that Whites have legitimate interests as a group, that race is real, and that immigration of non-Whites is a long-term disaster for Whites, etc.^[1057]

This is especially the case given the previously discussed mechanisms that promote inertia within the culture erected by the left. Nonconformity carries costs that can be avoided by dismissing contradictory information. And, given the control that mainstream media has over information presented to the public on race, etc., people can easily avoid information that conflicts with their world view. This explains why the leftist media corporations like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter are removing such information from the internet or at least limiting its reach. And it shows how important it is to erect an explicit culture in which White identity and interests are legitimate.

PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANISMS FOR A WHITE RENAISSANCE

In general, individualists are less ethnocentric than others, but this does not imply that they are incapable of ethnocentrism. It makes sense *a priori* to suppose that natural selection would act to make humans—even individualistic Whites—at least somewhat ethnocentric. Frank Salter presents a powerful case for the adaptiveness of ethnocentrism.^[1058] Different human ethnic groups and races have been separated for thousands of years, and during this period they have evolved some genetic distinctiveness. This genetic distinctiveness constitutes a storehouse of genetic interest. In other words, people have an interest in their ethnic group in exactly the same way that parents have a genetic interest in their children.

In raising their children, parents ensure that their unique genes are passed on to the next generation. In defending their ethnic interests, people are doing the same thing—ensuring that the genetic uniqueness of their ethnic group is passed on to the next generation. When parents of a particular ethnicity succeed in rearing their children, their ethnic group also benefits because the genetic uniqueness of their ethnic group is perpetuated as part of their children's genetic inheritance. Moreover, when an ethnic group succeeds in defending its interests, individual members of the ethnic group also benefit because the genetic uniqueness that they share with other members of the ethnic group is passed on. This is the case even for people who don't have children: A person succeeds genetically when his ethnic group as a whole prospers.

Even a cursory look at the historical record shows that conflict between biologically related tribal groups has been common throughout history. Cooperative defense by tribal peoples is universal and ancient and it is bound to have boosted the genetic fitness of those who acted to further the interests of their group. Under such circumstances it would be odd indeed if natural selection did not mold the human mind to be predisposed to ethnocentrism. Of course, this fact does not tell us what psychological mechanisms actually evolved to promote ethnocentrism or how these mechanisms can be controlled by inhibitory mechanisms located in the prefrontal cortex. For that, we will have to turn to the empirical research.

My review of the literature concluded that there are universal mechanisms underlying ethnocentrism.^[1059]

- Mechanisms of genetic similarity: People preferentially assort with genetically similar others. Friends, spouses, and the other people we

make alliances with are more like us than people selected at random; other things being equal, this enhances the benefits of such relationships and lessens the risks.^[1060] This is the most likely explanation for implicit Whiteness.

- As noted above, there is good evidence that social identity processes are a biological adaptation important for group defense. But since they don't necessarily respond to genetic differences between groups, they are not really of use in ethnic defense unless the groups are already constituted on an ethnic basis, as in traditional tribal societies.
- Groups composed of sports fans and the like can trigger social identity processes, but they do not result in the deep emotions that are aroused in ethnic, religious, and patriotic groups. It is not at all uncommon for people make the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of these groups. The best explanation for this is that humans have a natural tendency to classify themselves into ingroups and outgroups on the basis of these categories so that they tend to have stronger allegiance to these groups than, say, their stamp collecting club. Race and ethnicity have all the features of an evolved module. For example, processing of racial and ethnic differences is rapid, unconscious, and automatic^[1061]—all characteristics of implicit processing and hallmarks of evolved modules.

In any case, whatever the strength of the mechanisms underlying ethnocentrism, given the tendencies of Whites toward individualism in the context of the present cultural environment of the West that vilifies White ethnocentrism, these mechanisms have thus far proved insufficient to provide for ethnic defense of Whites. However, the current culture also contains facets that will in fact increase White ethnocentrism.

Being Aware of Impending Minority Status Triggers White Ethnocentrism

The foregoing has discussed why achieving widespread acceptance by Whites of an explicit culture of White identity and interests is an uphill struggle. However, there are also mechanisms that are likely to create an increased sense of White identity and White interests in the years ahead. The fundamental reason for this is the demographic transformation resulting from massive immigration of non-Whites into countries that were either

homogeneously White or, like the United States (ninety percent White in 1960), had a politically dominant White majority. This transformation, in which it is obvious that White political power is declining as Whites head toward minority status, would by itself trigger defensive mechanisms of implicit Whiteness and behavior such as White flight discussed above.

Individualists are less naturally ethnocentric, and the left has created a culture that encourages Whites to inhibit expressions of ethnocentrism while encouraging non-Whites to be ethnocentric. Because the media is dominated by the left and because even the conservative media is terrified of appearing to advocate White interests, explicit messages that would encourage Whites to become angry and fearful about their future as a minority are rare. Indeed, the media rarely, if ever, mentions that Whites are well on their way to becoming a minority. And this for good reason: Whites in the United States and in Canada who are given explicit demographic projections of a time when Whites are no longer a majority tend to feel angry and fearful. They are also more likely to identify as Whites and have sympathy for other Whites.^[1062]

In other words, while I have emphasized the ability of the higher brain centers to inhibit ethnocentrism, explicit messages indicating that one's racial group is threatened are able to trigger ethnocentrism. This is especially important because many Whites live far from the areas undergoing the demographic shifts. Their day-to-day life of living in an essentially White environment hasn't changed while population centers such as Los Angeles, Sydney, Toronto, and London have changed beyond all recognition from what they were 50 years ago. An obvious inference is that pro-White activists should appeal to Whites' higher brain centers with explicit messages emphasizing these transformations.

Expressions of Anti-White Hatred Promote White Ethnocentrism

Another force that will make Whites more willing to coalesce into cohesive groups is the strident anti-White rhetoric that is now common in the elite media and academic culture throughout the West. There are many examples of this. It's common now for the left to conceptualize American history as nothing more than dispossessing the Indians and enslaving Africans, Jim Crow laws in the South, etc., with the result that American history is being deconstructed from an anti-White perspective—Howard Zinn's *A People's History of the United States, 1492–Present* is the classic

text.^[1063] American historical figures are being delegitimized, their statues removed, etc.

Recently the *New York Times* hired Sarah Jeong, an Asian woman with a history of anti-White tweets, the *New York Times*' Michelle Goldberg rejoiced that Whites are being replaced in Georgia, a Princeton classics professor advocated shutting off White men from publishing in the field, and CNN's Don Lemon stated that White males are America's biggest terror threat.^[1064]

It's obvious that in a post-Obama America the anti-white zeitgeist is out of pandora's box. ... Due to unprecedented immigration and fatalist progressive experiments, there is no country where anti-white cultural currents are not rising. It wasn't supposed to be this way, weakness, wealth transfers, preferential treatment, open borders and accommodation were supposed to invite warm feelings, equal outcomes and racial blindness. ...

By the 1990s the entire constellation of Christian morality and civic responsibility in the public space had been secularized and compressed into a singular mandate. Millennials were taught from childhood that the highest moral good was serving the self-esteem of non-whites. In prior ages virtues such as courage, modesty, chivalry, valor and faith were ways young adults were encouraged to distinguish themselves but for Millennials it was an adeptness and willingness to navigate the mercurial minefield of knowing when and how to serve the self-esteem of non-whites that mattered.

Over the past thirty years conservatives were busy building an entire culture around anti-socialism while the Left was busy pushing its cultural trojan horse to unleash a whole different kind of plague. Maybe deep down many conservatives knew the anti-white damn would burst but they were too cowardly to confront it.^[1065]

Too cowardly indeed—quite like the professors unwilling to discuss Jewish influence on Mideast policy.

The following discusses several evolved mechanisms acting at the implicit, unconscious level that could act as a countervailing force to this culture of the left.

Social Identity Processes

At the outset of this chapter I reviewed research on social identity processes indicating that identification with an ingroup is increased in the presence of group competition—part of the argument for why social identity processes are an evolved universal. Because the left has adopted a program of encouraging identity politics among its racial, religious, and gender non-conformist constituencies, the result is that boundaries between groups have become clearer, thus triggering social identity mechanisms of positive bias toward the ingroup and negative bias toward outgroups.

As noted above, an awareness of impending minority status and the ubiquity of anti-White rhetoric are processed by the higher brain centers. However, the result is that Whites feel increasingly threatened in the multicultural West. This feeling of being under threat feeds into our evolved psychology of social identity. It is thus predicted that Whites in American and throughout the West will coalesce into a cohesive group based on these processes.

White people in the U.S. are coalescing in the Republican Party, and implicit White identities and associations continue to be common. However, explicit White identities remain uncommon, a testament to White individualism and relative lack of ethnocentrism, likely dovetailing with the effects of the media, the educational system, threats of ostracism, etc. According to a 2019 Pew Research survey, Whites remain by far the least likely racial group to state that race is extremely important (5 percent) or very important (10 percent) to their identity, with Whites under age 30 least likely to say so.^[1066] However, between 2017 and 2019 there was an increase among Republicans (the vast majority of whom are White) who agree that “if America is too open to the other people of the world, we risk losing our identity as a nation (from 48 percent to 57 percent),” with men, older people, and the less educated more likely to express this attitude.

Even more surprising is the sudden upsurge in such sentiments: “since September [2018], the share of Republicans who say America risks losing its identity if it is too open has increased 13 percentage points, while the share who view the nation’s openness to others as essential has declined 10 points.”^[1067] At least some of this phenomenon is likely explained by President Trump’s rhetoric on immigration which has placed the issue front and center in American politics and resulted in a torrent of abuse from the left.

Of course, these results are likely conservative estimates due to Whites not wanting to provide such opinions to a pollster given that such attitudes are

proscribed by elites in the media, political culture, and educational system.

It's therefore of interest that data from the same poll indicated that a substantial percentage of White Americans (61 percent) have a sense of shared fate with other White people, and such attitudes are actually more common among younger adults (age 30 or less) compared to older Whites (age > 50), and they are more common among highly educated Whites.^[1068] Attitudes of shared fate are an indirect measure of White identity and are likely more accurate than asking direct questions about explicit White identity or wanting more diversity because such attitudes have not been explicitly condemned by the mass media and educational system. A sense of shared fate is a strong marker of ingroup identity; at the extreme, a sense of shared fate has been linked to martyrdom and other forms of self-sacrificing behavior on behalf of the group.^[1069] As Ben Franklin reportedly stated at the signing of the Declaration of Independence, "we must indeed all hang together, or most assuredly we will all hang separately."

Chapters 3–5 of my book *Separation and Its Discontents* developed the argument that group competition has been central to the main historical examples of anti-Semitism: the development of institutionalized anti-Semitism in the Roman Empire in the fourth century, the Iberian inquisitions, and the phenomenon of National Socialist anti-Semitism in the period 1933–1945 in Germany.^[1070] The common denominator of these movements is that they involved a powerful sense of group cohesion in opposition to Judaism, and I argue that each of these movements may be profitably analyzed as a reaction to the presence of Judaism as a highly successful group evolutionary strategy. Based on the social identity research discussed above, powerful group strategies are expected to beget opposing group strategies that in many ways have provided a mirror image of Jewish groups which they combat—socialization for ingroup identity, punishment for defectors, feelings of ingroup superiority and outgroup inferiority, and a sense of shared fate.

What this means in the present context is that as Whites see their power diminishing and notice that hatred toward them and their history is increasingly expressed in mainstream media outlets and in the actions of activists, they will increasingly identify as Whites and develop into a much more cohesive group opposed to the forces arrayed against them. Historically, this has often ended in violent conflict between groups

THE EXTREMISM OF SCANDINAVIAN CULTURE:

EGALITARIANISM, TRUST, CONFORMITY AND CONSENSUS DECISION MAKING

It seems appropriate to conclude a chapter on the psychology of moral communities by discussing the extremism of Scandinavian political culture. In Chapter 1 it was argued that the Scandinavian countries are on the extreme end of the northwest-southeast genetic cline, with higher levels of northern hunter-gatherer-derived genes than other parts of Western Europe. Chapter 3 described these hunter-gatherer cultures as reflecting egalitarian individualism, and Chapter 4 described the Scandinavian family patterns as extreme within Western Europe.

Although all Western European-derived societies are undergoing replacement-level, non-White migration, there can be little doubt that Scandinavia and especially Sweden, are extreme in welcoming replacement of their peoples and cultures. As elsewhere in the West, a major role in these transformations has been played by Jewish activists and Jewish media ownership,^[1071] but Scandinavians seem particularly favorable to these transformations. Indeed, Noah Carl, analyzing 2015 survey data from the European Union, found that Swedes were the least ethnocentric group as measured by items such as approval of children having a love relationship with various ethnic groups, sexual minorities, and disabled people.^[1072] Respondents from the U.K. and the Netherlands were also highly tolerant, with Eastern European countries on the low end, data consistent with northwestern Europeans being the most tolerant.

The reputation-based moral communities of Scandinavia have been strongly egalitarian. The “Jante Laws” of Scandinavia are paradigmatic: 1. Don’t think you are anything; 2. Don’t think you are as good as us. 3. Don’t think you are smarter than us. 4. Don’t fancy yourself better than us. 5. Don’t think you know more than us. 6. Don’t think you are greater than us. 7. Don’t think you are good for anything. 8. Don’t laugh at us. 9. Don’t think that anyone cares about you. 10. Don’t think you can teach us anything.^[1073] In short, no one must rise above the rest. Such egalitarianism is typical of hunter-gatherer groups around the world^[1074] and is antithetical to the aristocratic ideal of the Indo-Europeans.

Extreme egalitarianism results in high levels of conformism and social anxiety. Individuals fear social ostracism for violating egalitarian norms and standing out from the crowd—a phenomenon that has played a major role in creating a public consensus in favor of mass migration and multiculturalism.

Decisions are by consensus, implying that individuals are loathe to stand out from the group. In Sweden especially there is no public debate on the costs and benefits of immigration; sceptics typically remain silent for fear of shunning and disapproval.

Reflecting this pattern, contemporary Scandinavian society in general has a history of relatively small income and social class differences, including the absence of serfdom during the Middle Ages (see Chapter 4). A recent anthropological study of hunter-gatherers found that economic inequality approximated that of modern Denmark.^[1075] Chapter 4 discusses the individualism of Scandinavian family patterns, including relatively egalitarian relationships between spouses—extreme even within the Western European context.

Reputation-based moral communities thus lead to groupthink as individuals trust one another to have honest opinions, and individuals who deviate from group norms are shunned. A Swedish attorney commenting on a legal case where an innocent person was convicted of a crime, noted that many people were involved in the decision and all agreed with what turned out to be an unjust verdict:

When the same people participated in all or most of [the decision], a groupthink developed. ... Strong trust between people is often described as one of Sweden's great assets [but] it cannot replace a critical approach to serious allegations, even when they are self-accusations [i.e., a false confession by the accused].^[1076]

Strong social trust is indeed a great asset of Sweden and other countries with a significant Nordic population, leading to societies based on individual merit (a facet of reputation) and low levels of corruption. However, as in the above example, it can lead to groupthink as individuals who stand out or dissent from group norms in any way are ostracized—a facet of the Jante Laws (and the Tall Poppy syndrome New Zealand; see Chapter 8): it's not only excellence that is punished, but any deviation from group norms, including opinions shared by group members.

Egalitarian groups thus make decisions by consensus, not in a top-down, authoritarian manner. Once there is a decision-by-consensus, dissenters are seen as willfully ignorant or obstinate, and they lose status within the group.

Strong tendencies toward egalitarianism can thus easily lead to powerful

social controls, either formal or informal, on behavior which are designed to ensure that individuals do not deviate from consensus attitudes, as noted in Puritan-derived cultures which became dominant in England and had a strong influence on the United States (Chapter 6). Thus, even though Scandinavian cultures have been described as the most individualistic in terms of family functioning (Chapter 4), it is not surprising that these cultures may exert strong controls on individual behavior to ensure conformity to the norms of a moral community.

Both egalitarianism and socially enforced norms (conceptualized in moral terms) thus typify these cultures. Sweden appears to be extreme in these tendencies. Whereas Chapter 3 discussed Sweden's egalitarianism, here I describe the intense social controls that have virtually banned discussion of the negative aspects of immigration and multiculturalism, support for which has become a consensus among the Swedish elite.

Sweden has declared itself a "humanitarian superpower"—a superpower whose ideology is that no sacrifice by the Swedes on behalf of Third World migrants is considered too great. Official policy is that Swedes should make sacrifices to ensure sufficient housing for the continuous flow of immigrants, including repurposing churches (while mosques are being built). The government buys virtually any standing structure to be turned into immigrant housing, and there are proposals to confiscate vacation homes "for the greater good." Meanwhile, Swedes have a lower priority for housing than immigrants, and thousands can't find an apartment, a situation that is particularly difficult for young people, especially those wishing to start a family. Leading politicians openly say that Sweden does not belong to the Swedes, and that Swedes and Swedish culture are bland or that Sweden does not have a culture. ^[1077]

This phenomenon is a violation of the general finding that people are less willing to contribute to public goods (e.g., public housing, health care) to people who don't look like themselves^[1078] and again indicates very low ethnocentrism. Thus, the European societies that inaugurated national health care programs did so when they were racially homogeneous. Besides a long history of self-reliance as fundamental to Americans' self-concept, a likely reason universal health care has been so slow in coming in the U.S. is its historically large Black population, and in recent decades the post-1965 multicultural tsunami. ^[1079]

A critical aspect of the success of Swedish multiculturalism is that Swedes

are terrified to violate the moral consensus surrounding migration for fear of ostracism and loss of job. They are engaging in groupthink that demands allegiance to a moral community as defined by the media and the political culture. In effect, considering the genetic distances involved, this is an extreme form of what evolutionists term “altruistic punishment”—willingness to punish one’s own people and sacrifice them on the altar of a moral ideal for fear of violating the norms of a moral community (Chapter 3, with further examples in Chapter 6).

Journalist Ingrid Carlqvist comments on the enforced silence on any criticism of multiculturalism, particularly in the above-ground media. Violating the silence is met with moral outrage intended to produce shunning and ostracism—in other words, there is a socially mandated groupthink where people are terrified at the thought of having dissenting opinions:

The situation in Sweden is far worse than in Denmark [which, as noted in Chapter 1 is quite different from Sweden genetically]. In Sweden *nobody* talks about immigration problems, the death of the multicultural project or the Islamisation/Arabisation of Europe. If you do, you will immediately be called a racist, an Islamophobe or a Nazi. That is what I have been called since I founded the Free Press Society in Sweden. My name has been dragged through the dirt in big newspapers like *Sydsvenskan*, *Svenska Dagbladet* and even my own union paper, *The Journalist*.^{[\[1080\]](#)}

This phenomenon has nothing to do with Christianity. Sweden is the most secular country in the world. Its elites are hostile to Christianity and more than happy to donate Christian churches to the non-Christian newcomers or to destroy churches to make housing for them. Rather, it is a new secular religion of moral consensus. They are behaving like the Puritans and Quakers, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, but without the religious veneer. Of course, we see the same thing throughout the West, albeit to a lesser extent. Western societies have uniquely been high-trust, reputation-based societies, a basic corollary of the psychology of Western individualism.

Ironically perhaps, one of the major findings on multiculturalism noted above is that it erodes trust not only of ethnic outsiders, but also of people of one’s own race or ethnicity. We can thus look forward to Swedes and other Westerners being less trusting, but by the time this happens, Sweden will

already have been transformed into a non-homogeneous society prone to intra-societal conflicts and lack of willingness to contribute to public goods. When trust evaporates, Swedes may become more willing to stand up to the suicidal consensus.

Groupthink implies failure to look at the facts of the situation rather than idealized versions that reinforce the consensus. Groupthink thus makes it difficult to question multicultural mantras like “diversity is our strength” by considering the research on the effects of importing ethnic and religious diversity. In the case of Sweden, research indicates that, as in the United States noted above, Swedes, especially highly educated, relatively affluent Swedes, are the first to flee diversity, typically while failing to question its value.

We’ve found a so-called “tipping point” at around 3-4%, says Emma Neuman, research economist at Linneuniversitet. When the non-European immigrants are that many in a residential area then the native Swedes start moving out. ...

The effect doesn’t revolve around immigrants generally. Immigrants from European countries do not result in a moving effect, only non-European immigrants. It is reminiscent of the phenomenon of white flight in the USA where whites move away from neighbourhoods where many blacks move in.^[1081]

Despite such implicitly nativist behavior, these Swedes are unlikely to publicly dissent from the consensus opinion that forbids any discussion of the effects of importing non-European diversity. The question of whether Swedes benefit from an increasingly segregated, culturally and racially divided, conflict-ridden society is never raised in public.^[1082]

The Special Case of Finland

I noted in Chapter 1 that Finns, particularly in eastern Finland, are genetic outliers compared to Western Europe. It’s interesting that Finnish society exhibits a similar phenomenon to the Jante Laws discussed above. Edward Dutton notes that a factor contributing to the lack of condemnation of a recent epidemic of rapes by migrants was the desire not to stand out from the crowd. Like their Scandinavian neighbors, Finns are high on conformism and social anxiety, concerned to maintain a good reputation in their moral community.

^[1083] They do not want to dissent from the moral consensus that defines the community. Being ostracized from the small face-to-face communities that Finns evolved in was certain evolutionary death.

At the same time, traditional Finnish society, especially in eastern Finland where there is relatively little Swedish genetic or cultural influence, clearly has not exhibited the northwestern European family system discussed in Chapter 4.^[1084] Family structure was patriarchal, with fathers controlling sons and determining marriages. “The head of the household took the decision as to when to partition his farm, when to make appointment to the son and when to retire.” Although they could leave the family farm with an equal inheritance as their brothers, sons tended to remain in the household, the oldest son becoming patriarch, while daughters married outside the family. In eastern Finland in the second half of the eighteenth century, fully 70 percent of families were extended or multiple, rising to 84–90 percent among the peasants. This pattern is remarkably similar to that found in southern France and southeastern Europe, and contrasts with the patterns of northwest Europe, as discussed in Chapter 4. In Finland, it wasn’t until well into the eighteenth century that this pattern began to change as a result of influence from Sweden via the Lutheran church’s opposition to clans and marrying kin. (Sweden dominated Finland until 1809.)—characterized by socially enforced egalitarianism as typified by the Jante Laws.

This suggests that egalitarianism, social anxiety, and conformism evolved in Finland independent of other parts of Scandinavia where they are linked to extreme individualism in family structure.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF CHANGING THE EXPLICIT CULTURE

Evolutionists have not been properly sensitive to the enormous gulf between humans and animals resulting from human general intelligence and the Conscientiousness system. At a very broad level, the Conscientiousness system allows our behavior to come under the control of the surrounding culture. We make complex appraisals of how our behavior and attitudes mesh with the rewards and punishments present in the current cultural milieu, and we are inundated with ideas and ideologies emanating from the academic world and the media. Importantly for the present political context, potential political dissidents must assess the risks to their reputation and livelihood in their face-to-face world.

But it gets more complicated than that. The people creating messages emanating from the mainstream media and academic culture need not—and often do not—have the same interests as the recipients of the messages. For example, it is a commonplace that media images have important effects on behavior even though people are often unaware that their behavior is so influenced.⁸⁵ These images are often engineered by advertisers who are consciously attempting to influence the recipients of the messages in ways that conform to advertisers' interests, not those of the audience.

More important, media messages and academic culture—both dominated by the anti-White left—have been able to shape the discussion of issues related to White identity and interests. The culture of critique has become the explicit culture of the West, endlessly repeated in media messages but packaged differently for people of different levels of intelligence and education, and for people with different interests and from different subcultures.⁸⁶ White people are constantly exposed to suffering non-Whites as proper candidates for immigration and refugee status. They are exposed to messages intended to induce guilt for the history of slavery and dispossession of the Native Americans. A theme of this chapter is that by programming the higher areas of the brain, this explicit culture is able to control the implicit ethnocentric tendencies of White people.

To find a way out of this morass, therefore, changing the explicit culture is critical, in particular legitimizing a strong sense of identity and group interests among Whites. This won't be easy, but I suggest that the first step is a psychological one: making proud and confident explicit assertions of White identity and interests, and creating communities where such assertions are considered normal and natural rather than grounds for ostracism. The fact that such assertions appeal to our implicit psychology is certainly an asset. It's always easier to go with a natural tendency than to oppose it. And in this case, opposing our natural ethnocentric tendencies by using our quintessentially human prefrontal inhibitory control against our own ethnic interests is nothing less than suicidal.

Moreover, the massive demographic changes that have occurred throughout the West along with increasingly common anti-White themes in the mainstream media appear to be making Whites more aware that their interests are not being met by the erection of minority-White, multicultural, multiracial societies throughout the West. As discussed above, this anti-White rhetoric has the effect not only of making Whites more conscious of

being White, but of making them more willing to coalesce into a White political force.

The result has been increasingly strident efforts to ramp up propaganda in support of the status quo on issues related to race and immigration and to shut down free speech on these issues. Particularly since the election of President Trump, the dominant cultural apparatus of the left has moved into high gear, with major newspapers (*The New York Times*, *Washington Post*) and television networks (CNN, MSNBC) becoming obsessively anti-Trump. Since the charge of Russian collusion has collapsed, the media has shifted to greater emphasis on Trump's alleged racism.

However, when propaganda fails to have its desired effects of manipulating our evolved psychology—as appears to be increasingly the case—the establishment has been resorting to force. Stifling speech by people who disagree with the establishment line on race has become common. Speakers are barred from college campuses or shouted down, often amid rioting.^[1085] Social media companies have shut down the accounts of outspoken White advocates, such as Jared Taylor, and have engaged in shadow banning, and limiting numbers of followers. Media sites associated with the Dissident Right have been denied financial services by PayPal and credit card processing companies.

As noted in Chapter 7, there is also a robust academic literature by leftist law professors that justifies essentially abrogating the First Amendment on issues related to race.^[1086] If Hillary Clinton had been elected president and appointed even one or two Supreme Court justices, the First Amendment would have been gutted. Justice Elena Kagan has already shown a willingness to rein in the First Amendment regarding speech on diversity issues.

And recently the American Civil Liberties Union—long a stalwart defender of free speech and often regarded as a de facto Jewish organization^[1087]—has changed its policies to combat ideas associated with the Dissident Right:

A recent internal ACLU memo on “case-selection guidelines” explicitly says that the cases the organization takes up may be influenced by “the extent to which the speech may assist in advancing the goals of white supremacists or others whose views are contrary to our values. ... Factors like the potential effect of the speech on ‘marginalized

communities’ and even on ‘the ACLU’s credibility’ could militate against taking a case.”^[1088]

Historically, leftists have favored free speech when they did not have the power they do today. For example, during the 1950s’ McCarthy era, the left—already well entrenched in the media and elite universities—was mainly concerned to protect communist professors and other leftist dissidents—many of them Jewish—who were targeted by Congressional committees. Their political views stifled by restrictions on communism, their response was to create a culture in which free speech was viewed as sacrosanct. *Inherit the Wind* (by Jerome Lawrence Schwartz and Robert Edwin Lee) was written to oppose McCarthyism.^[1089] Another famous example of anti-McCarthyism from the 1950s is Arthur Miller’s *The Crucible* which implicitly condemned the House Un-American Activities Committee by comparing their hearings on communist infiltration to the Salem witch trials in Puritan Massachusetts.

However, the rise of the left to cultural dominance has coincided with the power of organizations like the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC—another de facto Jewish organization^[1090]) and the Anti-Defamation League that care nothing for free speech and specialize in getting people fired and ostracized for thought crimes. There is clearly a Jewish ethnic aspect to this transformation.^[1091] While there are endless tears for Hollywood screenwriters blacklisted during the anti-communist fervor of the 1950s and since promoted to cultural sainthood,^[1092] don’t expect our new elite to condemn witch hunts against the Dissident Right. And don’t expect any time soon to see a hit Broadway play based on an allegory in which the SPLC is implicitly condemned for its persecution of race realists and White advocates.

The lesson is that the left will not give up its cultural dominance without a battle and they will be utterly unprincipled in how they attempt to remain in power. The left’s power resides in its ability to engage in psychological manipulation by occupying the moral and intellectual high ground in the media and universities; it resides in its ability to shape incentives and disincentives in the workplace; it resides in its ability to import a new left-leaning electorate. If all these fail, force can and will be used.

**APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 8: RECENT
CULTURAL DETERIORATION:
SOME CULTURAL CORRELATES
OF THE RISE OF A NEW ELITE**

It has been noted that the English Civil War was a fundamental breaking point in the history of the West. However, another watershed era was the 1960s. The outcome of the English Civil War result in the gradual ascendancy of a new elite. The success of the 1960s countercultural revolution has also resulted in the ascendancy of a new elite which has rapidly changed the country. The eclipse of the old WASP-dominated elite in America is described in Eric Kaufmann's *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America* (see Chapter 6);^[1093] the rise of the new Jewish-dominated elite is described in my book *The Culture of Critique*. While the ultimate loser of the English Civil War was the aristocracy, the ultimate loser of the 1960s countercultural revolution is the White population of America (and ultimately the West as a whole), but especially the White working class.

While the most important consequence of the 1960s countercultural revolution has been the colonization of millions of non-Europeans into the West to the point that traditional White populations will become minorities in this century if this is not reversed, there have also been dramatic changes in the culture of the West. This appendix discusses the effects of this cultural revolution on the family and on recent increases in mortality particularly affecting the White working class.

**THE GENERAL CULTURAL DECLINE IN AMERICA SINCE
THE 1960S**

A theme of *The Culture of Critique* is that the rising Jewish elite was fundamental to the success of the countercultural revolution of the 1960s, whether as leaders of campus radicals or promoting the sexual revolution.^[1094] Regarding the sexual revolution, higher-IQ people suffer to a lesser extent than lower-IQ people from the erosion of cultural supports for high-investment parenting and the decline in religious belief involving traditional Christian sexual attitudes. This was especially a theme of the chapter on psychoanalysis that focused on the effects of the sexual revolution.^[1095]

Although the West had developed a decidedly individualist culture, there remained strong social controls on certain aspects of individual behavior, notably sexual behavior. These social controls were buttressed by the pervasiveness of Christian religious beliefs. Although there certainly were periods of greater and lesser controls on sexual behavior, in general and at least since the Middle Ages, Western culture had been characterized by monogamous marriage, high-investment parenting, and very low divorce rates, with non-monogamous sex relegated to an underground of prostitution.

In general, people on the lower end of the IQ distribution benefit more from the traditional social supports embedded Western culture—in particular, support for marriage and for mores against out-of-wedlock births. In my previous life teaching developmental psychology, the textbook chapter on the family had charts showing that beginning in the 1960s there have been dramatic increases in out-of-wedlock births and divorce, resulting in many more children being raised without fathers. This opened up new fields in child psychology as psychologists investigated the effects on children of these cultural shifts. The results are clear: divorce, single parenting, and out-of-wedlock births are strong risk factors in a wide range of child problems, including delinquency, criminality, poor performance in school, poor physical and emotional health, and early mortality.”^[1096]

A major theme of Richard Herrnstein’s and Charles Murray’s *The Bell Curve* is that divorce and other measures of family dysfunction are more common at the lower end of the IQ distribution.^[1097] The only reason I use IQ is that it is studied much more and can be very precisely measured, but by using impulse control one could obtain similar findings. People at the lower end of the IQ distribution also have more difficulty controlling their impulses, are more prone to instant gratification rather than long-term planning and can be expected to be more prone to drug addiction.^[1098] As a result, they suffer more from the erosion of cultural supports for high-investment parenting—delaying sexual intercourse, not getting pregnant before marriage, etc. In my high school—a Catholic school where the traditional sexual ideology was firmly in place—virtually no one was having sex. But that was in the late 1950s–early 1960s. Since the 1960s, there has been a very successful attack on this culture.

Traditional Christianity was a major part of those cultural supports. Quoting from *The Culture of Critique*:

As [Norman] Podhoretz notes, “it is in fact the case that Jewish intellectuals, Jewish organizations like the American Jewish Congress, and Jewish-dominated organizations such as the ACLU ... have ridiculed Christian religious beliefs, attempted to undermine the public strength of Christianity, and have led the fight for unrestricted pornography.”^[1099] The fact is that psychoanalysis as a Jewish-dominated intellectual movement is a central component of this war on cultural supports for high-investment parenting

Although other factors are undoubtedly involved, it is remarkable that the increasing trend toward low-investment parenting in the United States largely coincides with the triumph of the psychoanalytic and radical critiques of American culture represented by the political and cultural success of the counter-cultural movement of the 1960s.^[1100]

These trends have occurred in all races, but they affect Blacks more than Whites because on average Blacks are around one standard deviation lower than Whites on IQ and, as noted in Chapter 8, they are lower on impulse control (Conscientiousness). Blacks have always had higher percentages of out-of-wedlock births, but the gap has widened since the 1960s.

This fits with J. Philippe Rushton’s ranking of evolved race differences.^[1101] Sexual behaviors are heritable (i.e., genetically influenced): a study showed that before the sexual revolution, age of first intercourse was not substantially influenced by genetic differences because there were strong social norms against premarital sex; if there is no variation, then there can be no genetically influenced variation by definition. As a result, age of first sexual intercourse was not significantly heritable.^[1102] So in my high school, since no one was having sex, age of first intercourse was not heritable. But after the sexual revolution it became heritable: people prone to a slow life history pattern and high control of impulses were more likely to delay onset of sexual behavior, avoid childbirth outside of marriage, and stay married. As would be expected given Rushton’s theory, the sexual revolution has been disastrous most of all for Blacks. In 1965, 24 percent of Black infants and 3.1 percent of White infants were born to single mothers compared to ~72 percent and ~29 percent now.^[1103]

In his book *Coming Apart*, Charles Murray notes that for Whites beginning in the 1960s, there has been an increase in crime, and a decrease in religiosity, the work ethic, and marriage.^[1104] For the upper-middle class,

marriage fell from 94 percent to 84 percent between 1960 and 2010, but for the White working class it fell from 82 percent to 48 percent. For the White working class, never-married rose from 10 percent to 25 percent; and there has been dramatically lower workforce participation. Murray attributes this to a loss of “virtue,” but doesn’t discuss the forces and motivations behind this massive cultural shift.

It’s common among Murray’s critics to claim that these shifts result from economic conditions rather than the broader culture. From this perspective, in the America of the early 1960s, a high school graduate might expect to find a job which would allow him to marry and enable his wife the leisure to stay at home and raise children. He could buy a house and a car, and still afford to take the family on a two-week vacation every summer.

The problem with this is that all the trends affecting marriage and the family started in the 1960s when the White working class was doing well, reaching its zenith in the early 1970s and stagnating thereafter.^[1105] The steep upward trend in family and other aspects of social dysfunction began around 1960 and continued to climb until around 1990, when it temporarily fell back before reaching new highs. By 1970, when the White working class was at its economic peak, out-of-wedlock births had already increased threefold from 1960 levels.

There’s no question that the period from 1948 to the early 1970s was the golden age for the working class (non-supervisory production workers)—strong unions and no outsourcing of jobs. Since 1973, the income of this group has actually increased ~9 percent^[1106]—much less than for the college-educated, but this is stagnation, not a disaster. By itself, it shouldn’t cause increases in family dysfunction.

Nor should it cause increases in mortality given medical advances in the areas of heart disease and cancer. Angus Case and Anne Deaton point out that any economic explanation must account for why stagnant incomes cause early mortality in Whites but not in Blacks or in Europe. “Even if we go back to the late 1960s, the ethnic and racial patterns of median family incomes are similar for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, and so can provide no basis for their sharply different mortality outcomes after 1998.”^[1107] This also rules out widening income inequality (“your income is going up faster than mine”), and it also precludes loss of virtue aided by generous welfare and disability programs—Europe also has strong programs in these areas.

In general, according to Case and Deaton, the increased mortality among

the White working class begins in the 1990s. The first cohort to really show increased mortality was the one born in 1950—they were 40 years old in 1990 and thus the first generation to experience the countercultural revolution as teenagers. For every cohort after that, the increased mortality from drug poisoning, liver disease, alcohol, and suicide starts at an earlier age and is steeper—it gets to higher levels faster. These trends are higher among men than women and vary by education, with Whites with high school diplomas or less showing by far the worst effects.

Gina Kolata and Sarah Cohen elaborate on these findings based on their examination of 60 million death certificates from 1990–2014, but they pin the blame squarely on opioids, not on alcohol or suicide.”^[1108]

In 2014, the overdose death rate from legal and illegal drugs for Whites ages 25 to 34 was five times its level in 1999, and the rate for 35- to 44-year-old Whites tripled during that period. ... While the death rate among young Whites rose for every age group over the five years before 2014, it rose faster by any measure for the less educated, by 23 percent for those without a high school education, compared with only 4 percent for those with a college degree or more.

Another study also found that increases in deaths were not due to alcoholism and pinned the phenomenon squarely on the opioid epidemic. The authors note that mortality rates “took off around the time when prescription opioids became readily available, and it has kept rising steadily ever since.”^[1109]

Given that the trend in mortality may have not occurred in Europeans, the cultural shifts inaugurated by psychoanalysis are not solely to blame.^[1110] The general decline in the culture is separate from increases in mortality—just because family relationships are dysfunctional doesn’t imply greater mortality. However, I suspect that these two factors interact in the sense that if the cultural supports that existed up until the 1950s had remained in place, the White working class would not have succumbed to the opioid epidemic.

Again, people with a faster life history profile are less able to control their impulses and thus more prone to maladaptive behavior in a culturally permissive environment awash in drugs and where religious and other cultural constraints on behavior have been weakened. The combined effects of these two things—the cultural shifts brought about by the triumph of the

countercultural revolution and the glut of opioid drugs—was a disaster for the White working class.^[111] In this regard, it's interesting that the first generation to show increased mortality was the one that became teenagers in the 1960s.

As in *The Culture of Critique*, the movement to promote opioid use was originated by elites and based ultimately on pseudoscience created at the highest levels of the academic medical establishment, motivated by payoffs to a whole host of people ranging from professors in the academic-medical establishment down to sales representatives and general practitioner physicians.

A fundamental problem in dealing with this now is that the trends in increased mortality set in motion by these processes will continue no matter what governments do about prescription opioids. Increased regulation simply forces addicts into heroin and other illegal drugs. In fact, whereas in 2002 deaths due to prescription opioids were much higher than total of deaths due to heroin and synthetic opioids, by 2017 43,900 deaths were due to the latter, compared to only 17,000 involving prescription opioids.^[112]

The opioid phenomenon reflects the post-1960s culture of America. It is the product of elite culture, well-funded and with access to the most prestigious institutions of society. Because of this prestige, it was able to present essentially false data as science and have it accepted by the medical establishment. Similarly, in the case of the campaign to enact the 1965 immigration law, pro-immigration committees were funded by wealthy individuals, fraudulent academic studies were created on the benefits of immigration, positive articles about immigration appeared in the media, lobbyists were paid, and prominent people were recruited. A good example of the latter is that future president John F. Kennedy was recruited to put his name as author on a book titled *A Nation of Immigrants* which was actually written by Myer Feldman and published by the Anti-Defamation League.^[113]

Also similar is the neoconservative infrastructure, with well-funded think tanks, prominent spokesmen at prestigious universities, and a very large media presence. Neocons can be assured that if they are forced out of a job in the Department of State or Department of Defense, they will have many options to fall back on in academia, think tanks, or lobbying groups. Despite promoting disastrous policies, such as the war in Iraq, they are still a very powerful component of the U.S. foreign policy establishment.^[114]

CONCLUSION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE EFFECT OF THE 1960S

COUNTERCULTURAL REVOLUTION

The countercultural revolution of the 1960s has had a transformative effect on American society every bit as dramatic as the eclipse of the aristocracy and the Indo-European model of Western culture that began in the seventeenth century. This new culture is fundamentally based on importing non-Western peoples as clients of the left and as vital to a permanent leftist hegemony as already seen in states like California where even moderate conservatives are excluded from the political process; it is also seen by many of its strongest proponents as a guarantee against the rise of a White identity movement violently opposed to minority group interests.

If this transformation is not rolled back, it essentially implies the end of the ethnic core of Western civilization and very likely the entire set of cultural structures created by West. And because of the rise of non-White identity politics, it likely means the end of individualism as Whites coalesce into a cohesive group able to assert its interests in the new multicultural context.

THE LIBERAL TRADITION VERSUS MULTICULTURALISM

This book has emphasized the liberal strain of Western culture stemming ultimately from European individualism which can be found at the very origins of the Western European peoples. As noted in several places, a fundamental aspect of individualism is that group cohesion is based not on kinship but on reputation—most importantly, a moral reputation as honest, trustworthy and fair.

There is much positive that can be said about these liberal-egalitarian cultural trends. One can easily see why an intellectual or religious leader would find that the aristocratic, fundamentally Indo-European culture that had dominated Europe for millennia had shortcomings. The aristocracy, originally composed of military leaders who had earned their positions in battle, had often become a politically and economically oppressive, parasitic elite—alienated from the people they ruled and, quite often, addicted to conspicuous consumption and degenerate sexual behavior, particularly in France.

These egalitarian social movements had an obvious appeal in such an environment, and, beginning in the eighteenth century, they became focused on improving the often-appalling conditions of labor and ending slavery.

Nevertheless, the aristocratic-egalitarian tradition per se has certainly had many positive attributes. In the ancient world, this tradition was firmly grounded in the idea that society should be dominated by those with natural superiority. Theodor Mommsen, the great historian of Rome noted that

the senatorial aristocracy had guided the state, not primarily by virtue of natural right, but by virtue of the highest of all rights of representation—the right of the superior, as contrasted with the mere ordinary man.^[1115]

Whatever could be demanded of an assembly of burgesses like the

Roman, which was not the motive power, but the firm foundation of the whole machinery—a sure perception of the common good, a sagacious deference to the right leader, a steadfast spirit in prosperous and evil days, and, above all, the capacity of sacrificing the individual to the general welfare and common comfort of the present for the advantage of the future—all these qualities the Roman community exhibited in so high a degree that, when we look to its conduct as a whole, all censure is lost in reverent admiration. [\[116\]](#)

One can certainly admire such an aristocracy, and in later periods of European history there certainly were instances where aristocracies served the interests of the community as a whole. King Louis IX of France (St. Louis), mentioned in Chapter 5 as promoting the economic interests of the entire community rather than maximizing his own wealth, comes to mind; the many military campaigns against Muslim invaders led by aristocratic heroes such as Charles Martel should also be mentioned. But such cannot be said in general, and it certainly cannot be said of the elites dominating the West today where shortsightedness, opportunism, greed, and pursuit of narrow individual and ethnic interests predominate. The path to creating such an aristocracy seems essentially utopian in the current milieu.

The egalitarian trends that began their ascent to power in the seventeenth century unleashed enormous creativity and innovation as inherited social status declined in importance in the new meritocratic context in which upward mobility was possible and individual initiative and talent rewarded. There was a tremendous flowering of science, technology, inventions, and the arts, to the point that, in comparison to all other areas of the world, almost all (97 percent) of the major figures in these fields have been males of European background, particularly northwestern Europe. Indeed, Charles Murray's map of the "European Core" that gave rise to this inventiveness coincides to a remarkable extent with the geographic area described in Chapter 4 as the area of moderate individualism—including the Germanic areas of northern Italy but excluding Scandinavia (except for Denmark, which, as noted in Chapter 1, has more genetic commonality with Germany than with the rest of Scandinavia) and southern Europe (including southern France and southern Italy). [\[117\]](#)

Further, while the accomplishments of Western science in the ancient world are without parallel elsewhere (in my opinion, Aristotle was the

greatest intellect of all time), this efflorescence began in the seventeenth century and coincides with the rise of egalitarian individualism (Chapter 6).

INDIVIDUALISM AS A PRECURSOR OF SCIENCE AND CAPITALISM

Individualism as Precursor of Science

The Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic (WEIRD) people discussed in Chapter 3 developed scientific and scholarly associations in the post-medieval West which assume groups are permeable and highly subject to defection—that there is a marketplace of ideas in which individuals may defect from current scientific views when they believe that the data support alternate perspectives. On the other hand, collectivist cultures create group-oriented intellectual movements based on dogmatic assertions, fealty to group leaders, ethnic networking, and expulsion of dissenters.^[1118]

Ricardo Duchesne highlights disputation as a critical component in Western intellectual discourse, analyzed in terms of the Indo-European cultural legacy of personal striving for fame.^[1119] Beginning in ancient Greece, intellectual debate was intensely competitive, and individuals were free to defect from a particular scholar if they found another more appealing.^[1120] Intellectuals sought followers not by depending on pre-existing kinship or ethnic connections, but rather by their ability to attract followers in a free market of ideas in which people were free to defect to other points of view. Just as members of a *Männerbund* were free to defect to other groups with objectively better prospects for success, the free market of ideas would naturally default to arguments and ideas that can appeal to others who are free to defect from the group and where groups are highly permeable. In a social context consisting of others who are similarly free to defect, logical arguments and predictive theories about the natural world would come to the fore.

Disputation implies that people are free to disagree. Scientific movements are highly permeable groups whose members are prone to defection if they find a better theory or if new data are uncovered. A fundamental issue in the philosophy of science is to describe the type of discourse community that promotes scientific thinking in any area of endeavor. As phrased by Donald Campbell, the question is “which social systems of belief revision and belief retention would be most likely to improve the competence-of-reference of beliefs to their presumed referents?”^[1121] Scientific progress (Campbell’s

“competence-of-reference”) depends on an individualistic, atomistic universe of discourse in which each individual sees himself or herself not as a member of a wider political or cultural entity advancing a particular point of view but as an independent agent endeavoring to evaluate evidence and discover the structure of reality.

As Campbell notes, a critical feature of science as it evolved in the seventeenth century was that individuals were independent agents who could replicate scientific findings for themselves.^[1122] Scientific opinion certainly coalesces around certain propositions in real science (e.g., the structure of DNA, the mechanisms of psychological reinforcement), but this scientific consensus is highly prone to defection in the event that new data casts doubt on presently held theories. Arthur Jensen summarizes this view well when he notes that “when many individual scientists ... are all able to think as they please and do their research unfettered by collectivist or totalitarian constraints, science is a self-correcting process.”^[1123]

Rational arguments appeal to disinterested observers and are subject to refutation. They do not depend on group discipline or group interests for their effectiveness because in Western cultures, the groups are permeable and defections based on individual beliefs are far more the norm than other cultures.

Moreover, as noted in Chapter 3, WEIRD people tend more toward analytical reasoning (detaching objects from context, attending to characteristics of the object and developing rules for explaining and predicting phenomena) as opposed to holistic reasoning (attending to relationships between objects and surrounding field). Westerners tend to categorize objects on the basis of rules that are independent of function and hence more abstract whereas non-Westerners are more likely to categorize on the basis of function and contextual relationship. Science is fundamentally concerned with creating abstract rules independent of context and developing explanations and predictions of phenomena in the empirical world. Such traits, which can be seen even in the ancient Greco-Roman world of antiquity, clearly predispose to scientific thinking.

In this regard, it’s interesting that being high on general intelligence (IQ) facilitates solving novel problems by decontextualization and abstraction. Decontextualization is also an aspect of Jean Piaget’s formal operational thought, “the independence of its form from its reality content.”^[1124] This is because both general intelligence and Piaget’s formal operational thought are

able to inhibit the default mode of human cognition, which is to process information in a highly context-sensitive and automatic manner. We have “automatic heuristics”—unconscious “rules of thumb”—that allow us quickly to process information in our environment, making inferences, judgments, and decisions. ^[1125]

People automatically tend to contextualize problems in terms of their personal experience, especially social experience. For example, many people are influenced by vivid but unrepresentative personal experience (e.g., narrowly escaping death in an airplane mishap) more strongly than by valid statistical information (showing that airline travel is safer than traveling by automobile). As a result, unless they inhibit these tendencies, they make mistakes on problems that are completely formal, such as logical syllogisms, geometry and math problems, or the kinds of problems found on a culture-fair IQ test such as the non-verbal Raven’s Progressive Matrices. ^[1126] Decontextualization results from inhibiting and thereby controlling these automatic processes; it thus enables one to deal with problems of formal logic or mathematics that are devoid of any social or personalized context.

IQ researchers are well aware of the centrality of decontextualization for thinking about intelligence and its relation to science. Arthur Jensen:

One of the well-known byproducts of schooling is an increased ability to decontextualize problems. In almost every subject ... pupils learn to discover the general rule that applies to a highly specific situation and to apply a general rule in a wide variety of different contexts. The use of symbols to stand for things in reading (and musical notation); basic arithmetic operations; consistencies in spelling, grammar, and punctuation; regularities and generalizations in history; categorizing, serializing, enumerating, and inferring in science, and so on. Learning to do these things, which are all part of the school curriculum, instills cognitive habits that can be called decontextualization of cognitive skills. The tasks seen in many nonverbal or culture-reduced tests call for no scholastic knowledge per se, but do call for the ability to decontextualize novel situations by discovering rules or regularities and then using them to solve the problem. ^[1127]

Thinking evolved in a social context, and contextualization processes usually work quite effectively in everyday situations; contextualization

processes are automatic (i.e., they are psychological reflexes that do not require thoughtful consideration); they occur quickly and effortlessly, whereas decontextualized thinking is relatively slow and requires effort—which is why children in educational settings must concentrate and apply themselves to the task at hand. However, apart from IQ tests, there are many real-life situations in which decontextualization is called for—where people must solve problems in novel situations, and in general, people with higher general intelligence are better able to reason logically on such tasks. ^[1128]

The finding that WEIRD people tend toward scientific, logical reasoning thus demystifies the origins of science as a uniquely Western phenomenon. Beginning in the Greco-Roman world of antiquity, logical argument has been far more characteristic of Western cultures than any other culture area. As Ricardo Duchesne has pointed out, although the Chinese made many practical discoveries, they never developed the idea of a rational, orderly universe guided by universal laws comprehensible to humans. Nor did they ever develop a “deductive method of rigorous demonstration according to which a conclusion, a theorem, was proven by reasoning from a series of self-evident axioms.” ^[1129]

Such universal, generalized laws and geometrical or mathematical theorems derived from axioms are decontextualized rules—i.e., rules about perfect triangles or frictionless motion which nevertheless have many uses in the real-world. This is the essence of scientific reasoning. Galileo’s concept of frictionless motion, e.g., fails to predict the precise rate at which an object will move down an inclined plane, because there will always be friction in the real world. However, his concept has been very useful in real-world predictions and in designing a wide range of artifacts, ranging from engines to roads.

The discussion of WEIRD people in Chapter 3 emphasized the social embeddedness of collectivist cultures regarding moral reasoning versus the Western tendency to create abstract moral rules that apply to everyone. For collectivists, moral reasoning involves taking account of the social context, which is fundamentally centered on fitting into and strengthening a kinship group. For individualists, the social world involves a greater need to interact with strangers and to consider their reputation for respecting impersonal rules.

I propose that the individualist cultures and genetic heritage of the West predispose Westerners to abstract their judgments from the social context,

and that this then predisposes the West to scientific, rational thinking as well as unique methods of moral reasoning. Individuals are evaluated as individuals on traits—e.g., honesty, intelligence, military talent, and the logic and usefulness of their arguments—in abstraction from their (relatively weak) kinship connections. Moral situations are evaluated in terms of abstract concepts of justice that apply to all individuals rather than being vitally concerned with social obligations to particular people enmeshed in a particular extended kinship network. When confronting the natural world, individualists more easily abstract from social context and personal experience, seeking out and applying universally applicable laws of nature.

Individualism as Predisposing to Capitalism

Besides science, capitalism also flourished in this new, post-seventeenth-century culture of egalitarian individualism, eventually eroding aristocratic cultures based on inherited status. By the twentieth century in Britain, ancient landed families with pedigrees going back to the Middle Ages—families that looked down on success in business—were going bankrupt and selling their estates to wealthy capitalists whose ancestors were farmers, tailors, and petty tradesmen; or they were marrying their children to the children of wealthy capitalists in order to retain their estates.

The social context in which aristocratic culture declined and in which people were freed from obligations to lords unleashed the acquisitive drives of individuals and a capitalist culture. This resulted in large differences in economic success.^[1130] As argued by Gregory Clark in his *Farewell to Alms*, this in turn led to natural selection for industriousness and intelligence in the pre-nineteenth century context where wealth was positively correlated with number of children.^[1131]

The transformation of the West was complete. It is true that the Industrial Revolution was extremely disruptive—“the suffering and dislocation experienced in England between 1790 and 1850 count among the worst in its history,”^[1132] and the same can be said about the industrialization process elsewhere in the West. However, in England “living standards for most people rose markedly in the second half of the [nineteenth] century.”^[1133] Western societies that were not only unprecedentedly wealthy, but also had created more-than-adequate living conditions for the working class and upward mobility for the talented and ambitious.

Over the span from the mid-seventeenth century up to 1960s the West

benefited from these movements and was in the process of creating not only wealthier but fairer and more equitable societies. In the United States in the 1950s there were already strong trends toward increasing fairness to African-Americans. The West had shed its colonies after bequeathing self-government and substantial infrastructure and educational institutions to much of Africa and Asia.^{[\[1134\]](#)} In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, leaving the West as unrivaled hegemon.

WHAT WENT WRONG? THE NEW ELITE AND ITS LOATHING OF THE NATION IT RULES

So, what went wrong? Why, little more than a half century after the countercultural revolution, is the West on the verge of suicide, everywhere inundated by other peoples—peoples that are typically far more clannish, far more prone to corruption (an endemic problem in much of the Third World where relationships are based primarily on kinship rather than individual merit and trust of non-kin), and often of demonstrably lower intelligence. This has continued to the point that Western peoples are on the verge of becoming minorities in areas they have dominated for hundreds or, in Europe, thousands of years. Ultimately, if present trends continue, their unique genetic heritage will be lost entirely. One need only look at the demographic trend lines in all Western countries, steady declines in the White percentage of the world population, and generally below-replacement White fertility in the context of massive immigration of non-Whites. Extinction, after all, is just as much a part of the story of life as the evolution of new life forms.

This ongoing disaster for the traditional people of America is the direct result of the rise of a new elite as a result of the 1960s countercultural revolution. This new elite despises the traditional people and culture of America. David Gelernter:

The old elite used to get on fairly well with the country it was set over. Members of the old social upper-crust elite were richer and better educated than the public at large, but approached life on basically the same terms. The public went to church and so did they. The public went into the army and so did they. The public staged simpler weddings and the elite put on fancier ones, but they mostly all used the same dignified words and no one self-expressed. They agreed (this being America) that

art was a waste, scientists were questionable, engineering and machines and progress and nature were good. Some of the old-time attitudes made sense, some did not; but the staff and their bosses basically concurred.

...

Today's elite loathes the nation it rules. Nothing personal, just a fundamental difference in world view, but the feeling is unmistakable. Occasionally it escapes in a scorching geyser. Michael Lewis reports in the *New Republic* on the fall '96 Dole presidential campaign: "The crowds flip the finger at the busloads of journalists and chant rude things at them as they enter each arena. The journalists, for their part, wear buttons that say 'Yeah, I'm the Media. Screw You.'" The crowd hates the reporters, the reporters hate the crowd—an even match-up, except that the reporters wield power and the crowd (in effect) wields none.^[1135]

This hostile, adversary culture is far more common and far more explicitly stated even than two decades ago when Gelernter's article appeared, as indicated, for example, by the frequent displays of anti-White venom noted in Chapter 8. It was certainly apparent during the 2016 election and thereafter as the vast majority of the media have displayed an almost apoplectic hatred for Donald Trump. Trump regularly returns the favor at his rallies, often pointing to the media area and referring to them as "the most corrupt people in the world" or similar—to enthusiastic audience applause.

At a basic level, the addiction of the left to identity politics has destroyed the traditional social-class basis of Western politics and resulted in a political scenario based on ethnic/racial identity and electoral benefits to the parties of the left and to business interests (via cheap labor) achieved by importing millions of non-Whites into Western countries. Historically this began with a shift among intellectuals associated with the Frankfurt School as a response to the emergence of National Socialism in Germany during the 1930s.^[1136] These intellectuals had been orthodox Marxists, believing that the fundamental divisions in society were based on social class, but they realized that a classical Marxist analysis could not explain the attraction of National Socialism to the German working class.

Common themes in this body of writing are hostility to American populism, the need for leadership by an elite of intellectuals, and pathologization of White identity and pursuit of White interests, including the ideology that concern by Whites about ethnic displacement and the rise of the

power of ethnic minorities is irrational and indicative of psychiatric disorder. These themes became established in intellectual circles by the 1950s and rose to dominance with the success of the countercultural revolution of the 1960s.

And because homogeneous White societies were seen as inevitably dangerous in the long run—as proved to be the case in Germany from 1933–1945—this ideology became fused with the effort to overturn the 1924 immigration restriction law that biased U.S. immigration toward Northwest Europe.^[1137] The result was the Hart-Cellar Immigration law of 1965 that opened up immigration to all the peoples of the world—the same era that saw the final phase in the rise to power of the new elite.

Over the years legal immigration has expanded to well over 1 million/year and a total of 59 million as of 2015 at which time first- and second-generation immigrants constituted 26 percent of the population, and nearly 65 million Americans did not speak English at home.^[1138]

Foreign-born Americans and their descendants have been the main driver of U.S. population growth, as well as of national racial and ethnic change, since passage of the 1965 law that rewrote national immigration policy. ... Without immigration since 1965, the U.S. ... would be 75% White instead of 62%. Hispanics would be 8% of the population, not 18%. And Asians would be less than 1% of Americans, instead of 6%.^[1139]

The result has been the racialization of politics as White people have increasingly coalesced in the Republican Party, whereas the post-1965 immigrants and their descendants have coalesced in the Democratic Party along with previously resident groups such as Blacks and Jews. In 2016, over 90 percent of Republican votes were from White people, while around 40–44 percent of Democratic votes were from non-Whites.^[1140] This racially polarized trend will likely increase in the future even if immigration were to stop immediately because people who have already immigrated and their children tend to be younger than the native population.

If present trends continue, the Democratic Party and the left generally will dominate American politics beginning in the very near future, quite possibly with the 2020 election. Despite the anti-immigration rhetoric of President Trump, nothing substantial has changed the trajectory of American immigration policy, with the result that, barring some kind of cataclysm, the

left will soon win the presidency and both houses of Congress. The left has already shown its authoritarian tendencies, particularly with regard to free speech. College campuses have become bastions of liberal/leftist intolerance for even mildly conservative viewpoints.^[114] One or two Supreme Court appointments by a liberal president would essentially gut the First and Second Amendments. And the anti-White rhetoric noted in Chapter 8 would be exacerbated far beyond current levels.

The deepening, racially based divide will mark the end of individualism for the White population of America as Whites coalesce into cohesive groups in an increasingly hostile, anti-White environment. An upsurge in ethnocentrism on the part of the European-derived majority in the United States is a likely outcome of the increasingly group-structured contemporary social and political landscape—likely because human evolved psychological mechanisms function by making ingroup and outgroup membership more salient in situations of group-based hostility and resource competition (see Chapter 8). The major examples of Western collectivism—medieval Christendom and National Socialist Germany—have been characterized by strongly negative ingroup-outgroup attitudes and sharp social divisions.

INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENTS OF THE LEFT HAVE EXPLOITED THE WESTERN LIBERAL TRADITION

The intellectuals who came to dominate American intellectual discourse and academe were quite aware of the need to appeal to Western proclivities toward individualism, egalitarianism, and moral universalism discussed throughout this volume. A theme of *The Culture of Critique* is that moral indictments of their opponents have been prominent in the writings of these activist intellectuals, including political radicals and those opposing biological perspectives on individual and group differences in IQ. A sense of moral superiority was also prevalent in the psychoanalytic movement, and the Frankfurt School developed the view that social science was to be judged by moral criteria.

The triumph of these intellectual movements to the point of consensus in the West has created a moral community where people who do not subscribe to their beliefs are seen as not only intellectually deficient but as morally evil.

Israel Zangwill is good example of an intellectual activist who emphasized that Western ideals of morality and fair play could be used against immigration restriction.

You must make a fight against [the immigration restriction bill of 1924]; tell them they are destroying American ideals. Most fortifications are of cardboard, and if you press against them, they give way.^[1142]

America has ample room for all the six millions of the Pale [i.e., the Pale of Settlement, home to most of Russia's Jews]; any one of her fifty states could absorb them. And next to being in a country of their own, there could be no better fate for them than to be together in a land of civil and religious liberty, of whose Constitution Christianity forms no part and where their collective votes would practically guarantee them against future persecution.^[1143]

It has been noted that during the period of ethnic defense in the 1920s, Darwinist thinking on race was common throughout Western culture and assumed prominence among many U.S. immigration restrictionists, energized by the changing ethnic balance of the United States (Chapter 6). A theme of *The Culture of Critique* is that the intellectuals who became influential beginning in the 1930s (particularly the Boasian school of anthropology) targeted Darwinian theories of race as well as individual identities based on White racial group identity. For example, attacking racial identities in favor of atomized individualism for European-Americans was a central strategy of the Frankfurt School. Group identities based on race and even the family, were portrayed as an indication of psychopathology. Radical individualism was thus promoted by intellectuals who retained a strong allegiance to their own group and self-consciously promoted group interests.

These ideologies fell on particularly fertile soil because they dovetailed with Western European tendencies toward individualism. And whereas individualism has been the key characteristic of Western peoples in their rise to world dominance, these ideologies and their internalization by so many Europeans now play a major role in facilitating Western dispossession.

In particular, the ideology that White identity and having a sense of White interests are signs of psychopathology has made it impossible in mainstream media and academia to argue for the legitimate interests of White people in having homelands and in avoiding becoming minorities in societies they have dominated for hundreds, and in the case of Europe, thousands of years. Such ideologies are disseminated by the mainstream media—including

conservative and libertarian media—and throughout the educational system, from elementary school through university.

They have in effect created a moral community that is radically opposed to the interests of Whites. And as with the Puritans, the new elite has been able to create a culture of altruistic punishment in which White people punish fellow Whites who deviate from the dogmas of the moral community created by the new elite, even at the cost to compromising the long-term interests of themselves and their descendants.

These ideologies have been increasingly buttressed by powerful social controls. As discussed in Chapter 8, in much of the West these controls include formal legislation punishing critics of immigration and Western dispossession. Because of the First Amendment, such statutory controls are in their infancy in the United States but are likely to gain traction in the coming years if the left gains power.

However, informal controls are also very effective in the United States and throughout the West. For example, many people have been fired from their jobs as a result of the actions of activist organizations simply phoning their employers. These organizations take advantage of the moral community created by media and academic elites over the last 50 years by limiting the influence of dissident individuals and exposing them to public scrutiny, thereby subjecting them to ostracism and job loss. The effectiveness of these tactics relies on elite consensus and conformist popular attitudes for their effectiveness. Scientifically based ideas that were entirely respectable less than a century ago now result in ostracism and job loss.

THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR WHITE INTERESTS

Ultimately, the effectiveness of the contemporary moral community of the left depends on Western tendencies toward individualism and liberalism, as recounted throughout this volume. Pro-White activists attempting to combat this moral community must be aware of the very powerful tendency among their constituents toward wanting to be part of a moral community. In particular, they must emphasize that Whites have interests that are morally legitimate. While the moral sentiments of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century abolitionists were certainly praiseworthy, adopting an ideology of moral universalism amounts to suicide under the present conditions where migration over long distances is so easy. Calling Whites “racist” for asserting their legitimate interests is an attempt to place their opponents in a morally

illegitimate category. Such campaigns are uniquely effective in the West. For example, Israel and its defenders in the West are remarkably immune to the charge, despite their erection of a society based on an ethnically defined immigration policy, ethnic cleansing and apartheid policies toward Palestinians, and expulsion of African migrants.

To an evolutionary psychologist, moralistic aggression against those who deviate from group attitudes seems obviously adaptive for maintaining the boundaries and policing the behavior of a close-knit group. Groups of Angles, Jutes, and their Puritan descendants doubtless benefited greatly from moralistic aggression because of its effectiveness in enforcing group norms and punishing cheaters and defectors, thereby creating effective groups.

Moralistic aggression is not inherently wrong. The key is to convince Whites to alter their moralistic aggression in a more adaptive direction in light of Darwinism. After all, the object of moralistic aggression is quite malleable.

A proper Darwinian sense of moralistic aggression would be directed at those of all ethnic backgrounds who have engineered or are maintaining the cultural controls that are presently dispossessing Whites of their historic homelands. The moral basis of this proposal is quite clear:

(1) There are genetic differences between peoples, so that, from an evolutionary perspective, different peoples have legitimate conflicts of interest.^[1144]

(2) Ethnocentrism has deep psychological roots that cause even relatively non-ethnocentric Whites to feel greater attraction toward and trust in those who are genetically similar.^[1145] Ethnocentrism among Westerners has paved the way toward creating the high-trust, culturally homogeneous societies that have traditionally been more common in the West than elsewhere. As noted in Chapter 8, studies have shown that areas with greater cultural and ethnic diversity tend to have lessened political participation and social trust, including trust of others from one's own racial/ethnic group.^[1146]

(3) As Frank Salter notes, societies with a predominant ethnic group bound by ties of kinship and culture are more likely to be open to redistributive policies such as social welfare and contributing to public goods like health care.^[1147]

(4) Societies with a predominant Western European-derived majority

are predisposed to political systems characterized by democracy and rule of law.^[1148] There are already signs that these features of Western European societies are threatened as a result of the rise of radical forms of leftism based on coercion, the eradication of individual liberties, and radical changes to the Constitution. A necessary condition for this transformation is the new electorate being imported into Western countries as a result of immigration policies brought about in the United States ultimately by the passage of the 1965 immigration law and spreading to other Western countries shortly thereafter.^[1149]

(5) The accusations of moral depravity now being leveled against Whites as a group for the history of conquest and slavery would also apply to non-White groups. Huge swaths of humanity (Arabs, Han Chinese, Bantu) have been able to ethnically monopolize vast areas as the result of the conquests of their ancestors, yet we never hear them expressing guilt for their conquests or their treatment of conquered peoples; nor are they exposed to messages from their elites that welcoming millions of non-Whites is a moral imperative.

(6) At least since the eighteenth century, Western societies have been not only more economically prosperous but also fairer and more equitable than non-Western societies, with the result that vast swaths of humanity would like to move to the West. A prime example is that slavery persisted in many parts of the world long after it was abolished in the West, and it continues in many parts of the world today, particularly Africa.^[1150]

(7) Because the great majority of post-1965 immigrants have IQ below the White average, they will be a long-term drain on the society because of low academic success in a highly technical economy,^[1151] high levels of using social services,^[1152] and proneness to criminality,^[1153] especially after the first generation.^[1154] This constitutes a long-term cost for White taxpayers as well as a general lowering of the culture.

(8) High levels of immigration result in downward pressure on wages for working-class people^[1155] and increasingly even in high-tech areas with the proliferation of visas for information technology workers from India and China.

(9) Immigration has resulted in the racialization of politics and an increase in political polarization and civil strife that could ultimately prove cataclysmic. Despite wars framed as being moral crusades against

cruel dictators (Iraq, Libya), Western interventions in these cultures have not altered their kinship-based dynamics—a harbinger for the increasingly fractionated future of the West unless the transformation of Western societies is reversed.

(10) I have already commented on the increased anti-White hatred emanating from the elite culture and from the wider society in the West. This will only get more intense as Whites lose political power, and may well lead to increases in violence against Whites. Already Whites are vastly more likely to be victims of violent Black crime than the reverse.

[\[1156\]](#)

(11) Because of the relatively high standard of living in Western countries, there are negative ecological effects of importing millions of poor people from the Third World.

And it goes without saying that immigration enthusiasts ignore the ethnic genetic interests of Whites. Moreover, they are unconcerned with intellectual consistency: they would be horrified at the thought that Korea, Nigeria, or Israel ought to have replacement-level immigration.

A good sign is that the great majority of pro-White activists and sympathizers see a strong moral imperative in preserving our people and culture. Often without a lot of conscious thought about it, there is a sense that we are a moral community, and we reject and shun those who hate us and our ideas. There is a sense of moral rectitude and an awareness of the hypocrisy and corruption of our enemies—particularly the globalist elites who now control the fate of the West. There is a lot of confidence that we are morally and intellectually right.

And that is a very good start indeed. It is a message that will find increasing resonance among the broad mass of White people as the West becomes ever more polarized across ethnic divisions and increasingly hostile toward Whites.

CONCLUSION: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE WEST

In *The Culture of Critique* I wrote that “segments of the European-derived peoples of the world will eventually realize that they have been ill-served and are being ill-served both by the ideology of multiculturalism and by the ideology of de-ethnicized individualism.” I envisioned increasing between-group conflict as well as stepped-up social controls that attempt to buttress

the multicultural project:

The importance of group-based competition cannot be overstated. I believe it is highly unlikely that Western societies based on individualism and democracy can long survive the legitimization of competition between impermeable groups in which group membership is determined by ethnicity. The discussion in *Separation and Its Discontents* strongly suggests that ultimately group strategies are met by group strategies, and that societies become organized around cohesive, mutually exclusionary groups.^[1157] Indeed, the recent multicultural movement may be viewed as tending toward a profoundly non-Western form of social organization that has historically been much more typical of Middle Eastern segmentary societies centered around discrete homogeneous groups. ...

There is thus a significant possibility that individualistic societies are unlikely to survive the intra-societal group-based competition that has become increasingly common and intellectually respectable in the United States. I believe that in the United States we are presently heading down a volatile path—a path that leads to ethnic warfare and to the development of collectivist, authoritarian, and racist enclaves. Although ethnocentric beliefs and behavior are viewed as morally and intellectually legitimate only among ethnic minorities in the United States, the theory and data presented in *Separation and Its Discontents* indicate that the development of greater ethnocentrism among European-derived peoples is a likely result of present trends. ...

One may expect that as ethnic conflict continues to escalate in the United States, increasingly desperate attempts will be made to prop up the ideology of multiculturalism with sophisticated theories of the psychopathology of majority group ethnocentrism, as well as with the erection of police state controls on nonconforming thought and behavior.

As discussed in Chapter 8, much of this is already happening. The ideology that White ethnocentrism has no intellectual basis and that it is an indication of psychopathology is more vigorously promoted than ever by the media and throughout the educational system, while ethnic identifications and interests among non-Whites are encouraged. Anti-White hatred among

non-Whites, especially hatred of White males, is clearly on the rise—a situation that inevitably makes Whites more conscious of themselves as a group. And we are also seeing increasingly stringent social controls attempting to buttress the multicultural state—both informal controls relying on elite consensus (removal from jobs, ostracism) and also, in many parts of the West, legal penalties for individuals who express pro-White views or dissent on race, migration, or the importance of Jewish influence.

Many commenters on the current scene in America have noted that the increased polarization and inability to communicate across the political—increasingly an ethnic—divide. Opposing groups have irreconcilable world views and see the other as evil incarnate—highly reminiscent of the millenarian thinking discussed in Chapter 6 as a strong trend in American history. As M.E. Bradford wrote, “we are well on our way to a full-fledged Puritan rhetoric of perpetual war against the ‘powers of darkness’: ‘to universal armed camps, engaged in a death struggle against each other.’”^[1158]

As this continues to fester, the conflict is seen by all sides as irreconcilable. This results in an existential clash where fundamental values are at stake. Hillary Clinton, commenting on the poisonous atmosphere of American politics in 2018, noted that civility in American politics could only be restored if her side, the Democrats, won: “You cannot be civil with a political party that wants to destroy what you stand for, what you care about.”^[1159]

This suggests the possibility of a civil war. Indeed, a 2018 Rasmussen poll indicated 31 percent of Americans think a civil war is likely soon.^[1160]

One possibility for a civil war scenario was presented by Michael Vlahos, who notes that civil wars begin when the population fractionates into opposing camps.^[1161]

Just since the 2016 election, we have witnessed a rolling thunder of Blue and Red elite rhetoric—packing the Supreme Court, abolishing the electoral college, repealing the Second Amendment, wholesale state nullification of federal law, shackling of voter rights, and Deep State invocation of the 25th Amendment. These are all potential extremities of action that would not only dismantle our constitutional order, but also skew it to one side’s juridical construct of virtue, thus dissolving any semblance of adherence to law by the other. Over time each party becomes emotionally invested in the lust to dismantle the old and make something new.

Hence, constitutional norms exist only conditionally, until such time as they finally be dismantled, and only as long as a precariously balanced electoral divide holds firm. A big historical tilt in favor of one party over the other would very quickly push the nation into crisis because the party with the new mandate would rush to enact its program. The very threat of such constitutional dismantling would be a sure *casus belli*. Such tilts in the 1770s against Britain, and later in the 1850s against the slaveholding party, were the real tipping points. Not only was *Dred Scott v. Sandford* just such a tipping point in 1857, but subconsciously its legacy weighs heavily on Americans today, as they contemplate—often with hysterical passion—the dread consequences of a [Brett] Kavanaugh appointment [to the Supreme Court]. ...

What is clear is that two warring parties will accept nothing less from the other than submission, even though the loser will never submit. Moreover, each factional ethos is incapable of empathizing with the other.

Vlahos suggests that “what might eventuate would be a national sorting out, a de facto kinship separation in which Blue and Red regions would go—and govern—their own ways, while still maintaining the surface fiction of a titular “United States.”

(1) The factions are not really regional as much as they are urban/rural and White/non-White, although of course these issues are conflated to some extent. In all Blue states, there is a divide between rural areas and the large urban centers that dominate politically, making a regional partition ineffective. Moreover, a regional breaking apart on clearly defined ideological lines, as occurred in the Civil War, would be much easier than partitioning in an artificial manner because partitioning would create enormous logistical problems.

(2) Several analysts have suggested various schemes for partitioning the United States to enable a White ethnostate. This would involve population transfers along the lines of the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe after World War II and the India-Pakistan partition of 1948.^{[\[1162\]](#)} In both cases, millions of people transferred, increasing the ethnic and religious homogeneity of both areas. Such a scheme in the contemporary United States would involve enormous logistical difficulties but would certainly be possible if there was enough political will.

(3) A major difficulty with a racial partition is that the left is poised to become a permanent majority within the present system because of their imported electorate. The left has shown increasingly authoritarian tendencies which would be directed at preventing a White ethnostate. The left has shown no tolerance for dissenting voices. Indeed, dissenters are seen as the personification of evil—exactly the same as in the period prior to the Civil War. If indeed the left obtains power, the expectation would be an increase in political repression, the end of First Amendment protections for free speech, radical changes to the Constitution, more or less official anti-White rhetoric, further removal of historical monuments, and increased levels of indoctrination throughout the educational system.

If this is correct, then we must expect violence as part of the equation. What would such a war look like? At the present time, the White/rural side would have several advantages in terms of gun ownership and representation in the police and military, especially in the higher echelons,^[1163] but that is no guarantee of victory.

I agree with Enoch Powell: “as I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the River Tiber foaming with much blood.’”^[1164] All the utopias dreamed up by the Left inevitably lead to bloodshed—because they conflict with human nature. The classical Marxist Utopian vision of a classless society in the Soviet Union self-destructed, but only after murdering millions of its own people. Now the multicultural utopian version that has become dominant throughout the West is showing signs of producing intense opposition and irreconcilable polarization.

When we look back on this era, we do not want to have to say we did too little too late, as happened with the 1924 immigration law aimed at creating an ethnic status quo. All of the measures of White representation in the forces of social control will continue to decline in the coming years given the continued deterioration of the demographic situation. At this point, even stopping immigration completely and deporting illegals would not be enough to preserve a White America long term.

The left and its big business allies have created a monster. Whites have to realize that if they do nothing, they will be increasingly victimized and vilified in the coming decades as the monster continues to gain power.

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- ^[2] Peter Frost, “The Hajnal Line and Gene-Culture Coevolution in Northwest Europe,” *Advances in Anthropology* 7 (2017): 154–174.
- ^[3] Mary Jane West-Eberhard, *Developmental Plasticity and Evolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); see also: Peter LaFreniere and Kevin MacDonald, “A Post-genomic View of Behavioral Development and Adaptation to the Environment,” *Developmental Review* 33, no. 2 (2013): 89–102.
- ^[4] West-Eberhard, *Developmental Plasticity and Evolution*.
- ^[5] Gregory Cochran and Henry Harpending, *The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
- ^[6] Iosif Lazaridis, et al., “Ancient Human Genomes Suggest Three Ancestral Populations for Present-day Europeans,” *Nature* 513, 409–413 (2014).
- ^[7] Eppie Jones et al., “Upper Palaeolithic Genomes Reveal Deep Roots of Modern Eurasians,” *Nature Communications* 6 (November 17, 2015): 1–8, 4.
- ^[8] Cochran and Harpending, *The 10,000 Year Explosion*, 36–63.
- ^[9] Eppie R. Jones, et al., “Upper Palaeolithic Genomes Reveal Deep Roots of Modern Eurasians.” Dating the end of the Mesolithic differs in various parts of Europe because the end of the Mesolithic is defined by the arrival of agriculture with the EF’s—hence earlier in the south, later in the north.
- ^[10] Iain Mathieson et al., “Genome-Wide Patterns of Selection in 230 Ancient Europeans,” *Nature* 528 (2015): 499–503.
- ^[11] *Ibid.*; see also Morton E. Allentoft et al., “Population Genomics of Bronze Age Eurasia,” *Nature* 522 (June 11, 2015): 167–172.
- ^[12] Lazaridis et al., “Ancient Human Genomes Suggest Three Ancestral Populations for Present-day Europeans”; Wolfgang Haak et al., “Massive Migration from the Steppe was a Source for Indo-European Languages in Europe,” *Nature* 522 (June 11, 2015), 207–211.
- ^[13] Haak et al., “Massive Migration from the Steppe was a Source for Indo-European Languages in Europe.”
- ^[14] Jones et al., “Upper Palaeolithic Genomes Reveal Deep Roots of Modern Eurasians”; see also Pontus Skoglund et al., “Origins and Genetic Legacy of Neolithic Farmers and Hunter-Gatherers in Europe,” *Science* 336 (April 27, 2012), 466–469.
- ^[15] Haak et al., “Massive Migration from the Steppe was a Source for Indo-European Languages in Europe.”
- ^[16] *Ibid.*, 4.
- ^[17] Allentoft et al., “Population Genomics of Bronze Age Eurasia.”
- ^[18] *Ibid.*, 169.
- ^[19] Wolfgang Haak et al., “Massive Migration from the Steppe was a Source for Indo-European Languages in Europe,” 207.
- ^[20] Lazaridis et al., “Ancient Human Genomes Suggest Three Ancestral Populations for Present-day Europeans.”
- ^[21] Helena Malmström et al., “Ancient Mitochondrial DNA from the Northern Fringe of the Neolithic Farming Expansion in Europe Sheds Light on the Dispersion Process,” *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. B* 370 (January 19, 2015): 11–10).
- ^[22] Alissa Mittnik et al., “The Genetic History of the Baltic Sea Region,” *Nature Communications* 9,

no. 442 (January 30, 2018): 1–11, 8.

^[23] Pontus Skoglund et al., “Origins and Genetic Legacy of Neolithic Farmers and H-gs in Europe,” *Science* 366 (2012): 466–469.

^[24] See also Davidski, “On the Modern Genetic Affinities of Ice-Age Europeans,” *Eurogenes Blogspot* (May 5, 2016).

^[25] Pontus Skoglund et al., “Genomic Diversity and Admixture Differs for Stone-Age Scandinavian Foragers and Farmers,” *Science* 344, no. 6185 (May 16, 2014): 747–750.

^[26] Oscar Lao et al, “Correlation between Genetic and Geographic Structure in Europe *Current Biology* 18 (August 26 2008): 1241–1248.

^[27] Natalia Kashuba et al., “Ancient DNA from Mastics Connects Material Culture and Genetics of Mesolithic Hunter-Gatherers in Scandinavia,” *Communications Biology* 2, no. 1 (2019).

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^[29] Mathieson et al., “Genome-Wide Patterns of Selection in 230 Ancient Europeans”; Lazaridis et al., “Ancient Human Genomes Suggest Three Ancestral Populations for Present-day Europeans.”

^[30] Lazaridis et al., “Ancient Human Genomes Suggest Three Ancestral Populations for Present-day Europeans.”

^[31] Mitnik et al., “The Genetic History of the Baltic Sea Region.”

^[32] Sandra Wilde, et al., “Direct Evidence for Positive Selection of Skin, Hair, and Eye Pigmentation in Europeans during the Last 5,000 Y,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 111, no. 13 (April 1, 2014): 4832–4837, 4835.

^[33] Allentoft et al., “Population Genomics of Bronze Age Eurasia.”

Cassidy et al. (2015) found that a Bronze age sample of three individuals from Ireland had an infusion of Yamnaya-linked genes (~32 percent), whereas this genetic influence was not found in a Neolithic farmer from Ireland. These individuals were at least heterozygous for blue eyes, although one had brown eyes. Presumably the gene for blue eyes was derived from the h-g influence which remained substantial (~26 percent). The EF individual had dark hair and brown eyes.

Lara Cassidy et al., “Neolithic and Bronze Age Migration to Ireland and Establishment of the Insular Atlantic Genome,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 113, no. 2 (January 16, 2016): 368–373.

^[34] Allentoft et al., “Population Genomics of Bronze Age Eurasia.”

^[35] Mathieson et al., “Genome-Wide Patterns of Selection in 230 Ancient Europeans.”

^[36] John Novembre et al., “Genes Mirror Geography within Europe,” *Nature Letters* 456 (November 6, 2008): 98–101.

Novembre et al found an F_{ST} , a measure of genetic distance, of 0.004, indicating a very low degree of genetic separation.

^[37] Lao et al., “Correlation between Genetic and Geographic Structure in Europe.”

Lao et al. also found low genetic variation in general within Europe, reporting a north-south cline in genetic diversity. Northern Europeans were found to be more closely related to each other than southern Europeans.

^[38] See also Michael F. Seldin et al., “European Population Substructure: Clustering of Northern and Southern Populations,” *PLOS Genetics* (2006), unpaginated. Seldin et al. find “clear evidence of large differences in population structure between southern and northern European populations.” Italian and Spanish samples clustered separately from samples of other European ancestry, including those of western, central, eastern, and Scandinavian European ancestry. These contrasts were also apparent within samples from Spain and Italy, with the northern areas resembling Northern European peoples more than the southern areas.

<http://journals.plos.org/plosgenetics/article?id=10.1371/journal.pgen.0020143>

^[39] Mari Nelis, et al., “Genetic Structure of Europeans: A View from the North-East,” *Plos One* 4, no. 5 (May, 2009), unpaginated.

<https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0005472>

^[40] Lao et al, “Correlation between Genetic and Geographic Structure in Europe.”

^[41] Nelis, et al., “Genetic Structure of Europeans.”

^[42] Amy Goldberg et al., “Ancient X chromosomes Reveal Contrasting Sex Bias in Neolithic and Bronze Age Eurasian migrations,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 114, no. 10 (March 7, 2017): 2657–62.

^[43] *Ibid.*

^[44] Iosif Lazaridis and David Reich, “Failure to Replicate a Genetic Signal for Sex Bias in the Steppe Migration into Central Europe,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 114, no. 20 (May 16, 2017): E3873–E3874.

Amy Goldberg, Torsten Günther, Noah A. Rosenberg, and Mattias Jakobsson, “Reply to Lazaridis and Reich: Robust Model-based Inference of Male-biased Admixture during Bronze Age Migration from the Pontic-Caspian Steppe,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 114, no. 20 (May 16, 2017): E3875–E3877.

^[45] Jeanne Arnold et al., “Entrenched Disbelief: Complex Hunter-Gatherers and the Case for Inclusive Cultural Evolutionary Thinking,” *Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory* 23 (2016): 448–499, 449.

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<https://journals.plos.org/plosgenetics/article?id=10.1371/journal.pgen.1000083>
- [47] Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West: Perspectives: Perspectives of World-History*, Vol. II, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (London: George, Allen & Unwin, 1928), 235.
- [48] Ricardo Duchesne, *The Uniqueness of Western Civilization* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 51.
- [49] Vagheesh M. Narasimhan, et al., “The Genomic Formation of South and Central Asia,” *bioRxiv* (preprint) (March 31, 2018).
<https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2018/03/31/292581.full.pdf>
- [50] *Ibid.*, 374.
- [51] *Ibid.*, 376, 387; italics in original.
- [52] David Anthony, *The Horse, the Wheel, and Language: How Bronze-Age Riders from the Eurasian Steppes Shaped the Modern World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007; paperback edition, 2010), 161.
- [53] *Ibid.*, 137.
- [54] *Ibid.*, 155.
- [55] *Ibid.*, 201.
- [56] *Ibid.*, 221.
- [57] *Ibid.*, 221–24.
- [58] *Ibid.*, 302.
- [59] *Ibid.*, 405.
- [60] *Ibid.*, 239; emphasis in text.
- [61] *Ibid.*, 364.
- [62] Duchesne, *The Uniqueness of Western Civilization*, 398.
- [63] *Ibid.*
- [64] Hans-Peter Hasenfratz, *Barbarian Rites*, trans. Michael Moynihan (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 2011; original German edition, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany: Verlag Herder, 1992), 49.
- [65] Michael Speidel, “‘Berserks’: A History of Indo-European ‘Mad Warriors,’” *Journal of World History* 13, no. 2 (1992): 253–90, 253–54.
- [66] Hasenfratz, *Barbarian Rites*, 64–65.
- [67] Anthony, *The Horse, the Wheel, and Language*.
- [68] Lotte Hedeager, *Iron Age Myth and Materiality: An Archaeology of Scandinavia, AD 400–1000* (London: Routledge, 2011).
- [69] *Ibid.*, 115–18.
- [70] Anthony, *The Horse, the Wheel, and Language*, 238.
- [71] *Ibid.*, 303
- [72] *Ibid.*, 343.
- [73] *Ibid.*
- [74] Duchesne, *The Uniqueness of Western Civilization*, 438.
- [75] *Ibid.*, 379.
- [76] Interestingly, Duchesne describes Stalin as a classic despot. Stalin, from Georgia, is said to have had a despotic Oriental personality, surrounding himself with “slavish characters” and continuing to need “choruses of public approval to reinforce his ego.” Duchesne, *The Uniqueness of Western Civilization*, 424.
- [77] Herodotus, *Histories* 7, 136.
<http://www.bostonleadershipbuilders.com/herodotus/book07.htm>
- [78] Haak, et al., “Massive Migration from the Steppe Was a Source for Indo-European Languages in Europe.”

^[79] Kristian Kristiansen, et al. ("Re-Theorising Mobility and the Formation of Culture and Language among the Corded Ware Culture in Europe, *Antiquity* 9, no. 356 (2017): 334–347.

^[80] Haak et al., "Ancient DNA, Strontium isotopes, and osteological analyses shed light on social and kinship organization of the Later Stone Age, *Proceedings of the national Academy of Science* 105, no. 47 (November 25, 2008): 18226–18231

^[81] *Ibid.*, 343.

^[82] Anthony, *The Horse, the Wheel, and Language*, 343.

^[83] Roger Pearson, "Some Aspects of Social Mobility in Early Historic Indo-European Societies," *Journal of Indo-European Studies* 1 (1973): 155–61.

^[84] *Ibid.*, 157.

^[85] Western societies have Eskimo kinship, with which emphasizes the nuclear family, identifying directly only the mother, father, brother, and sister. All other relatives are grouped together into categories. It uses both classificatory and descriptive terms, differentiating between gender, generation, lineal relatives (relatives in the direct line of descent), and collateral relatives (blood relatives not in the direct line of descent). The Eskimo system is defined by its "cognatic" or "bilateral" emphasis—no distinction is made between patrilineal and matrilineal relatives. This is compatible with the northern hunter-gatherer contribution to European origins (see Ch. 3). A full-fledged clan-type kinship system is the Sudanese, as seen, e.g., in Chinese kinship.

^[86] Hasenfratz, *Barbarian Rites*, 35.

^[87] Gary Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 135.

^[88] Hasenfratz, *Barbarian Rites*, 40.

^[89] Bente Magnus, "Dwellings and Settlements: Structure and Characteristics," in Judith Jesch (ed.), *The Scandinavians from the Vendel Period to the Tenth Century: An Ethnographic Perspective* (Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell Press, 2002), 5–32.

^[90] *Ibid.*, 11.

^[91] *Ibid.*

^[92] Hasenfratz, *Barbarian Rites*, 28–29.

^[93] *Ibid.*, 63.

^[94] *Ibid.*, 51.

^[95] *Ibid.*, 50. Hasenfratz notes in this passage that "markedly degenerated" *Männerbünde* would sometimes attack isolated farmhouses, raping and pillaging.

^[96] *Ibid.*, 55.

^[97] *Ibid.*, 56. Hanging was the typical penalty for treason. As a revival of the old practice, hanging was used in the Third Reich for traitors.

^[98] David Herlihy, *Medieval Households* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 44.

^[99] *Ibid.*, 55.

^[100] Duchesne, *The Uniqueness of Western Civilization*, 399.

^[101] *Ibid.*, 417.

^[102] *Ibid.*, 418.

^[103] *Ibid.*, 484.

^[104] *Ibid.*, 438.

^[105] *Ibid.*, 452.

^[106] Kevin MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements* (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2002; orig. pub.: Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), Ch. 6 and *passim*.

^[107] Regarding the Romans, see Appendix to this chapter.

^[108] Gary Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome: From Prehistory to the First Punic War* by Prof. Gary Forsythe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 368.

^[109] Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City: A Study on the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome* (Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001; orig. published in 1862), 166.

<https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/fustel/AncientCity.pdf>

^[110] *Ibid.*, 167.

^[111] Susan Lape, *Race and Citizen Identity in Classical Athenian Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 59.

^[112] Guillaume Durocher, “Ancient Athens: A Spirited and Nativist Democracy,” *The Occidental Quarterly* 18, no. 3 (Fall, 2018): 73–82, 78.

^[113] Guillaume Durocher, “Ancient Sparta: The First Ethnostate?,” *The Occidental Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (Winter, 2019–2020), in press.

^[114] Duchesne, *The Uniqueness of Western Civilization*, 465.

^[115] *Ibid.*, 483; emphasis in original.

^[116] *Ibid.*, 484; see also, on the rise of estates in medieval Europe as giving rise to representative government, Michael Mitterauer, *Why Europe? The Medieval Origins of Its Special Path*, trans. Gerald Chapple (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010; orig. German edition, 2003).

^[117] Américo Castro, *The Structure of Spanish History*, trans. Edmund L. King (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954), 497; see also Américo Castro, *The Spaniards: An Introduction to Their History*, trans. Willard F. King and Selma Margaretten (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

Castro maintained that the Enlightenment could not develop in a Spain fraught with competition between ethnic groups, referring to the conflict between Spaniards and Jews: “From such premises it was impossible that there should be derived any kind of modern state, the sequel, after all, of the Middle Ages’ hierarchic harmony” (*The Structure of Spanish History*, 497).

^[118] The Visigothic Code (Forum judicum), trans. S. P. Scott (Boston, MA: Boston Book Company, 1910; online version: The Library of Iberian Resources Online, unpaginated).

<http://libro.uca.edu/vcode/visigoths.htm>

^[119] *Ibid.*, (Title II, VI).

^[120] Kyle J. Bristow, “Our White Common Law,” *The Occidental Quarterly* 15, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 63–68.

^[121] Patrick J. Geary, *The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

^[122] Peter Heather, *The Goths* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).

^[123] Frederick Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1998).

^[124] Heather, *The Goths*, 4.

^[125] *Ibid.*, 26.

^[126] *Ibid.*, 45.

^[127] *Ibid.*, 49.

^[128] *Ibid.*, 57.

^[129] *Ibid.*, 65.

^[130] *Ibid.*, 66.

^[131] *Ibid.*, 68.

^[132] *Ibid.*, 73.

^[133] *Ibid.*, 76. These groups were very warlike. He notes the trouble leaders had in controlling their followers’ “martial enthusiasm.”

^[134] Heather, *The Goths*, 75.

^[135] *Ibid.*, 75. This is apparent in the Visigothic Code, as mentioned above.

^[136] *Ibid.*, 88.

^[137] *Ibid.*, 88.

- [138] *Ibid.*, 273.
- [139] *Ibid.*, 294.
- [140] *Ibid.*, 285. Notice the quotation marks around “Franks,” implying that the ethnic component had dissipated.
- [141] *Ibid.*, 90. On the other hand, Roman policy was to break up conquered peoples and distribute them widely within the Empire to dilute ethnic bonds.
- [142] *Ibid.*, 169.
- [143] *Ibid.*, 171–72.
- [144] *Ibid.*, 175.
- [145] *Ibid.*, 178.
- [146] *Ibid.*, 221.
- [147] *Ibid.*, 297.
- [148] *Ibid.*, 239.
- [149] *Ibid.*, 243–44. Heather describes Wittigus and Theudis as “senior members of the two clans that dominated the throne after the Amal dynasty had been ousted” (*ibid.*, 247). Medieval historians have found that succession tends to be an issue if there is no adult son ready to take over (*ibid.*, 253).
- [150] *Ibid.*, 257.
- [151] Sandra Wilde, et al., “Direct Evidence for Positive Selection of Skin, Hair, and Eye Pigmentation in Europeans during the Last 5,000 Y,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 111, no. 13 (April 1, 2014): 4832–4837, 4835.
- [152] Gary Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome: From Prehistory to the First Punic War* by Prof. Gary Forsythe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).
- [153] *Ibid.*, 199.
- [154] Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome*, 200.
- [155] *Ibid.*, 216.
- [156] *Ibid.*
- [157] *Ibid.*, 307.
- [158] *Ibid.*, 340.
- [159] *Ibid.*, 286.
- [160] *Ibid.*, 286–287.
- [161] Fiery Cushman, “Rationalization Is Rational,” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, in press.
- [162] Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome*, 281.
- [163] *Ibid.*, 353.
- [164] Larry Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 14.
- [165] *Ibid.*, 12.
- [166] *Ibid.*, 13.
- [167] *Ibid.*, 20.
- [168] *Ibid.*, 21.
- [169] *Ibid.*, 25.
- [170] *Ibid.*, 52.
- [171] Ricardo Duchesne, *The Uniqueness of Western Civilization* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), *passim*; see also Ch. 2.
- [172] Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome*, 167.
- [173] *Ibid.*, 167.
- [174] *Ibid.*, 169.
- [175] *Ibid.*, 98.
- [176] *Ibid.*, 102–103.

- [177] *Ibid.*, 103.
- [178] *Ibid.*, 106.
- [179] Ricardo Duchesne, *The Uniqueness of Western Civilization* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
- [180] Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome*, 110.
- [181] *Ibid.*, 150.
- [182] *Ibid.*, 229. Marriage by *confarreatio* was an exception: it was confined to patrician hereditary priests and was interpreted to mean that priests could not marry plebeians.
- [183] *Ibid.*, 111.
- [184] *Ibid.*, 170.
- [185] *Ibid.*, 171.
- [186] *Ibid.*, 170.
- [187] *Ibid.*, 171.
- [188] *Ibid.*
- [189] Andrew Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 14.
- [190] Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome*, 156–157.
- [191] *Ibid.*, 160.
- [192] *Ibid.*, 159.
- [193] *Ibid.*, 185.
- [194] *Ibid.*, 290.
- [195] The tribal assemblies (*comitia tributa*) were established on the basis of geographical residence as recorded by the censor. They elected the plebeian tribunes who could enact legislation and adjudicate non-capital litigation. They also had the power to veto the actions of the senate and other magistrates, including the consuls; however, this power was rarely used until the late Republic. *Ibid.*, 176.
- [196] *Ibid.*, 368.
- [197] *Ibid.*, 220.
- [198] Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome*, 363.
- [199] *Ibid.*, 368.
- [200] *Ibid.*
- [201] Tenney Frank, “Race Mixture in the Roman Empire,” *American Historical Review* 21, no. 4 (July 1916): 689–708 (reprinted in *The Occidental Quarterly* 5, no. 4 (Winter, 2005–2006): 51–68, 52. <https://www.toqonline.com/archives/v5n4/54-Frank.pdf>
- [202] *Ibid.*, 63.
- [203] *Ibid.*, 64.
- [204] *Ibid.*, 65.
- [205] John M. Viola, “Tearing Down Statues of Columbus Also Tears Down My History,” *The New York Times* (October 9, 2017).
- [206] Frank, “Race Mixture in the Roman Empire,” 67.
- [207] Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome*, 308.
- [208] Christopher H. Boehm, *Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
- [209] *Ibid.*, 8.
- [210] Fritz Lenz, “The Inheritance of Intellectual Gifts,” in Erwin Baur, Eugen Fischer, and Fritz Lenz, *Human Heredity*, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul (New York: Macmillan, 1931), 657.
- [211] Antoine Coutrot, et al., “Global Determinants of Navigation Ability,” *Current Biology* 28 (September, 2018): 2861–2866.
- [212] T. R. E. Southwood, “Habitat, the Temple for Ecological Strategies?” *Journal of Animal Ecology* 46 (1977): 337–366; T. R. E. Southwood, “Bionomic Strategies and Population Parameters,”

in Robert M. May (ed.), *Theoretical Ecology: Principles and Applications* (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, 1981): 26–48.

[213] Michael L. Burton, Carmella C. Moore, John W. M. Whiting, and A. Kimball Romney, “Regions Based on Social Structure,” *Current Anthropology* 37 (1996): 87–123.

[214] Wil Roebroeks, “Hominid Behaviour and the Earliest Occupation of Europe: An exploration,” *Journal of Human Evolution* 41 (2001): 437–461.

[215] *Ibid.*, 450.

[216] G. C. Frison, “Paleoindian Large Mammal Hunters of the Plains of North America,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 95 (1998): 14575–14583.

[217] T. Douglas Price, “The Mesolithic of Northern Europe,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 20 (1991): 211–233, 229.

[218] Lawrence H. Keeley, “Frontier Warfare in the Early Neolithic, in D. L. Martin and Paul Dolukhanoy (eds.), *Troubled Times: Violence and Warfare in the Past* (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1997): 303–319.

[219] Marek Zvelebil and Paul Dolukhanov, “The Transition to Farming in Eastern and Northern Europe. *Journal of World Prehistory* 5 (1991): 233–278, 262–263.

[220] Sveinung Bang-Andersen, “Coast/Inland Relations in the Mesolithic of Southern Norway,” *World Archaeology* 27 (1996): 427–443, 436, 437; emphasis in original.

[221] Jeanne Arnold et al., “Entrenched Disbelief: Complex H-gs and the Case for Inclusive Cultural Evolutionary Thinking,” *Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory* 23 (2016): 448–499.

[222] *Ibid.*

[223] *Ibid.*, 489.

[224] Frank Risdale, “A Discussion of the Potlatch and Social Structure,” *Totem: The University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology* 3, no. 2 (2011): 7–15.

<http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/totem/vol3/iss2/3>

[225] In the absence of kinship ties, reputation becomes the standard for relationships. Andrew Fraser notes that oath-taking was and remains a peculiarly English pre-occupation, so much so that “the commonplace spectacle of Third World immigrants reciting oaths of allegiance at naturalization ceremonies is calculated to warm the hearts of WASPs committed heart and soul to the constitutionalist creed of civic nationalism.” Oath-taking is a public affirmation that is fundamentally about one’s reputation. It is, of course, a bit of WASP egoism to assume other peoples have a similar sense of public trustworthiness:

WASPs are trusting souls. For that very reason they can be exploited easily by those who promise one thing and do another. ... Mass Third World immigration imposes enormous risks upon Anglo-Saxon societies grounded in unique patterns of trusting behavior that evolved over many centuries. If newcomers do not accept the burdens entailed by the civic culture of the host society—most notably the need to forswear one’s pre-existing racial, ethnic and religious allegiances—they are bound to reduce the benefits of good citizenship for the host Anglo-Saxon nation.

All evidence indicates that these groups will not forswear such allegiances, any more than Jews have forsworn their ethnic and religious allegiances despite centuries of living among Europeans.

Andrew Fraser, *The WASP Question* (Mumbai: Arktos, 2011), 57, 64.

[226] Christopher H. Boehm, *Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior* (Cambridge: Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

[227] *Ibid.*

[228] Peter Frost, “[European Hair and Eye Color: A Case of Frequency-Dependent Sexual Selection?](#),” *Evolution and Human Behavior* 27 (2006): 85–103.

^[229] Frank Salter, “Carrier Females and Sender Males: An Evolutionary Hypothesis Linking Female Attractiveness, Family Resemblance, and Paternity Confidence,” *Ethology and Sociobiology* 17, no. 4 (1996): 211–220.

^[230] Harry C. Triandis, “Cross-cultural Studies of Individualism and Collectivism,” in John J. Berman (ed.) *Current Theory and Research in Motivation; Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Cross Cultural Perspectives* 37 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1989): 41–133.

^[231] See Chapter 8 for a discussion of the psychological research on this trait.

^[232] Kevin MacDonald, Emily Patch, and Aurelio José Figueredo, “[Love, Trust, and Evolution: Nurturance/Love and Trust as Two Independent Attachment Systems Underlying Intimate Relationships](#),” *Psychology* 7, no. 2 (2016): 238–253.

^[233] John Murray Cuddihy, *The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss, and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

^[234] Money, *Love, and Love Sickness*.

^[235] Kevin MacDonald, “Warmth as a Developmental Construct: An Evolutionary Analysis,” *Child Development* 63 (1992): 753–773.

- [236] Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1977).
- [237] Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine, and Ara Norenzayan, "The Weirdest People in the World?," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 33 (2010): 61–135.
- [238] Benedikt Herrmann, Christian Thoni, C. and Simon Gächter, "Antisocial Punishment Across Societies," *Science* 319, no. 5868 (2008):1362–67, 1366.
- [239] Joan G. Miller and David M. Bersoff, "Culture and Moral Judgment: How Are Conflicts between Justice and Interpersonal Responsibilities Resolved," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 62 (1992): 541–554, 545.
- [240] This chapter is based on Kevin MacDonald, "The Familial Origins of European Individualism," *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 43. Nos. 1 and 2 (Spring and Summer 2018): 78–108.
- [241] <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325395931>
- [241] Mary S. Hartman, *The Household and Making of History: A Subversive View of the Western Past* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1, xxx.
- [242] *Ibid.*, 3.
- [243] See, e.g., Hartman, *Ibid.*; Michael Mitterauer, *Why Europe? The Medieval Origins of Its Special Path*, trans. Gerald Chapple (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010; orig. German edition, 2003).
- [244] For example, Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 6; Peter Laslett, "Characteristics of the Western Family Considered Over Time," *Journal of Family History* 2 (Summer, 1977): 89–114, 95.
- [245] Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 13.
- [246] John Hajnal, "European Marriage Patterns in Perspective," *Population in History: Essays in Historical Demography*, D. V. Glass and D. E. Eversle (eds.) (Chicago: Aldine, 1965): 101–43, 132.
- [247] James A. Brundage, "Concubinage and Marriage in Medieval Canon law," *Journal of Medieval History* 1: 1–17, 1975; Barbara Hanawalt, *The Ties that Bind: Peasant Families in Medieval England* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Alan MacFarlane, *Marriage and Love in England: Modes of Reproduction 1300–1840* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England: 1500–1800* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977); Lawrence Stone, *The Road to Divorce: 153–1987* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

- [248] Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500–1800*.
- [249] MacFarlane, *Marriage and Love in England*, 174.
- [250] Edward Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage* (5th ed.) (New York: Allerton, 1922).
- [251] E.g. Peter Brown, “Late Antiquity,” in Paul Veyne (ed.), *A History of Private Life*, Vol. I, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987): 235–311; Alain Corbin, “Backstage,” in Michelle Perrot (ed.), *A History of Private Life: IV. From the Fires of the Revolution to the Great War*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) 451–667; Roy Porter, “Mixed Feelings: The Enlightenment and Sexuality in Eighteenth-Century Britain,” in Paul Gabriel Boucé (ed.), *Sexuality in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1982): 1–27; Paul Veyne, “The Roman Empire,” in Paul Veyne (ed.), *A History of Private Life*, Vol. I, trans. Arthur Goldhammer. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987): 5–234.
- [252] Laslett, “Characteristics of the Western Family Considered Over Time,” 1977.
- [253] Hajnal, “Two Kinds of Pre-industrial Household Formation System.”
- [254] Stone, *The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England*.
- [255] Hajnal, “Two Kinds of Pre-industrial Household Formation System.”
- [256] Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 25.
- [257] *Ibid.*, 41.
- [258] Incidentally, from this perspective, one might even claim that the moderate collectivism of much of southern Europe and its persistence into the contemporary period needs explaining at least as much as the individualistic patterns of northern Europe.
- [259] Patrick Heady, “A ‘Cognition and Practice’ Approach to an Aspect of European Kinship,” *Cross-Cultural Research* 51, no. 3 (2017): 285–310.
- [260] Maria Iacovu and Alexandra Skew, “Household Structure in the EU,” in Anthony B. Atkinson and Eric Marlier (eds.), *Income and Living Conditions in the EU* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010): 79–100, 81.
- [261] Hajnal, “European Marriage Patterns in Perspective.”
- [262] Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 29.
- [263] However, in a situation where men faced the prospect of being forced to marry the mother of their illegitimate child, men would also face pressures to control their sexuality.
- [264] Kevin MacDonald, “Effortful Control, Explicit Processing and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions,” *Psychological Review* 115, no. 4 (2008): 1012–1031.
- [265] Peter Laslett, “Family and Household as Work Group and Kin Group: Areas of Traditional Europe Compared,” in Richard Wall (ed.), in collaboration with Jean Robin, and Peter Laslett, *Family Forms in Historic Europe* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 513–564.

- ^[266] [Krzysztof Kościński](#), “Assessment of Waist-to-Hip Ratio Attractiveness in Women: An Anthropometric Analysis of Digital Silhouettes,” *Archives of Sexual Behavior* 43, no. 5 (2014): 989–997.
- ^[267] Thomas R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976; orig. published 1798); quoted in MacFarlane, *Marriage and Love in England*, 294.
- ^[268] R. S. Schofield, “Family Structure, Demographic Behavior, and Economic Growth,” in J. Walter and R. S. Schofield, eds., *Famine, Disease and the Social Order in Early Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 279–304, 285.
- ^[269] Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 74.
- ^[270] Tacitus, *Germania* 18; emphasis added.
- ^[271] Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 75,
- ^[272] Laslett, “Characteristics of the Western Family Considered Over Time,” 113.
- ^[273] Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 76.
- ^[274] Richard P. Saller and Brent D. Shaw, “Tombstones and Roman Family Relations in the Principate: Civilians, Soldiers and Slaves,” *The Journal of Roman Studies* 74 (1984): 124–156, 124.
- ^[275] *Ibid.*
- ^[276] *Ibid.*, 146.
- ^[277] Brent D. Shaw and Richard P. Saller, “Close-Kin Marriage in Roman Society?,” *Man* (New Series) 19, no. 3 (September, 1984): 432–444, 432.
- ^[278] *Ibid.*, 438–439.
- ^[279] *Ibid.*
- ^[280] Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 86.
- ^[281] Kevin MacDonald, “[Temperament and Evolution](#),” in Marcel Zentner and Rebecca L. Shiner (eds.), *Handbook of Temperament* (New York: Guilford Press, 2012), 273–296.
- ^[282] Hartman, *The Household and Making of History Ibid.*, 83.

^[283] Wally Seccombe, *A Millennium of Family Change: Feudalism to Capitalism in Northwestern Europe* (London: Verso, 1992), 43.

^[284] Richard M. Smith, "Geographical Diversity in the Resort to Marriage in Late Medieval Europe: Work, Reputation, and Unmarried Females in the Household Formation Systems of Northern and Southern Europe," in P. J. P. Goldberg (ed.), *Women in Medieval English Society* (Phoenix Mill, Gloucestershire, U.K: Sutton Pub 1997): 16–59, 17.

^[285] Mitterauer, *Why Europe?*, 28.

^[286] *Ibid.*, 34.

^[287] *Ibid.*, 29.

^[288] *Ibid.*, 30

^[289] *Ibid.*, 31.

^[290] George Caspar Homans, "The Rural Sociology of Medieval England," *Past and Present* 4 (1953): 32–43; reprinted in George Caspar Homans, *Sentiments and Activities* (London: Forgotten Books, 2016): 145–157, 147.

^[291] From *Black's Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., 1891: A villein is "a person attached to a manor, who was substantially in the condition of a slave, who performed the base and servile work upon the manor for the lord, and was, in most respects, a subject of property and belonging to him."

<https://dictionary.thelaw.com/villein/>

^[292] From *Black's Law Dictionary*, 2nd ed., 1891: "Socage tenure, in England, is the holding of certain lands in consideration of certain inferior services of husbandry to be performed by the tenant to the lord of the fee. "Socage," in its most general and extensive signification, seems to denote a tenure by any certain and determinate service."

<https://dictionary.thelaw.com/socage/>

^[293] Mitterauer, *Why Europe?*, 59.

^[294] Herlihy, *Medieval Households* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 157.

^[295] Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 89.

^[296] Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri, "Major Influences on Agriculture, Ecology, Politics, and Economics," in Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri (ed.), *History of Science, Philosophy, and Culture in Indian Civilization*, Vol. III, Part 2 (Delhi: Pearson Education India, 2008): 169–402.

^[297] *Ibid.*

^[298] Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 90.

^[299] *Ibid.*, 91.

^[300] *Ibid.*, 99.

^[301] Muslim attitudes on religion and sexuality are resistant to change after migration to Western countries. Although Western Muslims are consistently located between Islamic and Western societies in their attitudes, there is no evidence that generational change, by itself, will transform the situation so that the cultural differences between Muslim migrants and Western natives will disappear: younger Westerners are adopting modern values even more swiftly than their Muslim peers.

Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations," HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP09-007, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2009.

https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4481625/norris_muslimintegration.pdf?sequence=1

^[302] Ladislav Holy, *Kinship, Honour, and Solidarity: Cousin Marriage in the Middle East* (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1989), 12, 13.

<https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=99vBAAAAIAAJ>

^[303] Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Montaillou: Cathars and Catholics in a French Village, 1294–1324*, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Penguin Books, 1980); orig. publ.: Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1978).

^[304] As noted above, a flaw in Hartman's argument on why the northwest European pattern served family interests was that daughters' labor could be exploited. Here we see that daughters-in-law could

easily replace daughters, and hiring non-relatives did occur.

[305] Emanuel LeRoy Ladurie, *The French Peasantry 1450–1660*, trans. A. Sheridan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986; orig. published in 1977.)

[306] Ladurie *The French Peasantry 1450–1660*, 340.

[307] *Ibid.*, 341.

[308] George Caspar Homans, “The Frisians in East Anglia,” *Economic History Review* Second Series 10 (1957), 189–206; reprinted in George Caspar Homans, *Sentiments and Activities* (London: Forgotten Books, 2016): 158–181, 180.

[309] Peter Laslett, “Family and Household as Work Group and Kin Group.”

[310] Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 127.

[311] *Ibid.*, 129.

[312] *Ibid.*, 132.

[313] *Ibid.*, 141.

[314] *Ibid.*, 151.

[315] *Ibid.*, 239.

[316] Gregory Clark, *A Farewell to Alms* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[317] Hartman accepts the idea that the rise of the nation state was not the result of attempts to create lasting institutions (state-building) but of elite family strategies. The eldest son inherited the estate, but younger sons could inherit any additions to the estate, “an adaptation to a changing environment of land shortage, population rise, and nuclear residential arrangements. ... The motor of conduct remained household interest” at all levels of society. Protestantism was imposed by elites, not the result of popular clamor; Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 211.

[318] David Sven Reher, “Family ties in Western Europe: Persistent Contrasts,” *Population and Development Review* 24, no. 2 (June, 1998): 203–234, 215.

[319] *Ibid.*, 217.

[320] *Ibid.*, 219.

[321] *Ibid.*, 221.

[322] *Ibid.*, 203.

[323] *Ibid.*, 229.

[324] Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 260.

[325] *Ibid.*, 270.

[326] Mitterauer, *Why Europe?*, 42.

[327] Tombs, *The English and Their History*, 88.

[328] Thomas Tombs, *The English and Their History* (London: Penguin Books, 2015; originally published: London: Allen Lane, 2014), 88.

[329] Jonathan Schulz, Duman Bahrami-Rad, Jonathan Beauchamp, and Joseph Henrich, “The Origins of WEIRD Psychology,” (preprint, Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, 2018).

<https://psyarxiv.com/d6qhu/>

[330] Herlihy, *Medieval Households*, 44.

[331] Wally Seccombe, *A Millennium of Family Change*, 51.

[332] Herlihy, *Medieval Households*, 47.

[333] *Ibid.*, 46.

[334] *Ibid.*, 48; emphasis added.

[335] *Ibid.*, 55.

[336] Mitterauer, *Why Europe*, 43.

[337] Herlihy, *Medieval Households*, 33

[338] *Ibid.*, 36.

^[339] John Bossy, *Christianity in the West 1400–1700* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 59.

^[340] Colm Lennon, “The Confraternities and Cultural Duality in Ireland, 1450–1550,” in Christopher Black and Pamela Gravestock (eds.), *Early Modern Confraternities in Europe and the Americas* (Hants, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2006): 35–52, 37.

^[341] Tacitus, *Germania*, 25.

^[342] Homans, “The Frisians in East Anglia,” 180.

^[343] Seccombe, *A Millennium of Family Change*, 47.

^[344] Hartman, *The Household and Making of History*, 117.

^[345] Ladurie, *Montaillou: Cathars and Catholics in a French Village, 1294–1324*, 19.

^[346] Daniel R. Curtis and Michelle Compianano, “Medieval Land Reclamation and the Creation of New Societies: Comparing Holland the Po Valley, c.800–c.1500,” *Journal of Historical Geography* 44 (2014): 93–108, 98–99, 102.

^[347] Homans, “The Frisians in East Anglia,” 159

^[348] Homans, “The Rural Sociology of Medieval England,” 147.

^[349] *Ibid.*, 148.

^[350] Homans, “The Frisians in East Anglia,” 180.

^[351] Homans, “The Rural Sociology of Medieval England,” 149.

^[352] *Ibid.*, 149.

^[353] Homans (*Ibid.*) suggests that the continuing division of land via partible inheritance may be a factor in the Peasants’ Revolt and in the rise of the textile industry, since people unable to make do on small plots sought ways out of their predicament. Partible inheritance would also promote a market in land because people would be willing to sell when their holdings were not viable.

^[354] *Ibid.*, 148.

^[355] As noted above, a disadvantage of the individualist family pattern is a lower rate of natural increase.

^[356] Homans, “The Frisians in East Anglia,” 169; Homans notes that areas under Danelaw also had a relatively high percentage of freemen (170).

^[357] Ladurie, *Montaillou*, 19.

^[358] See Mathieson et al., “Genome-Wide Patterns of Selection in 230 Ancient Europeans.” *Nature* 528 (2015): 499–503.

^[359] Heady, “A ‘Cognition and Practice’ Approach to European Kinship.”

^[360] Lars Trägårdh, “Statist Individualism: The Swedish Theory of Love and Its Lutheran Imprint,” in *Between the State and the Eucharist: Free Church Theology in Conversation with William T. Kavanaugh*, Joel Halldorf and Fredrik Wenell (eds.) (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2014): 13–38, 21–22.

^[361] *Ibid.*, 33.

^[362] *Ibid.*, 27.

^[363] *Ibid.*

^[364] *Ibid.*, 26.

^[365] *Ibid.*, 26–27.

^[366] Michael Roberts, *Essays in Swedish History* (London: Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1967), 4–5.

^[367] Trägårdh, “Statist Individualism,” 32–33.

^[368] Erik Gustaf Geijer, “Feudalism and Republicanism,” in Björn Hasselgren (ed.), *Freedom in Sweden: Selected Works of Erik Gustaf Geijer*, trans. Peter C. Hogg (Stockholm: Timbro Förlag, 2017): 125–306, 142.

^[369] Lars Magnusson, “Erik Gustaf Geijer—An Introduction,” in Björn Hasselgren (ed.) *Freedom in Sweden: Selected works of Erik Gustaf Geijer*, trans. Peter C. Hogg (Stockholm: Timbro Förlag, 2017): 13–60, 26; emphasis in original.

[370] Erik Gustaf Geijer, “Feudalism and Republicanism,” 139; emphasis in original.

[371] *Ibid.*, 138.

[372] *Ibid.*; emphasis in original.

[373] *Ibid.*, 140.

[374] Geijer, “Feudalism and Republicanism,” 155.

[375] Hans-Peter Hasenfratz, *Barbarian Rites*, trans. Michael Moynihan (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 2011; original German edition, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany: Verlag Herder, 1992), 49.

This contrast between the “Odinic rulers” and the previous priestly regime is consistent with Marija Gimbutas’s controversial theory that the Indo-Europeans introduced a warlike, male-dominated culture, replacing previously existing, more female-centric cultures.

The following is speculative, but it’s interesting that a theme of Norse mythology was a primeval battle between the Aesir and the Vanir, the former seemingly referring to the Indo-European conquerors with their highly militarized culture (with gods such as Odin and Thor), and the latter possibly referring to the previously resident hunter-gatherer culture discussed in Ch. 3. The main god of the Vanir was Freya, a goddess associated with magic and compatible with the idea that priests were the original rulers in Scandinavia and that the culture was much more influenced by women than the highly patriarchal culture of the Indo-European conquerors.

As noted in Ch. 3, this culture was quite sophisticated and supported a large population. They may well have been able to put up a formidable defense against the invaders; after all, as also noted in Ch. 3, the hunter-gathering cultures of Scandinavia held off the advance of agriculture by the farming culture of the Middle Eastern-derived farmers for 2000–3000 years. I suggest that the mythology ultimately refers to real battles that are lost to prehistory. According to the mythology, the Aesir used typical military tactics, while the Vanir used magic, and the two sides ultimately arrived at a *modus vivendi*. It’s therefore tempting to explain the relatively egalitarian thrust of Scandinavian cultures compared to other Germanic peoples as emanating from this cultural fusion.

Marija Gimbutas, *Bronze Age Cultures in Eastern and Central Europe* (The Hague: De Gruyter Noulton, 1965).

[376] Trägårdh, “Statist Individualism,” 132–133.

[377] Henrik Berggren and Lars Trägårdh, “Pippi Longstocking: The Autonomous Child and the Moral Logic of the Swedish Welfare State,” in *Swedish Modernism: Architecture, Consumption, and the Welfare State*, Helena Mattsson and Sven-Olav Wallenstein (eds.) (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2010): 11–22, 14–16. One might note that Sweden’s extreme individualism is a disastrously poor match with Middle Eastern collectivism and the Muslim religion which Sweden is nevertheless energetically importing.

[378] Heady, “A ‘Cognition and Practice’ Approach to an Aspect of European Kinship.”

[379] Berggren and Trägårdh, “Pippi Longstocking,” 17.

[380] *Ibid.*, 19.

[381] *Ibid.*, 20.

[382] See Kevin MacDonald, “The Establishment and Maintenance of Socially Imposed Monogamy in Western Europe,” *Politics and the Life Sciences* 14 (1995): 3–23; Kevin MacDonald, “Focusing on the Group: Further Issues Related to Western Monogamy,” *Politics and the Life Sciences* 14 (1995): 38–46.

[383] See, e.g.: David C. Geary, *The Origin of Mind: Evolution of Brain, Cognition, and General Intelligence* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2005); Kevin MacDonald, “[Effortful Control, Explicit Processing and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions.](#)” *Psychological Review* 115, no. 4 (2008), 1012–1031; Keith Stanovich, *Who is rational? Studies of Individual Differences in Reasoning* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1999); Keith Stanovich *The Robot’s Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004).

[384] Dan Chiappe and Kevin MacDonald, “The Evolution of Domain-General Mechanisms in

Intelligence and Learning,” *Journal of General Psychology* 132, no. 1 (2005), 5–40.

[385] MacDonald, “Effortful Control, Explicit Processing, and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions.”

[386] Kevin MacDonald, “[Evolution and a Dual Processing Theory of Culture: Applications to Moral Idealism and Political Philosophy](#),” *Politics and Culture* (Issue, #1, April, 2010), unpaginated; see also Kevin MacDonald, “Evolution, Psychology, and a Conflict Theory of Culture,” *Evolutionary Psychology* 7, no. 2 (2009), 208–233.

[387] See review in MacDonald, “Effortful Control, Explicit Processing, and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions.”

[388] Mario Beauregard, Johanne Lévesque, and Pierre Bourgouin, “Neural Correlates of Conscious Self-Regulation of Emotion,” *Journal of Neuroscience* 21, no. 18 (2001): 1–6.

[389] Alan G. Sanfey, Reid Hastie, Mary K. Colvin, and Jordan Grafman, “Phineas Gauged: Decision-Making and the Human Prefrontal Cortex,” *Neuropsychologia* 41 (2003): 1218–1229.

[390] John Gerring, “Ideology: A Definitional Analysis,” *Political Research Quarterly* 50 (1997): 957–994; Kathleen Knight, “Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century,” *American Political Science Review* 100 (2006): 619–625.

[391] MacDonald, “Evolution, Psychology, and a Conflict Theory of Culture.”

[392] Richard D. Alexander, *Darwinism and Human Affairs* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979); for ethnographic examples, see Mark V. Flinn and Bobbi S. Low, “Resource Distribution, Social Competition, and Mating Patterns in Human Societies,” in Daniel I. Rubenstein and Richard W. Wrangham (eds.), *Ecological Aspects of Social Evolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986): 217–243; Kevin MacDonald, “Production, Social Controls and Ideology: Toward a Sociobiology of the Phenotype,” *Journal of Social and Biological Structures* 6 (1983): 297–317.

[393] Alexander, *Darwinism and Human Affairs*.

[394] See Kevin MacDonald, “Mechanisms of Sexual Egalitarianism in Western Europe,” *Ethology and Sociobiology* 11 (1990):195–238; see also Conclusion of this chapter.

[395] The following is based on MacDonald, “The Establishment and Maintenance of Socially Imposed Monogamy in Western Europe.”

[396] Walter Ullman, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages: A Study in the Ideological Relation of Clerical to Lay Power*, 3rd ed. (London: Methuen, 1970), 1.

[397] Georges Duby, *The Knight, the Lady, and the Priest*, trans. Barbara Bray (London: Penguin Books, 1983), 162.

[398] MacDonald, “Evolution, Psychology, and a Conflict Theory of Culture.”

[399] Research on altruistic punishment, reviewed in the section of Ch. 3 on the behavior of WEIRD people, may be thought to be an exception. But here, people are motivated to punish selfish others even at a cost to self—i.e., they are motivated to punish people who are seen as not behaving in a reciprocal manner.

[400] Acclaim in the media would contribute to a good reputation and that would certainly be an asset. But I fail to see how it can result in tangible benefits for most people. For example, a small percentage of White Americans and a larger percentage of Hollywood celebrities have adopted impoverished children from other races rather than have children of their own. Such people are advertising that they are “good people,” and their behavior is typically acclaimed in the media and in society at large—discussed in Chapter 8 as resulting from the Left seizing the moral high ground. But, unless such behavior actually enables having other biologically related children, helping biological relatives, etc., I fail to see how it is biologically adaptive; even financial rewards would seem to be illusory for most.

[401] Larry Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 179.

[402] Quoted in John E. Lynch, “Marriage and Celibacy of the Clergy: The Discipline of the Western Church: An Historical-Canonical Synopsis,” *Jurist* 23 (1972):14-38, 33.

[403] Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual*.

[404] *Ibid.*, 186.

[405] *Ibid.*, 192.

[406] *Ibid.*, 282.

[407] Gerd Tellenbach, *The Church in Western Europe from the Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 101.

[408] The mendicant friars were bound by a vow of poverty and dedicated to an ascetic way of life; they renounced property and focused on preaching to the public, living off donations from their listeners.

[409] C. H. Lawrence, *The Friars: The Impact of the Early Mendicant Movement on Western Culture* (London: Longman, 1994), 126.

[410] Tellenbach, *The Church in Western Europe From the Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century*, 103.

[411] *Ibid.*, 101.

[412] Inner quote from G. Miccoli, "Monks," in Jacques LeGoff (ed.), *Medieval Callings*, trans. L. G. Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990): 37–74, 57.

Entire quote from MacDonald, "The Establishment and Maintenance of Monogamy in Western Europe, 9.

[413] Tellenbach 1993, *The Church in Western Europe from the Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century*, 105.

[414] *Ibid.*, 103.

[415] Miccoli, "Monks," 57.

[416] Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual*, 204, 206.

[417] *Ibid.*, 218.

[418] *Ibid.*, 231.

[419] *Ibid.*

[420] *Ibid.*, 221.

[421] Jeremy Cohen, *The Friars and the Jews: The Emergence of Medieval Anti-Judaism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982); Mark R. Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); William Chester Jordan, *The French Monarchy and the Jews: From Philip Augustus to the Last Capetians* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989); Kevin MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998; 2nd ed.: Bloomington, IN: 1stbooks Library, 2004), Chaps. 3 and 4; James Parkes, *The Jew in the Medieval Community*, 2nd ed. (New York: Hermon Press, 1976).

[422] Robert Chazan, *Medieval Jewry in Northern France: A Political and Social History* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); John Gilchrist, *The Church and Economic Policy in the Middle Ages* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969); Jordan, *The French Monarchy and the Jews*; MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*.

[423] The roots of the Church's collectivism may be traced to the late Roman Empire when it became the official religion of the Empire beginning with Constantine. During this period the Church actively sought to lessen Jewish power by, e.g., encouraging laws against Jews owning Christian slaves—a project that required high levels of internal discipline and influence on the government. Christian ideology essentially became a blueprint for an anti-Jewish group strategy.

MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, Ch. 3.

[424] Christopher Hill, *Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England*, 2nd ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), 349.

[425] Ronald A. Marchant, *The Church Under the Law: Justice, Administration and Discipline in the Diocese of York 1560–1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 224.

[426] David Herlihy, *Medieval Households* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 157.

^[427] See section titled “As noted in Ch. 4, E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield, *The Population History of England, 1541–1871* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989; orig. published: Edward Arnold, Ltd., 1981).

^[428] E.g., Patricia Ebrey, “Concubines in Sung China,” *Journal of Family History* 11 (1986):1–24.

^[429] E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield, *The Population History of England, 1541–1871: A Reconstruction* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).

^[430] *Ibid.*

^[431] *Ibid.*, 439; see also Hajnal, “European Marriage Patterns in Perspective”; MacFarlane, *Marriage and Love in England*.

^[432] James Foreman-Peck and Peng Zhou, “Late Marriage as a Contributor to the Industrial Revolution in England, *The Long Run* (blog of the Economics History Society) (February 13, 2018). <https://ehstheLongrun.net/2018/02/13/late-marriage-as-a-contributor-to-the-industrial-revolution-in-england/>

^[433] Patricia Draper and Henry Harpending, “A Sociobiological Perspective on Human Reproductive Strategies,” in Kevin MacDonald (ed.), *Sociobiological Perspectives on Human Development* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1988): 340–372.

^[434] Marcia Guttentag and Paul F. Secord, *Too Many Women?* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983).

^[435] Robert Trivers, *Social Evolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).

^[436] Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual*.

^[437] Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual*, 61.

^[438] See Ch. 2 and Appendix to Ch. 2 on the Roman Republic.

^[439] *Ibid.*, 79.

^[440] *Ibid.*, 80.

^[441] *Ibid.*, 82.

^[442] *Ibid.*, 83.

^[443] *Ibid.*, 88.

^[444] It is interesting that St. Augustine was motivated to say that the demise of the older deities was not responsible for Alaric’s sack of Rome in 410, “arguing that all human institutions were subject to decay and disaster” (*Ibid.*, 89). Would a robust aristocratic society have been better able to defend itself?

^[445] Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual*, 89.

^[446] In the early Church, bishops and presbyters were chosen by “general consent,” but this was not the case when the Church became wedded to the Empire (*Ibid.*, 93).

^[447] *Ibid.*, 98–99.

^[448] *Ibid.*, 102.

^[449] *Ibid.*, 104.

^[450] *Ibid.*

^[451] *Ibid.*, 105.

^[452] *Ibid.*, 107. As Siedentop notes, this doctrine can be seen in Kant’s moral philosophy in the late eighteenth century; as noted in Ch. 8, maintaining a reputation as a morally upright person is of vital importance in the contemporary world.

^[453] St. Gregory of Nyssa, who is regarded as a Church Father, was an ardent anti-Semite. His opposition to slavery was likely partly motivated by his concern about Jews owning Christian slaves at a time when Jewish enslavement of Christians was a major issue. See Kevin MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents* (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2004; orig. published: Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), Ch. 3, *passim*. Gregory wrote that “[Jews are] murderers of the Lord, assassins of the prophets, rebels against God, God haters, ... advocates of the devil, race of vipers, slanderers, calumniators, dark-minded people, leaven of the Pharisees, Sanhedrin of demons, sinners, wicked men, stoners, and haters of righteousness.”

^[454] Siedentop, 121.

^[455] James C. Russell, *The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity: A Sociobiological Approach to Religious Transformation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

^[456] *Ibid.*, 39.

^[457] *Ibid.*

^[458] *Ibid.*, 205.

^[459] *Ibid.*, 200.

- [460] *Ibid.*, 204.
- [461] *Ibid.*, 213, 212.
- [462] *Ibid.*, 207.
- [463] Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual*, 241.
- [464] *Ibid.*
- [465] *Ibid.*, 244.
- [466] *Ibid.*, 152.
- [467] *Ibid.*, 258.
- [468] *Ibid.*, 193.
- [469] Russell, *The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity*, 120.
- [470] Barbara Hanawalt, *The Ties that Bound: Peasant Families in Medieval England* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Dominique Barthelemy, "Kinship," in Philippe Aries and Georges Duby (eds.), *A History of Private Life, Vol. II: Revelations of the Medieval World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).
- [471] From an evolutionary perspective, marrying close relatives leads to inbreeding depression and an increased risk for genetic diseases caused by recessive genes. Many cultures allow first-cousin marriage and a few, such as traditional Judaism, allow uncle-niece marriage. As discussed here, Western societies tend to be more exogamous than Near Eastern societies.
- [472] C. B. Bouchard, "Consanguinity and Noble Marriages in the Tenth and Eleventh Century," *Speculum* 56 (1981): 268–287.
- [473] John Goody, J. *The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 145; one effect of this policy, emphasized by Goody, was that families were often left without direct heirs and left their property to the Church.
- [474] Karl E. Leyser, *Rule and Conflict in Early Medieval Society* (London: Edward Arnold, Ltd., 1979), 50.
- [475] John T. Noonan, "Power to Choose," *Viator* 4 (1973): 419–434, 430.
- [476] MacFarlane, *Marriage and Love in England*.
- [477] Henri Pirenne, *Medieval Cities: Their Origin and the Revival of Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1925, 1952, 1980), 112.
- [478] *Ibid.*, 116.
- [479] Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual*, 276.
- [480] Ricardo Duchesne, *The Uniqueness of Western Civilization* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2011), 250.
- [481] Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual*, 113.
- [482] *Ibid.*
- [483] Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual*, 301.
- [484] *Ibid.*, 303.
- [485] *Ibid.*, 306.
- [486] *Ibid.*, 307.
- [487] *Ibid.*, 316.
- [488] *Ibid.*, 331.
- [489] *Ibid.*, 335.
- [490] Thomas Babington Macaulay, *History of England from the Accession of James II*, Vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Porter and Coates, 1848); unpaginated.
<https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1468/1468-h/1468-h.htm>

Macaulay, who, as a highly partisan Whig historian, certainly cannot be accused of bias in favor of the Church, does not ignore what he regards as positive Christian cultural influences. The period after the Norman invasion is widely seen by historians as a period in which the English were dominated by

an alien, oppressive Norman elite. Macaulay credits the Church with defending the natives against the Norman oppression on the basis of the Christian moral universalism, albeit fairly ineffectually:

It is true that, shortly after the battle of Hastings, Saxon prelates and abbots were violently deposed, and that ecclesiastical adventurers from the Continent were intruded by hundreds into lucrative benefices. Yet even then pious divines of Norman blood raised their voices against such a violation of the constitution of the Church, refused to accept mitres from the hands of William, and charged him, on the peril of his soul, not to forget that *the vanquished islanders were his fellow Christians*. The first protector whom the English found among the dominant caste was Archbishop Anselm. ...

How great a part the Roman Catholic ecclesiastics subsequently had in the abolition of villenage we learn from the unexceptionable testimony of Sir Thomas Smith, one of the ablest Protestant counsellors of Elizabeth. When the dying slaveholder asked for the last sacraments, his spiritual attendants regularly adjured him, as he loved his soul, to emancipate *his brethren for whom Christ had died*. So successfully had the Church used her formidable machinery that, before the Reformation came, she had enfranchised almost all the bondmen in the kingdom except her own, who, to do her justice, seem to have been very tenderly treated.

Ibid., my emphasis.

[491] MacDonald, "Mechanisms of Sexual Egalitarianism in Western Europe."

[492] *Ibid.*

[493] Duchesne, *The Uniqueness of Western Civilization*.

[494] See Ch. 4; see also Michael Mitterauer, *Why Europe? The Medieval Origins of Its Special Path*, trans. Gerald Chapple (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010; orig. German edition, 2003), 62.

[495] "Harold Bluetooth," *Catholic Encyclopedia*.

<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07141b.htm>

^[496] “Christianization of Scandinavia,” *Wikipedia*.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christianization_of_Scandinavia

^[497] Kevin MacDonald, “Socialization for Ingroup Identity among Assyrians in the United States.” Paper presented at a symposium on socialization for ingroup identity at the meetings of the International Society for Human Ethology, Ghent Belgium (July 29, 2004).

<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308059453>

^[498] Jonathan Schulz et al. present data attempting to show that the Church’s rules on incest were the decisive force in establishing European individualism. This view cannot explain individualist family patterns being greater in Scandinavia which was Christianized much later than other areas of Western Europe, nor can it explain the north-south cline in family patterns in France and, perhaps, northern versus southern Italy, although the complex political history of the latter region, including Byzantine conquest, implies a shorter period of influence for the Western Church.

Jonathan Schulz, Duman Bahrami-Rad, Jonathan Beauchamp, and Joseph Henrich, “The Origins of WEIRD Psychology” (unpublished manuscript, Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, 2018).

^[499] Michael Mitterauer also emphasizes the special role of the imperial Church in establishing Western uniqueness; see Mitterauer, *Why Europe?*

^[500] Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual*, 146.

^[501] MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, Ch. 3.

^[502] *Ibid.*, Ch. 4.

^[503] Cohen, *The Friars and the Jews*, 97.

^[504] Inner quote from *Ibid.*, 13.

^[505] Entire quote from MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, 116.

^[506] Quoted in Chazan, *Medieval Jewry in Northern France*, 103.

^[507] G. W. Bernard, “The Dissolution of the Monasteries,” *History* 96 (October, 2011): 390–409.

^[508] Population genetic research does not support genetic differences within central and southern England, although there are differences between these areas and other areas in the U.K.. The authors suggest that this could be the result of recent movement within this area, and therefore consistent with genetic gradients between, e.g., East Anglia and other areas of central and southern England in the seventeenth century. The continental European groups that contributed most to British ancestry were west Germany, northwestern France, and Belgium, with Saxons represented at between 10–40 percent of the population of central and southern England and others (including the Danes) being indistinguishable—again perhaps suggesting recent migration within the area.

Stephen Leslie et al., “Fine Scale Genetic Structure of the British Population,” *Nature* 519, no. 7543 (March 19, 2015): 309–314.

^[509] Kevin Phillips, *The Cousins’ Wars: Religion, Politics and the Triumph of Anglo-America* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 26.

^[510] *Ibid.*, 27.

^[511] See Chs. 3 and 4.

^[512] David Sloan Wilson, *Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

^[513] Kevin MacDonald, “Human General Intelligence as a Domain General Psychological Adaptation,” in Joseph P. Kush (ed.), *Intelligence Quotient: Testing, Role of Genetics and the Environment and Social Outcomes* (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2013): 35–54.

^[514] Wilson, *Darwin’s Cathedral*, 96.

^[515] See section of Ch. 5 labelled “Implicit and Explicit Processing: How Ideology Motivates Behavior” which discusses ideology from an evolutionary perspective, with a focus on the motivational consequences of Christian religious ideology.

^[516] G. W. Bernard, “The Dissolution of the Monasteries,” *History* 96 (October, 2011): 390–409.

- [517] Wilson, *Darwin's Cathedral*, 107.
- [518] John T. McNeill, *The History and Character of Calvinism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), 100.
- [519] David Hackett Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 25.
- [520] *Ibid.*, 71.
- [521] *Ibid.*, 27.
- [522] *Ibid.*, 17.
- [523] Alden T. Vaughn, *The Puritan Tradition in America, 1620–1730*, revised ed. (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1997), xv.
- [524] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 70, 81.
- [525] Kevin P. Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 27.
- [526] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 49.
- [527] *Ibid.*, 38.
- [528] *Ibid.*, 26.
- [529] Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars*, 27.
- [530] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 133.
- [531] Vaughn, *The Puritan Tradition in America, 1620–1730*, xiv.
- [532] In *Ibid.*, 248.
- [533] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 97.
- [534] Vaughn, *The Puritan Tradition in America, 1620–1730*, xiii.
- [535] Thomas Tombs, *The English and Their History* (London: Penguin Books, 2015; originally published: London: Allen Lane, 2014), 236.
- [536] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 202.
- [537] Vaughn, *The Puritan Tradition in America, 1620–1730*, 179.
- [538] In *Ibid.*, 143–144; emphasis in original.
- [539] In *Ibid.*, 174–175.
- [540] *Ibid.*, 93.
- [541] *Ibid.*, 89.
- [542] In *Ibid.*, 245.
- [543] *Ibid.*, 261–262.
- [544] In *Ibid.*, 268.
- [545] *Ibid.*, 271.
- [546] In *Ibid.*, 194.
- [547] In *Ibid.*, 199.
- [548] *Ibid.*, 297.
- [549] See W. P. Allen, “Theodore Mommsen.” *The North American Review* 111, no. 229 (1870): 445–465, 457.
www.jstor.org/stable/25109578
- [550] Vaughn, *The Puritan Tradition in America, 1620–1730*, 298.
- [551] *Ibid.*, 298.
- [552] François Guizot, *Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe depuis la chute de l'Empire romain jusqu'à la Révolution française* (Paris: Didier, 1847), 344; quoted in Tombs, *The English and Their History*, 465.
- [553] Tombs, *The English and Their History*, 155.
- [554] *Ibid.*, 111.
- [555] Fraser, *The WASP Question*, 113.

- [556] *Ibid.*, 117,
- [557] Tombs, *The English and Their History*, 225.
- [558] *Ibid.*, 247; inner quote from Cromwell.
- [559] Fraser, *The WASP Question*, 122.
- [560] *Ibid.*, 156; see also Tombs, *The English and Their History*, 366–367.
- [561] Fraser, *The WASP Question*, 27.
- [562] *Ibid.*, 254.
- [563] *Ibid.*, 294–295.
- [564] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 357.
- [565] Vaughn, *The Puritan Tradition in America, 1620–1730*, 20.
- [566] Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars*, 477.
- [567] *Ibid.*, 556.
- [568] Ernest Lee Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968), 199.
- [569] Mark Twain commented early in the twentieth century in notes for a projected essay: “[Robber Baron Jay] Gould Followed CIVIL WAR & Cal. [i.e., California] sudden-riches disease with a worse one... by swindling and buying courts.” Quoted in Tuveson, *Ibid.*, 208.
- [570] *Ibid.*, 209.
- [571] *Ibid.*, 212.
- [572] Philip F. Gura, *American Transcendentalism: A History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).
- [573] Kevin MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements* (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 1998; orig. published: Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), Ch. 3.
- [574] Gura, *American Transcendentalism*, 121.
- [575] *Ibid.*, 84.
- [576] *Ibid.*, 18.
- [577] Quoting Ralph Waldo Emerson, in *Ibid.*, 15.
- [578] *Ibid.*, 266.
- [579] Quoted in *Ibid.*, 138–139.
- [580] Quoted in *Ibid.*, 139.
- [581] *Ibid.*, 80.
- [582] *Ibid.*, 143.
- [583] *Ibid.*, 156.
- [584] *Ibid.*, 85.
- [585] *Ibid.*
- [586] Quoted in *Ibid.*, 103.
- [587] *Ibid.*, 143.
- [588] Quoted in *Ibid.*, 219.
- [589] “Theodore Parker,” Dictionary of Unitarian & Universalist Biography.
<http://uudb.org/articles/theodoreparker.html>
- [590] In Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation*, 153.
- [591] Gura, *American Transcendentalism*, 228.
- [592] Gura, *American Transcendentalism*, 137.
- [593] In *Ibid.*, 216.
- [594] *Ibid.*, 245.
- [595] *Ibid.*, 246.
- [596] In *Ibid.*, 260.
- [597] In *Ibid.*, 265.

[598] M. E. Bradford, “Dividing the House: The Gnosticism of Lincoln’s Political Rhetoric,” *Modern Age* (Winter, 1979): 10–24, 13.

[599] Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation*, 139.

[600] Bradford, “Dividing the House,” 17–18.

[601] Lincoln, quoted in Bradford, *Ibid.*, 19.

[602] *Ibid.*, 53.

[603] *Ibid.*, 67.

[604] *Ibid.*, 68

[605] Gura, *American Transcendentalism*, 271.

[606] In *Ibid.*, 302.

[607] In *Ibid.*

[608] In *Ibid.*, 304–305.

[609] Quoted in Fraser, *The WASP Question*, 299.

[610] Kevin MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism* (Bloomington, Ind.: Firstbooks, 2004; orig. published: Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), Ch. 5.

[611] Josiah Strong, *The New Era, or the Coming Kingdom* (New York: The Baker & Taylor Co., 1893), 354,

Strong was a prominent Protestant thinker. His message in *The New Era* was that a revival of Christianity was necessary to deal with the problems of the cities and the working classes (Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation*, 137).

This reflects the diminished optimism characteristic of the end of the nineteenth century resulting from concern over immigration, culminating in the immigration restriction law of 1924. This is discussed below in the section titled “The Period of Ethnic Defense, 1880–1965.”

[612] Eric P. Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 18.

[613] *Ibid.*, 17–18; emphasis in original.

[614] In M. E. Bradford, *A Better Guide Than Reason: Federalists and Anti-Federalists* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994; orig. published 1979), 194.

[615] Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America.*, 22.

[616] See Paul Wolff Mitchell, “The Fault in His Seeds: Lost Notes to the Case of Bias in Samuel George Morton’s Cranial Racial Science,” *PLOS Biology* (October 4, 2018), unpaginated. Mitchell confirmed the accuracy of Morton’s measurements.

<https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.2007008#pbio.2007008.s001>

[617] Strong, *The New Era*, 81.

[618] Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation*, 142.

[619] Thomas Babington Macaulay, *History of England from the Accession of James II*, Vol 1. (Philadelphia: Porter and Coates, 1848); quoted in Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation*, 144.

[620] Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation*, 144. Tuveson also summarizes John Lothrop Motley’s *The Rise of the Dutch Republic* which contrasts Germanic and Celtic peoples, the former characterized by “popular sovereignty”

[621] Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America.*, 19.

[622] *Ibid.*, 37.

[623] *Ibid.*, 44–45.

[624] Ralph Waldo Emerson, *English Traits* (London: G. Routledge & Co., 1857), 27.

[625] *Ibid.*, 28.

[626] *Ibid.*, 25.

[627] Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, 44.

[628] See the section labeled “The Period of Ethnic Defense: 1880–1965” below.

- [629] *Ibid.*, 59.
- [630] *Ibid.*, 65.
- [631] *Ibid.*
- [632] Eric P. Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2004).
- [633] Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, 88–89.
- [634] Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, 153.
- [635] See MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, Ch. 7.
- [636] Quoted in Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, 144.
- [637] This is based on my experience at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in the 1960s. My attraction to the left during this period was much more toward the hippie version. The Jewish students so central to the leftist counterculture tended much more toward political radicalism. See: Kevin MacDonald, “Memories of Madison,” *VDARE.com* (March 18, 2009). <https://vdare.com/articles/memories-of-madison-my-life-in-the-new-left>
- [638] MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, *passim*.
- [639] Quoted in Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, 90; my emphasis.
- [640] Quoted in *Ibid.*, 90.
- [641] *Ibid.*, 47.
- [642] *Ibid.*, 47.
- [643] *Ibid.*, 49.
- [644] *Ibid.*
- [645] Thomas Tombs, *The English and Their History*, 245; inner quote from Oliver Cromwell.
- [646] Quoted in Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, 124.
- [647] *Ibid.*, 130.
- [648] *Ibid.*, 105.
- [649] *Ibid.*, 137.
- [650] *Ibid.*, 144.
- [651] *Ibid.*, 52.
- [652] MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, Ch. 2.
- [653] Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, 92.
- [654] *Ibid.*
- [655] *Ibid.*
- [656] *Ibid.*
- [657] MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, Ch. 7.
- [658] “\$10,000 Fund Presented to Dr. Felix Adler,” *The New York Times* (May 5, 1901). <https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1901/05/05/101072405.pdf>
- [659] MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, Ch. 3.
- [660] *House Reports*, No. 350 (1924), 16.
- [661] Israel Zangwill, quoted in Joseph Leftowich, *Israel Zangwill* (London: James Clark & Co., Ltd., 1957, 161)
- [662] Kevin MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2002; orig. published: Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), Chs. 3 and 4.
- [663] Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, 96.
- [664] *Ibid.*, 97.
- [665] *Ibid.*, 97–98.
- [666] David Hackett Fischer, *Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1989); see Ch. 7.
- [667] MacDonald, “American Transcendentalism.”
- [668] Thomas P. Slaughter, *The Beautiful Soul of John Woolman, Apostle of Abolition* (New York:

Hill & Wang, 2008).

[669] Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, 101.

[670] Kallen is discussed in Kevin MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, Ch. 7:

Reflecting the utility of cultural pluralism in serving internal Jewish group interests in maintaining cultural separatism, Kallen personally combined his ideology of cultural pluralism with a deep immersion in Jewish history and literature, a commitment to Zionism, and political activity on behalf of Jews in Eastern Europe (Sachar 1992; Frommer 1978).

Kallen (1915, 1924) developed a “polycentric” ideal for American ethnic relationships. Kallen defined ethnicity as deriving from one’s biological endowment, implying that Jews should be able to remain a genetically and culturally cohesive group while participating in American democratic institutions. This conception that the United States should be organized as a set of separate ethnic-cultural groups was accompanied by an ideology that relationships between groups would be cooperative and benign: “Kallen lifted his eyes above the strife that swirled around him to an ideal realm where diversity and harmony coexist” (Higham 1984, 209).

Morris Frommer, “The American Jewish Congress: A History, 1914–1950,” (2 vols.). Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1978).

John Higham, *Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America*, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).

Horace M. Kallen, “Democracy versus the Melting Pot,” *The Nation* 100 (February 18 and 25, 1915):190–194, 217–220.

Horace M. Kallen, *Culture and Democracy in the United States* (New York: Arno Press, 1924)

Howard M. Sachar, *A History of Jews in America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 425ff.

[671] *Ibid.*, 102.

[672] Randolph Bourne, “Trans-national America” (July, 1916).

<http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/16jul/bourne.htm>

[673] Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, 158.

[674] *Ibid.*, 156.

[675] Kevin MacDonald, “Preface to the First Paperback Edition of *The Culture of Critique*,” (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2002), liii.

<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329029251>

[676] Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*. 26.

[677] *Ibid.*, 68–69.

[678] *Ibid.*, 71.

[679] MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, 259–261.

[680] N. W. Cohen, *Not Free to Desist: The American Jewish Committee, 1906–1966* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1972), 41.

[681] *Ibid.*, 49.

[682] E. A. Ross, *The Old World and the New: The Significance of Past and Present Immigration to the American People* (New York: The Century Company, 1914), 144–145).

[683] Roger Daniels, *Not Like Us: Immigrants and Minorities in America, 1890–1924* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997).

[684] Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*. 81..

[685] Herbert S. Lewis, “The Passion of Franz Boas,” *American Anthropologist* 103, no 2 (June, 2001):447–467, 453.

[686] MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, Ch. 2.

[687] MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents*, Ch. 5.

[688] Kevin MacDonald, “Enemies of My Enemy. [Review of *The ‘Jewish Threat’: Anti-Semitic*](#)

[Politics of the U.S. Army by Joseph W. Bendersky](#),” *The Occidental Quarterly* 1, no. 2 (Winter 2001): 63–77, 63.

[689] Neil Baldwin, *Henry Ford and the Jews: The Mass Production of Hate* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

[690] Quoted in *Ibid.*, 59.

[691] David Starr Jordan, *Unseen Empire: A Study of the Plight of Nations that Do Not Pay Their Debts* (Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1912), 19–20.

[692] George W. Stocking, *Race, Evolution, and Culture: Essays in the History of Anthropology* (New York: Free Press, 1968), 286.

[693] Gelya Frank, “Jews, Multiculturalism, and Boasian Anthropology,” *American Anthropologist* 99 (1997): 731–745.

[694] Kevin MacDonald, “[Henry Ford and the Jewish Question](#),” *The Occidental Quarterly* 2, no. 4 (Winter 2002–2003): 53–77.

<http://www.kevinmacdonald.net/HenryFord-2.htm>

[695] Ernest Liebold and Billy Cameron, *The International Jew* (June 12, 1920).

[696] *Ibid.*, June 19, 1920.

[697] Joseph Bendersky, *The ‘Jewish Threat’: Anti-Semitic Politics of the U.S. Army* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 244.

[698] Kevin MacDonald, “Preface to the First Paperback Edition of *The Culture of Critique*.”

[699] Bendersky, *The ‘Jewish Threat*,’ 245.

[700] *Ibid.*, 250.

[701] *Ibid.*, 252–253.

[702] *Ibid.*, 253.

[703] *Ibid.*, 250.

[704] *Ibid.*, 280.

[705] *Ibid.*, 262.

[706] Carl Degler, *In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Frank, “Jews, Multiculturalism, and Boasian Anthropology”; Lewis, “The Passion of Franz Boas; Kevin MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, Ch. 2; Stocking, *Race, Evolution, and Culture*); George Stocking, “The Ethnographic Sensibility of the 1920s and the Dualism of the Anthropological Tradition,” *History of Anthropology* 6 (1989): 208–276.

[707] Higham, *Send These to Me*, 58–59.

[708] See MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, Ch. 6 for a summary.

[709] Kevin MacDonald, “Effortful Control, Explicit Processing and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions,” *Psychological Review* 115, no.4 (2008): 1012–1031.

[710] *Ibid.*

[711] The material on the British antislavery movement in this chapter is based on Kevin MacDonald, “The Anti-slavery Movement as an Expression of the Eighteenth-Century Affective Revolution in England: An Ethnic Hypothesis,” in Michael Austin & Kathryn Stasio (eds.), *Reasoning Beasts: Evolution, Cognition and Culture in the Long Eighteenth Century* (New York: AMS Press, 2013): 3–29.

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[712] For example, David Sloan Wilson and Lee Alan Dugatkin “Group Selection and Assortative Interactions,” *American Naturalist* 149 (1997): 336–351.

[713] Kevin MacDonald, “[Effortful Control, Explicit Processing and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions](#),” *Psychological Review* 115, no. 4 (2008): 1012–1031.

[714] Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson, “Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation (or Anything Else) in Sizable Groups,” *Ethology and Sociobiology* 13 (1995), 171–195; Joseph Henrich

and Robert Boyd, “Why People Punish Defectors: Weak Conformist Transmission Can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative Dilemmas.” *Journal of Theoretical Biology* 208 (2001): 79–89.

^[715] David Hackett Fischer, *Fairness and Freedom: A History of Two Open Societies, New Zealand and the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

^[716] In Gertrude Himmelfarb, *Roads to Modernity: The British, French, and American Enlightenments* (New York: Vintage reprint; orig. published 2004), 131; see discussion below.

^[717] Christopher Leslie Brown, *Moral Capital* (Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina Press, 2006), 161.

^[718] Adam Hochschild, *Bury the Chains: Prophets and Rebels in the Fight to Free an Empire’s Slaves* (Boston: Mariner Books, 2006), 5; emphasis in text).

^[719] Seymour Drescher, *Capitalism and Antislavery: British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 2.

^[720] Brown, *Moral Capital*, 450.

^[721] *Ibid.*, 3–22.

^[722] *Ibid.*, 16

^[723] Robert Tombs, *The English and Their History* (London: Penguin Books, 2015; orig. published 2014), 318.

^[724] *Ibid.*, 329.

^[725] *Ibid.*, 324.

^[726] *Ibid.*, 327–328.

^[727] In *Ibid.*, 329.

^[728] Gertrude Himmelfarb, *Roads to Modernity*, 134.

^[729] *Ibid.*, 142.

- [730] Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500–1800* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1977).
- [731] *Ibid.*, 238.
- [732] Himmelfarb, *Roads to Modernity*, 144.
- [733] Elie Halévy, *The Birth of Methodism in England*, trans., Bernard Semmel (Chicago, 1971), 37.
- [734] *Ibid.*, 66.
- [735] Himmelfarb, *Roads to Modernity*, 146.
- [736] Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 146ff.
- [737] *Ibid.*, 310.
- [738] Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1944).
- [739] Brown, *Moral Capital*, 15.
- [740] *Ibid.*, 24.
- [741] *Ibid.*, 315.
- [742] *Ibid.*, 441.
- [743] *Ibid.*, 438–439.
- [744] Ricardo Duchesne, *The Uniqueness of Western Civilization* (Leiden, Brill, 2011), 486; emphasis in text; the inner quote is from philosopher David Hume.
- [745] *Ibid.*, 481.
- [746] Barbara Oakley, Ariel Knafo, Curuprasad Madhavan, and David Sloan Wilson (eds.), *Pathological Altruism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); see Ch. 8.
- [747] *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2000), 722.
- [748] Thomas A. Widiger and Jennifer Ruth Presnall, “Pathological Altruism and Personality Disorder,” in Barbara Oakley, Ariel Knafo, Curuprasad Madhavan, and David Sloan Wilson (eds.), *Pathological Altruism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012): 85–93.
- [749] Kevin MacDonald, “Evolution, the Five Factor Model, and Levels of Personality,” *Journal of Personality* 63 (1995): 525–567.
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^[751] James Ramsey, *An Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the British Sugar Colonies* (London: James Phillips, 1784), 2–3.

http://books.google.com/books?id=Zf9AAAAcAAJ&pg=PR1&source=gbv_selected_pages&cad=3#v=onepage&q&f=false

^[752] Thomas Clarkson, *Abolition of the African Slave-Trade by the British Parliament*, Vol. 1 (Augusta, GA: P. A. Brinsmade, 1830), 24.

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^[753] MacDonald, “Effortful Control, Explicit Processing, and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions.”

^[754] *Ibid.*

^[755] See review in *Ibid.*

^[756] William A. Cunningham et al., “Separable Neural Components in the Processing of Black and White faces,” *Psychological Science* 15 (2004): 806–813.

^[757] Alan G. Sanfey, Reid Hastie, Mary K. Colvin, and Jordan Grafman, “Phineas Gauged: Decision-making and the Human Prefrontal Cortex,” *Neuropsychologia* 41 (2003): 1218–1229.

^[758] Joshua D. Greene et al., “Pushing Moral Buttons: The Interaction between Personal Force and Intention in Moral Judgment,” *Cognition* 111, no. 3 (2009): 364–371.

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^[764] Kevin MacDonald, “Evolution, Psychology, and a Conflict Theory of Culture,” *Evolutionary Psychology* 7, no. 2 (2009): 208–233.

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^[768] *Ibid.*, 131.

^[769] Mary Gwladys Jones, *The Charity School Movement: A Study of Eighteenth Century Puritanism in Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938).

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^[771] David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1739–1740), Book III, Pt. 3, Sect. 6.

^[772] *Ibid.*, Sect. I, Pt. 3.

^[773] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), Bk. III, Pt. 3, Sect.1.

^[774] Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Sect. IX, Pt. 1.

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^[776] Adam Smith, *A Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), Pt. I, Sect. 1, Ch. 1.

^[777] MacDonald, “Effortful Control, Explicit Processing, and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions.”

^[778] Smith, *A Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Pt. I, Sect. 1, Ch. 5.

^[779] *Ibid.*, Pt. III, Ch. 2.

^[780] Brown, *Moral Capital*, 380.

^[781] In *Ibid.*, 115.

^[782] *Ibid.*, 48.

^[783] *Ibid.*, 98.

^[784] Himmelfarb, *The Roads to Modernity*, 234.

^[785] Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 366.

^[786] In *Ibid.*, 88.

^[787] In *Ibid.*, 91.

^[788] In *Ibid.*, 313.

^[789] *Ibid.*, 128.

^[790] *Ibid.*, 190.

^[791] In *Ibid.*, 366.

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^[793] Brown, *Moral Capital*, 23.

^[794] In Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 128–129.

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^[796] *Ibid.*, 307.

^[797] Brown, *Moral Capital*, 37–38; emphasis in original.

^[798] *Ibid.*, 49.

^[799] *Ibid.*, 106–153.

^[800] *Ibid.*, 437.

^[801] Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 45.

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^[803] In *Ibid.*, 175; emphasis in text.

^[804] In *Ibid.*, 199.

^[805] *Ibid.*, 179–180.

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^[807] Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 91.

^[808] Brown, *Moral Capital*, 78.

^[809] *Ibid.*, 405.

^[810] *Ibid.*, 391.

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^[812] *Ibid.*, 430.

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^[814] Maurice Jackson, *Let This Voice be Heard: Anthony Benezet, Father of Atlantic Abolitionism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

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^[816] Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 78.

^[817] Brown, *Moral Capital*, 424.

^[818] *Ibid.*, 424.

^[819] *Ibid.*, 429.

^[820] Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 327.

^[821] *Ibid.*, 77.

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^[823] *Ibid.*, 425.

^[824] Hochschild, *Bury the Chains*, 108.

^[825] *Ibid.*, 127.

^[826] Brooke Palmieri, "The Wild, the Innocent, and the Quaker's Struggles," *The Appendix* (August 21, 2014).

<http://theappendix.net/issues/2014/7/the-wild-the-innocent-and-the-quakers-struggles>

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^[828] Brown, *Moral Capital*, 88–89.

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^[832] *Ibid.*, 349.

^[833] *Ibid.*, 66.

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^[836] In *Ibid.*, 369,

^[837] Ramsey, *An Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the British Sugar Colonies*, 67.

^[838] *Ibid.*, 70.

^[839] *Ibid.*, 74–75.

^[840] *Ibid.*, 3.

^[841] *Ibid.*, 4.

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^[843] *Ibid.*, 352.

^[844] *Ibid.*, 357.

^[845] *Ibid.*, 387.

^[846] *Ibid.*

^[847] *Ibid.*, 388,

^[848] Tombs, *The English and Their History*, 459–460.

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^[850] *Ibid.*, 123.

^[851] In *Ibid.*, 129.

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[id=iTdcAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false](http://books.google.com/books?id=iTdcAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false)

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^[864] *Ibid.*

^[865] *Ibid.*, 7.

^[866] *Ibid.*, 8

^[867] *Ibid.*, 10.

^[868] Andrew Joyce, “The 1865 Morant Bay Rebellion: Race and White Pathology at the Height of the British Empire,” *The Occidental Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (Summer, 2013): 15–38.

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<http://www.everyculture.com/Ja-Ma/Jamaica.html>

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Recently, the results of the IAT showing that people higher on the IAT are more likely to engage in discrimination have been called into question. However, these findings do not reflect on studies that do not focus on discrimination; nor do they affect studies based on brain scans.

For a good summary of the controversies surrounding the IAT, see Jesse Singal, “Psychology’s Racism-Measuring Tool Isn’t Up to the Job,” *The Cut* (January, 2017).

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Margo J. Monteith, Leslie Ashburn-Nardo, Corrine I. Voils, and Alexander M. Czopp. “Putting the

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^[987] *Ibid.*, 141.

Wright’s book was published in 2002. Since then, the Confederate flag has been less in evidence and there have been efforts to minimize its presence. In 2015 Brian France, Chairman of NASCAR, called the flag an “offensive symbol,” and asked, but did not require, that it not be shown. Some well-known drivers have discouraged it. In 2019 NASCAR rejected an ad for a semiautomatic rifle. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that NASCAR is any less an implicit White community.

Mike Hembree, “NASCAR Fans: Confederate Flag Still Important Symbol,” *USA Today* (August 8, 2017).

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The reason perhaps is that scientific communities in the hard sciences (but not in many of the social sciences) are not moral communities. Dissenters may be treated as eccentric or none-too-smart, but they are not vilified as moral reprobates.

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Moreover, until quite recently with the rise of the intellectual left in areas such as IQ and race differences, scientific areas have not been analysable as moral communities, so that people were free to disagree without dire consequences to their reputation either by being automatically impugned as incompetent or as a moral reprobate. Dissenters may be treated as eccentric or none-too-smart, but they are not vilified as evil.

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